V. V. Zenkovsky’s assessment of S. L. Frank’s attitude to the problem of the beginning of the world

Chzhen Yan graduate student of the Department History of Philosophy, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia named after P. Lumumba (RUDN University) 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2 chzhen.yan@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of the article is determined by the importance of conducting historical and philosophical research aimed at clarifying the specifics of Russian philosophical thought, on the one hand, adequately reflecting the realities of Russian socio-historical development, on the other hand, influencing and even largely determining these realities. Russian Russian thinkers S. L. Frank and V. V. Zenkovsky occupy a worthy place in the remarkable galaxy of Russian thinkers, being the authors of original ontognoseological systems, while we have the opportunity to reasonably judge the ideological differences of these thinkers, since V. V. Zenkovsky in his "History of Russian Philosophy" expressed quite definite judgments about them, focusing special attention on the attitude of S. L. Frank to the problem of the beginning of the world. The purpose of the article is to clarify the reasons why S. L. Frank refused to accept the dogmatically stated doctrine of the creation of the world by God "out of nothing", as well as to clarify the question of whether the arguments he gives in favor of the emanation origin of the world are effective.    

V. V. Zenkovsky, assessing the work of S. L. Frank, spoke very highly of him: "By the strength of Frank's philosophical point of view, one can without hesitation be called the most outstanding Russian philosopher in general – not only among those close to him in ideas" ^{[1, p. 450]}; he considered his system "the most significant and profound that we find in the development of Russian philosophy" ^{[1, p. 472]}. At the same time, V. V. Zenkovsky was very critical of the central and fundamental concept of unity for this system, in the presentation of which S. L. Frank, in his opinion, was not original, because he found it "in Solovyov, Plotinus, Nikolai Kuzansky"; in addition, "next to him" the metaphysics of unity was developed"Karsavin, O. Florensky, O. Bulgakov". The originality and "philosophical power" of S. L. Frank is "in the justification of this metaphysics, which he developed in his works" ^{[1, pp. 472-473]}. The philosophical system created by him "is the highest achievement, the highest point of development of Russian philosophy in general, but it lacks just the clarity in the distinctions of the Absolute and the world that is needed for a system of basic concepts." V. V. Zenkovsky clarified at the same time: philosophers do not always "realize that the idea of creation philosophy needs it no less than theology." The metaphysics of unity may, of course, be harmonious and internally consistent, but its characteristic "bad, hasty monism" still "does not answer the mystery of being"; the combination of the idea of unity with the concept of creation, even very skillfully conducted, remains a "weak spot" in it and "still confuses philosophical thought" ^{[1, p. 474]}.

Panentheism as a modification of Pantheism

         The problem of the beginning of the world was, perhaps, the most important point that caused ontognoseological disagreements between S. L. Frank and V. V. Zenkovsky, and this is explained by the fact that the type of the thinker's worldview, and therefore his entire philosophical system, depends entirely on the solution of this problem. If V. V. Zenkovsky, always remaining within the framework of the Christian tradition, strictly followed the dogma of the creation of the world by God "out of nothing", then S. L. Frank was not satisfied with this fundamental idea. Although he used the term "creation", and even admitted that the act he meant was committed by God's own will, however, he believed that the idea of creating the world "out of nothing" is dangerous in its consequences, it endows the Creator with the property of omnipotence, therefore, makes problematic theodicy, the justification of God for the presence of evil in the world, in which there is no doubt. A modern researcher of S. L. Frank's creativity, E. S. Kiseleva, rightly remarks: "Abandoning the traditional Christian concept, Frank suggests thinking of the process of creation as the formation of material that God himself posits. To some extent, this resembles the relationship between matter and the One in Neoplatonism, with the only difference that the One does not assume matter" ^{[2, p. 15]}. Indeed, such an understanding by S. L. Frank of creation no longer fits into the framework of a monotheistic worldview, being nothing more than pantheism, the fact of adherence to which the philosopher himself has always denied.

         S. L. Frank preferred to characterize his own worldview as "antinomian panentheism", by which he understood "the justification of the world and man through the inseparable, but also non-merged duality of the Creator and creation" ^{[3, p. 304]}. However, panentheism in its essence is only a modification of the pantheistic worldview, according to it, "the world resides in God, but God does not dissolve in the world (as in pantheism). God is present in all things, includes the universe, but is also outside of it. A certain aspect of God is transcendent in relation to the surrounding world" ^{[4, pp. 136-137]}. But after all, the pantheistic Absolute, no matter how it is thought of theologically and philosophically – whether as Brahman, Tao, or the One-Good, Absolute Idea – does not belong at all to the world that emanates from it, it is the source of everything, and at the same time – nothing (for the world). The only significant difference between panentheism and "classical" pantheism is that it gives the Absolute the status of the Supreme Personality, which assumes everything that exists from itself. However, even in pantheism, it is possible to fix the presence of vague ideas "about the non-worldly Creator of our life" due to a peculiar "premonition" of the theistic worldview in him, based on the understanding of the Absolute as a transcendent category ^{[5, p. 228]}.

         If we turn to the "New Philosophical Encyclopedia", we will see that pantheism is characterized in it as "a religious and philosophical doctrine according to which God is immanent in the world, God and the world are one." There are such forms of it as Hylozoistic (Brahmanism, Taoism, pre-Socratics), monistic (Parmenides), absolutist (G. Hegel) and immanent (Heraclitus, B. Spinoza) pantheism. The latter "places God in the world as its "part" – as a force or law, eternal and unchangeable, governing the changing world," and the author of the encyclopedic article notes that in some immanent pantheistic teachings, God "can be considered not as a focus of characteristics opposite to the world, but as a unity of opposites (Nikolai Kuzansky, J. Bruno, J. Boehme)" ^{[6, p. 191]}. There is no separate article devoted to panentheism in the encyclopedia, and this does not seem to say at all that such a worldview does not exist, but confirms our thesis that panentheism is only a modification of pantheism, and the description given here of immanent pantheism is quite suitable for panentheism. S. L. Frank said about Nikolai Kuzansky as his only teacher of philosophy, and a modern German researcher of the work of the Russian philosopher rightly believes that he was such a teacher "precisely in methodological terms," from him "Frank found an argumentative justification for real-idealistic ontology" ^{[7, p. 262]}; from him, as we see, he took and immanent pantheism, which understands the Absolute as a unity of opposites.  

S. L. Frank did not even abandon the term emanation (expiration), or radiation (radiation), characteristic of Neoplatonism, this carefully philosophically developed pantheistic doctrine, designed to describe the mechanism of a step-by-step "transition" from the One-Good to the material world: "God," he wrote, "being the primary source and center of reality, simultaneously permeates all reality, as if radiating through its all–encompassing completeness" ^{[3, p. 288]}. Or directly: "... the deep layer of the human spirit is not his "creation" in relation to God, but his "emanation" – that which is "born" or "flows" from him..." ^{[3, p. 335]}. The philosopher also resorted to an open polemic with the traditional dogmatic teaching of the Church, contrasting his understanding of the relationship between God and the created world with the "direct experience of consciousness", which speaks "about the presence within myself, in the composition of my soul, of something unconditionally durable, something eternal and therefore "uncreated"" ^{[3, p. 333]}, rooted in God.

         Thus, the replacement of the term (and the concept) in determining the origins of the created world (instead of "from nothing" – "from myself") leads to the fact that S. L. Frank "from the concept of "creation" remains, in fact, only the word" ^{[1, p. 462]}. As a deep-thinking philosopher, he could not help but realize this. Why, after all, did S. L. Frank persistently continue to adhere to such a borderline mentality between theism and pantheism all his life, subject to criticism from all sides, and he always considered "not abstract theism, but concrete panentheism" to be the "true, adequate" essence of religious faith ^{[8, p. 507]}?

         Theosis by essence and by grace

Let us assume that the result of S. L. Frank's solution of the problem of the beginning of the world was affected by the clear predominance in his religious experience of the psychology of the Christian religion over its ontology. Born into a devout Jewish family, having passed the stage of fascination with Marxism and atheism in his youth, the philosopher already in his mature years and quite consciously adopted Christianity. Undoubtedly, he was not only "convinced" by his mind of the truth of this confession, but also felt God in the depths of his soul – he came to him both logically and psychologically. The protest against the traditional understanding of the essential transcendence of God, who created the world "out of nothing", was based, first of all, on a deeply personal understanding of faith as a mutual relationship between a human person and God, perceived as "such a "you", which at the same time is the basis, the soil and the deepest root of my "I"". Despite the fact that S. L. Frank, of course, recognized the difference, even a certain opposition of personality and God, he at the same time clearly realized his own unity with Him: "This unity is so intimate," he wrote, "that I do not know, I do not see clearly where the last depth of myself and God ends. where does what I call God begin: for meeting is an inseparable connection here" ^{[8, pp. 511-512]}.

However, according to S. L. Frank, there is often an authority standing in the way of personal communication with God, prescribing what, how and when to do and how to understand one's place in the world and religion. The philosopher, of course, did not oppose church authority in general, because he understood that, firstly, not only certain authorities, not only the Eastern patriarchs and the Pope, but also dogmas, and Holy Tradition, and Holy Scripture, have authority, and, secondly, authority is necessary, and therefore if we we will refute one authority, its place will immediately be taken by another, if we reject one dogma, it will immediately be replaced by another. The philosopher protested against the idea of "infallible religious authority", which should be "fundamentally removed; it contains an internal contradiction, suggesting a rejection of personal judgment, consent to blind faith, whereas faith and sight, faith and inner conviction are essentially the same" ^{[8, p. 545]}.

Regarding the Christian dogma about the creation of the world, S. L. Frank spoke about its unacceptable distortion, supported by all church authority. More precisely, he was not even talking about the dogma, the validity of the oros (definition) of which is fixed by the Ecumenical Council, but about its later interpretation – after all, in the Nicene-Tsaregrad Creed there is not a word about God's creation of the world "out of nothing", it says only: "I believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, the Creator heaven and earth, visible to all and invisible..." ^{[9, p. 6]}. The philosopher believed that the assertion of the complete "otherworldliness" of God, His fundamental essential difference from the world and the man existing in it leads to the confession of a God distant and unattainable, absolutely transcendent to every creature, and such a confession excludes close communication between God and man. It should be noted that this idea of the tradition of understanding the relationship between God and the world, as if sanctified by the church authority, is generally inadequate, although, we agree, it is quite often allowed in religious practice. On the contrary, it was really dogmatically determined, and at the councils (true, not Ecumenical, but local Constantinople, called "Palamite"), that not only communication between God and man is possible, but also theosis, the formation of the latter as a consequence of such communication, or synergy (co-action, co-cooperation) when uncreated energies (grace) emanating from God are freely perceived by a person, transforming, deifying him. Only here a very important addition was made: a person can become god not by essence, but by grace, while preserving his own human, created essence forever. The transition of the transcendent into the immanent, on which panentheism so insists, from this point of view is a mystery (for the human mind – a miracle), and not a natural law.

We see that the psychological problems that so deeply affected the soul of S. L. Frank were characteristic of the Christian world in the XIV century, and, presumably, at a much earlier time, and most importantly, they were solved and solved in the plane of the theistic worldview, without the slightest deviation into pantheism. The psychology of religion and the epistemology of S. L. Frank could significantly enrich the concept of "Orthodox energetism" ^[10] provided that some ontological views are abandoned, and, in particular, the idea of emanation. Did S. L. Frank himself know about St. Gregory Palamas, the main ideologist of the above-mentioned councils, was he familiar with his works? The answer to this question can only be positive: very rarely, but the philosopher mentions svt. Gregory Palamas, for example, when he writes (in a footnote) about him as a "mystical theologian" who distinguished "in God His "energy" permeating the created being from His unapproachable "essence"" ^{[3, p. 414]}. However, we must admit that a deep acquaintance with the teachings of svt. Nevertheless, S. L. Frank did not have Gregory Palamas, and his remark (again in a footnote) indirectly testifies to this that the "quite orthodox doctrine of cooperation (synergism) of freedom and grace as two independent instances" can be included in the installation of "Pelagianism" (in a broad sense) ^{[3, p. 331]}. Attention is drawn to the fundamentally incorrect "definition" of synergy contained here: cooperation occurs precisely between free God and man, and freedom and grace are not "instances" at all, but rather essential manifestations (the first is both God and man, the second is only God, therefore it is uncreated). The attribution of synergism to Pelagianism is beyond any criticism at all, if only because the Pelagian heresy attached very little importance to Divine grace, which cannot be said about Palamism, which places the acquisition of grace in Hesychast practice at the forefront. 

         It should be noted that in the pre-revolutionary years, especially in emigration, the works of svt. Gregory's Palamas were difficult to access, they were not widely distributed, and the Hesychastic part of his theological heritage was apparently almost unknown to Russian metaphysicians. And although the Orthodox collection "Dobrotolubie", compiled at the end of the XVIII century and periodically supplemented, contained many ascetic texts set forth in the Hesychast tradition, there are also some works of St. Peter in it. Gregory Palamas, but, for example, his "Triads in Defense of the Sacred and Silent", which contain the most important provisions of the theologian regarding synergetic practice, were published in Russian only at the very end of the XX century, already during the period of "perestroika" ^[11]. At the beginning of the XX century, however, there was a certain increase in the interest of the educated public in the works of svt. Grigory Palama in connection with the dispute of the "name Slavs", but it was very limited, without causing translations and publications of his main works related to the essence of this dispute. It can be assumed that a more detailed acquaintance with the Palamite doctrine would make its own adjustments to the worldview systems of Russian religious philosophers. Russian Russian philosopher Y. V. Bondareva notes that the first steps towards the reception of Palamism "have already been made in the Russian philosophy of the "post-Solovyov" era, however, fascination and even blindness with the methodology of unity did not allow Russian philosophers to develop independent philosophical systems based on energetism" ^{[12, p. 84]}.

Conclusion

So, we see that V. V. Zenkovsky had every reason, despite the general highest assessment of S. L. Frank's creativity, to criticize at the same time his metaphysics of unity, which logically inevitably leads to the assertion of a pantheistic worldview with its characteristic concept of the "outflow" of God into the world. As A. P. Glazkov accurately notes: "God in Frank's teaching is organically included in the unity" ^{[13, p. 257]}, and this is the natural result of independent research of the truth, the maximum to which deep and sincere philosophical reflection based on individual religious experience can lead. But the path of knowledge can be continued further if we accept as indisputable dogmas of the theology of Revelation, which S. L. Frank did not fully do, and as a result he never went beyond the pantheistic thinking. As for V. V. Zenkovsky, he, like svt. Grigory Palama, in his philosophical and theological work, tried to strictly adhere to the Orthodox monotheistic worldview, realizing the task of his whole life – the creation of a fundamental work "Fundamentals of Christian Philosophy", unfortunately, not finished (the first volume was published in 1961, the second in 1964, the third volume, anthropological, was never completed written), in which he sought to develop an integral religious and philosophical system, distancing itself from any modifications of pantheism and characterized by modern researchers as "Orthodox universalism" ^{[14, p. 442]}. The leitmotif of this work was the assertion of the "basic and central" idea of the creation of the world for Christian metaphysics, according to which "the world has no roots in itself" ^{[15, p. 148]}.

The main reason identified in the article, why S. L. Frank could not accept the Christian doctrine of God's creation of the world "out of nothing", in our opinion, has a pronounced psychological character. The philosopher, giving a clear preference in religious experience to the personal relationship between God and man, believed that the church authority, if not completely rejects them, then does not pay due attention to them when organizing religious practice. While agreeing that the latter often takes place in church life, it should still be noted that this is not caused by the peculiarities of the Christian doctrine, but by its misinterpretation, since synergy, the interaction of God and man, are fixed in it by dogmatic definitions that unequivocally affirm the possibility of deification of a person, performed not by essence, but by grace. Consequently, S. L. Frank's arguments in favor of the essential "affinity" of God and man lose their credibility, which means that the grounds for a "panentheistic" solution to the problem of the beginning of the world disappear.