Fundamentals and factors of deployment in the United States in 1913-1917 Naval construction

Usatiuk Dmitrii PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of History, N. F. Katanov Khakassky State University  655017, Russia, Republic of Khakassia, Abakan, Lenin str., 92/1, office 310 sibdims@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The First World War became one of the important stages in the history of the United States of America, when they made a serious attempt to take a leading position in global politics, relying on significantly increased economic opportunities and having formed a powerful military potential.

At the beginning of the XX century . The United States had a small land army and a relatively small and modernizing fleet, which significantly limited its foreign policy capabilities, making the United States a regional power. Under these conditions, the United States faces the task of retaining new territories acquired as a result of expansion at the turn of the century, and achieved political and economic positions in the Western Hemisphere, ensuring American interests in other parts of the world, which required considerable efforts and resources. Therefore, it was believed that cooperation with Britain could help the United States protect its possessions and interests abroad ^{[7, p. 74]}.

The development of events in Europe, associated with the aggravation of the bloc confrontation, also determined a lot for the United States. In many ways, the American position towards Europe was still viewed through the prism of "special relations" with Great Britain, which led to a rapprochement of the positions of the two countries on many international issues, despite the existence of contradictions between them. Although the United States did not have a formal treaty with Great Britain, apparently, there was still a perception of a certain positive role of the British navy for the development of the United States - as a deterrent against plans for possible naval operations of the German fleet in North America at the beginning of the century.

After taking office as US President W. Wilson (March 4, 1913), his administration began to adjust its foreign policy, focusing on achieving parity with Great Britain in all spheres of international relations and on forming the basis for strengthening its influence both in certain regions of the world and globally.

If the United States was already noticeably superior to Great Britain in economic terms, then in terms of capabilities, British positions, unlike American ones, still relied on naval hegemony and dominance in the field of maritime trade. The naval strategy of the United States, which was formed by the Wilson administration before the war, although it assumed a weakening of the British naval superiority in relation to the American fleet, but the English fleet was not considered as a threat to the United States or to American interests.

Serious concerns in the United States were caused by the military activity of Germany, which, having outstripped Great Britain in terms of industrial development and ranking second after the United States in this indicator, decided to challenge the maritime sovereignty of Great Britain. A certain anxiety was also associated with the strengthening of Japan 's position in the Pacific as a result of

With the arrival of President W. Wilson in the White House, naval construction intensified taking into account a new look at foreign policy, which assumed increased attention to the processes in Europe, although still within the framework of a defensive concept.

Washington followed the construction of both the German and British fleets with some apprehension, and, not wanting to change the balance of forces by weakening the positions of its own fleet, before the war they spoke in favor of limiting the naval arms race. However, demonstrating support for the British proposal that provided for the suspension of the build-up of naval weapons – the adoption by Great Britain and Germany of a moratorium on the construction of new ships ("sea holidays"), the United States itself continued to build up the Navy, as it sought naval parity with Germany (to repel potential German aggression in the Western Hemisphere) and decisive superiority over Japan, feeling the weakness of its navy and strategic positions in the Pacific (especially given the withdrawal of the main forces of Great Britain to the mother country).

The amount of expenses for the construction of ships of the American Navy in 1914, provided for by the law on appropriations for the naval service of 1913, increased in relation to the funds allocated for 1913 by more than 70% ^{[4, P.94]}. In 1914, compared with 1912, the number of battleships changed from 30 up to 34 units, cruisers – from 25 to 28 units, the number of destroyers increased significantly – from 36 to 50 units, and an even greater increase occurred in the number of submarines – from 17 to 36 units ^[18].

Such a significant increase in the financing of naval construction, carried out in 1913, was associated not only with a quantitative increase in the fleet, but also with plans for its development, taking into account the main trends in the naval sphere. In the framework of the implementation of these plans, since 1914, the military-technical modernization of the fleet has been carried out through the construction of ships that meet modern requirements ^{[4, p. 93]}.

The transition of the bloc confrontation in Europe to the military phase in 1914 required the US leadership to develop a strategy of action taking into account national interests and the development of the situation during the First World War.

August 4, 1914. The United States declared neutrality. However, the scale of the European conflict made it impossible and undesirable for the United States, as a power claiming a significant place in the world system, to be completely detached from it. At the same time, the Wilson administration had to take into account the absence of a decisive instrument of influence on the course and outcome of the conflict – powerful armed forces. The assessment of the war as a whole, the positions and actions of the parties to the conflict, as well as the course of the war itself determined the evolution of President W. Wilson's foreign policy. However, at the initial stage of the war, the dominant socio-political sentiments restrained this evolution and, accordingly, the change in military policy.

In 1915, the construction of 3 battleships, 6 destroyers, 16 (or more) submarines was planned as part of an increase of 15% compared to the previous year in the amount of expenses for the construction of fleet vessels provided for by the law on appropriations for Naval Service of 1914 ^{[4, p. 94]}.

Although American neutrality since mid-1915 was inherently "benevolent" towards Great Britain, the United States sought to maintain its position in trade and economic rivalry with Great Britain, preventing it from seizing control over maritime trade communications and restrictions imposed on American trade with Europe. The United States assessed the blockade restrictive actions of Great Britain not only as a military necessity, but also as a continuation of the struggle for economic positions and world market shares, but already using the military factor. Therefore, Wilson and his administration, along with concern about the prospect of a German victory, there was also a fear of a crushing victory for Great Britain and its allies, because as a result of such an outcome of the war, England and its allied countries would have enormous military power and economic potential of the whole of Europe, which would inevitably affect the post-war settlement.      Reflecting these concerns, Presidential adviser E. House noted that the British "naval colossus is now in rapid motion, and ... if the war lasts another six months, then England will have a fleet superior to all the other fleets of the world combined. We Americans should think about it..." ^{[1, p. 152]}.

However, soon the Anglo-American contradictions were pushed into the background by the events of May 7, 1915, when a German submarine sank the English ocean steamer Lusitania and 128 Americans were killed. It became obvious for the Wilson administration to abandon attempts to restore the pre-war status quo on the basis of a compromise between Britain and Germany and move to a more substantial involvement in the European conflict. Already on May 9, E. House said in a telegram to Wilson: "We can no longer remain neutral observers" ^{[1, p.193]}.

On May 17-18, 1915, President Wilson and Secretary of the Navy J. Daniels conducted a review of the US Atlantic Fleet in New York Harbor, which consisted of 64 ships (including 16 battleships), grouped after months of training and target shooting ^{[4, p. 13]}.

As part of the continued defensive strategy for the development of the Navy, the Law on Appropriations for Naval Service of 1915 planned the construction in 1916 of 2 battleships, 6 destroyers, 2 ocean submarines (a new type of vessel with a displacement of more than 1,000 tons), 16 coastal defense submarines and 1 tanker vessel (for the transportation of petroleum products) ^{[4, p. 94]}.

Against this background, in the United States in 1915, there was an expansion and intensification of the socio-political campaign of "military readiness" aimed at strengthening the country's military power. Among the supporters of the movement, such authoritative figures as Senator G. Lodge, ex-President T. Roosevelt, General L. Wood stood out, who considered the measures taken by the Wilson administration for the development of the fleet insufficient. They advocated the immediate creation of strong naval and land forces for defensive purposes against the threat of "German militarism", and later began to designate the need for US participation in deciding the outcome of the war ^{[6, p. 46; 14, p. 67-68]}.

Wilson initially had to resist the demands of the readiness movement for a significant increase in the armed forces and the strengthening of the navy, because there was a strong opposition in the Democratic Party to the ideas of this movement, led by Secretary of State W. J. Bryan (held office until June 9, 1915) and supported by a number of prominent politicians. The Democrats, who had full control over the 63rd Congress, even tried to cut the military budget. The Democrats saw an electoral background in the "readiness" movement – in terms of the activity of potential Republican presidential candidates (T. Roosevelt and L. Wood).

Nevertheless, since the middle of 1915, the US government began to turn towards a campaign of "military readiness", which was a reaction to the changing military situation in Europe both due to the intensification of the German submarine war and, to a certain extent, due to disagreements in relations with Britain.

President Wilson noted that he considers obsolete the provision that "only one nation should rule the sea" and is convinced that "every combat-ready nation should strive to become the mistress of the seas" ^{[9, p. 367]}. Therefore, he instructed the Secretary of the Navy, J. Daniels to develop a "reasonable and compliant maritime program for presentation to Congress" ^{[9, p. 326]}. On this basis, in October 1915, at the request of J. In the General Council of the Navy, the development of a naval construction program with an eye to the future of American naval power began.

The involvement of the US government in the "military readiness" campaign unfolding in the country, aimed at significantly increasing the armed forces and strengthening the navy, was dictated by the desire to ensure reliable defense capability of the United States in the face of the German threat and to provide the country with a weighty argument in discussions with Britain, both on bilateral issues and on the issue of European settlement.

Therefore, the idea of creating a "fleet that is not inferior to any other", which arose, along with other factors, as a result of the Anglo-American rivalry on the issue of "freedom of the seas", acquired, in addition to the officially designated anti-German, and a certain anti–English orientation - to ensure the possibility of forcing it to take into account the position and interests of the United States. Against the background of the full-scale orientation of American capital to trade with Britain and its allies, which brought huge profits, British "arbitrariness" was perceived as evidence of Britain's aspirations in the economic sphere and a certain demonstration of its position and role in the world economy and trade. As noted by the American researcher Ch . Seymour, "allied management at sea hurt not so much our pocket as our pride" ^{[15, p. 8]}.

The government program to strengthen the naval power of the United States was signed by the President on October 15, 1915. It provided for spending almost $502.5 million on the construction of the fleet over five years. For these allocations, it was planned to build 10 battleships (dreadnoughts), 6 battlecruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers and 100 (15 submarines of the fleet (ocean) and 85 coastal - for coastal use) ^{[4, p. 5]}.

On December 7, 1915, in his annual message to Congress, which was radically different from the pacifist message of 1914, the president, having outlined plans for ensuring national defense, in fact, initiated the official recognition of "military readiness". Presenting the government's naval construction program to Congress, Wilson described it as "necessary first steps" not only to ensure its independence from external aggression, but also "to be prepared to play a great role in the world, and especially in this hemisphere..." ^{[3, p. IX-XXIV]}.

 In parallel with the current construction of the fleet, its organizational development was also carried out – in 1915, the post of Chief of Naval Operations (Chief of Naval Staff) was established, who was responsible for "the functioning of the fleet and its readiness for war" - drawing up plans for the use of the fleet in war and ensuring the readiness of their implementation, the US Navy reserve was created and the Naval Advisory Council (focused on attracting leading scientists and engineers and industrialists to the development of the fleet). An action plan was being developed for the large-scale expansion of the main Navy shipyards, their modernization to increase the fleet and introduce the latest technologies.

Since the beginning of 1916, despite the fact that, as part of the unfolding election campaign, Wilson advocated the preservation of neutrality and his slogan was "He saved us from war", the president had already openly voiced the idea of creating a powerful navy capable of solving significant combat tasks ^{[10, p. 17]}.

At the same time, since the discussion in Congress of the government bill on the development of the fleet was accompanied by a serious discussion, it was stated that it was not aimed at preparing the United States to enter this war, but rather at guaranteeing the security of the United States in a deteriorating situation in the world.

On this basis, the management of the current fleet was also improved. After the aggravation of relations with Germany due to the attack of a German submarine on the passenger steamer "Sussex", the naval leadership made preparations for the mobilization of the fleet. On April 27, 1916, the chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W. Benson, sent a memorandum to the command staff of the fleet with a detailed description of the steps to be taken when receiving the mobilization order, in May an inspection of the operational communication system of the naval command with the fleet ships was carried out ^{[10, p. 9-10]}.

On August 29, 1916, Congress passed the law on appropriations for the development of the Navy on the basis of the program proposed by the government, reducing its implementation period from five to three years and leaving the volume of construction at almost the same level.

The three–year program determined the financing of the construction of 157 vessels - 144 warships with the best tactical and technical characteristics: ten first–class battleships (dreadnought type), six heavy (armored) battlecruisers - larger and faster than all existing at that time, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, nine submarines of the fleet (ocean), fifty-eight coastal submarines (coastal defense) and one Neff type (equipped with a Neff underwater propulsion system), as well as 13 auxiliary and support vessels ^{[17, p. 616-617]}.

The priority of battleships and battlecruisers betrayed the offensive nature of the fleet rearmament program, and was a direct challenge to England. Secretary of the Navy J. Daniels, describing the program adopted by Congress, noted that its implementation "will make the US Navy stronger than the English" ^{[9, p. 376]}. Wilson, assessing the current international situation and the problems of relations with England, noted even more specifically: "Let's build a fleet stronger than England's and do what we want" ^{[2, p. 241]}.

To begin the forced increase in the size of the Navy, more than $ 139 million was allocated from the total expenditures of the three-year program for the 1917 fiscal year, which was 3 times higher than the expenditures of the previous year and became the largest amount ever allocated for naval purposes in peacetime. To implement the program, funds were allocated to ensure the functioning and development of shipyards and other necessary naval infrastructure, to create a system for providing the fleet with the necessary equipment, ammunition, etc. The law provided for the creation of a naval flight corps consisting of 150 officers and 350 conscripts, the development of naval aviation.

The total financing of the Navy for the 1917 fiscal year exceeded $ 312.6 million, which more than doubled the total expenditures of the 1916 fiscal year ^{[5, p. 92-93]}. Taking into account the scale of the increase in the fleet, its regular military personnel also increased significantly – up to more than 100,000 people of emergency (mobilization) strength. The Naval Reserve, created in 1915, was transformed into a naval reserve force of unlimited strength ^{[10, p. 13]}.

As part of the appropriations for the construction of naval vessels in 1917, provided for by the Law of August 29, 1916, it was planned to build 66 vessels from the list of the three-year program – 4 battleships, 4 battlecruisers, 4 scout cruisers, 20 destroyers, 31 submarines and 4 auxiliary and support vessels ^{[4, p. 93]}.

As noted by the Minister of the Navy, J. Daniels: "before the end of 1916, we started implementing the largest shipbuilding program ever carried out by any navy..." ^{[10, p. 13]}. During 1916, 4 new battleships, 4 destroyers and 7 submarines entered service. By the end of 1916, the American Navy had 36 battleships, 30 cruisers, 61 destroyers and 44 submarines ^[18].

Thus, in 1916 there was a transition of the campaign of "military readiness" into the category of issues of national importance, the departure of the United States from the traditional policy in the field of national security began to be legislated. In fact, the United States began to purposefully prepare for possible participation in the war and for a post-war settlement. This marked a turn towards the correlation of peacekeeping projects and military efforts, especially taking into account plans for the formation of a new world order.

On February 3, 1917, it was announced that the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Germany. The United States has moved to a state of "armed neutrality."

On April 6, the US Congress supported the president's demand by a majority vote and declared war on Germany. The Navy was placed under martial law, and the U.S. Coast Guard automatically became part of the Navy Department.

However, on April 6, direct hostilities between the United States and Germany did not begin, and the US military leadership did not have a well-developed military plan and, as a result, the head of the naval staff, Admiral V.S. Benson, defined the task of the American fleet by patrolling the Atlantic Ocean near the American coast and observing Japan, which was now a US ally in the anti-German coalition ^{[16, p. 388]}. Despite the fact that the strategic goals and objectives by the time the United States entered the war had already been largely determined by the political leadership of the country, the American naval forces were focused on ensuring the immediate security of the country.

According to American researchers J. Greenville and J. From 1914 to February 1917, the General Council of the Navy was preparing not for possible participation in the current war, but for the war that could follow it (i.e., for a possible war with the victor in Europe) ^{[11, p. 326]}.

American military plans until April 1917 did not envisage joining forces with Britain and its allies at sea, because, at the political level, the deterrent circumstance was President Wilson's very serious perception of disagreements with Britain regarding the ultimate goals of the war and the conditions of peace. The President also considered it necessary to avoid serious losses in the army and navy, since the armed forces were considered by him as an important factor in influencing the post-war peace settlement in the direction that meets the interests of the United States.

As of April 1917, the American Navy had 361 vessels: twelve first-line battleships, twenty-five second-line battleships, nine armored cruisers, twenty-four other cruisers, seven monitors, fifty destroyers, sixteen coastal torpedo ships, seventeen torpedo boats, forty-four submarines, eight tenders for torpedo boats, twenty-eight gunboats, four transports, four supply vessels, one hospital vessel, twenty-one fuel vessels, fourteen converted yachts, forty-nine tugs and twenty-eight small vessels ^{[13, p. 484]}.

However, despite the large-scale program of naval construction adopted in 1916, the American Navy was neither technically, nor human, nor organizationally, nor tactically prepared for direct participation in the war - the program of accelerated and multifaceted development of the fleet had just begun to be implemented, and the fleet management could not fully assess the realities of the ongoing military confrontation and the nature of the participation of the American fleet in it. During the post-war hearings in the Senate, Admiral W. Sims criticized the readiness of the American Navy for war, blaming the Secretary of the Navy personally for this. Daniels ^{[8, p. 364]}. According to W. Sims, "in April 1917, only ten percent of the Navy's warships were fully manned; 43% of the sailors were missing from the rest. Only a third of the ships were fully ready. There were few light anti-submarine ships, as if no one noticed the submarine factor, which had been the focus of foreign policy for two years" ^{[12, p. 479-481]}.

The circumstances and the nature of the development of the military situation led the American leadership after the United States entered the war to the need for close naval cooperation with the allies, making the most important tasks of the American fleet countering German submarines and escorting transport convoys.  This led to the suspension of the implementation of the naval development program adopted in 1916, in terms of the construction of battleships, which were a symbol of naval power, and the concentration of efforts on the accelerated construction of destroyers, anti-mine vessels (minesweepers), submarines, patrol vessels.

Outlining the fundamentals of the strategy of the American leadership regarding the role of naval power as a factor of ensuring national interests in the context of global foreign policy objectives, it is necessary, first of all, to note the serious changes in the international situation that coincided with the coming to power of the Wilson administration, which opened up new opportunities and prospects for the activities of the United States in the international arena. As the US leadership increasingly confidently defined itself as one of the architects and pillars of the new system of international relations, the United States needed to have a reliable basis for pursuing the desired policy and, above all, with regard to Great Britain, which was an important element for building this new system. In this context, the presence of a "powerful American military force" has become increasingly important. The US leadership considered it necessary to demonstrate the capabilities of the United States to realize and defend its interests at the interstate and international level through the modernization and development of the fleet.

The consequence of this was the official recognition of the "military readiness" campaign, formally aimed at strengthening the country's military power to provide defense against the threat of "German militarism", but, in fact, focused on the active participation of the United States in deciding the outcome of the war. Measures to increase the navy accompanied the transformation of American neutrality and the departure from it to participate in the war. The scale of naval construction was not based on specific plans for the use of the Navy, but was aimed at defending the interests of the United States in the conditions of war and post-war settlement. An important factor in the dynamics of the development of the fleet was the high economic potential of the United States, which allowed significant resources to be directed not only to the construction of ships, but also to the development of the fleet infrastructure. However, the construction of the fleet, which involved the development and modernization of the material and technical base of shipbuilding, was complicated by the absence in the United States of a state military-industrial complex that would work for the needs of the army and navy on a non-commercial basis. The restructuring of the organizational structure and management of the Navy, necessary for the expansion and development of the fleet, also required time to debug processes. As a result, by the time the United States entered the war against Germany in 1917, the role of the Navy in the implementation of foreign policy tasks was determined, but the goals of quantitative and qualitative state of the US Navy for real influence on the resolution of the conflict were not achieved.