The struggle for power in Egypt in May 1971 and its impact on relations with the USSR

Abdalla Moataz Mohamed Eldawoudy ORCID: 0000-0002-9008-0395 Postgraduate Student, Department of Oriental Studies, Ural Federal University 620083, Russia, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Yekaterinburg, Lenina str., 51 Mr.Moataz@Mail.Ru Other publications by this author

The events that took place in Egypt in May 1971 are one of the most important problems that the country faced in its relations with the USSR, since Egyptian President M. A. Sadat overthrew a group of politicians known for their loyalty and ideological ties with the Soviet Union. Politicians and analysts of that time regarded this event as a serious blow to Soviet influence in the Middle East and an indirect victory for the United States, but the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Egypt and the USSR was a confirmation to the whole world that the latter's position remains the same in the region, despite the fall of their supporters in Egypt. The truth in this matter is connected with the fact that after the death of Egyptian President G. A. Nasser on September 28, 1970, according to the laws of the country, supreme power passed to Vice President Sadat before the election of a new president ^{[1, p.96]}. A few days after Nasser's death, the centers of power (a group of supporters of President Nasser who remained in senior positions After his death) considered Sadat weaker than themselves and decided that if he became president of Egypt, they would be able to control him and govern the country. Based on this, the Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union nominated Sadat for the post of president of the country to replace Nasser p^{[2, p.136]}.

On October 15, 1970, a national referendum was held in Egypt to elect Sadat as president. Sadat has already received broad support from a large mass of the Egyptian people, trade unions, representatives of peasants, intellectuals, students and many public organizations. After his success in the popular referendum, Sadat declared, after becoming president of Egypt, that his policy would be the same as Nasser's ^[3].

The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the focus of Sadat's attention since the very beginning of his reign. In January 1971, Sadat convened a meeting of the VIC ACC to discuss Egypt's reaction to the end of the ceasefire period established by the Rogers plan. Then the first disagreements between the president and the centers of power, known as the A. Sabri group, appeared. At that meeting, Sadat proposed extending the ceasefire period by a month and opening the Suez Canal to international shipping. However, provided that Israel is ready to partially withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula as the first stage of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories and the return of the borders that existed before June 5, 1967 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 242. Sabri and his group, which controlled the ACC, unanimously rejected this proposal and considered it necessary to continue fighting against Israel. Sabri described in his memoirs the reasons for rejecting this proposal: "I objected because this initiative could show that we are in a weak position before the world... It also shows that we have not liberated our territory, and those who help us in returning our territories will see that we are not serious." The meeting ended without comments from Sadat ^{[4, p.100]}.

Sadat insisted on the implementation of his idea and announced on February 4, 1971 at the National Assembly: "The UAR is committed to one responsibility, namely the idea of liberating all territories occupied since 1967. Therefore, I will announce that we decide to extend the ceasefire period for thirty days until March 7. We ask the UN Secretary-General and the international community to ensure, during the period when we refrain from firing, a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory, that is, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal as the first stage of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories in accordance with the schedule to be established for the implementation of resolution 242 The Security Council" ^{[5, p.716]}. In his memoirs published in 1978, Sadat outlined his point of view, which he expressed to the centers of power at the meeting: "I told them that I would not enter into another war of attrition until I received missile batteries from the USSR and ensured the security of half of Egypt's facilities" ^{[6, p.232]}. And this confirms what Sadat saw: his army at that time was not ready to engage in new battles due to the lack of modern weapons that help achieve victory, and this was clear in his speech at the UAR National Assembly on February 4. Then he said: "Israel took advantage of the ceasefire and received an unlimited amount of weapons and equipment under the pretext of a balance in the Middle East" ^{[5, p.712]}.

On the other hand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt M. Riyadh clarified Sadat's initiative by stating: "The President believed that this initiative would attract to us the countries that suffered from the closure of the Suez Canal, and if Israel rejects this initiative, the whole world will oppose it, which will lead to its international isolation" p^{[7, p.343]}. Since then, the dispute between Sadat and Sabri began to escalate, as the memoirs of Sadat and Sabri showed that the differences between them were not so much because of different political views, as an expression of a power struggle. It is clear that Sadat felt that the centers of power led by Sabri wanted to control all political decisions. He wrote about this in his memoirs: "It was clear from the discussion that the prevailing opinion would be in favor of the centers of power – the political majority left by Nasser... Therefore, I did not tell anyone from the centers of power about the final decision to implement the initiative to extend the ceasefire. And when I announced my initiative at the National Assembly on February 4, everyone was stunned" ^{[6, p.323]}. In this regard , Sabri noted in his memoirs the following: "When Sadat announced the initiative, it became clear to me that this was the beginning of a struggle between us" ^{[4, p.101]}. It can be briefly said that the initiative to extend the ceasefire was considered the starting point for a dispute between Sadat and the centers of power. The discussion and political views of each of the two sides also showed the desire to rule Egypt alone. On the one hand, Sadat wanted to rule Egypt as Nasser's successor, and on the other, Sabri and his group saw themselves as Sadat's partners in governing the country.

When Sadat decided to get rid of Sabri, whom he described in his memoirs as the supreme agent of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the president tried to find out the position of the USSR on this step so that it would not affect foreign policy relations. Sadat told the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, V. M. Vinogradov, that he had decided to get rid of Sabri: "I am very interested in relations with you, but I would like to inform the Soviet government that I have decided to get rid of A. Sabri, knowing that this concerns internal affairs. But I'm afraid when I do, Western newspapers will talk about getting rid of the first person of Moscow in Egypt, which will cause you embarrassment" ^{[6, p.235]}. And then the Soviet ambassador told Sadat that this was an internal matter of Egypt and he should not comment on the decision taken by the Egyptian president ^{[8, p.32]}.

The dispute between Sadat and the centers of power came to an impasse when on April 17, 1971, the president announced the creation of a union ("Federation of Arab Republics") between Syria, Egypt and Libya, without consulting anyone from the ACC. This, in turn, angered the centers of power, so Sabri rallied supporters in the ACC to oppose the decision to create the FAR. Sadat was criticized at a meeting of the VIC ACC when he tried to speak. Despite the hostile popular demonstration organized against the President by the Sabri group, Sadat made a speech to the population in the Helwan district of Cairo on May 1, 1971, in which he openly expressed his intention to eliminate all centers of power. The next day, Sadat dismissed Sabri p^{[9, p.60]}.

Sabri's fall did not lead to any serious consequences, but his group preferred such a method of action as a conspiracy against the president. It follows from Sadat's memoirs that on May 11, 1971, a security officer Taha Zaki visited him and personally handed over a tape recording of conversations of the centers of power. From these recordings, it became clear to Sadat that Sabri's group had entered into a conspiracy against him, intending to besiege the Egyptian radio building in order to prevent him from speaking to the people, and then kill him ^{[6, p.236]}.

On May 13, 1971, an unexpected message was broadcast on Cairo radio that Sh. Gomaa had resigned from the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister. Following this, the resignation of Minister of State Affairs S. Sharaf, Minister of Information M. Fayek, Minister of Construction and Housing M. S. Zayed and Minister of Electricity and Dams H. was announced. El-Said. President Sadat was not notified about this beforehand. The resignation of A. Abu al-Nur from the post of Secretary General of the ACC was immediately announced, followed by the resignation of the Chairman of the National Assembly M. L. Shukeyr, member of the ACC D. Daoud, Minister of War M. Fawzi and Chief of General Intelligence A. Kamel. All of them planned to put pressure on Sadat from a position of strength if he did not accept their resignation. Otherwise, a constitutional crisis will break out in the country, as a result of which the president will be forced to leave [10. p.33]. Also, their resignation will lead to problems in relations with the USSR, since they were supporters of Soviet policy in Egypt p^{[11, p.127]}.

Sadat acted quickly and decisively. He accepted their resignation and appointed a new government, including M. A. Elzayat as Minister of Information, who was instructed to take control of radio and television. The Chief of the General Staff, M. Sadek, who showed loyalty to Sadat, was promoted and appointed Minister of War. And also the Governor of Alexandria M. Salem became the Minister of Internal Affairs. People loyal to Sadat were sent to those organizations that were headed by persons who resigned. Thus, the strategy of the centers of power failed, and the Egyptian government did not collapse. As a result, all those who resigned appeared in court on charges of conspiracy against the country ^{[10, p.33]}.

These events coincided with the visit of US Secretary of State William Rogers to Egypt on May 3, 1971, which was the first visit of a US Secretary of State to Egypt since 1953. On May 9, US President Nixon stated that American and Soviet interests in the Middle East contradict each other, and this means that the US administration is concerned about the Soviet presence in Egypt p^{[12, p.394]}. On the other hand, a few days before Rogers' arrival in Cairo, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee met to reassess the situation in Soviet-Egyptian relations, at which V. A. Kirpichenko, a resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in Egypt, presented a report indicating that Sadat planned to secede from the Soviet Union and deliberately deceived the Kremlin ^{[13, p.117-118]}. So it was natural that all the successive events led to the dissatisfaction of the Soviet leadership with Sadat's policy. And here it should be noted the words of the Ambassador of Egypt to the USSR M. Ghaleb regarding the position of the USSR: "When the leaders of the Soviet Union were in intellectual confusion, I met A. A. Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in his office at the Foreign Ministry, and he told me: "A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, asks you have no explanation of what is happening in Egypt..."To be honest, I replied to Gromyko that what happened does not mean that President Sadat does not want relations with the USSR, he wants good relations with your country" ^{[14, p.169]}.

As for Sadat, he received the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov at the Al-Tahra Palace in Cairo, and they talked about the events of May. In an interview with the Ambassador, the President explained that Sabri and other leaders abused their power and interfered with the rights of the president, citing as an example that the centers of power tried to disrupt the idea of creating the FAR. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador assured Sadat that these events would not be reflected in Soviet-Egyptian relations ^{[8, pp.37-38]}. And on May 20, 1971, during a speech at the National Assembly, Sadat called these events a "corrective revolution", stating: "I tell the whole story about this: the revolution of correction, which people started on May 15 last week, should give the leadership of the alliance of national forces a sense of leadership" ^{[15, p.1648]}.

In general, the Soviet leadership felt that with the fall of the A. Sabri group and the attempts of the United States to intensify contacts with Cairo, it was time to protect Soviet interests in Egypt and the Middle East. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee held a meeting at which it was decided to send the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. V. Podgorny to Cairo to conclude the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation as a guarantee of the continuation of the rapprochement with the Soviet Union achieved by Nasser. The Soviet delegation headed by Podgorny, together with Ambassador Ghalib, had already left for Cairo on May 25, 1971, when negotiations with the Egyptian side began: the Soviet delegation invited Sadat to sign an agreement on friendship and cooperation between Egypt and the USSR for a period of 15 years. Sadat found it necessary to study this issue by meeting with an Egyptian delegation consisting of Egyptian National Security Adviser H. Ismail, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Riad and Ambassador Ghaleb. During the meeting, Ghaleb told Sadat: "This is probably an exam. The Soviet leaders want to know your political direction and plans with them after you exiled those with whom they had good relations..." Sadat replied: "Yes, this is really an exam, and I have no other choice, I will sign the contract." The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Egypt was signed on May 27, 1971 ^{[14, pp.169–170]}.

 So, we can conclude that underestimating the real role and political weight of Sadat is evidence of a clear miscalculation of his opponents. At the same time, the struggle for power in Egypt caused concern among the leaders of the USSR, since the events of the struggle coincided with Rogers' visit to Cairo. This led to the need to conclude a Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship and cooperation in May 1971, until the Soviet leadership was convinced of Sadat's good intentions.