Aristotle's Early Treatises as a Clue to Interpreting of Plato’s Euthyphro

Soloviev Roman Sergeevich ORCID: 0000-0002-0833-0624 Postgraduate, Lecturer at the Department of Philology at Moscow Theological Academy (Sergiev Posad, Russia), Lecturer at the Department of Early Christian Literature at St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University for the Humanities (Moscow, Russia) 141310, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, Likhov Lane, 6, office 1 solorom@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

This article is an attempt to rethink the place of the dialogue "Euthyphron", in which the interlocutors try to define one of the virtues – piety (). "Euthyphron" is included in the Corpus platonicum, which contains both Platonic dialogues and dialogues written most likely by members of the Academy. In world science, the Euthyphron is attributed and dated in different ways, and in Russian science, with rare exceptions ^[1], this dialogue was not a special object of scientific research. The dialogue is considered both belonging to Plato and not belonging to him; as one of the earliest, and belonging to the late period. Meanwhile, it is on understanding the place of this dialogue in the Platonic corpus that its correct interpretation depends.

In earlier articles ^{[2],[3],[4],[5]} we compared the dialogues "Protagoras" and "Euthyphron", which traditionally belong to the early works of Plato. Based on the analysis of the genre, the differences in the image of Socrates, the peculiarities of the interpretation of the concept of "piety", as well as comparison with other works of the Platonic corpus, we came to the conclusion that the dialogues under study could not have been written simultaneously, namely: "Protagoras" refers to the early works of Plato, and "Euthyphron" is probably a late work platonic corps. Considering that the very concept of "early Socratic dialogue" turns out to be questionable: neither from a genre, nor from a substantive, nor from a methodological point of view, the dialogues usually included in this group are not distinguished by unity, their authorship is questionable, which is why the traditional point of view needs to be revised. We also identified a group of school dialogues in a direct dramatic form and showed their mutual closeness. Having given examples of the dependence of "Minos", "Alcibiades I", and "Crito" on Plato's later dialogues, we focused on finding parallels between "Euthyphron" and "Laws". The closeness in the consideration of controversial topics, the direct parallels of the definitions of piety in "Euthyphron" to "Laws", the assessment of the role of piety and obedience to the state in two dialogues allowed us to hypothesize that "Euthyphron" is an example of an academic discussion of a certain topic of "Laws": the relationship of justice and piety.

Aristotle at the Platonic Academy

So, in the previous series of articles in the Theological Bulletin, we came to the conclusion that "Euthyphron" cannot be considered a youthful Platonic dialogue. It belongs to the late dialogues of Plato's corpus, based on its genre, linguistic, literary and stylistic features (comparable to Plato's work on "Laws"). Further, "Euthyphron" is probably a fake dialogue, which can be judged both on the basis of style and on the basis of dependence in literary and substantive terms, characteristic of other school dialogues. Finally, by bringing the relevant context of other dialogues, comparing with them and identifying their mutual influence, we have shown that this is a school dialogue reflecting the practice of disputationis in utramque partem, containing the materials discussed in the "Laws".

To confirm the late chronology of the writing of the Euthyphron dialogue, we should refer to the texts of a direct participant in academic discussions – Aristotle and try to find common places in his texts with the dialogues of the circle of "Laws" relevant to us. Defending the thesis that the dialogue "Euthyphron" was written in the late period of Platonic creativity against the background of "Laws", we should pay special attention to the texts of Aristotle, since Aristotle, who joined the Academy in 366 BC, immediately declared himself as a researcher: he participates in the discussion of methods of sophistry and rhetoric, as well as he begins to develop new separate sciences: logic, physics, ethics and politics ^[6]. Aristotle argued with Plato at the Academy. Questions of rhetoric began to occupy Plato precisely because of the Aristotelian approach to rhetoric and dialectics. As an example, the very beginning of Aristotle's "Rhetoric" is often cited, in which it is called dialectics. This is a response to Plato's "Gorgias" (Plato. Gorg. 465d:7-e:1), where rhetoric is called cooking art. Thus, Aristotle questions the value of Plato's invented dialectics as a method. Plato defends dialectics in Parmenides, where he talks with one of the characters, Aristotle, and also in Philebus, where the position of Aristotle is personified by the Protarch who is interested in the originals. While still at the Academy, Aristotle writes textbooks () and treatises (). He also castigates the method of dieresis invented by Plato (Arist. Anal. I. 31, 46a:32-34: ? · ? , ?’ ), criticizes need ideas (Idem. Anal. II. 77a:5-7: ? , , ), argues with Plato and platonically in his works.

Aristotle was the first to introduce historical excursions into his works (Arist. Top. 105b:12-18). The collections constructed according to the same rules are seen in "Minos" (the state structure of Crete under Minos: 318c-321c) and "Alcibiades I" (an essay on the state structure of the Spartans and Persians, 120a-124b). There is no such detailed essay in Euthyphron, but the dialogue mentions the gods Zeus, Cronus, Uranus, Hephaestus and Gaia, Daedalus, Tantalus and Proteus, and also analyzes the poems of an unknown poet (passim).

References to school dialogues in the writings of Aristotle

While still at the Academy, Aristotle writes "Sophistic Refutations" and "Topics". In the 14th Chapter of "threads" we meet as an example of moral follows: ? , (Arist. Top. 105b:21-23), which is a direct mapping of the situation of Estepona that, deciding to obey the laws haunts in the court of his father. In the treatise "On Virtues and Vices", included in the Corpus Aristotelicum, among the virtues we also find piety, which "either is part of justice or accompanies it", which again corresponds to the problematic of "Euthyphron" (Arist. De virtutibus et vitiis. 1250b:19-24: , , , · ? , ? . ? ? ). This treatise has a long history of disputes about authenticity. Since the XVI century. belonging to Aristotle began to be questioned In the XIX century. E. Zeller and K. Shuhard, based on the proximity of the text to Plato's ideas, the presence of late vocabulary, parallels with the original writings of Aristotle, as well as based on the method of describing and classifying virtues, which is characteristic of peripatetics after Theophrastus, attributed the text to the period of late eclecticism. However, in the middle of the XX century, researchers Z?rcher and Golke questioned the arguments of the inauthenticity of the treatise. For a detailed exposition of the arguments for and against the authorship of Aristotle, see ^[7].

In Aristotle's "Divisions" we find the division of justice into three parts: in relation to gods, people and the dead. Justice towards the gods consists in pious thanksgiving to the gods and the fulfillment of their commandments (Arist. Divisiones. 6col:2: ? · , , . ? ’ ). Another connection between Aristotle and Euthyphron is Aristotle's criticism of those who introduce ideas as models (Arist. Metaph. 991a:20-23: ? . ; the same idea: 1079b24-26. Y. A. Shichalin convinced that this passage from Metaphysics taken from the writings of the ideas or somehow connected. This is confirmed by the testimony of Alexander of Aphrodisia in the commentary on Metaphysics, where it is said that the first book On ideas just talked about the idea and the paradigm (Alex. Aphrod. In Metaph. 79.4)). This criticism may well be addressed to Euthyphron's Socrates, who is convinced that there is one idea for the pious and the impious, which serves as the basis for affirming or denying the piety of anything (Plato. Euthyph. 6e).

Parallels between Aristotle and the dialogue "Crito" are indicated by A. Zolotukhina ^{[8, pp. 136-137]}. Thus, according to Aristotle, all citizens belong to the state, which is why it regulates marriage, birth and upbringing of children (Arist. Pol. 1337a:27-29, 1334b – 1336a). This position is similar to the opinion of the Laws from "Crito" (51d-e). In addition, according to the "Laws" (Leg. 762e:1-7), the ruler must be able not only to govern, but also to obey. Aristotle also believes in his "Politics", noting that it is impossible to govern without the ability to obey (Arist. Pol. 1277a:25-27, 1277b:9-13). In addition, a significant part of "Politics" is devoted to criticism of Plato's "Laws" (Arist. Pol. 1264b:26 ff.).

Aristotle's doctrine of justice is very similar to what we see in "Euthyphron" and "Laws". As we remember, Plato in "Euthyphron" (7b-d) distinguishes two groups of concepts: what can be measured, calculated and weighed (arithmetic equality), as well as fair and unfair, beautiful and shameful, good and evil (geometric equality). The "Laws" (757b:1-7) also deal with two opposite equalities: measures, weights and numbers, as well as the judgment of the gods who most honor the virtuous. In the texts of Aristotle, in particular in the Nicomachean Ethics, we see that Aristotle establishes two types of justice. The first governs how the state distributes benefits among citizens, the second regulates the relations of citizens among themselves (Nic. Eth. 1130b:30-35). Both types of justice are designed to ensure fair equality, but the first is based on geometric equality, the second on arithmetic (Idem. 1131b:12-15, 1132a:1-2).

Here, speaking about and , Aristotle admits absolutely eftimovski statement: inequality and illegality are not identical, but differ from each other as part of a whole (because all unequal illegal, but not all illegal uneven), and the unjust and injustice is not the same thing, on the contrary, they differ from each other as part of the whole (Arist. Nic. Eth. 1130b:11-14: ’ ( , ), ? ’ , ?’ ), the same is true of injustice and justice (Idem. 1130b:14-16: ? , ? ). In Euthyphron, such relations are established in relation to the pious and the just, where the former turns out to be part of the latter (Plato. Euthyph. 12c-d).

Topic

Returning to how the dialogue "Euthyphron" is constructed, we note that Aristotle's "Topic" describes the principles according to which syllogisms should be constructed (Arist. Top. 105a:35–105b:35, 106a–107b:35, 108a:1-5). First, we must accept a certain position, in our case a moral one: who should obey more – the laws or parents? Further, Aristotle advises to consider the genera of things called the same, so that, despite homonymy, it was possible to determine their difference from each other. In "Euthyphron" the author does this, establishing the content of piety. When Socrates' interlocutor identifies piety with concern for the gods (12e5-8), Socrates is just beginning to establish what this concern is, consistently distinguishing the desired concept from those of the same name: whether it is bringing benefit to the gods, or the art of serving them. This is exactly what Aristotle suggests doing: finding out all the meanings of a word in order to avoid homonymy.

Further in the text, "Topic" advises finding differences within the same kind. As an example, Aristotle advises to establish how justice differs from courage (to which "Lakhet" is dedicated) and prudence ("Menon") — from moderation ("Harmid"). "Euthyphron" is also dedicated to establishing such a relationship, but already between justice and piety.

Following the difference, according to Aristotle (Arist. Top. 108a:12-17), one should find similarities in things. Aristotle mentions man, horse and dog as examples belonging to the same genus. If the same thing is inherent in them, then they are similar to each other. This similarity in the "Euthyphron" is the benefit. So, Socrates says that not every concern is directed at the same thing, it serves a certain good and benefit of the one to whom it is directed. As an example, the author of "Euthyphron", in full agreement with Aristotle, cites people, horses and dogs (Plato. Euthyph. 12e:7-8, 13a:1-12).

Aristotle convinces that finding differences is useful for drawing conclusions about the identical and different, as well as for knowing the essence of each thing (Arist. Top. 108a:38–108b:1). In Euthyphron, Socrates and the interlocutor, finding out the essence of piety, at a certain stage come to the statement that what is pleasing to the gods is pious, while what is objectionable is impious. Having found the difference, Socrates did not fail to notice that the pious and the impious are not identical, but directly opposite to each other. Reproducing this school formula, the author of the dialogue does not hold back and through the mouth of Socrates asks Euthyphron if he agrees with the obvious things: O o; . . . ; . , ? . [ .] (Plato. Euthyph. 7a:9-b:1).

In the second book of Topics, Aristotle advises replacing a less understandable word with a more understandable one, since the more clearly what is said, the easier it is to refute the thesis (Arist. Top. 111a:8-11). In Euthyphron (14d6-e8), Socrates applies this method and replaces the definition of "piety – the science of how to ask and bestow gods" with a more understandable and definite "piety – the art of trade between people and gods." Moreover, Socrates himself puts forward these definitions (14d:9-10, 14e:6-7), and then, when Euthyphron agrees with him (14e8: "if you like it that way"), exclaims: "I don't like it at all, since it's wrong," and then easily deals with his own thesis.

Socrates in "Itemone", citing the words of the poet " ", disagrees and sets the opposite correlation: where shame, there is fear, because shame is a kind of fear, as odd (view) part number (kind of). Transferring this logic to piety and the just, Socrates tries to establish what part (kind) constitutes piety in the just (kind) (Plato. Euthyph. 12b-d). Aristotle speaks of the need to establish a relationship between the genus and the species, because what the species contains must contain the genus, but what the species does not contain is not necessarily absent in the genus (Arist. Top. 111a:15-30). This procedure in "Evtifron" is implemented just by the example of establishing the ratio of shame and fear (Plato. Euthyph. 12b:5-c:1).

In order to refute the thesis, Aristotle advises considering it based on the actual or apparent definitions of the subject under discussion, because it is easier to argue against definitions (Arist. Top. 111b:12-16). The dialogue "Euthyphron" is based on the nomination and refutation of consistently put forward definitions of piety:

1) "what I do",

2) what the gods want,

3) what all the gods want,

4) piety is just,

5) piety – offering sacrifices and offering prayers, i.e. pleasing the gods.

As an example of refutation, Aristotle mentions the refutation of a proposition through the refutation of its consequences. It is necessary to find contradictory statements, because this will help to refute the thesis (Arist. Top. 113a:23). In Euthyphron, Socrates refutes the definition of "piety – pleasing to the gods" in this way. Since it is impossible for opposites to be inherent in the same thing at the same time, the definition of Euthyphron is also incorrect, since the pious turns out to be identical with the wicked, because one and the same thing is hated by some gods, and the other is loved (Plato. Euthyph. 8a:10-b:6).

In the third book "Topics", Aristotle, speaking about the preferred, advises to rely on the opinion of a good and prudent person, as well as on the opinions of specialists (Arist. Top. 116a:13-19), the appeal to which is an indispensable attribute of school dialogues (Plato. Alc. I 110d-e and Crit. 44d:8-9, Min. 316c:3-e:3, 317e:2–318a:2, Laches. 184d–185a. Cf. giving examples of medical and construction art in "Topic" 116a:17-18 and school "Ion" 537c:8-9). The next top is also implemented in school dialogues: Aristotle speaks about the preference of gender over specific manifestations and gives an example of justice itself, preferable to something fair. This indication is consistent with the search for a kind of pious, and not a separate pious in Euthyphron, which is realized in the requirement to define the pious by itself, and not to give individual examples.

Discussing tops, concerning the kind, Aristotle notes that the kind of relates to everything that is subject to the same species (Arist. Top. 120b:19-20: CP. the request of Socrates in "Itemone" (6d:11) specify the form in which all the pious is pious: ? ). Special attention Aristotle devotes a wrong definition of the genus through intervening ( ), which is not the essence of things, but something valid or is undergoing a (Arist. Top. 120b:26-27: ? ), as well as the quality of things ( ). In "Euthyphron", the hero of the same name does not manage to identify a thing in any way, instead he calls its states. So, Euthyphron first asks is (Plato. Euthyph. 5c:9). Then he reformulates the question by asking it with the formula ’ (6d:2). Socrates also accuses Euthyphron that he does not give a definition, but lists the states of the subject: Euthyph. 11a:6-b:1.

If we look to clarify the relationship of shame and fear in "Itemone", here you may notice the use of the stamp that you want to figure out, "does not extend that believe as belonging to the genus, more than race" (Arist. Top. 121b:1-2: ). As a result, it turns out that fear is a kind of shame, which Socrates cites as a model of reasoning about the ratio of the pious and the just. In the Russian translation of "Evtifron" by S. Ya. Sheinman-Topstein, the specifics of school reasoning are not conveyed. The translator conveyed the expression as "occurs more often", while this is clearly an analysis of what is the genus for what (Plato. Euthyph. 12c:2)

In the fourth book of Topics, the idea of the incoming is clarified: it is necessary to find out whether a species difference is given as a genus, since a species difference does not denote the essence of a thing, but only a certain quality (Arist. Top. 122b:12-24). In Euthyphron, Socrates, in accordance with this principle, exempts Euthyphron from proving that all the gods consider his behavior to be correct, since the fact that the gods consider death to be impious says nothing about the essence of the pious and impious (Plato. Euthyph. 9c).

In the "Topic" we also see a controversy with the opinion of the author of "Evtifron": if he considers the odd part of the number (Plato. Euthyph. 12c:6-7), i.e. Aristotle says that such an opinion is incorrect, since odd is only a specific difference of a number, which, being neither a single nor a species, is not involved in the genus (Arist. Top. 122b:18-24).

Aristotle devotes the sixth book of Topics to the consideration of definitions. Having first listed the five main errors in defining, Aristotle proceeds to describe specific topics: having mentioned the problem of homonymy and allegory, the author of the Topic notes that the correct definition should help in determining the opposite (Arist. Top. 140a:19-20). This idea echoes the "Euthyphron", where the definition of piety also defines impiety, which is opposite to piety and identical with itself (Plato. Euthyph. 6d:1-5). Note that Socrates asks to define not just the pious, but at once the pair "pious – impious" (Plato. Euthyph. 11a), which constantly appears in the dialogue (Plato. Euthyph. 4e:2, 5d:7, 6e:1, 7a:6-9, 8a:11, 9c:5, 9d:5, 11b:4, 15d:4).

Moving along the tops, Aristotle disputes the correctness of definitions on the basis of what is known to everyone. In this case, we have many definitions of the same thing, since one knows one thing better and the other knows another (Arist. Top. 141b:34–142a:2). In order to avoid this, it is necessary to give a definition through what is more generally known, i.e. everyone. And immediately Aristotle clarifies that the opinion of those with good mental abilities will be more important than the opinion of everyone (Arist. Top. 142a:9-10). The author of "Euthyphron" follows this pattern: first the pious – pleasing to the gods. However, since the gods differ in their assessment of Euthyphron's act (cf. Aristotle's many definitions), he clarifies the definition of piety with the help of Socrates: pleasing to all the gods. In the end, having found out that the pious is part of the just, which refers to the gods, Socrates introduces the topic of experts, whose care is beneficial.

If the definition is given through two things, then there is a high probability that the same thing turns out to be opposites at the same time. Aristotle cites as an example the definition of beauty as pleasing to sight and hearing, as well as the definition of being as being able to endure () and act (). The same thing, as a result of such a definition, will be both beautiful and not beautiful, existing and bearing. There are two reasons for this: either something will be unpleasant for hearing and then pleasant, or the same thing will be pleasant for sight and unpleasant for hearing. As a result, it turns out that the same thing is both beautiful and ugly, existing and bearing (Arist. Top. 146a:21-33). We see the definition of beauty as pleasant to the ear and sight in "Hippias the Greater" (Plato. Hipp. Maj. 297e–298a), where this definition, put forward by Socrates, is rejected precisely on the basis of the reasons indicated by Aristotle. In Euthyphron, the situation is repeated in the definition of the pious as pleasing to the gods. Since the gods have quarrels, one and the same thing is considered by some gods to be pious and pleasing to God, and by others to be impious and ungodly (Plato. Euthyph. 7e–8b).

Further on in the text we see the criticism of being as acting and undergoing. Socrates puts forward the famous dilemma: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it?" (Plato. Euthyph. 10a). Socrates is convinced that it is not the state of becoming and undergoing that determines what an object is in becoming or experiencing something, but the corresponding actions. The pious is loved by the gods because it is such in itself (i.e. it acts), whereas God–pleasing is such, since it is loved by the gods (endures). As a result, Socrates blames Euthyphron for indicating not the essence of a thing, but its state (). This means that the essence of a thing cannot be expressed through its actions and suffering, which is in accordance with the above-mentioned top of Aristotle.

When determining, it is necessary to indicate the species differences: "how much", "what", "where" – otherwise it is impossible to express the essence of the being of a thing (Arist. Top. 146b:20-35). In Euthyphron, Socrates insists on defining the pious, indicating its distinctive qualities (Plato. Euthyph. 5c:9-d:1). The question repeats itself when the interlocutors come to the conclusion that the pious is part of the just (Plato. Euthyph. 12d:6-7), citing as an example the distinctive quality of the "even": ? ' .

Aristotle emphasizes that the definition should express the essence of the being of a thing, which can be achieved by specifying the genus and species difference of a thing. For the definition, he suggests using the following procedure: to indicate the most obvious opposites and investigate their definition in whole and in parts. Next, it should be determined whether the opposites belong to one or different genera. Moreover, it should be remembered that the species difference between opposites can be the same. We see all these procedures in the "Euthyphron": the theme of opposites already mentioned above (pious – impious, pleasing – displeasing to the gods), which are considered in the context of the discussion of the "whole – part" (piety as part of justice). Euthyphron is convinced that opposites belong to different genera, since each of the opposites has its own idea expressing its being (Plato. Euthyph. 5d:1-5), and genera and species differences, according to Aristotle, cannot coincide, otherwise it turns out one definition for opposites, which the author of "Euthyphron" did not like so much.

Topic advises to pay attention to cases and derivatives, because genera follow genera, and definitions follow definitions (Arist. Top. 153d:25-26). Therefore, if one thing is recognized, then it is necessary to ( ) and the recognition of the rest. Just as "forgetting" depends on "forgetting" and "perish" depends on "destruction", so in "Euthyphron" "piety" depends on "pious", and "impiety" depends on "ungodly" (Plato. Euthyph. 5d:4-5; 14c:1-5). Moreover, in our dialogue, the necessity of following one after the other, as stated by Aristotle, is transferred to the interlocutors in the search for definitions: (Plato. Euthyph. 14c:3-4). As you can see, in Euthyphron, the author adheres to the transition from to , which is skillfully introduced by using the same participle in different pledges.

In the last book "Topics", Aristotle pays attention to the technique of conducting a conversation between the questioner and the answerer. In particular, he notices that when the respondent does not understand something because of the ambiguity of the question, he should immediately inform the interlocutor about it (Arist. Top. 160a:18-22). This is what Socrates does in the dialogue being analyzed, when Euthyphron defines piety as caring for the gods. Having informed him that he does not understand, Socrates proceeds to clarify the meaning that Euthyphron puts into the concept of "care" (Plato. Euthyph. 13a:1-2).

From the presented analysis of the connections between the early "Topics" of Aristotle and the school "Euthyphron", it can be concluded that these texts reflect a close stage of school discussion. In addition to the above-mentioned similarity of examples that have become cliches among Plato's students and are reflected in the Topic, we see in Euthyphron the implementation of the principles of conversation stated in the Topic, namely:

1. analysis of the concept with the help of the topos "identical-opposite", "whole-part", which in the supposedly early "Euthyphron" are accepted without question as an already established method;
2. replacing less understandable statements with more understandable ones, with the help of which Socrates successfully refutes one of the definitions of Euthyphron;
3. the establishment of correct generic relations, thanks to which the pious turns out to be a kind of justice, and fear is a kind of shame;
4. refutation of statements through their consequences, as a result of which the pious turns out to be identical with the ungodly;
5. appeal to the opinion of experts, which has become a common place of school dialogues;
6. preference of the genus over its species;
7. the incorrectness of the definition through the incoming, which in "Euthyphron" is given as a definition through "action-undergoing";
8. the difference of the genus from the species difference, denoting the quality, not the essence of the thing;
9. the correct definition also points to the essence of the opposite, so that by defining piety we can also understand impiety;
10. the ability to give only one definition, and not on the basis of a well-known;
11. the definition through two things turns out to be internally contradictory, i.e. existing and bearing;
12. the need for indication in the definition of genus and species differences;
13. taking into account the same-root and close words, the consequences of which are identical;
14. overcoming the ambiguity of words, with the help of which the inconsistency of the definition is proved.

Sophistic refutations

The second text of Aristotle, which, in our opinion, is included in the relevant context of the dialogue "Euthyphron", is "Sophistic refutations". The question of the relationship between "Sophistic Refutations" and "Topics" is still open, which is clearly seen by the example of the publication of the Greek text of "Sophistic Refutations" in the Oxford Classical Texts series ^{[9, p. 191]}. After the text of the Topic, publisher Ross places "Sophistic refutations": on the left page in the footer we read , while on the right we see the sign "I", which can be understood both as a Roman unit and as the ninth letter of the Greek alphabet. As a result, the question of whether Ross considered "Sophistic Refutations" to be a continuation of "Topic", i.e. the ninth book, remains open.

Let's list the arguments that allow us to perceive "Sophistic refutations" as a continuation of "Topics" ^{[10, p. 24-25]}:

1) In the "First Analysis" and "On Interpretation" there are quotations that Aristotle cites with reference to the "Topic", whereas they are contained in the "Sophistic refutations" (Arist. An. Pr. 65b:16 refers to Arist. Soph. El.167b:21–36, Arist. De Int. 20b:26 refers to Arist. Soph. El.169a:6 sq., 175b:39 sq., 181a:36 sq.).

2) In the "Sophistic Refutations" there are references to the "Topic" as an earlier part of the same work (Arist. Soph. El. 166b:14 refers to Arist. Top. I, 9; Soph. El. 172b:27 – to Top. II, 5; Soph. El. 174a:18-19 – to Top. VIII, 1; Soph. El. 183b:8-9 – to Top. II–VII).

3) "Sophistic refutations", as well as all the books of "Topics", except the first, begin with the particle , which shows their connection with the "Topic".

4) The task of analyzing sophisms is assigned to the dialectician.

5)    The last chapter of "Sophistic Refutations" is a cursory overview of what Aristotle talked about both in "Topic" and in "Sophistic Refutations".

Noting the unity of "Topics" and "Sophistic Refutations", we recall that there is a consensus in the scientific world regarding their dating: these treatises were written during their stay at the Platonic Academy ^{[11, p. 75],[12, p. 86, 283]}.

Regarding the sophists, whose arguments Aristotle analyzes in his treatises, there is no such certainty. Some researchers believe that sophists should be understood as the very sophists whose names some of Plato's dialogues are named after ^[13]. However, if we turn to the text of the "Sophistic Refutations" itself, we have to state that Aristotle mentions only five sophists and only once: Antiphon (172a:7), Protagoras (173b:19), Lycophron (174b:13), Thrasymachus (183b:32) and Gorgias (183b:37). Without stopping at the analysis of each mention of the said sophists (see the analysis of contexts in the mentioned book of Dorion ^{[10, p. 33-37]}), we note that nowhere in the text are they the object of Aristotle's attacks, and their names are not associated with the criticized elenchos ^{[14, p. 156]}.

Many researchers have linked the invention of elenhos as a dialectical procedure with sophists, and some accept this opinion as a self-evident truth ^{[13, p. 128]}. If we turn to the sources, the view that Protagoras invented dialectic, we find in Diogenes Laertius, according to which he at two · , (D. L. Vitae philosophorum. IX, 51, 1-3), and (Ibid. IX, 53, 1). Diogenes' testimony is doubtful already because earlier in his work he attributed the invention of the dialectical method to Plato (Ibid. III, 24, 48). It is no secret that Diogenes' work is filled with anecdotes and rumors, the purpose of which is to question the originality of Plato. Thus, he cites the testimony of Aristoxenus, who claimed that Plato borrowed almost the entire "State" from Protagoras' "Antilogies" (Ibid. III, 37, 10 – 38, 1). Aristotle attributes the invention of dialectics to Zeno (Arist. Soph. fr. 65 Rose), and Protagoras does not mention at all as a dialectician. Considering that Diogenes Laertius is a late author, and Aristotle is almost a contemporary of Protagoras, the latter should be trusted. Moreover, in Plato's Protagoras (329b, 335a-b), we see that Protagoras is more inclined to "" than to "", i.e. to rhetorically constructed speeches, and not to the method of questions and answers practiced by Socrates. Sophists were experts in rhetoric, they taught young men to achieve success in the people's assembly and in court with the help of beautiful speeches. Dialectics could do little to achieve this goal.

As we can see, it is difficult to identify the sophists from the "Sophistic Refutations" with the first sophists. However, considering that Aristotle uses the term much more often than , it can be assumed that it characterizes megarians. Euclid of Megara and his disciples were called "megarians", "eristics" and "dialectics" (see fr. 31, 33, 34 in ^{[15, p. 108]}). Since they were called dialectics and their eristics were sometimes called dialectics (Ibid. cf. fr. 31, 84, 91, 99, 106, 218 et passim), it becomes clear why Plato and Aristotle so insisted on the separation of eristics and dialectics. Plato and Aristotle argued with representatives of the Megarian school, whose founder Euclid of Megara created a school or a certain, say, philosophical circle, perhaps even before the death of Socrates (hence the story that after the death of Socrates, his students retired to Megara) and taught until 369-366 BC, i.e. at the time of Plato's active writing activity ^{[15, p. 11]}. Therefore, it is quite possible to assume that Plato introduces into his dialogues contemporary opponents, who in the dialogues become opponents of Socrates ^{[14, p. 122],[16, p. 58]}.

In Dorion's monograph we find an extensive list of sophisms, the authors of which were precisely megariki ^{[10, p. 49]}. Another source of sophisms was Plato's "Euthydemus", which is also directed against megariks and reproduces their sophisms ^{[17, pp. 35-39],[18, pp. 30],[16, pp. 28, 58]}. Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus represent the position of the Megarians, while Plato, in the person of Socrates, tries to refute this perverted dialectic. Let us recall how in "Euthydemus" Dionysiodorus promises to refute Clinius, no matter what he answers (Plato. Euthyd. 275e:5-6). This position is characteristic of megariks, whose sophisms "Liar", "Horned", "Bald", "Heap", "Covered" were aimed at refuting the interlocutor. Sources call them sophists (Dorion gives a trace. fragments on Dering: 9, 83, 106, 127, 216, 217, 220), and their arguments are sophistic and sophisms (fr. 127, 129, 186 D?ring). Aristotle in "Politics" mentions a sophistic reasoning, very similar to the paradox of megariks "Heap" (Arist. Pol. 1307b:35-37. Cf. fr. 65 D?ring). In addition, according to Klassen's observation, Aristotle never calls the former sophists , referring this name to his contemporaries ^{[19, p. 23]}.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the context for "Sophistic refutations" are the contemporaries of Aristotle megariki (first of all, Euclid's successor Eubulides of Miletus, who, according to D. L. 2.109.2-3, wrote against Aristotle). Thus, the "Topic" and "Sophistic refutations" act as a source for the type of reasoning practiced by the megarians ^{[10, p. 53],[14, p. 125, 128-129]}.

Now let's look at the text of the "Sophistic Refutations" and analyze the material similar to "Euthyphron".

Revealing the types of sophistic refutations, Aristotle, among other things, speaks of the same name. After the example with the verb and the substantive participle , it is the turn of the person who is sitting and standing, sick and healthy (Arist. Soph. El. 165b:38-166a:3: ? , ’ ? [? ], ?’ ). Aristotle observes that what the patient does or undergoes does not mean the same thing, since actions can occur at different times. This method of refuting paralogism is implemented in "Euthyphron": the definition of "pious – pleasing to the gods" is incorrect, since the gods argue with each other. Euthyphron tries to save his argument by correcting "what pleases all the gods." To which Socrates divides action and suffering (to love and be loved, to look and be considered in Plato. Euthyph. 10a:1-d:13) and shows that it is impossible to define a thing through them (Plato. Euthyph. 11a:6-b:1).

Aristotle gives examples of ambiguity, on the basis of which sophisms are often built. Thus, in the sophism "If he knows it, does he know it" (Arist. Soph. El. 166a:7-8) knowledge can refer both to the knower ( ) and to the known ( ) (Ibid. 166a:8). The same applies to the sophistry "' ;" meaning as what the speaker ( ) silent, and what is silent about what there is a speech ( ) (Ibid. 166a:12-14: , ).

Turning to arguments based on the form of expression, Aristotle cites cases when the uses of masculine, feminine and neuter, quantity and quality, acting and undergoing, are mixed (Ibid. 166b:10-14). In "Euthyphron" we are also talking about the difference between action and suffering, the indication of which, although it does not bring us closer to the definition of piety, still allows us to conclude that pious and pleasing to the gods are different things.

From the "Sophistic refutations" it can be understood that the theme of identity was the key for the sophists of Aristotle's time. Thus, he mentions those who prove that the same thing has opposite properties (the same double and not double, as can be seen in the example of the number two, double for one, but not double for three in Ibid. 167a:28-33). This reasoning is close to " "5.4, where it is proved that talent is both light and heavy. Aristotle argues that the main reason why such paralogisms are misleading is the inability to parse the different meanings of one word (Ibid. 169a:22-24), which manifests itself in the inability to distinguish the identical from the opposite and the one from the many (Ibid. 169b:2-6). In Euthyphron, the theme of the identical and the opposite is one of the most important: working with opposites and justifying the difference in their causes allow us to refute the unsuccessful definitions of Euthyphron (Plato. Euthyph. 8a:4-5, 10e:9).

Aristotle proves that dialectics and the art of testing (? ) are not the same, "because the latter is addressed not to the one who knows, but to the one who does not know, but pretends to know" (Arist. Soph. El. 171b:3-6). It is this art of testing that Socrates applies, who admits himself to be ignorant in "Euthyphron", talking to someone who pretends to be knowledgeable, that is, according to Aristotle, he is engaged in sophistry (Plato. Euthyph. 6c:9, 9a:8, 10a:5, 12e:1), capable of exposing the ignorance of the interlocutor on the basis that he does not know the consequences of his art (Arist. Soph. El. 172a:23-26). It is appropriate to expand this analogy and recall that the approach described by Aristotle is quite consistent with the principles of Socrates, according to which it is not necessary to be a sage yourself in order to reveal the ignorance of another. It should be deduced on the basis of the consequences, for which Socrates asks the interlocutors to express their opinion in the conversation (for example: Plato. Crit. 49c-e, Gorg. 495a, Meno. 83d).

P. Moreau also noted that the Socratic method of searching for the definition of courage, wisdom, piety and justice is quite identical with the Aristotelian art of testing ^[20]. Socrates does not prove something, he starts from the hypotheses put forward, draws conclusions that he compares with established facts and the opinion of the majority, on the basis of which he judges the quality of hypotheses. If it turns out that the interlocutor does not know the conclusions and contradicts himself, then his false knowledge is revealed ^{[21, p. 306]}.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that Aristotle, an active participant in intra-academic discussions, reflected in his early works the themes developed at the Academy. Aristotle explicitly says that the question corresponding to the case of Euthyphron, "whether parents or laws should be obeyed more if they do not agree with each other" (Arist. Top. 105b21-23), is a typical school statement. "Topics" and "Sophistic refutations", as we have shown, reflect the realities of school debates and work on certain problems reflected in the "Laws" and developed in school dialogues. The texts correlate not only thematically, but also in form: school dialogues, in particular "Euthyphron", are built according to the rules summarized by Aristotle. The connection of "Topics" and "Sophistical refutations" with modern opponents of Aristotle and Plato (primarily megarians) and set the aporium of the dialogue, caused not by the weakness of Socrates' thought or early Plato, reproducing Socrates' conversations from memory, but by the reflection of the Megarians' eristics, with which Plato argued for many years.