Secret diplomacy of the US President T. Roosevelt during the Peace Conference in Portsmouth (August 1905)

Baibakova Larisa Vilorovna Doctor of History Professor, Section of Modern and Contemporary History, History Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University 119192, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Lomonosovskii Prospekt, 27 korpus 4, kab. G-421 larisa.baybakova@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The eve of the 120th anniversary of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 serves as an occasion to once again turn to the analysis of its poorly studied aspects. This topic requires a multifactorial analysis, which highlights global, regional and country?specific aspects, within which the state of the warring powers at the front and in the rear is studied, and when considering the complex intertwined complex of international relations, the role of East Asia as a special sub-regional subsystem in the structure of global political and economic relations. The internationalization of world economic relations caused by the first wave of globalization that began at the end of the nineteenth century largely explains why the Russo-Japanese war began with the Japanese attack on Port Arthur, which was the base of the Imperial Russian Navy in northern China, and ended with the signing of a peace treaty not in Japanese Shimonoseki or Russian St. Petersburg, but in an American town Portsmouth.

In this case, following the principle of consistency, which is the most optimal for studying international conflicts, it is necessary to identify changes in the qualitative state of its components, which reveals "close intertwining in the objective reality of the common, special and singular", taking into account that the elements themselves retain a certain independence ^{[1, p. 175]}. That is why, in order to recreate the integrity of the picture of the relations between the states involved in the settlement of the Russian-Japanese conflict in the Asian space, close cooperation is necessary, both international historians and regional scientists considering the complex dialectic of these objective and subjective interests, not excluding possible alternative development options. For Americanists, out of the entire complex set of aspects of this issue, the priority is to consider the specifics of the diplomacy of the President of the United States. Roosevelt during the preparation and holding of the peace conference in Portsmouth. Having offered assistance to the conflicting parties in search of a mutual compromise, he sought, through skillful maneuvering, to prevent the excessive strengthening of the great powers in crisis regions of the world, believing that the United States, which had reached an unprecedented level of economic power by the beginning of the twentieth century, could themselves count on obtaining an appropriate share of influence on the world stage. The true goal of the politician was to achieve world domination under the plausible pretext of providing peacekeeping services.

In American literature, the techniques used by Roosevelt to achieve his goals were called "personal" (personal) diplomacy, which assumed disproportionate activity in the foreign policy sphere, bypassing traditional bureaucratic structures. The fact is that he made all political decisions unanimously, without coordination with the Cabinet of Ministers, the State Department, Congress and diplomatic services. In many ways, this happened by chance: Secretary of State J. Hay, who was responsible for policy in the Asia-Pacific region, died on July 1, 1905 in the midst of the armed confrontation between Russia and Japan. Left without a close associate, Roosevelt was forced to discuss the details of the preparation and conduct of peace negotiations exclusively with a narrow circle of like-minded people (influential Senator G. K. Lodge and diplomat G. White, appointed ambassador to Italy in March 1905). The deliberate concealment of the details of his foreign policy activities from the government, not to mention the media, allowed the politician to secretly conduct confidential negotiations outside the usual diplomatic framework, realizing that multi-step decision-making by a huge staff of bureaucracy could cause their duration in time and obvious dependence on the dynamic international situation.

Due to a number of foreign policy factors, including the confrontation of the great powers in the territorial division of the world, Roosevelt's role in ending the Russian-Japanese war is assessed ambiguously. The disclosure of the secret thoughts underlying his "imaginary" peacemaking was repeatedly made by Soviet scientists who claimed that the purpose of the politician was, on the one hand, to prevent the expansion of Russia's influence in China, and on the other, "not to let Japan be robbed" ^{[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]}. In the works of modern authors, the emphasis is more on the pragmatism of a politician who deliberately went beyond neutral mediation, since he "needed not just peace, but an outcome that would meet the geopolitical interests of the United States in East Asia" ^{[7, 8, 9, 10]}.

In American literature, regardless of the interpretation of one or another historiographical school, President Roosevelt is depicted as a peacemaker, without whose mediation reconciliation of the warring countries would be impossible ^{[11, 12, 13, 14, 15]}. Thus, R. Pipes, speaking about his "outstanding contribution" to the end of the Russian-Japanese war, argued that "if it were not for him, the negotiations in Portsmouth would probably have failed, and the war would have continued for many more months" ^{[16, p.103-115]}. Ordinary Americans were delighted with Roosevelt's mediation, and at the call of the New Herald newspaper, they raised funds to create a "bronze group to perpetuate his peacekeeping activities during the Portsmouth negotiations" ^{[17, l. 77]}. The politician himself was proud that he "did not suffer the usual fate of peacekeepers – to incur the discontent of both sides" ^{[18, l. 32]}.

To understand the validity of various assessments of President Roosevelt's mediation mission, it is worth referring to the materials of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), which contains about 20 cases in which the mechanism of his "good offices" is analyzed in detail. The author's article, written more than a decade ago, discussed the role of a politician in developing preconditions for negotiations between Russia and Japan (obtaining the status of an official mediator and the consent of the warring parties to choose the place and time of their holding) ^{[19, pp. 3-41]}. This work is devoted to the analysis of Roosevelt's mediation mission during the peace conference itself in order to show the full range of various diplomatic means used by him to achieve his goals. It is extremely important to understand all its details, since the current level of world order is unthinkable without taking into account the accumulated experience of peaceful settlement of regional conflicts.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the phenomenon of peacemaking was one of the weakly demanded norms of international law, since States preferred to resolve controversial issues by armed rather than peaceful means. The ways to reconcile the conflicting parties provided for by the Hague Convention of 1899 "on the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflicts" encountered limited accumulated potential in reaching a compromise, and many of its forms (negotiations, arbitration and international arbitration) were rarely used. Such difficulties were caused by the fact that not every politician could and wanted to offer their help to the warring parties, subjective factors were of great importance ? the personality of the person himself, his competence in international affairs, his understanding of the goals of the negotiation process and, based on this, finding a field of overlapping interests for the participants. And although all these qualities were objectively inherent in Roosevelt, they did not become his motive. His mediation represented a kind of attempt to enter world politics from the "back door", while receiving undoubted economic and political dividends.

Roosevelt's pacifism, which went down in history with the militant aphorism "speak softly, but keep a big club ready," was explained not by an abstract commitment to peacefulness, but by a very pragmatic goal – to assert the status of the United States as a world power in the context of the intensified rivalry of European countries in the struggle for sources of raw materials and markets. If before him, politicians, acting in line with the Monroe doctrine, considered American interests to be purely "continental", then Roosevelt was one of the first to declare the need to push the boundaries of expansion and engage in the development of the Asia-Pacific region. And since the country's armed forces, being in a state of modernization after the Spanish-American War of 1898, were unable to compete with the leading armies of Europe, the president preferred preventive diplomacy.

Roosevelt analyzed the situation in crisis regions of the world in the context of the theory of the "balance of power" formulated by him. The course of his reasoning, sustained in the spirit of social Darwinism, was as follows: foreign policy relations are an arena of struggle between various states, in which the strongest wins, therefore the natural order in the world, regulated by force, finds expression in the distribution of spheres of influence between the main players in world politics. And if we follow his theory, then to equalize the positions of geopolitical competitors in East Asia, it was necessary, on the one hand, to prevent the obvious strengthening of Russia, and on the other, to use Japan as a counterweight, which boldly challenged a huge empire. Having concluded the US-China trade agreement on exclusive privileges in Manchuria in October 1903, the White House was playing a double game, secretly supporting Japan, but at the same time trying to moderate its geopolitical appetites in the region of interest. Roosevelt did not think about excluding Russia from the balance of power system, because according to the maxims of diplomacy, its weakening would replace the Russian threat with a Japanese one, which the United States clearly did not want. In an interview with the tsarist Ambassador R. R. Rosen, he argued that "Japan, not Russia, remains the main rival of the United States in terms of trade and industry, and therefore the excessive strengthening of Japan, thus, cannot correspond to American interests" ^{[20, L. 3]}. However, Roosevelt was often hampered by emotions when implementing his own pragmatic formula. According to State Secretary S. Y. Witte, "he wanted peace, but as beneficial as possible for the Japanese" ^{[21, p. 491]}.

But how should the situation in the Asia-Pacific region be adjusted according to one's own vision? The only option for Roosevelt was mediation in the Russian-Japanese war, but this required the belligerent countries to appeal to him. Japan was the first to secretly request his diplomatic assistance in the summer of 1904. France's mediation was considered preferable for Russia, although "good offices" were offered to it by the English King Edward VII and the German Emperor Wilhelm II. The "overseas" initiative was radically rejected by the ruling elite of Russia, who believed that "it is not in our interests to allow such a dangerous intermediary as America to the Far East" ^{[22, L. 45]}. At the cost of incredible efforts in May 1905 Roosevelt nevertheless obtained Nicholas II's consent to mediation, but on condition that Japan made a similar decision. Without even informing the Japanese about the outcome of the negotiations, Roosevelt immediately informed St. Petersburg about the alleged consent of Mikado Mutsuhito ^{[23, p. 1221-1223]}. The settlement of the Far Eastern conflict has entered a decisive phase. The United States was chosen as the place of peace talks.

The Russian delegation, headed by State Secretary S. Y. Witte, sailed for New York on July 14 (27), where the Japanese commissioners had left the day before. On the same day, all the newspapers of St. Petersburg made headlines with the message that representatives of the tsarist government had gone "to America to conclude our peace with Japan in a city full of anger and hatred towards Russia" ^{[17, l. 8]}. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Japanese captured the southern part of Sakhalin at the end of July, perceived by the emperor as an attempt on the integrity of the Russian Empire. Before the delegation left for Washington, Nicholas II wrote a letter to Roosevelt, in which he expressed confidence that he would "do everything within his competence to satisfactorily complete the peace negotiations" ^{[24, L. 69]}. The president himself was not sure of the success of the planned event, although he claimed that he "did everything he could. I brought the horses to the watering place, but only God knows if they will drink water or start kicking each other ^{[25, p. 398]}.

It becomes clear from various sources that Roosevelt initially stated the "irreconcilable opposite" of the positions of the warring countries ^{[21, p. 478]}. Under the influence of Japan's military successes and the defeats of the Russian army, he became convinced that the achievement of a truce was possible solely due to territorial losses on the part of Russia. According to him, "Japan's triumph is complete and overwhelming, therefore it is given the right to demand very significant concessions as the price for signing peace" ^{[23, p. 1253]}. In the president's imagination, two scenarios were drawn for the development of events ? either the Japanese capture of the entire Pacific coast, or their firm consolidation in Manchuria and Korea. As for Russia, it was apparently expected to "conclude peace as soon as possible, at least on difficult terms," since, otherwise, it could have lost all of Siberia due to the completely hopeless situation in the theater of military operations ^{[26, p.188]}. However, Roosevelt missed one important detail in his calculations: Japan was far from the final victory, and Russia did not lose the war.

The new Russian ambassador, R.R. Rosen, who arrived in New York, who had previously been envoy to Tokyo (1897-1899), was immediately received by Roosevelt at the summer residence located on the shore of Oyster Bay in the village of Oyster Bay. In an effort to create an exaggerated idea of the ability of the Japanese army to conduct offensive operations in the tsarist ambassador, the politician deliberately misled him about the unlimited resources of the enemy. Thus, during the discussion of the future agenda of the negotiations, Roosevelt stated that he did not know anything about the conditions that the Japanese were ready to present to the Russian delegation, but he was doing his best to "persuade them to moderation in their demands" ^{[27, L. 4]}. Rosen didn't believe him. Having maintained ties with a number of Japanese officials, he knew first-hand that Japan at that time did not have "any means that would give it the opportunity to force Russia to conclude peace and pay military indemnity if Russia preferred to evade this and decided to continue, at least passive resistance. Meanwhile, only the early consolidation of the successes already achieved by the peace treaty and the addition of the burden of the enormous military costs already incurred by Japan on Russian shoulders could turn into a complete triumph of Japanese policy..." ^{[20, l. 4-5]}.

Of course, Roosevelt was lying, trying to misinform the tsarist ambassador. He knew the plans of the Japanese: he met three times in July, according to his work schedule, with the special envoy of the Japanese government, K. Tahakira, and once with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, K. Kaneko, a former fellow student at Harvard University. The focus of their attention was the elimination of territorial disputes in the Far East. The result of the consultations was the conclusion on July 27 between Japanese Prime Minister D. Katsura and W. Taft, who acted as President Roosevelt's personal representative, of an oral "gentleman's" agreement recognizing Japan's rights to Korea in exchange for guarantees of U.S. security in the Philippines. Thus, without any consultations with Russia, which was trying to protect the sovereignty of a neighboring small country, the fate of Korea was predetermined long before the final terms of the peace treaty were adopted ^{[28, pp. 113-134]}.

Before the arrival of the Russian delegation, Roosevelt met with Rosen again, realizing that any negotiations always begin with clarifying the positions of the conflicting parties and finding common ground between them. And although the president complained that the Japanese did not tell him about their plans, from the context of the two-hour conversation, the ambassador guessed "that he knows or considers it likely that the Japanese will insist on the cession of Sakhalin and on indemnity." From Japanese sources, he heard rumors not only about the desired amount of compensation of 1.2 billion yen, but also about the intention to present "directly their basic requirements and condition the continuation of negotiations on the preliminary acceptance of such" ^{[27, L. 61]}. "There is no doubt," Rosen telegraphed to St. Petersburg, "that in addition to satisfying national pride and territorial acquisitions, Japan, first of all, needs the opportunity to shoulder the burden of the enormous debt caused by the war on Russian shoulders." Saying goodbye to the ambassador, Roosevelt declared his readiness to meet with him again in an informal setting, as well as with Secretary of State Witte, who immediately after arriving in America was invited to "have breakfast with him easily" ^{[29, L. 2b]}.

Roosevelt was aware of the demands of the Russian delegation in advance. Secretary of State Witte, stopping in Paris, halfway to America, rejected the recommendations of the French to conclude peace on Japanese terms. He remembered the parting words made before his departure by Foreign Minister V. N. Lamsdorff, who claimed that "Russia is far from thinking of making peace, no matter what. Its best intentions may crumble if Japan, intoxicated with success, decides to put conditions in Portsmouth that are incompatible with its dignity as a great power" ^{[30, L. 56]}. Another instruction received by Witte during the sea voyage once again clarified two "completely unacceptable conditions" for the tsarist government regarding the inadmissibility of paying indemnity and the cession of Sakhalin ^{[27, l. 57]}. Confirming his readiness to follow the instructions received, the high-ranking official nevertheless noted the vulnerability of the position of the Russian delegation due to "the most unfavorable fact that Sakhalin is in the hands of the Japanese" ^{[27, l. 66]}.

Meanwhile, July 19th (August 1st) Witte, sailing to New York aboard the German steamer Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, gave an interview to foreign journalists. In it, he stated: "Yielding to the desire of the American people, of whom the President is the representative, the EMPEROR authorized me to come here in order to inquire about the conditions that our brave enemy considers necessary as the basis for international negotiations." Speaking about the upcoming agenda, Witte noted that "Japanese conditions must be clarified, weighed and recognized as acceptable before it is possible to begin formal negotiations"^{[31, l. 21]}. Thus, he hinted at a certain "red line" that could not be crossed. It was about excluding from the joint discussion the provisions on "1) the cession of any part of the Russian territory; 2) payment of military indemnity; 3) the withdrawal from our jurisdiction of the northern Manchurian railway leading to Vladivostok; 4) the destruction of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean" ^{[31, L. 6]}.

The interview of the chief Commissioner for negotiations with Japan made a sobering impression on the American public, confident that "Russia needs peace, at all costs, on any terms" ^{[20, L. 10]}. Having familiarized himself with the harsh position of the tsarist government, Roosevelt doubted the success of the upcoming negotiations. In a letter to the editor of the London Spectator newspaper He noted that "the chances of peace are unfavorable" ^{[25, p. 401]}. Before the arrival of the Russian delegation, he nevertheless tried to clarify the position of the Japanese by inviting Baron Komura to Oyster Bay on July 14 (27). He showed Roosevelt a list of requirements that completely satisfied him. He saw the only difficulty only in the conditions of receiving a military indemnity from Japan ^{[5, p. 357]}.

The Russian delegation arrived in New York a week later than the Japanese ? on July 20 (August 2). A day later, Witte, who was referred to in the American press as nothing less than "the tsar's messenger of peace," visited Roosevelt's country house. This informal meeting, which lasted about two hours, was important, first of all, for the president himself, who heard firsthand "a clear and categorical statement of the Russian point of view." Witte voiced its main provisions, stating that "1) we are not defeated, and therefore we cannot accept any conditions that do not correspond to our position, and, therefore, first of all, we will not agree to any indemnity; 2) Great Russia will never agree to any conditions, those who offended honor... and if the Japanese do not now take our point of view, then we will wage a defensive war to the last extreme and see who can stand it longer." At first, the president was very categorical in his assessments, believing that "in the interests of both belligerents, the war should now be ended, because if this cannot be achieved without indemnity, then it should be paid." During a heated discussion with Witte, he was forced to admit that due to the unprecedented differences in the views of the Russian and Japanese commissioners, "there is very little hope for a peace treaty" ^{[27, l. 71-72]}. Nevertheless, it was clear that the overall balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region depends on finding common points of contact in the positions of the warring Powers.

In order to smooth out sharp corners and prevent potential conflict situations, Roosevelt did a lot to create a comfortable environment that was maximally adapted for the work of participants in the negotiation process. On the eve of fierce battles, the White House carefully developed a scenario for official events and friendly dinners. The first of them was the presentation of the commissioners of both countries to each other, organized under the supervision of Assistant Secretary of State G. Pierce. The idea of the ceremonial meeting was that the members of the Russian and Japanese delegations could not meet earlier in any way. To this end, they were placed in different hotels in New York, and on the appointed day they were sent to a meeting with the president, with a half-hour break.

On July 25 (August 7), according to the established naval ceremony, the Japanese left the hotel at exactly 9 a.m. for the pier, from where they went on the ship "Tacoma" to meet with the president. Half an hour later, the Russian delegates sailed after them on the cruiser Chattanooga. Upon receiving the news of the arrival of the commissioners of both countries at the marina of the town of Sagamore Hill, near which his summer residence was located, the president stepped onto the deck of his own yacht "Mayflower". Immediately, the presidential flag flew up and a 21-gun salute thundered, inviting foreign guests to take part in the reception. Their name-calling took place on board the yacht. First, the President introduced the heads of the Russian and Japanese delegations, State Secretary S. Y. Witte and Japanese Foreign Minister Yu. Komura and then Pierce introduced the other commissioners by name. The Japanese marched decorously along the row of Russian delegates lined up, successively shaking hands with each of them.

After a brief acquaintance, the president invited the participants of the future negotiations to a buffet in the mess hall, where all kinds of dishes and drinks were set on a large round table. When the champagne was served, the president uttered the following words in a loud voice: "Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no answer, and which I ask you to listen to in silence and standing. I drink to the prosperity and prosperity of the States and peoples of the two great countries whose Representatives met on this ship. My most serious hope and prayer, in the interests not only of these two great Powers, but also of all mankind, is that a just and lasting peace be concluded between them without delay" ^{[31, l. 30]}. The official reception of the delegations took place in hot sunny weather, so residents of the surrounding villages greeted the presidential ship with enthusiastic shouts, waving flags of the warring countries brought in advance. In short, it was a real holiday for the Americans, because, according to Russian diplomat A. G. Planson, "two great warring Powers came to make peace on their territory, at the invitation of their President and under his auspices" ^{[31, L. 21,31]}.

The seat of the commissioners was located in Portsmouth, representing the naval shipyard in the northeastern United States. The small resort town was chosen at the initiative of the Governor of New Hampshire, J. McLain, who convinced the White House that there are "appropriate conditions for negotiations in the territory entrusted to him and any unexpected interference is completely excluded" ^{[23, p. 1226]}. Local residents were looking forward to the distinguished guests who agreed to sit down at the negotiating table in their seaside town: the shipyard was cleaned, houses were painted, military infantrymen were dressed in ceremonial uniforms, cannons for ceremonial volleys were polished to a shine, flags of the three countries were hung on houses, and military orchestras prepared a repertoire for honored guests ^{[32, l. 46; 48]}. Provincial America froze in anticipation of the most important event in its history.

Located on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, Portsmouth was small compared to other settlements in the state, and the number of people working at the naval arsenal did not exceed 11 thousand people. There were no appropriate buildings for the event of such a high rank, so the commissioners were placed in a wooden four-story hotel "Wentworth", located near the city. Ordinary members of the delegation were allocated a single room, and for their leaders ? a block consisting of two small rooms and a closet for a valet ^{[21, p. 481]}. If the issue with the hotel was somehow resolved, then the search for a suitable room for meetings of delegates took quite a long time. Ultimately, it was decided to adapt for this purpose the newly rebuilt warehouse building, in which the workers erected partitions, dividing it into a conference hall and working rooms for delegations. The shabbiness of the interior was somewhat smoothed out by mahogany furniture, modeled after one of the offices of the White House.

Choosing such a modest place for an international conference in many ways violated the canons of diplomatic etiquette accepted in Europe, since an event of such a high rank was more consistent, at least, with the castle of a nobleman or the palace of the tsar. The overall negative impression of the building was brightened by the comfortable working and recreation conditions created for the members of the delegation. Desks with stationery and typewriters were installed in the workrooms, electric fans provided fresh air into the room, and a telegraph was at the disposal of each delegation. Wines and spirits were provided for the needs of the conference, delivered by three trucks. It was 9 km from the hotel to the conference venue along a dirt road (it took an hour for the crew to overcome this distance, and half an hour for the car), so five cars and one open electric car were allocated for transporting people.

The hearings during the conference were hampered by strong noise coming from nearby workshops, warehouses and institutions of the maritime department, the work in which was accompanied by the hissing of steam engines, the sound of chains from cranes, hammers hitting iron, metal noise during unloading, etc. Despite the heat, the windows of the premises were carefully closed in order to make out the meaning of the speeches of the commissioners who spoke.

A security clearance was introduced in the building where the negotiations were taking place: 25 Marines under the leadership of two sergeants and 6 corporals meticulously inspected each visitor and checked the authenticity of the document on admission to the premises ^[33]. The security service, headed by Rear Admiral W. Meade, took measures to limit the presence of the press in the city. However, after the news of the upcoming negotiations, hundreds of journalists and photographers rushed there, while most of them settled in the hotel, which previously housed members of both delegations. It soon became clear that even with such strict security, the commissioners were under the full supervision of a cloud of correspondents, while the heads of delegations were under the special eye of the press, at the doors of which journalists took turns on duty. "Everything that they managed to notice, hear or eavesdrop on was immediately published in newspapers" ^{[31, l. 36]}.

Due to the military purpose of the shipyard, the city had the best telegraph and telephone communications at that time, representing the property of the Western Union company. At the initiative of the military command, she was brought to the hotel building and placed at the disposal of the Pier. The presence of an extensive communication system helped Roosevelt to be aware of the negotiations and immediately learn about all the twists and turns that took place during the meetings. Of course, one should not think that he personally read the messages of the heads of delegations, but even from purely official data, for example, the number of telegrams sent, one could extract a lot of information about who sent them and when, what their volume and number of requests were. Thus, the members of the Russian delegation were aware that "the Japanese receive and give a lot of telegrams to London" ^{[34, l. 112]}. It is clear that any astute and intelligent person, like Roosevelt, could judge the intensity of the atmosphere at the negotiations from the list of messages received and sent and control their progress to one degree or another.

An important advantage of Portsmouth was its proximity to the summer residence of the president, so members of the delegations alternately visited him. Their transportation was carried out by sea, for which the high-speed steamer "Dolphin" was used, staffed by 25 sailors, as well as the presidential yacht "Mayflower", on which the Japanese sailors were replaced by the Chinese to avoid misunderstandings. For the daily needs of the conference participants, 4 military boats were involved, over which one or another national flag was alternately flown, since the heads of delegations had the temporary status of ambassadors of foreign powers. E. Pearson, the Secretary of the State of New Hampshire, was seconded to the Russian delegation, ready to perform "at any time any work within the capabilities, both official and personal" ^{[30, L. 52]}.

Official negotiations began on July 27 (August 9), when both delegations arrived on yachts from the hotel in Portsmouth, where they were met by Rear Admiral Meade and Secretary of State Pearson. When the ships approached the pier, a cannon salute was fired, accompanied by demonstrative firing by marines, followed by a solemn buffet for distinguished guests. A motorcade of Japanese and Russian commissioners, accompanied by a large retinue of officials, marched through the streets of Portsmouth, filled with trellises of troops and crowds of numerous onlookers. A three-week diplomatic battle began, followed by the whole world.

From the very beginning, the parties agreed that the conference meetings would be held daily (from 9.30 to 12.00, and after a break ? from 15.00 to 17.30). French was declared the official language of negotiations, along with partial use of English and Russian, so Witte spoke French, and Komura ? in English. After each meeting, brief minutes of the debate were drawn up, on the basis of which joint statements were prepared for the public ^{[27, L.81]}. The procedure for publishing the debate, which took place after each meeting, was carried out on the initiative of Witte, who believed that "the negotiations should be available to the press, ... could be made public to the public at any moment" ^{[34, L. 10]}.

On July 28 (August 10), the Japanese presented an extensive list of 12 points of requirements, many of which, according to the Russian commissioners, went beyond the limits of what was possible. The Japanese claims were divided into two blocks according to the degree of importance: the first one referred to the return of Manchuria to China, recognition of Korea, Sakhalin, Port Arthur, the Liaodong Peninsula, as well as the southern branch of the Sino-Eastern Railway and compensation for military losses in the amount of 1.2 billion yen, and the second one was about extradition Russian Russian ships sheltering in neutral waters, allowing fishing off the Russian coast of the Pacific Ocean and restricting Russia's right to keep a fleet in the Far East. In response, Witte made it clear to the Japanese that Russia would not make any compromises that detract from its sovereignty, since among those present "there are no winners, and therefore there are no losers." He himself "behaved in public as if a small misfortune had happened to Russia in Manchuria, and that was all"^{[21, p. 477]}.

The terms of peace put forward by the Japanese commissioners were immediately transferred to St. Petersburg. The reaction of the tsarist government to the "excessive claims" of the Japanese was predictable. Nicholas II, stating that "the people entrusted to Him by God will not stop at any sacrifice to protect the honor and dignity of their dear Homeland, MOST HIGHLY commanded his commissioners to stop further discussion of peace conditions" ^{[34, l. 1-2]}. To clarify his own position, he ordered the preparation of a telegram addressed to Roosevelt, which stated his sincere support for the "proposal put forward by him, which had a high goal ... to consolidate peace for the benefit of the whole world." However, it was important for the emperor to stake out the following message: "It was not Russia that violated the peace. Following the surprise attack on the Port Arthur Squadron, she was forced to take up arms. The 18,000-strong army did not exhaust its forces, and Russia, not considering itself defeated, of course could not accept the conditions presented to it." Based on this, he asked Roosevelt to judge fairly on whom ? "Russia or Japan, moral responsibility should fall for the consequences of the unsuccessful outcome of negotiations initiated on your personal initiative on hospitable American territory" ^{[34, l. 3]}.

An unusual situation has arisen in Portsmouth, threatening the failure of the conference that has just opened. Explaining its reasons, Witte stated that "there is a gap between the views of both sides, therefore one can think that Roosevelt gradually came to this conclusion" ^{[27, l. 113]}. However, in a government telegram received by him on July 29 (August 11), it was noted that the demands made by the Japanese "should hardly be considered final", it is necessary to wait for the moment ^{[34, L. 96]}. Indeed, the disruption of the conference was not the intention of the president, who could be accused of the failure of negotiations due to the intransigence of the Japanese. Roosevelt immediately met with Witte on July 31 (August 13) to discuss a strategy for further action. He recommended that he "first talk about issues where an agreement is achievable, and then move on to issues on which it is difficult to expect an agreement." And although Vite considered the proposed action plan a "waste of time," he nevertheless agreed to accept "any method of discussion in order not to give a reason to blame Russia for the continuation of the war." Surprisingly, the discussion of the articles article by article, putting the most controversial of them aside, allowed the commissioners of both countries to make coordinated decisions on issues of Japan's control over Korea and the "open door" policy in Manchuria, which essentially started the war. However, Witte himself was at a loss to guess, thinking about whether "the President did not tell the Japanese the same thing as he told me, and whether that is why they so far avoid touching on issues where disagreement is obvious" ^{[27, l. 124]}.

Informing Foreign Minister Lamsdorf of the details of the conversation with Roosevelt, Witte drew attention to his "thought that it was desirable, in any case, not to completely close the doors to negotiations." Reflecting on this phrase carelessly thrown by the president, he considered it important "to find a form in which a new conference could take place regardless of the initiative of one of the parties." In particular, the Secretary of State was ready to suggest that the Japanese "meet after a certain period of time at a certain point, for example, in six months in The Hague," or directly appeal to Roosevelt "to present him with the idea to convene a conference again if, in the course of events, he recognizes this as necessary and in the place that he chooses" ^{[34, L. 17]}. However, Witte himself was not sure that Roosevelt would take "on his own initiative subsequently the initiative to convene a second conference," because he believed that "a secondary conference, if the parties wished it, could take place without his direct initiative" ^{[34, L. 28]}. Lamsdorff, experienced in diplomacy, did not exclude the possibility that "the president himself, informed in a timely manner about the entire course of the case, would make every effort to leave the doors open for the timely resumption of negotiations" ^{[20, l. 21]}. In the end, the Foreign Minister's political instincts did not let him down.

During the first eight meetings of the conference, the commissioners managed to come to a common point of view on 8 of the 12 points. It was about satisfying Japan's claims against Korea, the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria, the transfer of part of the CER, and the concession for mining. Negotiations stalled on August 5 (18), when it was not possible to "agree" on 4 points, including such concessions to Japan as the transfer of Sakhalin Island, the extradition of Russian military vessels interned in neutral ports, the limitation of the Imperial Navy's naval forces in the Far East and reimbursement of military costs ^{[35, l. 12]}. The work of the conference was again in danger of disruption.

The stalemate was suddenly resolved by the head of the Japanese delegation, Komura. Stating his desire to make a special statement during the next meeting, he wrote a few phrases in English on a piece of paper and handed it to Witte. The essence of the combination he proposed was Japan's refusal to restrict Russia's naval activities and the extradition of interned enemy ships, provided that "the Russian commissioners, in turn, would agree to consider in a conciliatory spirit the issues of the cession of Sakhalin and reimbursement of military expenses" ^{[31, l. 135]}. However, the reconciliation plan proposed by the Japanese, which was the result of Roosevelt's consultations with Kaneko, was considered unacceptable. Witte, stating that "if Russia had been completely defeated, which was only if Japanese troops had come to Moscow, then only we would have considered it natural to raise the issue of indemnity" ^{[31, l. 117]}.

The prospects for peace gained a new dimension after an additional meeting between the head of the Japanese delegation Komura and Witte. He announced the readiness of the Japanese to abandon not only the previously agreed requirements, but also to divide Sakhalin Island along the 50th degree of north latitude while retaining the occupied southern part, for which the tsarist government should pay compensation in the amount of 1.2 billion yen. Receiving a monetary reward tied in a tight knot with the annexation of Sakhalin was of paramount importance for the Japanese government, since its debts to England and the United States totaled $410 million ^{[3, pp. 148-149]}. Witte's response was quite predictable. According to him, "it seems impossible for us to agree on the amount indicated by the Japanese, since this is equivalent to paying military expenses" ^{[34, L. 66-68]}.

The Russian commissioners, forced to interrupt the work of the conference, requested new instructions from St. Petersburg. During the consultations held by the tsar with ministers and members of the royal family, the Japanese demands were considered absolutely "unacceptable" ^{[20, l. 32]}. Discussing the main snag that arose during the negotiations, Witte reasoned as follows: "The issue of paying military compensation is especially important, both from the point of view of Russia's dignity and from the point of view of our most essential interests.... The issue of Sakhalin is extremely important, since this territory, which was in our possession, can represent great wealth and serve as an outpost of the Amur… Our main misfortune is that Sakhalin is in the hands of the Japanese..." Based on the current situation, he considered it possible to transfer the island to the Japanese, but without monetary compensation. At the cost of territorial concession, the State Secretary intended to achieve an end to the war in order to use the army to restore order in revolutionary Russia ^{[36, pp. 32-34]}. Explaining his point of view, Witte referred to the split in public opinion in the United States, where the demand for payment of military expenses was considered unreasonable, and in relation to Sakhalin occupied by the Japanese, it was quite acceptable. He himself believed that "the continuation of the war would be the greatest disaster for Russia" ^{[34, l. 60]}. Limited in freedom of action by strict government instructions, Witte took a rare step in diplomatic practice, announcing his decision to show Komura the contents of all telegrams received from the tsarist government.

The representatives of both delegations waited in agony for news from St. Petersburg. Reflecting on the prospects of the negotiation process, Witte was convinced that "the president will not again take the initiative on his own initiative to convene a disrupted conference" ^{[34, L. 52]}. His opinion was not shared by Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, who argued that although negotiations had reached an impasse, there was still the possibility of resuming them in the future. He believed that "there are no obstacles to saying goodbye to Roosevelt, expressing gratitude to him, the commissioners of both sides told the President, even in writing, of their readiness to reconvene for a meeting if the President eventually undertakes to make such an offer" ^{[34, L. 54]}. Nicholas II's reply, which he soon received, testified that, despite concessions from Japan and Roosevelt's exhortations, he remained with his own opinion. According to him, "in essence, the Japanese are shuffling their demands: giving up half of Sakhalin and paying such a huge amount for the northern part does not change my basic view at all – not an inch of land, not a ruble of indemnity, or reimbursement of military costs, which is the same thing" ^{[34, l. 65]}. His verdict put an end to the further work of the conference. The Russian delegation packed their bags while waiting for instructions on departure, and Witte tried to negotiate with the Japanese on a joint appeal to the president with a request to "assemble a new conference so as not to completely close the doors" ^{[34, l. 66]}.

Roosevelt intervened in the emergency situation, considering the Russian-Japanese negotiations as a rare opportunity to strengthen the country's position on a global scale. Late at night on August 5 (18), Pierce came to Witte with a request to hastily send Baron Rosen to him in order to convey to the tsar a confidential message from the president ^{[34, L. 70]}. He immediately left for Oyster Bay, having previously found out that the president had spoken with Kaneko the day before, but no final decision had been reached. From the context of a two-hour conversation with Roosevelt, it became clear to the Russian diplomat that he did not know anything about the division of Sakhalin Island proposed by the Japanese, so the meaning of his idea aimed at equalizing the forces of the opponents represented the worst case scenario. According to him, "if three of the four points on which the agreement could not take place were turned off, namely the 10th and 11th through the rejection of them by the Japanese, and the 5th through the cession of Sakhalin to the Japanese, which is already actually in their possession, ... then only item 9 on reimbursement of military expenses" ^{[31, l. 137]}. Roosevelt argued that if the plan he proposed was implemented, an honorable peace between the warring countries could be concluded on the same day. As for the controversial provisions, he proposed to transfer them to two trusted persons representing the interests of the warring parties for consideration so that they would slowly work out a reasoned conclusion. His procedure was supposed to take "a lot of time, during which, according to Roosevelt, passions between the warring countries could weaken, so Japan hardly decided to continue the war because of one "money issue". This was one of the first examples of the so-called "cooling arbitration" that became popular in the run-up to the First World War, which was embodied in the form of bilateral "reconciliation" pacts.

The president urged Rosen to give in to the Japanese, citing as an argument their seizure of Sakhalin, which could not be retaken in the near future. As a good example, he mentioned the long-term presence of American troops in one of the Latin American countries: "We (Americans) are also sitting in Panama and will not leave." The foreign policy incident he mentioned did not impress Rosen, who stated that "Japan is not America, and we are not Colombia" ^{[31, l. 138]}. However, Roosevelt nevertheless asked the tsarist ambassador to convey the contents of his plan to the emperor, mentioning at the same time that it was hardly worth considering this initiative "as a proposal coming from the President of the United States, but only as a thought expressed in a private conversation" ^{[34, L. 74]}.

Analyzing the presidential plan in detail, Witte saw in it a rational basis for mutual concessions. After the disruption of the conference, "when everyone finds out what happened at it, then peaceful public opinion recognizes that Russia was right to reject military compensation, but will not take our side on the issue of Sakhalin" ^{[31, l. 79]}, he argued. His views were shared by Minister Lamsdorff, who called on the tsar to decide whether "to continue attempts at a possible agreement with Japan without prejudice to Russia or, interrupting the meeting, and with renewed vigor to begin further struggle." The minister believed that "all negotiations with Japan should be rejected only if fully confident that the army commanded by General Linevich could break the enemy" ^{[35, L. 5]}. American cartoons depicted Russian commissioners sitting at the negotiating table waiting for good news from Manchuria, against which the silhouette of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces appeared by the forces of Russia ^{[31, l. 149]}. Their hopes were not in vain: by the end of the summer, the Russian army, having increased its advantage in technical support and manpower (due to the addition of two army corps), became significantly stronger than the Japanese. Perhaps this circumstance explained the inflexibility of the tsar, who believed that "Japan desperately needs money, we will not give it to her, and we will never agree on this" ^{[34, L. 74]}.

The way out of the impasse was again found by Roosevelt. On the evening of August 8 (21), Pierce came to Witte, informing him of the president's telegram intended for both the state secretary and the Russian emperor ^{[34, L. 80]}. It reported that the Japanese, after a conversation with Roosevelt, agreed to remove two provisions insulting to Russia, but on condition that they transfer the southern half of Sakhalin Island and pay an "adequate" amount of compensation. Roosevelt was convinced that peace could be concluded if the tsarist government agreed in principle to pay a certain amount, and its value could become the subject of further negotiations. "If peace is not established now and the war continues, it may well happen that although this will place a severe financial burden on Japan, Russia will still end up losing the provinces of Eastern Siberia, which were founded for three centuries, thanks to the heroism of its sons" ^{[34, L. 94-96]}, he argued. By persuading the governments of the warring countries to make mutual concessions, the president, in search of a compromise, developed a certain formula for success. Knowing about Russia's categorical refusal to pay the indemnity, he repeatedly told the Japanese: "If you ... were already in Moscow, then the claims of the war would be fair; let's say that you take Siberia in a year, losing another 200 thousand people and receiving a billion yen, and then? You will not know what happens next, and therefore I advise you to give in" ^{[17, l. 148]}. Similar measures of psychological pressure were applied to Russia in the form of imposing the idea of a hidden indemnity, namely, "the redemption of the northern part of Sakhalin for a monetary reward in reasonable amounts" ^{[35, l. 8]}.

Roosevelt's letter forced Witte to delay the end of the negotiations, taking into account that Japan had withdrawn most of the humiliating demands for Russia. However, one detail surprised him in the politician's thoughts: "the president in his telegram, expressing his opinions, as if prejudging what he considers fair and what is unfair, and therefore, in any case, HIS MAJESTY's telegram will have to take this fact into account." Fulfilling Roosevelt's request, Witte immediately forwarded his message to St. Petersburg, accompanied by his own comment. In his opinion, "these proposals cannot be accepted by Russia's self-consciousness, because, in fact, they contain, under a different form, the payment of Japan, if not all, then most of the military costs. Russia will not agree to this, just as it cannot admit itself defeated" ^{[34, l. 93]}.

Nicholas II was skeptical about the news that came from overseas. In the prepared draft of a secret telegram addressed to Roosevelt, he claimed that "I would be ready to agree to the adoption of any way out of the difficulties that arose during the negotiations, corresponding to the dignity of Russia, but the demands of the Japanese commissioners did not give hope for the possibility of finding a suitable combination." The Japanese demarche, from his point of view, contained one "unsuccessfully hidden condition ? the payment of the same, but under a different form, military indemnity." He saw a way out of this situation in the termination of negotiations, since "under such conditions, further discussion of the completely unacceptable concession of Sakhalin naturally disappears. He asked Roosevelt for only one thing ? "to put the matter in such a way that the blame for the termination of the meetings fell solely on Japan" ^{[34, L. 89, 101-102]}. The tsar announced the decision to the American Ambassador Meyer personally during an audience on August 10 (23) ^{[34, L. 125]}.

The next day, the restless Roosevelt sent Witte a new dispatch in which he accused him of "inaccurately" interpreting the contents of the message transmitted to the emperor, clarifying that it was not about reimbursement of military costs, but the purchase of territory. Taking into account as a fait accompli the impossibility for Russia to fight at the moment for the return of the entire Sakhalin Island, he offered to accept the Japanese offer to sell them a part for a "certain amount". Pushing the tsarist government to conclude peace without delay, Roosevelt frightened the emperor with the possibility of new victories for Japan on the battlefields and, accordingly, terrible disasters for Russia, after which it "would be very difficult for him to take responsibility for this refusal if possible for Russia to conclude a just and honorable peace" ^{[34, l. 114]}.

At the same time, the president tried to influence public opinion by leaking confidential information to the press. Ordinary Americans, praising their president for his noble desire to reconcile the warring nations, did not understand why the Russians were so stubbornly bargaining with the Japanese, preferring the payment of a sum of money to unpredictable military battles. They asked, "isn't it more profitable to spit and pay than to wake up the whole fortune." Many of them said: "You Russians are terribly fond of theories and principles, whereas in politics the most important thing is practical results" ^{[17, l. 12]}. Numerous caricatures depicted Roosevelt, sometimes in the form of a dove carrying an olive branch of peace, then a certain giant holding Count Witte's ear with one hand and Baron Komura with the other, depicted as offended scoundrels who are forcibly forced to put up. The president was often presented "in the form of a brave hunter who clung to a huge bear, galloping towards the abyss and being held on the very edge of the abyss." Public opinion in the United States was completely on the side of the president, who advised the tsarist government to "pay a contribution just to end the war" ^{[31, l. 148]}.

The tough position of Nicholas II, who stubbornly bent his line, did not correspond to the plans of Roosevelt, who could not allow the failure of negotiations, perceiving such a hypothetical possibility as the collapse of personal diplomacy. On his initiative, informal contacts were launched, which, as a rule, contributed to the dehumanization of the conflict and facilitated mutual understanding between people. After ten days of fruitless work of the conference, a series of social events were organized for the commissioners, which demonstrated the determination of the New Hampshire authorities to do everything in their power to establish peace between Russia and Japan. One of the first events of this kind was the invitation of both delegations to the famous sports club, where some of the commissioners showed high skill in playing pool and billiards. This was followed by a party on board the aircraft carrier along with local politicians and celebrities. It was replaced by an excursion to the world's largest textile complex “Amoskeag Mills". Then came dinner parties in the famous Greek Farm garden decorated with Russian and Japanese flags, visits to minstrels in the Portsmouth Music hall, etc. The vibrant social life arranged for the representatives of both delegations was supposed to compensate for the rigidity of official negotiations and, ultimately, soften the diametrically opposed positions of the parties. There is a legend that on one Sunday, August 13 (26), the heads of the delegations of Witte and Komura, who speak French fluently, secretly met in the rose garden of the hotel and, despite their differences, talked about their commitment to peace.

At the same time, Roosevelt updated the practice of working meetings, which allowed not only to receive the information he was interested in directly, but also to probe the reaction of diplomats who could convey his innermost thoughts to governments. In this situation, such people were, on the one hand, financial agent Kaneko, who organized all wartime loans for Japan, and on the other, Russian Ambassador Rosen, a significant part of whose career was connected with the Far East. On the morning of August 7 (19), when the Russian commissioners went to a piano concert, the president invited Rosen to a private conversation, persuading him to accept the terms of the peace agreement formulated by him, namely, to transfer the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan, and to pay for the northern part. To the ambassador's question, "does he really think that Russia could ever agree to pay Japan an indemnity in any form, the president replied: "Frankly, no, but as an intermediary, I considered myself obliged to advise Russia to pay a certain amount of money rather than continue this bloody... war, in which at the same time, advising Japan not to insist on the issue of reimbursement of military expenses" ^{[45, l. 7]}. The diplomat promised to immediately bring Roosevelt's point of view to the attention of the emperor in the form of "friendly advice" expressed privately, and not an official proposal, as requested by the president ^{[29, l. 37]}.

On the evening of August 8 (21), when the Russian commissioners participated in a dinner party hosted in their honor by Secretary Pierce, Roosevelt met with Kaneko. Knowing about the tsar's refusal to pay any monetary compensation, he strongly advised the Japanese to halve the requested amount of remuneration to 600 million yen. Not satisfied with the results of a brief conversation with the Japanese diplomat, Roosevelt sent him a detailed letter the next day. It began with the statement of the fact that letters had been received from numerous "friends" of Japan who doubted "the possibility for her to continue the war because of a large reward", since she had not occupied any Russian territory except Sakhalin, which she still has to hold in the future. From Roosevelt's point of view, "agreeing to the return of the northern half of Sakhalin gives Japan some hope of receiving money in addition to those that are justly owed to her for Russian prisoners of war," although it is unlikely that she will be able to "receive anything like the amount that she has put up as necessary, namely six hundred million." He recalled that since he was the one who recommended the Russians to make peace, he has every right to advise the Japanese not to continue the war solely because of the indemnity. Moreover, he was sure that if they persisted in extorting money, the civilized world would support Russia's refusal not to pay "the enormous amount that was demanded or something similar to this amount." In an effort to force the Japanese to moderate their demands, Roosevelt resorted to explicit threats, arguing that in the event of the conquest of Eastern Siberia, they would need, on the one hand, at least "five hundred million in addition to those that have already been spent", and on the other, a lot of the spilled blood of their own soldiers ^{[29, L. 27-28]}.

The ultimatum presented by Roosevelt essentially meant that if Japan did not make concessions to the Russians, it would not be able, as before, to count on the public sympathy of the civilized world. Of course, it was about the refusal of the J. Schiff banking house from further financing of the Japanese government. Although the president's letter was confidential, its contents immediately became known to the Japanese government, which, unable to withstand the severity of financial pressure, announced its readiness to carefully discuss Roosevelt's recommendations with cabinet ministers, military leaders and statesmen ^[37].

Meanwhile, being in gloomy forebodings about the prospects of a peace treaty, Roosevelt, in search of a possible compromise, decided to act ahead of the curve. He did not limit himself to informing the tsar of his telegraphic "advice", but sent Ambassador von Meyer directly to Peterhof on August 10 (23), where he unsuccessfully persuaded the emperor to accept the Japanese conditions for two hours. Among the arguments, the diplomat pointed out that Sakhalin had been in Russian hands for only 30 years, that this small island was not of particular value to huge Russia and that without the fleet, which Russia lost during the war, it had no chance of returning it. And although the amount of monetary compensation for the transfer of the northern part of Sakhalin to Russia was not determined in advance, peace could be concluded with the emperor's simple consent to pay Japan a reasonable amount of compensation, which should be discussed during subsequent negotiations. In response, Nicholas II declared that, although he wanted peace, he "would not pay military indemnity in any form" and was even ready to go to the front to fight the enemy. He believed that Russia's current situation could not be compared with the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, during which the Prussian troops, having occupied a significant part of French territory, achieved the payment of huge monetary compensation. According to him, he would rather "prefer to temporarily lose territory than suffer humiliation by paying military indemnity like a defeated nation" ^{[38, l. 87-88]}.

At the end of the audience with the American ambassador, Nicholas II nevertheless agreed, as a forced compromise, to stipulate a number of acceptable conditions for himself, on the basis of which negotiations could be continued: "No payment of military remuneration, but only a generous and broad payment for the care and maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, but not in such an amount that could be interpreted as a military reward. Japan's renunciation of the claim to interned ships and the limitation of maritime power in the Pacific Ocean. Russia will own the northern half of Sakhalin, and Japan will hold the southern half, the part that previously belonged to Japan" ^{[29, l. 16]}. Nicholas II was sure that "G. Roosevelt will appreciate the new evidence of peaceful feelings animating his Imperial Majesty" ^{[34, l. 110]}. And although American scientists attribute his fateful decision to transfer part of Sakhalin to Japan entirely to the merits of Ambassador Meyer ^{[15, p. 151]}, known for his gift of persuasion, the documents indicate otherwise. The ruling elite of Russia was forced to take into account the requests of some of the large industrialists and zemstvo figures, who considered it possible to "limit themselves to ceding only the southern part of Sakhalin, provided that the Straits of Laperuzov and Tatarsky were freely used."

Witte, having learned about the tsar's final verdict from the text of the telegram he received on August 12 (25), immediately "clearly and categorically explained to the president "that Russia would not go further than what the EMPEROR told G. Langerke Meyer..." ^{[34, l. 122]}. After making sure that the Japanese knew the emperor's answer, the state secretary confirmed the official position, saying that "in no case and under no pretext" would he abandon the decisions taken, and any new proposal would be rejected even without submitting it to St. Petersburg. Nicholas II, approving Witte's style of behavior, imposed on his message a resolution on the need to "end negotiations tomorrow, anyway" ^{[34, l. 128]}. The final meeting of the conference was scheduled for August 16, so the Russian commissioners began to demonstratively prepare for departure ^{[34, l. 116]}.

Upon learning about the fixed end date of the conference, a disappointed Roosevelt informed his friend H. White: "I have no hope of a favorable result, but I will do everything in my power" ^{[23, p. 1313]}. And since relations with Witte had completely broken down due to his intransigence, the president decided to directly appeal to the emperor in an attempt to persuade him to compromise. He sent a telegram to Ambassador von Meyer on August 13 (26), intended only for Nicholas II. According to Roosevelt, it is extremely unpleasant for him to impose his advice on anyone, but he deliberately took such a risk after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that "Russia will never pay money and will not cede territory." According to his logic of reasoning, "such an announcement means absolutely nothing when Sakhalin is already in the hands of the Japanese," but at the moment "there is a great opportunity to get peace on honorable terms." He recalled that both delegations had come to an agreement on all points except two concerning indemnity and Sakhalin, so peace could be concluded "on the basis of the reverse cession of the northern half of Sakhalin to Russia for the payment of the ransom amount" to Japan. Such a decision in itself "does not bind the Russian government to the amount to be paid, leaving it open for further negotiations." To do this, the president proposed the creation of a mixed commission consisting of an even number of trusted persons (French, German or English) and another independent member, not bound by any national ties, to make recommendations for the warring countries. Scaring the tsarist government with the loss of the territory of Eastern Siberia, Roosevelt deliberately exaggerated the colors, trying to achieve his goal through cunning manipulations and outright blackmail. And although he did not urge the tsar to go against his own conscience, he hoped that it would "prompt him to stop the war, the continuation of which would turn into the greatest disaster for Russia" ^{[38, l. 91-92]}.

The Emperor remained adamant. After reviewing Roosevelt's new message, he issued an unequivocal verdict: "I stand by my opinion"^{[34, l. 126]}. On the same day, Meyer telegraphed to the president that he had warned Nicholas II about possible territorial losses in the event of a continuation of the war, but he "prefers to take this risk, but not to pay indemnity in any form." Moreover, he informed about his instructions to announce to the Japanese plenipotentiaries the completion of the conference in the very near future ^{[38, L. 94-96]}. It became clear that Roosevelt's plan to pay indemnity to Russia, which had been hatched for so long, had failed.

After learning the latest news from St. Petersburg, the head of the Japanese delegation Komura realized that the peace talks had come to a logical end. He reported this to his Government on August 13 (26). Before leaving for Portsmouth, the Japanese determined for themselves four necessary conditions that could ensure them a favorable outcome. Russian Russian troops were dealt a crushing blow to the Russian army, receiving foreign loans in the amount of $300 million, expelling Russian troops from North Korea and the complete occupation of Sakhalin. With great difficulty, only two of them were fulfilled, so the Japanese government, after lengthy consultations in high circles, agreed to accept all the conditions of Russia (without Sakhalin and indemnity!), believing that until the situation in Manchuria worsened, peace should be concluded as soon as possible. Sad for Japan was the news that the Russian tsar "will not cede any territory and will not pay any compensation" ^{[23, p. 1319-1320]}.

The Japanese commissioners were instructed to continue negotiations and, with the support of President Roosevelt, conclude an agreement in any way, first renouncing indemnity, and then territorial acquisitions. It turned out that the Japanese were ready to make peace on milder terms than the action plan promoted by the president, since Sakhalin was not listed among the priority goals in the original text of the instructions received by the Japanese commissioners. Unfortunately, the tsarist government did not know about this, but Roosevelt had such information. And although diplomatic etiquette obliged him to keep such confidential information secret, a day later the Japanese learned about the readiness of the tsarist government to cede half of Sakhalin Island, having received secret information in one of the foreign missions in Tokyo. Based on the information received, the Japanese government decided "as a sign of its peacefulness" to withdraw the demand for monetary compensation if Russia gives up half of Sakhalin Island ^{[39, pp. 102-104]}. Unaware of the behind-the-scenes part of the negotiations, Komura unsuccessfully tried to convince the mikado to resume hostilities "with all certainty until another opportunity for peace appears" ^{[34, pp. 209-214]}.

On the morning of August 16 (29), before the start of the conference meeting, Komura invited Witte to a private conversation in the hope of learning the latest news from St. Petersburg. He informed him that the tsarist government had agreed to "the division of Sakhalin with free straits, but without any remuneration," so the Japanese "can only accept or reject the final and irrevocable decision of our SOVEREIGN EMPEROR" ^{[34, l. 139]}. In response, Komura announced the possibility of refusing damages, but on condition that the entire island be transferred to the Japanese. Witte categorically rejected this proposal, saying that he was ready to transfer only the southern part of Sakhalin to them without paying any indemnity. The official part of the conference did not last long: after exchanging a few phrases between the heads of delegations, Komura announced that the Japanese government accepted all the conditions of the tsarist government. An agitated Witte, who came out of the meeting room, solemnly announced to those present: "Well, gentlemen, peace, congratulations, the Japanese have conceded in everything" ^{[41, p. 96]}. The Russian commissioners were stunned by the news, since no one expected that the Japanese would refuse the indemnity and agree to return part of the island they had captured free of charge ^{[17, l. 77]}. Even Nicholas II, having received a message about the end of negotiations, "walked around like in a daze all day" ^{[42, p. 214]}.

Komura immediately informed Roosevelt of the end of the negotiations, and Witte sent him a telegram thanking him for "humane efforts to establish peace" ^[37]. The President was "overjoyed" and lavished compliments on Japan "for generosity in the hour of its triumph" ^{[23, p. 1326]}. In Europe, the news of the end of the war was greeted with congratulations "to Russia, which unexpectedly completed a series of military failures with a brilliant diplomatic success" ^{[17, l. 127]}. In Portsmouth, decorated with flags of former opponents, bells rang for half an hour, which previously happened only during the Civil War. Local residents were overwhelmed with emotions, and Witte's appearance at the hotel caused a stir among the local public: men threw their hats in wild delight, and women cried uncontrollably.

The signing ceremony of the treaty, which put a bold end to the Russian-Japanese war, took place on August 23 (September 5, new style), and its ratification on October 1 (14), 1905 simultaneously in St. Petersburg and Tokyo. The peculiarity of the treatise was that it was not an act of surrender of one of the warring countries, but a document reconciling former opponents, since half of its articles concerned clarifying their rights to own territories in Korea and China, which were formally neutral states. For Russia, the conditions of the Portsmouth Peace turned out to be relatively mild compared to the initial demands of the Japanese: its main reputational damage can be considered the loss of part of Sakhalin Island. The Tsarist government managed to avoid paying the indemnity by compensating only the cost of keeping prisoners (on the basis of reciprocity) in the amount of 46 million rubles in gold, which was several times less than the amount originally announced by the Japanese. According to modern experts, "The 1905 Portsmouth Treaty became the quintessence of Roosevelt's balance of power diplomacy. The treaty limited Japanese expansion, prevented the collapse of Russia, and as a result, as Roosevelt described it, Russia "would be left face to face with Japan so that each side could exert a restraining influence on the other" ^{[43, p. 323]}.

Meanwhile, the question of evaluating Roosevelt's mediation still remains open, since other factors significantly influenced the cessation of the regional conflict, primarily the revolutionary events in Russia. And although the results of the American president's mission led to an end to the bloodshed, the response of the general public of the warring countries, who believed that Roosevelt had deprived them not only of laurels, but also of the trophies of the winner, was of no small importance. In Japan, after the signing of the peace treaty, mass protests began, as Russia's refusal of indemnity was perceived as nothing more than a national insult. A wave of indignation also swept through Russia: according to archival sources, ordinary citizens, doubting the good intentions of the mediator, tearfully begged the sovereign not to make peace, thereby saving "the long-suffering Homeland from unbearable insults inflicted on it" ^{[34, l. 134]}. Many of the appeals to the tsar, as the anointed of God, expressed a sense of sorrow because "English treachery triumphed again in Portsmouth, which robbed our valiant army of hope for retribution" ^{[34, l. 231]}.

In modern Russian literature, one of the reasoned points of view is that the circle of arbiters of the fate of the peace treaty in Portsmouth did not focus exclusively on the American president. The signing of the treatise on more or less decent conditions for Russia took place thanks to Witte's skillful diplomacy and the firm position of the Russian emperor, who relied on the steadfastness and heroism of Russian soldiers and sailors ^{[5, pp. 266-267; 44, p. 617]}. As for Roosevelt's peacemaking itself, all researchers, noting his personal contribution to the settlement of an acute armed conflict, advise taking into account the experts' assessment of the characteristic features of his diplomacy. One of them was the Russian Ambassador Rosen, who had a number of informal meetings with Roosevelt and therefore was better informed than anyone else about his intentions. According to the official, "justice requires taking into account both the straightforwardness of his character, his ignorance of diplomatic forms, the brusqueness characteristic of Americans in general, and the sincerity of his beliefs that he was required to voluntarily assume the role of mediator" ^{[45, L. 7]}.

The difficulty of the negotiation process was that the warring countries opposed direct contacts with each other, so Roosevelt was forced to resort to the so-called "shuttle diplomacy", sometimes called "quiet" because of its confidentiality. To coordinate a decision on a particular issue, he contacted each of the parties in turn and, acting as a postman, transmitted information from the Japanese mikado to the Russian emperor, and vice versa, thereby maintaining a key position in the ongoing discussions at conferences. The establishment of bilateral contact in identifying initial positions on key issues contributed to the development of mutually acceptable options for a peace agreement. Despite his apparent detachment from official contacts, the president was so deeply immersed in the work of the conference that he did not have time for other state affairs. During the three weeks of the negotiation process (from July 27 to August 23), he not only sharply reduced the volume of official correspondence, but did not discuss the vicissitudes of the diplomatic battle with anyone at all. Later, complaining to a friend about the burden of responsibility for the outcome of the negotiations, Roosevelt pointed out that, on the one hand, he felt joy when he "brought this matter to an end", and on the other, he felt emotionally burned out, since he literally had to do everything himself ^{[23, p. 414]}.

Valuing face-to-face communication above all, he preferred to hold business meetings in a one-on-one format, rejecting the forms of etiquette generally accepted in diplomatic practice. His democratic manner of communicating with his interlocutor, without tailcoats and tuxedos at home, had considerable advantages. Thus, Roosevelt, who had never attended the meetings of the Portsmouth Conference, was aware of everything that was happening there. In case of deadlocks, he repeatedly called the politicians he needed for private conversations at a convenient time, trying to convey to them his own way of thinking. In particular, during August, he had 5 secret conversations with Japanese (Kaneko and Komura) and three times with Russian diplomats (Rosen and Witte) at his country house in the hope of finding a compromise between what was desired and what was achievable. Playing the role of a friendly host, he got the opportunity to meet with statesmen of all ranks and talk more during negotiations than was supposed according to official etiquette. Being an active participant in the negotiation process, well-informed in detail about the position of the warring parties, he could indirectly influence its results himself.

As the head of the republic, which abolished aristocratic titles after the War of Independence at the end of the 18th century, Roosevelt often acted impromptu, inventing various forms of protocol events for high-ranking foreign guests. For Europeans, the lack of generally accepted diplomatic routs caused obvious bewilderment, so State Secretary Witte, who met privately with the president, was shocked by the simplicity of the reception organized for him. He was struck by Roosevelt's modest house, comparable to the cottage of a poor burgher, the Negro servants, the absence of a tablecloth on the dining table and an inedible breakfast with ice water by his standards ^{[21, p. 478]}. An even more paradoxical reception awaited the Russian Ambassador Rosen, who was invited to Oyster Bay on June 30 (July 13) to present his credentials to the president. Unlike the strictly verified protocol ceremony in Europe, which assumed a special form of clothing, escort, exchange of speeches and a solemn reception, the president met Rosen on the lawn of the house, playing tennis and only after finishing the set, accepted his official documents. A short conversation between them was followed by a family breakfast, which was attended by the President's wife and her relative ^{[20, L. 2]}.

During the negotiations, Roosevelt conducted active behind-the-scenes diplomacy (back channel diplomacy) bypassing official channels in order to accelerate the resolution of controversial issues. Historically, proxies of one government or another have often become the most effective interlocutors, both in terms of clarifying contentious positions between conflicting parties and transmitting certain signals to each other. Under these circumstances, they turned out to be diplomats from different countries, with whom Roosevelt had warm friendly relations. In particular, the president carried out direct communication with the leadership of Germany and France not through employees of the American embassies, but through personal communication with the French and German ambassadors in Washington – Jules Jusserand and Baron Hermann Speck von Sternburg. And since Roosevelt had no sympathy for the British Ambassador M. Durand, he conducted contacts with the British political establishment through his long-time friend Cecil Spring-Rice, who headed the British embassy in St. Petersburg. Thanks to the measures taken, the mechanism of making foreign policy decisions excluded information leakage and allowed Roosevelt to maintain secrecy in the development and implementation of the mediation mission.

Playing a subtle diplomatic game, Roosevelt did not shy away from sharing confidential information with a narrow circle of trusted persons that was not intended for disclosure. So, on the 20th of August, he sent his letters to the Russian emperor to the German and French ambassadors for review, in which he urged them to accept his "completely impartial proposal" ^{[23, p. 1306-1308]}. Many of them were surprised not only by the fact of the publication of secret correspondence with Nicholas II, but also by pushing the idea of "buying out the northern part of Sakhalin, that is, such a territory of Russia that has not yet been occupied by Japanese troops" ^{[34, l. 117-118]}. Roosevelt, thereby, deliberately violated the basics of "honest" mediation, which assumed the same attitude to both sides, without trying to play along with anyone. After the negotiations were over, he honestly admitted that "the Russians did not even know that I wrote as vigorously to the Tokyo government as to their own" ^{[23, p. 1328]}.

At the same time, it turned out that the Japanese government had all of Roosevelt's letters to the tsar, while "each of them was read and approved by Baron Komura before being sent." Proof of the president's blatant double-dealing was Witte's handing over copies of letters to Baron Kaneko before leaving for Russia, which stated that if the negotiations ended unsuccessfully through Japan's fault, it would lose "all the sympathies that had hitherto been on its side" ^{[45, l. 7]}. The practice of declassifying confidential documents was contrary to the principles generally accepted in diplomatic practice. However, in Portsmouth, most of the classified materials became not only the property of the warring parties, but were also published in American newspapers, whose leadership considered it possible to use all available means to inform the world about everything that took place at the meetings of the peace conference.

Roosevelt sought to involve third parties in the search for a compromise between Russia and Japan, even if they showed disinterest in a successful resolution of the conflict. Thus, pressure on Japan was carried out through interaction with the British government. Despite feeling dislike for Durand, the president still asked him to explain to the Japanese that if the war continued, they could "lose more, instead of getting at least something" ^{[23, p. 1311]}. The British government ignored his call, renegotiating in August 1905 the Treaty of alliance with Japan, which gave it full carte blanche in the colonization of Korea. Roosevelt's appeal to William II did not bring success either. Knowing about the emperor's rejection of even the idea of monetary compensation, he nevertheless asked the German Kaiser to show "initiative" in the negotiation process ^{[23, p. 1317]}. Soon, information leaked to the American press that "Emperor William allegedly informed the President that he strongly advised the tsar to make peace if only Japanese demands could be accepted in accordance with the dignity of Russia." The tsar's reply was made public during the audience of the American Ambassador Meyer, to whom Nicholas II read the text of the telegram sent to the Kaiser. It stated "the impossibility of peace if Japan insists on paying some form of indemnity" ^{[38, l. 88]}.

The French government turned out to be more receptive to Roosevelt's appeal. On the evening of August 11 (24), Ambassador M. Bompard in St. Petersburg visited Lamsdorf, offering to discuss the idea of the American president, who advocated paying "the Japanese, under a plausible form, a moderate amount of money, without which they would hardly be able to conclude a peace treaty." The Foreign Minister's response was quite predictable. He stated that the essence of the wish expressed by the French is still "the subject of an exchange of views" between the Russian emperor and the American president and therefore is not subject to publication. According to him, "France, of course, could render the greatest service in this peaceful direction by a corresponding impact on the Japanese, whose claims exceed any measure"^{[35, l. 8]}.

Roosevelt played an important role in the formation of public diplomacy, designed to build bridges between peoples and find common ground between their interests. In between the meetings of the conference, the state authorities and the city community organized entertainment events for the members of the delegations. The credit for this belonged to the Governor of New Hampshire, J. To McLane and the Mayor of Portsmouth, J. Cousins, who sought to create an atmosphere of hospitality in the context of intercultural communication. The residents of the town enthusiastically welcomed the diplomats at church services, picnics, dinner parties, concerts and theatrical productions. Souvenir shops were filled with postcards depicting Portsmouth, and in local restaurants, a drink called "conference cocktail", the ingredients of which were known only to the bartender, was popular among tourists who flooded into the city. The informal events that accompanied the work of the peace conference made a significant contribution to the success of the diplomatic negotiations.

Of course, now, a century later, the assessment of Roosevelt's mediation seems more ambiguous than it was seen by contemporaries. Acute inter-imperialist contradictions affected not only the relations between individual countries, they covered the entire system of international relations as a whole. This largely explains why, in the context of aggravated global contradictions, the regional conflict, conventionally called the "zero world war" in modern Western literature^[46], could at any moment develop into a global confrontation. The objective consequences of the mediation mission, for which Roosevelt received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906, were more important and significant than his initial subjective intentions. Assessing his role in the Portsmouth negotiations, he himself argued that "personal feelings in this case turned out to be very, very insignificant compared to the huge need to try to do something that ... the interests of the whole world demanded" ^{[23, p. 1328]}.

Such a significant phrase of the president, bordering on obvious bragging, characterizes him as a man who knew his worth. Indeed, among his so-called "insignificant" acts were not only an oral agreement with Japan on the delimitation of spheres of influence in East Asia, but also the "opening of doors" to North China for American capital on the basis of the principle of the most favored nation, fixed in the articles of the peace treaty. The results of the Portsmouth Peace led to a change in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, in which the United States, thanks to Roosevelt's successful mediation, became the main player in international diplomacy. The words that sounded from the pages of the Russian press turned out to be prophetic: "America will retain this role of mediator for the future... It is very important for her that no one's absolute domination is established on those coasts where her own interests grow every year"^{[17, l. 107]}.