Comparative analysis of aviation losses of the Leningrad Front during the blockade

Prigodich Nikita Dmitrievich PhD in History Senior Lecturer, National Research ITMO University; Senior Researcher, Saint Petersburg State University 197101, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Kronverksky Ave., 49, letter A ndprigodich@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Vasil'ev Andrei Vladimirovich PhD in History Associate Professor, ITMO University 197101, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Kronverksky Ave., 49, letter A ander-vaas@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

IntroductionIn recent years, attention has been increasing to a number of problems related to the history of the defense and blockade of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War.

This circumstance is connected with several factors at once. Firstly, access to new sources, including declassified ones, has significantly expanded. Several research teams have carried out large-scale work on the preparation and publication of collections of documents. Among them, it should be noted the publication of decisions of the highest party bodies of Leningrad during the blockade ^[1], transcripts of meetings of the executive committee of the City Council ^[2], the five-volume collection "Leningrad. War. The blockade", which included documents of various military, party and city structures ^[3], the publication of materials from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History about the defense of the city ^[4], as well as, released a little earlier, but has not lost its relevance, the collection "The Blockade in the documents of declassified archives" ^[5].

Another reason for the actualization of the subject under consideration was the use of modern scientific methods and approaches, including interdisciplinary ones, which made it possible to revise a number of well-established scientific concepts of the Soviet period. The most striking examples in this regard should be considered the three-volume study by G. L. Sobolev "Leningrad in the struggle for survival", which comprehensively and fully presents a view of the life of the city-front in 1941-1944 ^[6]. Some important subjects were considered in the works of J. Hass on survival practices in a blockaded city ^[7], Anastasia and Alexey Pavlovsky on the study of blockade diaries ^[8], V. L. Pyankevich on the informal communicative space of the city ^[9], M. V. Khodyakov on the card distribution system ^[10], and many others. The general characteristics of the works released in recent years are presented in the study of the head of the laboratory of the "History of the Siege of Leningrad" of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences K. A. Boldovsky ^[11].

In this regard, special attention is focused on the actions of the army to conduct the defense of urban boundaries, attempts to break through the blockade ring and the complete liberation of the city. This circumstance concerns both the military leadership and the actions of individual branches of the armed forces, to which a number of modern studies are also devoted ^[12-13]. Thus, the appeal to statistical data on losses in the composition of aviation defending Leningrad, from the perspective of an integrated approach to the study of the history of the blockade of the city, as a single inseparable process, represents an important expansion of scientific knowledge about the affected problem. In addition, this study is based on the materials of the Leningrad Front Air Force headquarters, which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Aircraft lossesA separate characteristic of the losses of the material part of the aviation defending the city in the period 1941-1944 is found in the scientific literature.

The most complete characteristic of the periods is presented in I. G. Inozemtsev's monograph "Under the Wing – Leningrad" ^[14]. However, the data in this study somewhat contradict each other and do not allow us to make a clear relationship between equal time intervals and lost aircraft. Monthly reports on the losses of the Leningrad Front Air Force headquarters in the period from February 1942 to July 1944 were used as the main source for the representation ^[15]. The lower border is due to the lack of reliable information about the previous period, and the upper border is due to the period of complete liberation of the territorial borders of the Leningrad Region and the disbandment of the front. The table below includes information about the combined grouping of the Front Air Force, as well as air defense aviation. However, they do not take into account the aviation of the Baltic Fleet, which also performed tasks for the defense of the city, but was allocated to an independent structure. Period

Table.  1. Monthly statistics of lost aircraft.

According to research on the work of the rear structures of the Leningrad Front Air Force during the war, the possibility of repairing aircraft lost in combat amounted to about 20.5% ^{[16, p. 134]}. This circumstance suggests that every fifth of the aircraft listed in the table returned to service. Most of the periods of relatively low level of material losses occur in the late autumn and winter of 1942-1943 and 1943-1944, since the actions of aviation largely limited weather conditions ^{[14, p. 104]}. Other examples of a lull in June 1942 and May 1944 are associated with the regrouping of troops and preparation for offensive actions.

Among the periods with a high level of losses, massive offensive and counter-offensive operations of the Leningrad Front, in which air support was used, should be distinguished. So, in September 1942, air support was deployed during the Sinyavinsky operation. All kinds of air Forces were active: bombers, attack aircraft, fighters. The ground forces were especially effectively supported by assault aircraft on the battlefield, but there were only 34 such aircraft ^{[17, l. 104]}. Against the background of high losses and low efficiency at the end of September 1942, serious tension arose between members of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front L. A. Govorov, A. A. Zhdanov and S. D. Rybalchenko. In particular, the front commander openly wrote: "The cover of the troops of the Nevsky group is organized ugly. The enemy is bombing our troops with impunity. You have completely removed yourself from directing the actions of aviation in the area of the Nevsky task force, uncontrollably leaving this matter to other persons, which may lead to the disruption of crossings. Immediately take the leadership into your own hands and organize the cover of the troops" ^{[17, l. 179-180]}. As a result, the main goal of the operation – breaking the siege of Leningrad – was unfulfilled.

Another point of growth in losses was June-July 1943. The Air Force Command organized massive raids on the rear communications of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, which lasted throughout June 1943 ^{[14, p. 212]}. At the same time, in accordance with the instructions of the Stavka, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive in the Sinyavino area in order to finally disrupt the enemy's attempt to organize an offensive on Leningrad, to bind his troops and not allow the German command to transfer them to the central section of the Soviet-German front. The troops went on the offensive on July 22, 1943. They were supported from the air by the 13th Air Army, which by that time numbered 379 aircraft ^{[12, p. 38]}. The increase in losses was also facilitated by the increase in the aviation group in the Leningrad direction from the enemy.

High rates of losses in the period from January to July 1944 are associated with a significant increase in the number of combat aircraft on the eve of the start of the operation to completely liberate Leningrad from the blockade. In the 13th Air Army and in the 2nd Guards Fighter Air Defense Corps there were 524 aircraft, of which 86 bombers, 92 attack aircraft, 258 fighters, 88 scouts, spotters and communications aircraft. 192 aircraft were also involved in the operation additionally from the Stavka reserve ^{[14, p. 195]}. Due to the losses and the intensification of hostilities during the redeployment of units in the spring and summer of 1944, the command carried out constant replenishment of units. The statistics under consideration may look more indicative in the form of a diagram presented below.

Fig. 1. Diagram of lost aircraft statistics.

Loss of pilotsWhen considering the statistics of flight crew losses, it should be noted some general patterns that repeat the provisions described in the previous section.

The table below includes information about the combined grouping of the Front Air Force, as well as air defense aviation, similar to aircraft loss data. Period

Table.  2. Monthly statistics of dead and missing pilots.

In contrast to the statistics on material losses, some data on flight personnel with reference to specific periods differ markedly. So, in January 1943, an operation was carried out under the name "Iskra", which assumed a joint strike on the narrowest section of the German defense, between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, at the junction of Lake Ladoga and the Neva River. It was possible to achieve this task only with the active use of artillery and aviation forces. The main task of the Soviet aviation in the offensive in order to unblock Leningrad was to deliver bombing and assault strikes on the most important nodes of resistance and enemy communications, preventing the transfer of reserves to the breakthrough area. It was this circumstance that led to a noticeable increase in the number of pilots killed compared to the lost aircraft. On the other hand, despite the massive offensive, the total number of losses is small, since by the beginning of Operation Iskra on January 12, 1943, weather conditions were established that were as severe as possible for aviation operations. For this reason, the support of ground units and counter-battery attacks were carried out only limited ^{[14, pp. 142-144]}.

Another characteristic difference is the period of September 1943. At this stage, fighting broke out again in the Sinyavino area. To ensure the offensive of the corps, the 13th Air Army, the KBF Air Force and the 2nd Guards Leningrad Fighter Air Defense Corps were involved. During 1943, considerable experience of interaction with land formations was accumulated, which was successfully used in offensive operations. Simultaneously with the Sinyavinsky operation, a purely aviation operation "Arrow" was carried out, aimed at destroying the enemy's material part ^{[18, l. 390]}. The successful actions of the Leningrad Air Force from 15 to 18 September 1943 played an important role in the success of the general offensive. However, it was the specifics of the assault strikes on enemy airfields, in which crews of two or four people were involved, that led to a multiple increase in the death of pilots, compared with the actions of fighter aircraft.

Similar to the losses of aircraft, the increase in the number of pilots killed in the first half of 1944 can be explained by several other factors. Thus, an increase in the number of formations of attack aircraft and dive bombers, whose actions are primarily necessary with the support of advancing troops, led to an increase in losses among personnel compared to the number of lost aircraft. A visual demonstration of the statistics in question is presented in the diagram below.

Fig. 2. Diagram of the statistics of the dead and missing pilots.

ConclusionsSumming up the general conclusions, it should be noted that the periods of increasing losses of personnel and materiel are naturally associated with the stages of massive counter-offensive operations in September 1942, January and September 1943, in January 1944. A significant increase during the first half of 1944 is correlated with the beginning of continuous attacks on German positions in various areas of the Leningrad region, so with a total multiple increase in the number of formations of the front Air Force.

At the same time, the level of a certain lull in the late autumn and early winter of 1942 and 1943 is associated with the traditional periods of severe weather conditions, the so-called "non-flying weather", which becomes an obstacle to any aviation actions. The same lull, but due to the regrouping of troops, is clearly seen in the example of May 1944.

However, these data also indicate a number of unique provisions, the explanation of which requires more in-depth study, compared with the periods of offensives. Thus, the difference between the colossally high level of aircraft losses and the relatively average indicators among the flight personnel in June and July 1943 may be due to large additions of new equipment and personnel who were trained and tested for coordination in combat conditions. This circumstance often led to the loss of equipment, but not the crews who managed to return to the location of the unit. Another striking example was the period of January 1943, during which Operation Iskra fell, which led to the breakthrough of the Leningrad blockade. Despite the natural increase in the number of pilots killed and aircraft lost, it cannot be said that it fully reflects the level of scale of the operation and data on the massive use of aviation. This situation is connected with, on the one hand, several days of "non-flying weather" in a row at once, when the Air Force was inactive. On the other hand, German resistance in this sector of the front turned out to be minimal and was successfully suppressed, including by the work of ground forces.

As a result, the presented information allows us to somewhat expand the available data on the actions of aviation in the defense of Leningrad. The use of statistical materials allows us to ask some important questions, the scientific answer to which will be inextricably linked to the more general problems of the history of the defense and blockade of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War.