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The dilemma of France's relations with Africa in the 21st century: the relationship between discourse and practice

Li Jinyang

Postgraduate student, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6

ljy950517@gmail.com

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0641.2023.3.43553

EDN:

SIYBSS

Received:

06-07-2023


Published:

13-07-2023


Abstract: The object of the study is the foreign policy of the French Republic. The subject of the study is the African vector of France's foreign policy in the 21st century during the presidencies of N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande and the current head of state E. Macron. The purpose of the study is to identify the reasons why France faced difficulties in the African direction of its foreign policy in the 21st century. The author analyses in detail the declarative and practical components of French policy towards Africa in the period under study. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of French military intervention in Africa between 2007 and 2023. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the study makes a comparative analysis of the discursive and practical dimensions of French policy towards Africa between 2007 and 2023 in order to identify possible reasons for the failure of France's policy course towards Africa in the 21st century. The study concludes that France, which has a long history of colonisation of Africa, still does not consider Africa as an equal partner, while the African dimension of French foreign policy is characterised by a contradiction between its declarative and practical components, as the declared principle of equality as the basis of Franco-African relations actually gives way to the traditional policy of spheres of influence and France's desire to maintain its position on the African continent.


Keywords:

foreign policy, France, Africa, Franco-African relations, military presence, colonialism, special partner for Africa, Nicolas Sarkozy, Francois Hollande, Emmanuel Macron

This article is automatically translated.

Introduction

In May 2022, E. Macron was successfully re-elected for a second presidential term. In March 2023, he visited Gabon, Angola, the Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo [1]. During his visit to Angola, E. Macron had a conversation with the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during a joint press conference on March 4 during his visit to this country. During a press conference, E. Macron accused the DRC government of incompetence and inability to control the security situation in the country. In turn, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that France cannot look at Africa with a paternalistic view. France should respect Africa and see it as a true partner.

France has always had a strong influence in Africa. After the end of World War II and the collapse of the colonial system, France continued to exert a profound influence on the development of many African countries through political, economic and military means. Nevertheless, the visit of E. Macron once again actualized the issue of the current role and image of France among African states, as well as the actual degree of equality in relations between France and Africa at the present stage.

 

Africa in N. Sarkozy's Foreign Policy strategy: a new Discourse with previous methods

As a result of the long colonization of Africa by France, Franco-African relations were described by researchers as "father-son" under Charles de Gaulle and "uncle-nephew" under Francois Mitterrand [2]. In the XXI century, with the rapid economic development of the continent, the role of Africa in the global political and economic systems is becoming increasingly important. The old "special Franco-African relations" clearly no longer correspond to the modern development of Franco-African relations. A feature of the new stage of relations between France and Africa is the gradual departure from the agenda of the former French colonialism. In particular, Nicolas Sarkozy, who held the post of president of the country in 2007-2012, was the first head of France born after World War II, and therefore he had no experience of France's colonial past in Africa and personal relations with African heads of state, like previous French leaders. The rapid development of ties between other world powers, especially developing countries such as China, and African countries at the beginning of the 20th century objectively weakened the French presence and forced France to reconsider its African policy.

One of N. Sarkozy's foreign policy tasks in relation to the African continent was the departure of Franco-African relations from the old colonial paradigm. To emphasize equality as a principle of Franco-African relations and the importance that France attaches to African countries, the heads of 13 African states were invited to the National Day of France on July 14, 2010, and the armies of African countries were invited to participate in the parade [3]. In his statement on Franco-African relations the day before the holiday, N. Sarkozy noted for the first time that the idea of Africa as France's "backyard" was a thing of the past, France would no longer position itself as a special partner of Africa [4]. According to the "White Paper on Defense and Security of France 2008", France closed some of its bases in Africa, and at the same time adjusted the deployment of its armed Forces in Africa, improving their maneuverability and responsiveness [5]. During a visit to South Africa in February 2008, N. Sarkozy publicly stated that he would adapt the military agreements signed by France and African countries to support Africa in creating its own collective security system, while Africans should guarantee their own security, since "France does not have the right to indefinitely keep armed forces in Africa" [6].

Despite the stated revision of the African vector of France's foreign policy, in fact, during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, France has repeatedly departed from the principles of equality in relations with the states of the region, guided by its national interests. An example is France's policy towards the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the activities of the Mediterranean Union. The idea of creating a Mediterranean Union was first proposed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in early 2007, when, setting out the main directions of the foreign policy of France and the EU as part of his election campaign, he expressed his intention to create a Mediterranean regional cooperation organization covering Southern Europe, North Africa and some countries of the Middle East [7]. As an important country in North Africa, Libya had a great influence on the formation and functioning of the Mediterranean Union. In 2007, shortly after his election, Sarkozy invited Libyan President Gaddafi to pay a visit to France and even set up a tent in the hotel where he was staying, in accordance with Bedouin customs [8]. At the time when N. Sarkozy was actively promoting the implementation of the Mediterranean Union, Libya, as one of the key states of North Africa, was in his sphere of attention. However, Gaddafi was not interested in the French project of the Mediterranean Union, as he did not want to leave control of the southern shores of the Mediterranean to France. On June 10, 2008, at the summit of Arab countries (Syria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), convened at the initiative of Libya, Gaddafi publicly spoke out against N. Sarkozy's project, saying that "the Mediterranean Union will destroy relations between Africa and Arab countries", "The Mediterranean Union is doomed to failure", and asked the Arab The countries should take a unified position on the creation of the Mediterranean Union [9]. As a result, relations between Libya and France have become tense.

At the end of 2010, the events of the "Arab Spring" began, which in early 2011 spread to Libya, marking the beginning of the civil war in the country. From the very beginning, France actively advocated intervention in Libya, condemning the Gaddafi regime, and on March 10, 2011, it was the first to recognize the legitimacy of the Transitional National Council of Libya, which was in opposition to the government of Gaddafi [10]. On March 17, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973, agreeing to impose a no-fly zone over Libya and to protect the civilian population by alternative means, with the exception of occupation by foreign forces [11]. After that, France took the initiative and sent military aircraft to launch airstrikes against Gaddafi's government forces. Despite the UN Security Council resolution, France's actions can be interpreted as going beyond the limits of this resolution. In particular, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that a direct attack on government forces goes beyond what was authorized by the UN Security Council resolution [12].

In general, N. Sarkozy's commitments to revise France's African policy have not been fully implemented. Although N. Sarkozy granted African countries a relatively equal status in the political sphere, but when his efforts to promote the "normalization of Franco-African relations" came into conflict with the real interests of France, there was a departure from the declared principle of equality in relations with the states of the region and the commitment to reduce the military presence of Paris in the region.

 

Africa in the foreign policy strategy of F. Hollande: continuity and unfulfilled promises

In 2012, N. Sarkozy lost the election to the Socialist candidate Francois Hollande, who became the second socialist president of France after Francois Mitterrand. F. Hollande, as a socialist and representative of the post-war generation of French leaders, continued to proclaim equality as a key principle of Franco-African relations in his political statements. In October 2012, F. Hollande made a speech in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, in his speech he stated that France and Africa have a common history, which was both beautiful and cruel, and stressed that the era of what was once called "Francafrica" is over [13].

In the field of military cooperation in the first year of his tenure in power , F. Hollande stressed the need to reduce the military presence in Africa, in his speech in Dakar in 2012, he emphasized that the future of Africa would be achieved by strengthening African self-government [14]. This was reflected in the White Paper on the Defense and Security of France, released in 2013: France believes that Africa is especially important for French and European security, the entire Sahel region from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, as well as some parts of the sub-Saharan Africa are a priority area of interest for Europe and France, at the same time France stressed that which helps Africa build its own defense forces, since Africans "have to solve their own problems" [15].

However, ensuring a military presence in Africa and intervening if necessary was one of the most effective means by which France maintained its influence in Africa [16]. Statements by F. Hollande's proposals to reduce interference in African affairs were limited to the premise that the continent would be "safe" and that French interests in Africa would not suffer. When there was a threat to French interests in Africa, F. Hollande, like his predecessors, also resorted to military intervention. A striking example of this was the change in France's position during the crisis in Mali.

After the coup d'etat in Mali in March 2012, armed extremist groups occupied the northern part of the country and threatened the security of the Sahel region, which is one of the traditional spheres of France's interests. France's initial proposal was a military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the leadership of the UN with the support of France in accordance with the idea of F. Hollande on "strengthening African self-government." However, at the beginning of 2013, the situation in Mali became critical, the unrest spread to the countries surrounding Mali, posing a direct threat to French interests. In particular, Mali's neighbor, Niger, is an important source of uranium for France, which is necessary to maintain the status of a nuclear power and the operation of nuclear power plants, at that time 1/3 of France's annual uranium needs fell on the neighboring countries of Mali [17]. As a result , the relation of F. Hollande's attitude to the situation in Mali has changed. In December 2012, France drafted UN Security Council Resolution 2085 and achieved its adoption. The resolution included the consent of the relevant countries to intervene in the situation in Mali [18]. Subsequently, the Malian authorities sent an invitation to the French government to help in the fight against the Islamists, which gave the French government additional grounds for sending troops. In January 2013, France officially launched Operation Serval in Mali and quickly, at the end of January, took control of the situation in the country [19]. However, instead of withdrawing the armed forces from Mali immediately after relative stabilization, France has repeatedly postponed the date of withdrawal of troops. There is reason to believe that the administration of F. Hollande hoped to expand the French military presence in the region as a result of the intervention in Mali [20].

Finally, in July 2014, the French Defense Minister announced that Operation Serval in Mali was over, but France never withdrew its armed forces from Mali and instead joined the five countries of the Sahara-Sahel region in Operation Barkhan to combat terrorism in the region. The Minister of Defense categorically stated that it would be a "permanent presence" [21]. Thanks to these measures of the French Government, it was possible to strengthen its military presence in the region, while practical solutions to F. Hollande was contradicted by his statement "to allow Africans to solve their own problems."

Thus, in African politics, F. Hollande still had a noticeable discrepancy between the discourse and the practice of foreign policy. This contradiction was especially pronounced when it came to the French military presence in Africa. The reason for this is that there has been no significant change in the status of the African continent in the French national strategy. Despite F. 's attempts . Hollande's efforts to normalize Franco-African political and economic relations, France chose interventionism as a means of achieving foreign policy goals and realizing national interests.

 

Africa in E. Macron's foreign policy strategy: a new stage or a traditional approach?

In May 2017, at the age of 39, F. Hollande was replaced as President of France by Emmanuel Macron. Both in his election declarations and in specific diplomatic actions, E. Macron demonstrated efforts to develop Franco-African relations and move away from their "special character". E. Macron's speech at the University of Ouagadougou in the capital of Burkina Faso on November 28, 2017 can be considered as an official statement about his African policy. In his speech, which lasted more than two hours, E. Macron decisively demonstrated his desire to restart Franco-African relations: for example, E. Macron did not avoid the question of France's colonial past in Africa, stressing that "the crimes of European colonization are indisputable and are part of our history"; he considers the African continent as a whole and He believes that "the barriers between French-speaking or English-speaking Africa, between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, between French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking Africa are artificial"; he expressed "a desire to fulfill the conditions for the temporary or permanent return of African heritage (cultural values) within five years" [22].

E. Macron continued the practice of his predecessors and paid special attention to military operations in Africa, visiting Mali just four days after his inauguration and paying tribute to the French soldiers conducting Operation Barkhan there. [23]. E. Macron's appointment of a new foreign minister also reflected the importance he attached to the fight against terrorism in Africa: Jean-Yves Le Drian was Minister of Defense under F. Hollande, and during his work as Minister of Defense, France launched an intervention in Mali. After E. Macron took office as president, he moved to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of France [24]. In December 2017, E. Macron convened a meeting of the leaders of the Sahel region in Paris with the participation of representatives of other EU, UN and AU countries in order to accelerate the implementation of the plan of the joint forces of the Sahel Five, at which the EU promised to contribute 50 million euros to the training of the joint forces of the five, and France - 8 million euros [25]. However, E. Macron's measures did not have a significant impact on the security situation in the Sahel region. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the number of terrorist attacks in Mali in the period from 2016 to 2018 amounted to 100, 142 and 164 cases, respectively, which indicates a trend towards an increase in terrorist activity in the region [26].

In light of the commitment made in a speech in Ouagadougou to return the African heritage, in March 2018, E. Macron commissioned a report by Senegalese writer and economist Felvin Sarre and French art critic Benedict Savoy. The report entitled "Restoring African Heritage: Towards a New Ethics of Relationships", presented on November 23, 2018, shed light on the situation and features of African heritage, as well as outlined proposals for the implementation of restitution procedures [27]. The first 26 African cultural values were returned to African countries before the end of the year, as stipulated by the relevant French law of December 24, 2020 [28]. However, it is worth noting that French museums have a collection of almost 90,000 African cultural values and that the return of these values has yet to be ensured [29].

Thus, E. Macron began to pursue a qualitatively different course of development of Franco-African relations from his predecessors. From his declarations on policy towards Africa to concrete diplomatic actions, E. Macron is making efforts to promote a new stage of Franco-African relations, striving to form a positive image of France in Africa. However, his efforts are still far from the goal of rebuilding Franco-African relations. In 2021, E. Macron invited many young Africans to the postponed Franco-African summit in Montpellier, but they criticized France's African policy, calling it "arrogant", "colonialist", "military intervention", "paternalistic and racist", and stated that Western aid had been provided in Africa for centuries without much Of course, Africa does not need help, but an end to the intervention of France and other Western countries and Africa's choice of its own path of development [30]. It is obvious that E. Macron's policy towards Africa in the first term, despite his desire to rebuild Franco-African relations, could not reverse the long-standing negative image of France in the minds of Africans.

 

Conclusion

In general, France does not consider Africa as an equal partner. In the 19th century, as the international status of the African continent increased and the overall power of France decreased, successive French presidents tried to move away from the concept of "special Franco-African relations" and establish an equal, modern Franco-African partnership. Nevertheless, under the presidency of N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande and E. Macron, the French leaders were not able to overcome the contradictions with the African states on issues of common history, and equality as a principle of relations was mainly declarative in nature, in connection with which Africa was never able to obtain an equal status with France in the minds of the French leadership.. This problem of Franco-African relations can be considered as one of the reasons for the decline of France's former influence in Africa in favor of such powers as Russia and China. These countries have never colonized the African continent and have always regarded it as a close partner for cooperation and development in the spirit of the concept of equality and mutual benefit, which has become a factor in the rapid development of Russian-African and Chinese-African relations in the 20th century.

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Review of the article The Dilemma of France's relations with Africa in the 21st century: the correlation of discourse and practice." The subject of the study is indicated in the title of the article and explained in the article. The author of the article examines the policy of France in African countries at the beginning of the XXI century during the period when N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande and E. Macron were in power. Research methodology. The dissertation used general scientific methods - problem-historical, comparative and system analyses. The paper also uses a descriptive method to analyze the development of relations between France and African countries. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that France has always had a strong influence on Africa and after the Second World War and the collapse of the colonial system, France was able not to lose its special influence and continued to exert a fairly strong influence on the development of many African countries "through political, economic and military means." At the beginning of the XXI century. France has stated that it will build equal partnerships with African countries. The question of France's role among African countries and the "actual degree of equality in relations between France and Africa" in the last two decades seems relevant and beyond doubt. France for a long time. The novelty of the research lies in the formulation of the question and objectives of the research. The novelty of the reviewed article is also due to the modernity of the topic, a comprehensive study of available sources and literature on the topic, as well as an attempt to comprehensively study Franco-African relations during the reign of three presidents N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande and E. Macron. An attempt was made to identify what was common in their policy towards African countries and what was distinctive. The novelty of the article also lies in the fact that it is actually the first work in which this topic was covered. The style of the article is scientific, clear and clear, at the same time, there are descriptive elements, which makes the article more accessible and understandable not only to specialists, but also to a wide range of readers. The structure of the article is aimed at achieving the purpose and objectives of the article, it is logically structured. The structure consists of an introduction, which describes the history of France's relations with African countries, shows the relevance of the study, the main part consists of three sections: Africa in the foreign policy strategy of N. Sarkozy: a new discourse with previous methods; Africa in the foreign policy strategy of F. Hollande: continuity and unfulfilled promises; Africa in E. Macron's foreign policy strategy: a new stage or a traditional approach? The names of the sections reveal their contents. The article concludes with a conclusion, which presents the conclusions on the topic under study. The content of the article is presented logically and is replete with interesting details on the research topic. The conclusions are objective and follow from the work done, the author (authors of the article) note that modern realities (increasing the international status of the African continent and reducing the overall power of France, as well as the emergence of new actors in the international arena (Russia and China), three French presidents tried to move away from the "concept of "special Franco-African relations" and to establish an equal, modern Franco-African partnership," but they could not overcome contradictions with African countries on issues of common history, "and equality as a principle of relations was mainly declarative, in connection with which Africa was never able to obtain an equal status with France in the minds of the French leadership." The bibliography of the article contains 30 sources (these are monographs and articles by Russian researchers, as well as works in French and Chinese). The bibliography, as well as the text of the article, show that the author is well versed in the topic. e. The appeal to the opponents is presented at the level of information collected during the work on the article and in the bibliography. The article is written on an urgent topic, has signs of novelty and will arouse the interest of specialists.