Abstracting Objects on the Example of the Concept "Color". The Phenomenological Aspect

Kuzmin Vladimir PhD in Philosophy Independent researcher 214000, Russia, Smolensk region, Smolensk, Nogina str., 32, sq. 26 kvg-17@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction. In traditional logic, abstracting an object by some property implies tacitly ignoring other properties. Meanwhile, in the aspect of phenomenology, such a procedure has not been fully worked out. In particular, the need to modify classical epistemological abstractions in the aspect of phenomenology is pointed out by S. M. Mikeshina and, according to her, "phenomenology acts as a special way of approaching "things themselves" through the recreation of a direct semantic field between consciousness and objects"^[14]. In the act of attention, the subject ("I") is given an object with an intentional (actual) property characterizing it at this insignificant moment of time. And this property is sufficiently unique to describe this particular object, and not some other one. G. Lanz noted that with the phenomenological approach, abstraction is not performed at all, namely, a specific object (object) given in the situation. "... The result of abstraction is always something individual, an individual moment derived from a concrete thing; from this very moment..."^[11]. This result is relevant only at the moment of abstraction, but in the next situation it may no longer be relevant. Based on it, the subject "by inertia" analyzes the following situations and receives the necessary conclusions. This is the essential difference between phenomenological abstraction and traditional abstraction.

The main provisions. An object in a situation is endowed with only one property, whatever they may be (even a very complex one consisting of many and many "elementary" properties). And such a property has the structure of a certain "polyhedron": for the subject, the facet that matters in the selected segment of reality is actually given. Other facets of the actual property are hidden, they are present in the "here-being", but they are not actualized (potential) in the act of attention, or they are not fully disclosed to the subject, but only in some part of it. In perception, such a "multifaceted" actual property is "turned" to the subject from the side that is essential (has meaning) in the situation or within the framework of the task. "... The sensory perception of material things is not total in the sense of completeness: being is given in it, although original; but always only from one side. No matter how adequate this or that perception is, the perceived being always shows itself only in a certain perspective"^{[17, p. 54]}. At the same time, the subject actualizes not only the directly perceived (actual) property itself, but also all the variety of connections that this very property is connected with other properties in the same segment of reality. Because of this, we agree to consider this segment as a system whole in the following presentation. The perceived actual property of the object, by virtue of what has been said, is inherent in completeness. It covers not only this property itself, but also everything in which it is actualized in a number of other properties related to it.

The interval methodology developed recently (Novoselov M. M., Lazarev F. V., Kreminsky A. I., etc.) studies abstraction in a certain range of applicability – the abstraction interval in which the corresponding restrictions apply. The object is set in a certain range of properties and relationships. So Lazarev F. V. notes that "abstracting in the process of cognition, the researcher does not act arbitrarily, but according to certain rules and according to the set cognitive task"^[10]. In this article, the formulated approach is refined and developed, but not in a methodological, but in a phenomenological aspect. Abstraction is understood as a distraction from unnecessary features not at all, but only within the framework of the task as an idealization according to some one highlighted feature (property). The actual property is highlighted by an act of attention from the "sea of what is available", potentially residing in the same segment of reality in which it, as a structure of properties ("polyhedron"), is multidimensional in itself, which causes the "multidimensionality of the object of scientific knowledge"^[8]. The actual property characterizes the object in "here-being". It is impossible to make abstraction in this situation, it is necessary to rely on the entire interval of abstraction, coinciding in the act of attention with the specified segment. In addition, the actual property is inherent not only to a particular object (in a situation) studied from one side, but also to a class of objects. In any case, it satisfies the constraints (natural settings).

The cognizing subject in intention produces an expansion of certainty. The actual property is defined to the extent that its disclosure is sufficient for an adequate definition of the object (or class of objects). It bases the inscribability of an object into a segment of reality; in practice, this is expressed in its adequate applicability (meaning). By virtue of all that has been said, the subject in his act of attention, depending on the degree of coverage, is always given this segment of reality in some "size". Depending on the latter, we distinguish three types of it: "situation", "co-existence" (situations) and "universe". From the following it will be clear what we are talking about. In each of these three types of reality segment , the actual property is given in two interrelated parts: 1. its content and 2. the whole region of being in which it is revealed in the act of attention in terms of that inscribability-embeddedness in the corresponding segment of reality in which the object with its "polyhedron" of the actual property for the "I" is relevant. Accordingly, the abstraction of an object itself by some property (included in the "polyhedron" of the actual property) can be performed either by content within its segment, or by the very region of being to which the latter belongs. In the first case, we have abstraction already well developed in traditional logic, when the subject is distracted from secondary properties (in the "polyhedron") and by an act of attention actualizes only one property that is given meaning and which is abstracted. In the second case, abstraction is performed in the aspect of the influence (participation) of the property that it exerts on the object, and thereby forms a "situation" ("co-existence", "universe") in the act of attention. By this participation, the property is actualized within the framework of the system whole. Thus, abstracting an object within the abstraction interval can be done in two ways, from two sides. Firstly, traditionally, as a distraction from secondary properties (abstraction by content, for brevity we will call it "internal" abstraction), and, secondly, taking into account the relationship with the specified whole, as revealing the meaning of the actual property for the "here-being" of the object (abstraction in the enclosing whole, "external" abstracting). Note that in the Russian language itself, the syntactic compatibility of the verb "to abstract" has two forms: "transitive – to abstract something, and intransitive - to abstract (to abstract) from something… The transitional form expresses the focus of attention on what is abstracted. The intransitive form, on the contrary, refers to what is abstracted from" ^{[15, p. 46]} (i.e., "external" abstraction). And Novoselov M. M. writes that both forms of this verb complement each other. It is curious that Aristotle also divided abstraction into two forms: theoretical (for example, the concepts of arithmetic) and empirical (for example, movement).

In accordance with what has been said, we will distinguish the following three forms of object abstraction.

1. In the act of attention, a segment of reality is given in some one (current) situations (we will denote such a segment in quotation marks, in this case – "situation"). "Internal" abstraction is performed as highlighting one property and ignoring all the others that take place in the "polyhedron" of the actual property. For example, the subject ("I") is given an object: "kitchen table". Abstracting by the property "to have an application" gives the object "table". "External" abstraction is performed as a clarification of the value of the property "to have an application" within a given situation (to be inscribed in the situation). Such abstraction gives an object: "a table, among the uses of which is to be a kitchen table." Note that the fit into the situation is expressed through the meaning of the term.

2. In the act of attention, the segment is expanded to "co-existence" (situations). For example, the subject sees how the invited guests began to sit down at the kitchen table, on which various dishes are already laid out. The "internal" abstraction of the "kitchen table" object leads to the concept of "table" (namely, to the concept). "External" abstraction gives the concept of a "table", which is inscribed in a system whole, regardless of what kind of table it is. In pragmatism: the "table", together with all the understanding and aspects of application that it contains, is a frame (according to M. Minsky and Ch. Fillmore), – as a data structure (integrity). The latter assumes the entire context of the use of the term (for example, when using the term "Thursday", the subject means, in addition to the meaning of this word, also the understanding of the weekly cycle in the calendar, the use of the calendar, etc. ^[16]).

3. In the act of attention, the segment is expanded to the universe "Everything" ("universe"). The "internal" abstraction of the "kitchen table" object by the property of "having an application" gives an object whose only quality is "being a table" (in general, i.e. without any aspect of applicability). The "external" abstraction of the same object in the aspect of "Everything" gives an object whose way of being in the "universe" is its meaning as "quantity". This very "so many" creates a certain kind of presence in the actual being. So, in our case, an object with the quality of "being a table" and an object present as a "table" in the region of being outlined by us are two different forms of abstraction in the "universe".

Thus, depending on the "size" of the reality segment, we have three forms of abstraction of the object: 1. the object itself (in the "situation"), 2. the concept-concept (in the "co-existence") and 3. "object in general" with the quality or originality of its presence in the "universe". All three forms have two different ways of manifestation, depending on the structure of the actual property – this is "external" and "internal" abstraction. Let's examine what has been said by the example of the concept-concept "color".

Forms of color abstraction. In perception, the color of the object for the subject ("I") in the situation takes place only as a color text. The latter is a structure consisting of two interconnected parts: the content (internal context) and the situational environment in which it is placed (external context). The latter represents the conditions that allow the "I" to perceive the color text, so that it becomes visible. These include, in particular, lighting, contrasting background with the surrounding visual space, the required angle of view, permissible humidity, acceptable distance from the subject to the perceived color text, etc.

The totality of color texts given for the "I" or for Another (Others, as original "I"), in a variety of situations forms a color reality. Note that we talk about color texts in the aspect of perception by a specific "I" or Another, and about color – in the aspect of communication, as a social phenomenon. Thus, color text and color have different modes of being. Both constitute, in essence, the concept-the concept of "color".

Objects of color reality can have the following forms of abstraction: 1. a specific color (for Another, Others) or a color text (for "I"), further, 2. a category of color (acts in communication) and, finally, 3. chroma in general. All these forms depend entirely on the boundary conditions of the constitution, are determined by the task at hand or by the enclosing whole. The listed forms of color abstraction are found at every step. In perception, we see colored objects, and immediately the eye can touch objects of gray color (it has a higher degree of abstraction). Further, in communication, the situation perceived by the subject ("I") is given in its entirety, but in a message (for Another or Others) it is abstracted, only its general iconic outlines are expressed, including the color of objects. Therefore, in order to convey to the Other (Others) a message about the color seen, the "I" must abstract the color and speak out (in linguistic reality), resorting to another form of abstraction of color – categories. And chromaticity, as an abstraction, takes place wherever the "I", the Other or Others presuppose the existence of any color.

The "external" abstraction of the concept of "color" is based on the analysis of the enclosing system whole. This is expressed in the constitution of the color in the corresponding segment. Accordingly, abstraction here is a distraction from some external factor (a parameter of the situation that affects the constitution of color).

The "internal" abstraction of the concept of "color" is made by the property of "being colored". And here it is important to take into account that the subject is already somewhere (present), respectively, the situational environment has already been given to him as a given, i.e. we conditionally believe that it is stable and unchangeable. "Internal" abstraction is performed by tone, brightness or saturation, i.e. by those components that form the color content of the object. Accordingly, abstraction by the property of "being colored" can be performed in three directions – as a distraction from tone, from saturation or from brightness. The absence of tone in the "tone-saturation-brightness" triad leads to the constitution of color as achromatic. The absence of brightness (lightness, "internal illumination" of the content) leads to blackness, the object in this case is intended as black (without brightness). The absence of saturation (color is determined only by tone and brightness) leads to whiteness of some degree of brightness (unsaturated tone with some brightness). In any case, the absence of at least one parameter from the specified triad leads to achromatism, i.e. colorlessness. Thus, colorlessness (achromatism) for the "I" arises from the incompleteness of the content (internal context). For more information about this, see Kuzmin V. G.^[9]. Because of this, achromatic colors are not only more fundamental in their essence, but also more abstract.

In accordance with the "size" of the segment, we have the following forms of "external" and "internal" abstraction of color.

1. Specific color. Segment – "situation". "Internal" abstraction. The perception of color is based on concreteness. According to J. L. Kayvano^[18], color is a continuum of perception. Visible color is its separation from some continuum of colors that is in existence (in potency). The color continuum is, according to him, everything that contains some colors, starting with achromatic and ending with the whole variety of monochrome. This is the same "polyhedron" of the property "to be colored". From it, only one facet of it is actualized in the act of attention: in the color continuum, the subject is given only one color or several (within the color text). The color continuum is conditioned by the corresponding boundary conditions of perception – these are the features of the subject ("I") in perception: his physiological, mental, emotional state, aesthetic preferences, as well as the horizon of his understanding. If the property "to be colored" is set in the "situation", then the specific color of the object is actualized in the act of attention. Other manifestations of the same property in the "situation" will be possible, invisible (in memory, for example). And accordingly, for one subject ("I"), this continuum will be one, for Another – another, it all depends on the perception capabilities of the subjects themselves.

The literature on the psychology of perception describes such a thought experiment. A certain Mary lived all her life surrounded by black and white objects, while she understood well what color was, she was constantly told about it: ripe tomatoes are red, the sky is blue, etc. And then one day she was released into the light, into the colored world. What will she feel, what will the colored world be for her? To find out this question is the main goal of the experiment (for this experiment, in particular, see Kazakov M. A.^[7]). Let us, however, conduct a reverse thought experiment ("Anti-Mary"): a certain subject led his whole life among colored objects. And one day he was placed in the world of black and white things: these are the same things or some other, but having only an achromatic color (gray). What will the world be like for him? What will color be for him? The objects will not have a tone, it will be impossible to determine what color they are. More precisely: the content of the corresponding color text will be incomplete, and this is not only due to the lack of tone, but may be due to the lack of brightness or saturation. In any case, these will be achromatic colors. The world for him will be only light or dark. What is it like abstracting on the actual property of "being colored"? It is curious that we met with such abstraction in the era of black-and-white television. What color were the objects in the films about Detochkin or Stirlitz in one situation or another – all this could only be speculated, but we were shown only objects differing in brightness and nothing more. A black-and-white (achromatic) representation of the color of objects is a more abstract representation of color in a situation than a polychromatic one.

The "external abstraction" for the "I" depends on the situational environment (external context) within which the color text is constituted, and is determined by the boundary conditions of perception. Distraction from at least one of the components of the external context leads to the fact that the color text for the "I" becomes invisible (for example, there is no lighting or the distance to the object is too large and the "I" cannot make out its color, etc.). In this case, "external" abstraction leads to the following abstract forms of color: visible color (occurs when there are full conditions for vision, i.e. with full external context) and invisible color – in the absence of any factor of external context. The meaning of color for the "I" here is expressed through the inscribability of an object having some color in the situation.

2. Color category. "Co-being." "Internal" abstraction by an actual property, for example, "to be red" generates a new more "narrow" continuum of the property: "be colored except red." In other words, the relevant relevant property is specified. This is a kind of paradox: in order to abstract (in our case, to distract from redness), it is necessary to concretize the corresponding actual property ("to be colored, except red"). This is provided, we recall, that we are always present in the enclosing continuum of the property of "being colored", which, in fact, generates color in general.

Speaking about this kind of abstraction, G. Lanz writes that for red "nothing more can be abstracted, since it, as a special single moment, is the last product of abstraction." For him, "being red" is a "universal sign". "... We are able to think concretely only of a single manifestation of red, or a sequence of separate manifestations of this kind, for example, a sequence of shades of red; we are not able to imagine red in general and are not able to distinguish it from a real thing, since it is not really contained in it"^[11]. Abstraction does not occur at all, namely by a given property and only within the specified segment. An object by its inherent property of "being red" in abstraction will have the property of "being colored" in the color continuum. Let's look away from the sign "red", then the object of red color in abstraction will lose its redness, it will become just light or dark, i.e. – achromatic. At the same time, it remains the carrier of the property "to be colored". Contrary to the opinion of G. Lanz, the abstraction of redness is not final, it can be carried out further, but there will be no redness in fact, there will be achromatism (gray). "Internal" abstraction, as we see, is performed either by the color inherent in the object, or by not inherent. Let's imagine that we are given an object in the concept, for example, a "green apple". Abstracting by the property of "being red" leads to the fact that the object given in the concept remains unchanged. Digress from the redness of the green apple, we get the same green apple. Thus, abstracting by a non-existent object the property of "being such and such a color" (red, green, etc.) does not lead to anything. On the contrary, abstraction by inherent property leads to the chromaticity of the object, i.e. to its achromatism. For example, the source object: "green apple". Abstraction by its inherent actual property of "being green" is an object "colored apple" (without specifying the tone, i.e. essentially achromatic (colorless) "colored apple", no matter how paradoxical it may sound).

"External abstraction" leads to the concept of "color", among the applications of which will be the identification of the inscribability of the category of color in the constituted segment of reality, i.e. in "co-existence". For color categories, the situational environment is expressed in the correct application of color categories in the corresponding "co-existences". In linguistic reality, this is expressed through the correctness of combinations of colorative words with other parts of speech; in color reality, through the achievement of color, consistency of the tones of the color series in the visual. At the same time, the category of color indicated in the message is conditioned by the constitution for Others, and, moreover, it is determined by those aspects of application and meaning that it contains (as a frame). For Another (Others), "external" abstraction occurs whenever we want to explain to someone what color this or that object is. To do this, we turn to the color categories. For the "I" who formulates a statement for Another (Others), abstracting color in linguistic reality leads to the idea of color, more precisely, to the concept of color: "blue", "red", etc. At the same time, we believe that the Other (Other) these concepts are known. In fact, the category of color is a kind of "two–faced Janus" in abstracting color. It is the result of both "external" and "internal" abstraction of the concept-concept "color". The category of color takes place in communication, is given both for the "I" and for the Other (Others), respectively, it is objective in nature, unlike the color text given to a specific "I". In this case, the objectification of countless situational environments (external contexts) of any color texts for any subject leads to their ignoring.

3. Chroma. "Universe". Chromaticity occurs when there is no specific situation. If the situational environment of the color text is not specified, then the "I" does not constitute a specific color or category, but a variety of colors at once or their absence (for example, when it is indicated in the message that the object is colored, but it is not specified what color it is). In this case, we are talking about color. Any visualization is performed within the color range. From the point of view of optics, the chromaticity is contained in the sunbeam. When this beam passes through a light filter, prism or diffraction grating, this color becomes concrete depending on the situation, the angle of view and other parameters of the experiment. We get individual colors as parts of a whole (a sunbeam). Meanwhile, abstracting chromaticity as an object leads to chromaticity itself, in this regard it is self-referential. Therefore, in this combination (chromaticity – "universe"), we will talk about abstracting any color within the color continuum. In accordance with this, "internal" abstraction takes place for the "I" – in memory or representation, for the Other (Others) – in historical evidence. This means that in the "universe" ("Everything" and "Nothing"), the color of objects generally exists or does not exist. The only quality of objects in all these cases is their color, i.e. they are colored. The same form of abstraction also takes place if nothing is said about color or there is nothing to say, due to the fact that the objects themselves are abstract. The latter takes place, for example, in stereometry problems – for example, to calculate the volume of a ball inscribed in a cube. The color of these abstract objects, as we can see, is not specified. The same thing happens in a literary narrative when the color of objects is not indicated (they are already abstracted by the property of "being colored"). Such abstraction takes place in speculation or discussion when working with concepts that are not related to color in a given segment. In this case, we can only assume the color of objects, in this sense, the abstraction of color resembles some kind of extrapolation of the previously visible. To a certain extent, M. Merleau-Ponty is right when he speaks about abstraction as an extrapolation of existence ^{[13, p. 238]}.

"External" abstraction. If the situational environment is not defined in any way (it is not specified, it is not in question), then the color of the object present in being can be anything or have none (this is the form of abstraction – "color", as a special peculiarity of presence in the "universe"). In this regard, color forms the boundary of our being, beyond which the actualization of the color of objects does not occur. For the Other (Others), the "external" abstraction of chromaticity bases applicability (meaning) in the "universe".

All three forms of color abstraction are closely interrelated with each other. And it is quite difficult to separate one from the other in real life. A specific color is actualized based on the color (as potency), on the basis of "here-being". For the "I", the situation is determined by the factors that determine the existence of a color text in it (content and situational environment, boundary conditions of constitution and perception). For example, the subject sees an object of some color. He is present in the continuum of the property of "being colored", i.e. in "chroma", his attention snatches out of the variety of potential colors some one color, the concreteness of which stems from the existence of a color text in this situation. One or another state of chromaticity for an object "shines through" through the "lattice of certainty", due to which it is constituted in the act of attention as having some specific color. This "grid of certainty", in fact, characterizes the segment as a whole, within which the color of the object is relevant to the subject ("I" or the Other). V. F. Asmus emphasizes: "No object and no property exists without what determines their existence. If there is an object, then there must also be conditions that made its appearance necessary"^{[1, p. 13]}. Our thinking, studying certain objects, is always in the variety of properties being studied. And in this variety, only one property – "to be colored" (in the "polyhedron" of the actual property) – is endowed with certainty in the intention: i.e. it is given "here and now" for "I" or for Another (Others). "Thinking is an absolute continuum of assumptions of something in its definiteness"^[12]. How is certainty achieved for a single subject or for a class of similar subjects? According to N. Hartmann, it is divided into two aspects: first, the certainty itself (here is being), defined through definitions, and, secondly, the given (so-being), determined by the (actual) property. This means:

a) here is the being of color: "in every being there is a moment of here-being. By this we should understand <...> only "the fact that it exists at all" ^{[2, p. 234]}. Here color is ideality (chromaticity). In our case, when abstracting in a segment of a certain "size", this being determines the actual being of the "polyhedron" of the actual property in the intention when abstracting;

b) so-being of color: "this "essence" includes all the content, up to the most individual differentiation"^{[2, p. 234]}. In this way, the color acquires concreteness in the mode "here and now" for the "I" or for the Other (Others). So-being denotes the concreteness of the actual property, i.e. its "turning" for the subject by some facet of the corresponding "polyhedron" inscribed in the "situation" (in "co-being" or in the "universe"). Thus, the existence of color can be somehow designated, indicated, named.

Chromaticity is determined in being by all kinds of colors not factually. "In the here-being of something, there is always just a fragment of so-being"^{[2, p. 307]}. At the same time, a specific color already exists in chromaticity as potency. Chromaticity does not take into account the "differential" principle of phenomenology itself: the concreteness of being. Here-the existence of color is its certainty, and so-the existence of color is its realization in a specific situation. This is also indicated by A. A. Isaev, he defines chromaticity as his here-being, and a specific color as his so–being^[4].

We have considered the procedure for abstracting color only for the main combinations of the object – a "segment of reality". The peculiarity of abstraction for the concept-concept "color" in other combinations (specific color – "co-being", specific color – "universe", color category – "situation", color category – "universe", chroma – "situation", chroma – "co-being") it can be derived from the main ones indicated above.

Abstraction of gray color. We almost never observe individual (monochromatic, including gray) colors. For the "I" in any situation, the color of the object is always a color text. And this color text unfolds for the viewer in different ways in three segments of reality that differ from each other in "size". For gray , we have the following forms of abstraction:

1. in the "situation", manifests itself through the complementarity and contrast of colors in perception (for the "I");

2. in "co-existence" – gray color in the mode of "there and then", historicism and sociality of color for Another (Others). A simple example: antique sculptures were originally painted. However, for us they have been preserved in achromatic (gray) color, because of this they look more abstract than in those distant times;

3. in the "universe" – gray color between two extremes: "Everything" and "Nothing"; generates a difference in monochrome colors in lightness and saturation.

In all three cases, gray is crucial. This is its value and inexplicable mystery. The essence of achromatic (gray) color underlies all phenomena in the perception of the color world (contrast and complementarity, harmony of colors, etc.). I. Itten in his famous book reveals the main feature of neutral (gray) color: with the help of it, balance (harmony of colors) is achieved. The viewer sees individual colors that are balanced and harmonious for him. According to his definition, "two or more colors are harmonious if their mixture is a neutral gray color. All other color combinations that do not give us gray become expressive or disharmonious by their nature"^{[6, p. 22]}. It emphasizes the peculiar abstractness of achromatic colors. "Each individual color, due to the specifics of perception, makes the eye strive for universality. And then, in order to achieve this, the eye, for the purpose of self-satisfaction, searches next to each color for some colorless-empty space to which it could produce the missing color. This is the basic rule of color harmony" ^{[6, p. 23]}. This most "colorless-empty space" is the achromatic (gray) visual space. If the main characteristic of a particular color is considered tone, then the addition of an achromatic (more abstract) color makes this tone less recognizable, and the color less concrete (but more abstract in the continuum of the property "to be colored"). Note that the continuum of the property "to be colored" carries its own original abstraction procedure: it is produced not at all, but within its limits by adding achromatic colors. I. Itten writes that by adding white or black to a color, it loses its inherent saturation ^{[6, pp. 58-59]}. Pure colors are smoothed or condensed. Color becomes more abstract in the color continuum. "Gray is a barren, neutral color, the life and character of which depends on the neighboring colors. It softens their strength or makes them juicier. As a neutral mediator, he reconciles bright opposites with each other, simultaneously absorbing their power and thereby, like a vampire, gaining his own life. ...In contrast to the lively vibration of the variety of chromatic colors, achromatic ones give the impression of rigidity, inaccessibility and abstraction"^{[6, p. 42]}.

Gray is abstract already by its physical nature. As M. V. Isaeva notes, white and black colors are idealities (abstractions). "There are no black and white colors in nature, there are only gray colors"^[5]. Next to black, you can match an even blacker color. And for the white color, there is even whiter than the one already given. Therefore, black and white colors are ideally unattainable, although they are conceivable. A similar idea was once expressed by I. Goethe ^{[3, p. 133]}. The question of whether, for example, there is an absolutely red body that would reflect all rays except red is incorrect, since red is a certain interval in the spectrum: there is dark red, light red, etc. Therefore, there are no absolutely red or absolutely blue bodies, etc., according to the degree of reflectivity. So, red is, generally speaking, an ideality (i.e. a category). It cannot even be conceivable, since red is always thought of with some kind of tone, as a particular red, for example, crimson, crimson, etc. The same can be said about any other monochromatic color expressed by means of a category. If we can say with regard to black: we will make it even blacker, then we cannot say this with regard to red.

The unconscious process of abstraction occurs when the color text is directly seen by a specific "I". Consider a situation quite typical in the recent past. The viewer is watching a black-and-white film on television, his attention is focused on it. The things shown to him by the property of "being colored" are of an abstract nature, since they differ only in lightness (achromatic – gray – color). However, the black-and-white screen occupies only part of its visual overview. The viewer's gaze is focused on an abstract gray color, and the surrounding background is colored. The color text perceived by him is a very complex formation, containing not only shapes and colors, but also their depths as abstraction. In the view, the viewer's consciousness tends to level such depths of abstraction, to make them on the same "level", because of this, the color of perceived objects becomes more concrete, as given in "here-being". To simplify mental activity, the concreteness of the perceived should not be weighted down by abstraction procedures. Because of this, such phenomena as complementarity and contrast of colors become important. In visual perception, consciousness strives for a harmonious perception of dissimilar colors, it generates the color itself, which it lacks in vision for such harmony. In this regard, the role of achromatic color (gray with gradations from white to black) is very important. Gray, as a more abstract color, the viewer's consciousness tends to eliminate, put it on a par with other colors: red, blue, green, etc.

But how does gray, as a more abstract color, become concrete in a situation? Firstly, it attracts a shade generated by a nearby color, and thanks to this it becomes more specific. Secondly, the gray color does not correspond to any one monochrome interval in the color spectrum. If we can say about the red color that it corresponds to the wavelength of electromagnetic radiation approximately in the range of 625-740 nm, then the gray color corresponds to the entire visible spectrum at once, so it is more abstract compared to the same red color. The gray color, in fact, corresponds to visibility in general, and not just the visibility of only red or some other color. The visible, thus, can be divided into two asymmetric parts: monochrome colors (color spectrum) and achromatic colors. The first part is "visible in particular" (specific colors), and the second is "visible in general" (gray).

The abstractness of gray color suggests that there may be an abstraction not only of concepts and speculative things in general, but an abstraction in the very perception of individual things perceived by the eye, for example, paintings of painting. I think that the aesthetic sense of beauty is largely based on this kind of abstraction. When a subject looks, for example, at a red object, he already refers it to some category. If we are talking about red, then it is the redness of this subject that is meant, i.e. not the actual state of affairs, but the idea. Considering color separately, we mean precisely the concept of "redness", "whiteness", etc. And this categorization is made instantly in the same act of attention. M. Heidegger writes that our perception is commensurate with the judgment in the same act of attention. "In fact, even our simplest perceptions and grasps are always already expressed, and moreover, interpreted in a certain way. Initially and for the first time, we do not so much see objects and things as talk about them, more precisely, from the very beginning we do not talk about a thing what we see in it, but on the contrary: we see in it what others say about it"^{[17, p. 61]}. But this assumes that the subject is present in the community, and builds his judgment in intersubjectivity (for Another or Others). Heidegger writes that categorical contemplation is already present in the intentional act. It "is an integral moment of any concrete perception"^{[17, p. 53]}.

Why do artist photographers prefer black and white pictures? Because black-and-white photos are more abstract than color ones, they elevate to the ideal almost immediately. Black-and-white photography actually becomes detached from the specific situation and appears to us in an idealized state. This allows the viewer to focus on the whole: composition, form, chiaroscuro, etc., i.e. on aesthetic merits, and not to wander by the ratio of the main and secondary in search of concreteness. In such photographs, the abstraction of gray color is due to an incalculable number of gradations from very black to dazzling white. This allows you to use it to convey in a simplified form the plot of what you saw.

Conclusion. The article shows the features of abstracting objects, set out in terms of the phenomenological approach. Abstraction is carried out within the necessary segment of reality, to which the activity of the subject is directed (in methodology – in the interval of abstraction). At the same time, the degree of abstraction of the object depends on how wide it is. In this case, the abstraction operation can be performed in two ways: as abstraction by content ("internal") and as abstraction by the enclosing system whole ("external" abstraction). As applied to the color, we have the following. For each "I", a color text is a structure consisting of two components: an internal context (content) and an external one (situational environment). Accordingly, when we talk about abstraction, then in these bundles the actual segment of reality (namely color reality) is expressed through "situation", "co-existence" (related situations) and "universe". The actual property of the subject "to be colored" is realized in a situation within the existing comprehensive (color or achromatic) whole – color reality. Color abstraction gives three forms of abstraction: chromaticity, color category, specific color. This color reality in the intention (in the act of attention) for each "I" (including for Others, as original "I") is given every time as a color text (in a "situation"). Further, it is given as a "co-existence": for the "I" it is a sequence of color texts at some time interval (typical for the creators of color texts - artists, fashion designers, designers; they choose the necessary colors based on the whole variety of colors (continuum of chromaticity)). For Another (Others), "co-existence" in color reality is a sequence of impressions and opinions transmitted in communication, expressed through a category of color tied to a fixed state of affairs; determines historicism and sociality of color in society. And finally, color reality is given as a "universe" ("Everything" or "Nothing" without reference to a specific situation, we are talking about color in any aspect at all); it takes place for the "I" and for the Other (Others) as a connotation of whether there is a color at all or not. We have revealed how "internal" and "external" abstraction for color occurs, noted the importance of gray abstraction, both in everyday life and in aesthetics (painting).