The Art of Argumentation in Ancient China

The art of argumentation, aimed at convincing someone by justifying the need to adopt a particular point of view, arose simultaneously with the development of major ancient civilizations, such as Babylon, Egypt, India, China, Greece. In the modern public space, with the advent of new information technologies and media practices, the power of the evidentiary word has increased many times even compared to the role it played in the ancient world, whose impact on effectiveness then for the first time began to be equated with the power of weapons in war. So Plato in Philebus quotes the words of the famous ancient Greek sophist Gorgias, who believed that the "art of persuasion" is much better and more important than all others, since "it forces everyone to serve themselves slavishly voluntarily, and not forcibly" ^{[1, p.75]}. Since then, theoretical studies of the art of argumentation have begun, which, despite the efforts of many great minds, nevertheless have not led to the creation of a generally valid theory of argumentation to date. This is largely due to the complexity of the phenomenon of argumentation itself, the nature of which makes it extremely difficult to solve the problem of constructing such a theory, which, without falling into the limitations of one of the sides of argumentative discourse (logical, rhetorical, psychological or communicative-pragmatic), would be able to combine into a single whole such heterogeneous cognitive procedures as justification, initially included in the sphere of interests of logic, and persuasion, which was the goal of rhetoric ^{[2, p.15]}.

This is reflected in the variety of argumentation models that emerged in the twentieth century, among which the most significant are: informal logic (R. Johnson, A.Blair), continuing in a relaxed form the tradition of a normative (logical) approach to the modeling of argumentation; pragmatic dialectics (Frans. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst) with its communicative-pragmatic normativity; formal dialectics (E.Barth, E. Crabbe), as well as descriptive theories (for example, the radical argumentativism of O. Ducrot and J.-K. Anscombra), etc. ^{[3, pp.154-161]}. At the same time, these theories, which are fully working in one or another area of application, have proved unable to fulfill the role of a generally valid theory of argumentation, so more and more researchers today are coming to realize the need to move from describing and modeling various dimensions of argumentation to considering it as an integral phenomenon ^[4].

The numerous attempts made to describe and generalize various polemical speech practices make it relevant to turn to the methodological apparatus of philosophical hermeneutics and the theory of communicative rationality, which allows in the course of studying the history of the development of any phenomenon "to constantly see the metahistorical, contemporary to us" ^{[5, p.94]}.

Also, despite the doubts that exist about the possibility of creating a history of the theory of argumentation, and not in the form of a theory of historical narratives, but as an independent research area (and not a section of the history of logic or the history of rhetoric), works of this nature are also beginning to appear ^[6]. The appeal to the historical argumentative heritage of the ancients, despite the fact that "speculative profundity, vague oracular speech and prophetic pathos are now rejected with disgust" ^{[7, p.24]}, which captivated the minds of the ancients, is justified, since the actual task is to move from describing the various dimensions of argumentation to understanding it in unity of all sides. And just in ancient times, the phenomenon of persuasive speech was comprehended in the syncretic unity of all its components. In this regard, one of the urgent scientific problems is to identify the strategies and methods of argumentation that were characteristic of the ancient Chinese culture of dispute, and compare them with the ancient tradition.

In ancient times, both in the West and in the East, the rhetorical component of argumentation dominated, which was due to the practical needs of conducting disputes in the era of widespread oratory. However, unlike the polemical practices of antiquity, in which rhetoric was presented as a "ritualized sports contest of argumentation" ^{[8, p.95]}, which almost immediately became the subject of theoretical reflection, Chinese rhetoric, which arose as a form of instruction by advisers to rulers by justifying ethical norms and convincing them of the need for tradition, turned out to be on the periphery of research interest. The little-studied tradition of polemics is explained, first of all, by the presence of source barriers, since ancient Chinese thought, in the texts that have come down to us, represent an uneven (perhaps unrepresentative) sample of subsequent Chinese scientists from works in which some parts are sometimes lost ^{[9, pp.102-131]}; secondly, difficulties in isolation from a large number of treatises devoted to philosophical, ethical and political issues, plots devoted to the laws of thinking and problems of names, statements and reasoning; and thirdly, the existence of general cultural barriers associated with the unusual Chinese style of thinking and method of theorizing for Europeans, during which metaphors, aphorisms, examples, hints are widely used. The latter circumstance, as well as the immutability of grammatical forms, makes it very difficult to understand some nuances and shades of meaning that cannot be conveyed in the translation process, which, of course, impoverishes the original texts, and, as one of the greatest Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century Feng Yu-lan emphasizes, complicates their adequate understanding ^{[10, p.35]}. All of the above caused the appearance of a number of stereotypes, the most radical of which was the representation of Chinese thought as argumentative "wisdom" (M.Granet) ^{[11, p.5]} or "numerology".

However, the stereotype of the absence of logic in Ancient China ^[12] as a universal method ^[13], which has a pronounced Eurocentric character, was more widespread (A.C.Graham, C. Hansen). It arose as a result of unjustified projection of the Western European mentality and terms of the Western philosophical language, as well as logical schemes of Aristotelian syllogistics on the original Chinese material ^{[14, p.112]}.

The main argument in this case was not so much the language barrier as such, as the problem of the relationship between the Chinese language, which was considered unsuitable for expressing abstractions (for example, due to the lack of a bundle of "to be" and the subject-predicate structure of the sentence) and Chinese thought ^[15], as well as arguments about the profound difference between Chinese hieroglyphic writing from European alphabetical, based on the "semantic emptiness of letters by themselves" (A.Kobzev) ^{[16, pp.314-325]}, in which "non-significant letters form significant words".  "The Greek philosophers," U. emphasized in this connection. Eco, - Greek was recognized as the language of reason, and Aristotle built his categories on the basis of grammatical categories of the Greek language" ^{[17, p.52]}. The absence of grammatical categories and the "iconicity" of Chinese writing, which by its nature is "synthetic and figurative" ^{[18, p.222]}, as well as the specific symbolism of Chinese hexagrams, were misinterpreted in the Western intellectual tradition, where "symbols were perceived, as a rule, in the order of conceptual (logical or pseudological) knowledge" ^{[19, p.100]}. In the West, symbols were understood as a special kind of signs designed to expand knowledge, thereby they were translated from the situation of understanding the symbolic meanings of consciousness into signs of culture. And language was most often considered as a way of transmitting information (communicative and informational speech acts), whereas in the Chinese tradition, the most important function of language is verbal behavior, "discourse as a guide to action" (perlocative speech acts that affect not only consciousness, but also human behavior) ^{[20, pp.25-26]}. It is no coincidence that in the Western man's worldview, symbols gradually became less and less over time ^{[19, p.101]}. The opposition of Western alphabetization, which initially has an analytical and logical character, to the synthetics of Chinese hieroglyphic writing, today, in the context of changes in the understanding of the subject of logic, criteria and boundaries of logic, is gradually beginning to be overcome thanks, among other things, to the research of domestic sinologists. The latter have "re-posed" the question of the existence of what is called "Chinese logic" in the literature of the Celestial Empire.

As a result of the study of the general methodological constructions of the most advanced in this regard, moists and representatives of the school of names, some of the modern researchers, such as the creator of the concept of "constructivism" of Chinese logic, A.A.Krushinsky, starting not from the traditional set-theoretic approach, but using the genetic method, come to the statement about the existence in the Chinese algorithmic style of thinking and the way reasoning (based on the activity attitude) of the developed theory of logical inference (due to the distinct priority of the construction over the class) [14. p.114]. This looks quite convincing if we proceed from the expansion of the subject of logic that occurred when deduction ceased to be synonymous with deduction from axioms [14. p.115]. Others, like A.I. Kobzev, the creator of the theory of "numerology" of Chinese rationality, justify the conclusion that in this case we are dealing more with protology and eristic problems ^[21].

It seems, and this is the task of this article, that in the perspective of the modern understanding of logic and those problems that, after the "linguistic turn" of the twentieth century, it is customary to refer to "informal logic" and the theory of argumentation ^[22], the methodological constructions of the ancient Chinese, which arose on the basis of the analysis and systematization of polemical practices, can be regarded as the beginning the history of the theory of argumentation. At the same time, the author shares the broad interpretation of argumentation, which is still in the minority (compared to the narrow-minded approach), as a specific form of thinking and substantiating any statement with the help of other statements, taking into account not only different ways of persuasion, but also "providing for different assessments of argumentation (not only logical-epistemological, but also pragmatic, ethical and aesthetic)" ^{[23, p.8]}. This does not mean that the theory of argumentation is free from normativity, on the contrary, it is in search of a new normativity, developing "less strict than in logic, but still rules" on the basis of which persuasion is practiced ^{[24, p.11]}.

The most important attitude for the Celestial Empire to prioritize action over knowledge was also clearly manifested in relation to the phenomenon of argumentation, in which the logical, rhetorical, linguistic and eristic are in syncretic unity, i.e. what has not yet been differentiated in the philosophical works of the ancient Chinese. And argumentative problems, despite their relevance in the social context, due to their weak theoretical and systematic nature, were not specified as a separate field of knowledge, but were woven into a broad rhetorical and polemical practice ^{[3, pp.52-91]}.

This rethinking of the problem is based on the use of the method of philosophical comparative studies, based on the recognition of the existence of different philosophical cultures, and focused on the search for similar basic ideas, thought processes and intuitions in different civilizations in the ancient era. The use of this method in this article will allow for the disclosure (taking into account the historical and cultural context) of the explicit and implicit foundations of the content and structure of the reasoning of the ancient Chinese, as well as the analysis of their ideas about what norms the argumentation should correspond to in order to be convincing ^{[25, p.66]}.

The peak of the heyday of the ancient Chinese institute of dispute, as a type of public activity, is considered to be a turbulent period of social change called Zhanguo (V–III centuries BC), in which there were constant disputes between such philosophical currents as Confucianism, Taoism, Moism, the school of "names" and the school of "lawyers", and also the concept of "philosophical discussion". The acute intellectual competition of the "era of rivalry of a Hundred Schools", in which ethically pragmatic projects of Order and Harmony were vied with each other, contributed to the fact that the problem of identifying and systematizing the most effective argumentative strategies fell into the sphere of the main research efforts and was reflected in written works, where the collected methods of discussion were further developed and gradually acquired the status of norms.. Thus, argumentation, as a specific form of thinking and justification of positions, became increasingly widespread in the culture of Ancient China.

The widespread spread of the dispute in the Zhanguo period was preceded by the practice of monologue speeches, so-called "beliefs" (shui) - teachings ("follow the pattern"), appeals ("observe traditions"), with which advisers addressed the sovereign. In these speeches, in addition to arguments to ritual and authority (archetypal examples from the life of "perfectly wise vans"), not just examples of the correct use of words were given, but the semantic relationship of the name and its meaning was already fixed, and also actually contained the rudiments of the most important for the Chinese methodology of the theory of names (min) and the theory of utterances (tsy). These "beliefs" stimulated the search for the most effective logical, rhetorical and psychological methods of influencing the addressee, taking into account his cognitive abilities, ethical and political attitudes, as well as character traits. Soon professional "masters of persuasion" developed a whole arsenal of argumentative techniques that allowed them to evasively, "keeping the face" of the gentleman and without affecting his dignity, convey to him the idea of the need to correct behavior. The most important argumentative technique that allowed achieving this goal was the method of the so-called "double persuasion". It was an indirect argumentation, during which not only the proof of the validity of the argumentator's point of view was conducted, but also the refutation of the opposite position of an imaginary opponent. This phenomenon of "fictional dispute" was similar to the famous "double speeches" of the Greek sophists.

At the same time, despite certain similarities, the phenomenon of "persuasion" cannot be considered a dispute, as it sometimes occurs. According to many characteristics, dispute and "persuasion", as Yu.L.Krol showed in his research, are opposite procedures: in terms of goals (in dispute – "to win the mouth", in "persuasion" - "to conquer the heart"), in terms of the degree of dialogization, democracy, absence/presence of an audience, etc. ^{[26, p.24-34]}. Therefore, the dispute tended to logical means, and "persuasion" - to psychological, it was much more consistent with the social status of the parties and in this sense was "hierarchical", ... which created a "difficulty to convince", which consisted in "knowing the heart of the persuaded" (treatise of Han Fei tzu)" ^{[26, p.31]}, and in choosing the appropriate method of persuasion.   Nevertheless, the experience gained in the course of "beliefs" had a stimulating effect on the theoretical understanding of the argumentation process. For example, the personal experience of the teachings of the famous debater Meng-tzu, was summarized by the latter in a treatise, where, in addition to the traditional problem of the correct assignment of "names", he was asked about the criteria for evaluating speeches ("reasonableness" - zhi). Meng-tzu also developed a classification of ways to refute the arguments of an ideological opponent.

Soon, quasi-disputes, which can be considered "beliefs", were replaced by real disputes with detailed argumentation of the positions of the participants. First of all, this was due to the emergence of political pluralism as a consequence of political fragmentation, but there were also ideological reasons. The installation on the Harmony of social relations between the sovereign and subjects required discussion of issues related to the correctness of the course of public administration and ways of its implementation ("ritual" or "law"), and also brought to life a number of competing social projects.  Their justification was already conducted in the form of real polemics, during which the art of argumentation was perfected. Thus, a dispute about the deep nature of the dispute ("dispute about dispute") is known from history, the result of which was a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of dispute, on the one hand, as an intellectual competition, during which the correctness of a particular project of social structure was established, and on the other, as an organizational procedure that ensures order during the justification of rival political positions and moral and ethical doctrines. This approach ensured the constructive nature of the dispute and allowed avoiding conflicts during polemical communication. This revealed a specific feature of the ancient Chinese (noted by researchers and modern Chinese), to avoid conflicts when communicating as much as possible ^{[27, p.387]}, since they not only cause stress, but also disrupt the life orientation to Harmony ^{[28, p.767]}. And although the terminology from the military sphere was used to describe disputes (bian): "victory" (sheng), "defeat" (fu), rivalry" (zheng), the latter, unlike the ancient Greek agon and disputes in Ancient India, was quite peaceful, and the disputes were mainly of an adversarial nature.

The experience of participating in public disputes led to the emergence of so–called professional debaters - "masters of persuasion" (bian shi), who, like the Greek sophists, soon also opened schools of speakers everywhere (zong he). The layer of "masters of persuasion" was heterogeneous: among them were both serious debaters who were well versed in the art of persuasion, among whom, according to the famous historian Sima Qian, Gongsun Lung, Tzimu-tzu, Mao-gong, Kun Chuan, Zhou Yan ^{[29, p.51]}, and the so-called "slippery talkers", who most often were not good speakers themselves, but taught others the art of persuasion, which was very popular at that time.

 By this time, the art of argumentation included not only those techniques that were developed in the practices of "persuasion" (indirect argumentation, hints, parables, various kinds of allegories), but also new normative (not in the sense of correctness of reasoning, but practically effective) means, which included: the method of "virtues and shortcomings" (chang duan); "double conviction", "thinking in genera", which allowed to build whole series of historical examples as generally significant structures ^{[26, p.28]}, which occupied the most important place in polemical practices. Later, the examples will turn into the basis of inductive reasoning and paralogical reasoning by analogy, as well as acquire the methodological status of the topos of the ancient Chinese dispute.

Among the polemical practices of Ancient China, three main types of disputes were clearly specified: political, philosophical and judicial.  The latter were connected with the solution of legal issues (especially during the period of the division of property of large families, where consanguineous tradition and property rights collided), which necessarily implied the use of argumentative means in the interpretation of legal norms, the arsenal of which was extensive, but non-systemic and heterogeneous. It included many techniques and all sorts of tricks, among which a special place was occupied by the so-called "last word technique", which later established itself as another (along with examples) topos of the ancient Chinese dispute.

It was in court disputes that the ancient Chinese "sophists" - representatives of the "school of names" (ming-jia), professional debaters (bian zhi), always ready to assert what others denied in the course of polemics, and vice versa, were most clearly manifested. The most famous of them is the lawyer who "destroyed the law" with his paradoxical arguments, Dan Xi, who skillfully mastered the famous "last word" technique. Paying attention to names rather than facts, he was able to interpret the formal letter of the law depending on the situation, deftly turning the right (shi) into the wrong (fei), and vice versa ^{[10, pp.104-105]}. Deng Xi became famous for his special ability to provide a large number of justifications for the truth of contradictory judgments, as well as the formulation of a number of normative and logical requirements. It is he who is credited with the creation of the reasoning about two "possible interpretations", vaguely reminiscent of the ancient Greek paradox "Protagoras and Evatl". In general, the use of paradoxes strikingly reminiscent of ancient Greek ones, for example, about a flying arrow that is sometimes neither in motion nor at rest, or reasoning about the possibility of infinite division of a stick in half, reminiscent of Zeno's "Dichotomy", was typical for Chinese debaters ^{[10, p.111]}. At the same time, Feng Yu-lan, the author of the famous history of Chinese philosophy, analyzing in detail the arguments of the "school of names" in such arguments (for example, "Reasoning about Hardness and Whiteness" by Gongsun Moon), regarded by European researchers as paradoxical, shows that they cease to be such if one understands the fundamental metaphysical attitudes of their authors ^{[10, pp.110-113]}.

The presence of paradoxes in reasoning was one of the reasons for the emergence of relativism and a negative attitude towards philosophical disputes (especially between Confucians and Mohists) of the thinker Chuang Tzu, who "denied the traditional Chinese way of thinking and conducting disputes" ^{[30, p.173]}, and therefore came to a pessimistic conclusion about the pointlessness of any discussion, since he saw in the latter not a means of finding the truth by equivalent partners, but only the art of defeating the enemy ^{[31, p.214]}.

However, the most common were political disputes, which were conducted by those who were professionally engaged in diplomacy and politics. Their base was the "state pluralism" of the era of the "appanage kings", who were at the head of different states. These disputes often took the form of so-called "conferences", many of which played an important role in the political life of their time. The most famous of them was a conference called "The Dispute about salt and iron" (81 BC), dedicated to the problem of state monopolies on the production of salt and iron, which was opposed by the Confucian Dong Zhong-shu. He actively used the pragmatically oriented method of associations (reference to historical precedents as an indisputable argument), which allows to organize thinking and build a consistent chain of deductive-didactic reasoning, as well as an argument to authority (ad hominem in the European tradition), which in this case was the Sky ^{[32, pp.160-175]}. Moreover, the reference to Heaven was used by both opposing sides, both opponents and defenders of monopolies ^{[33, p.17]}, which testified to the sophistication of argumentative technique.  The argument to authority (reminiscent in importance of ipse dixit in medieval disputes with prescriptions) often took the form of an argument to tradition, very close to the already mentioned associative reference to precedents, as well as a modification of the argument to benefit, which was a manifestation of the priority of cognitive effectiveness over formal correctness ^{[14, p.111]}. Based on the typicality of argumentative techniques used in the dispute about salt and iron, the author of its reconstruction, Huan Kuan (treatise "Yan te Lun"), gave it a normative function of a model for the Confucian philosophical school, considering the arguments used in it an example of refuting the position of legists and Taoists.

The ability to skillfully argue one's views from antiquity, both in the East and in the West, was considered necessary for a philosopher, or, as Plato clarified in the Phaedrus, a person striving for wisdom. Therefore, it is not by chance that philosophical disputes, both interschool and intraschool, occupied a special place in terms of theoretical and methodological understanding of the art of argumentation in Ancient China. It was in them that the necessary normativity gradually crystallized. The most important contribution to its development was made by the already mentioned Deng Xi, as well as such thinkers as Confucius, Han Feizi, Hui Shi, Gongsun Lung, Mo Tzu, etc. ^{[34, p.174]}. So, for example, the issues of dispute theory were considered in "Judgments and Conversations" ("Lun yu") Confucius, who for the first time put forward the requirement of normalizing" (general significance and simplification) of the language in the strategy he developed for the correct use of names. "Correcting names" (Zheng ming), in his opinion, was a guarantee of the correctness (morality) of the act. The latter is important for the establishment of the desired social order, in which everyone should behave in accordance with their social status ^[35]. The ancient rhetorical tradition also declared a similar task – to force a person to act in the right direction, but in this case it was not about the strategy of discussing the problem by autonomous and sovereign subjects using rational arguments, in Ancient China the antecedents determined by the political and cultural context and the status of the participants were completely different. At the same time, some technical methods of argumentation were similar, for example, the use of the method of questions and answers, etc.

An important problem of the theory of argumentation – the dependence of the meaning of statements on the linguistic form, was considered not only by Confucius, but also by other thinkers. Thus, the specific principles of the ordering of names and their classification were studied by the philosopher Xun-Tzu, who owned a number of ideas devoted to the art of argumentation, for example, the doctrine of ways to prove the truth or falsity of the same thesis, as well as the systematization of a large number of specific examples of the use of incorrect arguments in disputes, allowing skilled debaters to achieve victory over the opponent. Gongsun Lun, a well-known representative of the "school of names" (ming-jia), who is often likened to the Greek sophists for his love of substitution of concepts, also dealt with the problem of the study of names. In an effort to clarify the logical relationship between the names, in his famous argument "Judgment of the White Horse" ("Bai ma Lun"), he actually posed a logical problem about the ratio of the content and scope of concepts ("horse" and "white horse"), which "made a huge contribution to the development of logical thought of that period" ^{[36, p.154]}. However, in practice, using the substitution of concepts in the form of sophisms, like the Greek ones, for example, the famous Hui Shi sophism "white dog – black" to confuse the enemy, turned a serious discussion into a fruitless polemic. At the same time, the activity of sophists negatively assessed by contemporaries turned out to be a good incentive for philosophers to pay close attention to the art of argumentation. An example is the school of the late Moists, who made a "serious" dispute, following the skillful debater Meng-tzu, the author of a treatise on the art of argumentation, the subject of their special study.

An important milestone in the theoretical and methodological understanding of the art of argumentation in Ancient China was the appearance of the famous "Dispute Program" directed against sophists, which had a strong influence on the development of the entire Chinese intellectual culture, up to the displacement of the institution of dispute from social life and the prohibition of philosophical disputes on pain of death in 213 BC. The "dispute program", the creator of which is considered to be Tsoi Yan, can be regarded as a prototype of the ancient Chinese theory of argumentation, since it systematizes the general principles and strategies of argumentation, as well as the basic requirements for the dispute, including: clarity of presentation, rigor of reasoning, rejection of linguistic and logical tricks that confuse the opponent, as well as bans on widespread rivalry over the right to the "last word", on "embellishment of expressions", manipulation of comparisons and quotations ^{[29, p.11]}.

If the "Program of the dispute" was only a prototype of the theory of argumentation, then the encyclopedic treatise "Mobian" ("The Reasoning of Mo-tzu"), written by "the first opponent of Confucius" (Feng Yu-lan), the founder of the school of moism - Mo-tzu, can be considered the first version of the theory of argumentation itself, because it was an attempt is made to create a normative base of argumentation, namely, its laws (fa-samples), interpreted in a logical-epistemological sense ^{[37, p.182]}. In addition, in this treatise, Mo-tzu, in contrast to Confucius, who was a critic of ancient Chinese civilization, disparate logical-argumentative ideas about the criteria and conditions for the correctness of reasoning (which were the basis, confirmation and applicability) took shape in a fairly coherent system, as a result of which the theory of argumentation appeared as applied logic.

Methodological problems of argumentation were considered by the moists in the specified theory of reasoning (sho) and dispute (bian).  It was Mo-tzu who conceptualized a number of key terms, introducing the concept of "reasoning", understood as a way of thinking that allows you to distinguish between true and false. The founder of Moism considered the rules of the thesis and its justification to be a special subject of study, together forming "three exemplary forms of judgment" (San biao sho) ^{[36, p.153]}.  It is significant that the "teacher of Mo" was not only a theorist who developed, for example, the classification of names (concepts) into "general, generic and private" ^{[38, p.102]}, but also a practitioner who tried with his speeches using utilitarian arguments to encourage people to follow the principle of universal love. In order to achieve this, he believed, not only religious, but also political justification is needed ^{[10, p.79]}. What a debater he was can be seen by the example of the chapter "Gong Shun" from the treatise "Mobian". His arguments combined such key components of an effective argumentative discourse as logical evidence and psychological persuasiveness, achieved by paying attention to the implicit assumptions of reasoning that are evaluative in nature. He practiced three persuasion strategies. The first was as follows: to clearly formulate the thesis, consistently argue it, using examples and analogies in such a way as to either bring the opponent's position to the point of absurdity, or show the inconsistency of the position, and then (and in this his method was similar to Socratic) force the opponent to agree with an apparently harmless statement, and then eventually force the opponent agrees with Mo-tzu's rightness. The second method of persuasion was based on the widespread use of examples as arguments proving to the enemy the unattainability or danger of the goal that the latter set for himself. Usually both methods went in conjunction. The third method was actually a modification of the second – persuasion of the enemy was carried out by means of an argument for practical use (to benefit) the idea that the speaker defended ^{[30, pp.43-44]}.

Developing the ideas of Mo-tzu, representatives of the Moist school studied in detail the utterance (tsy), distinguishing between truth (xin), referring it to a speech act, and correctness (dan), i.e. the correspondence of information in tsy to the actual state of affairs. Moreover, the moists developed a typology of statements that clearly echoes the ancient Greek: complete - general assertive (tsin), private assertive (ho), conditional (jia), imperative (bi), etc. They are also already beginning to distinguish the relation of contrarity from contradictority, which serves for some Chinese researchers as an argument in favor of having a description of the laws of logic, like Aristotelian, for example, the requirement of consistency, embodied in the famous fable of Han Fei-tzu about an impenetrable shield and an all-destroying spear. Moists also came close to the theory of the distribution of terms in categorical judgments ^{[3, p.82]}. It can be argued that the teachings of the Moists, both in a meaningful and even partly in a formal sense, surpassed all the logical-epistemological constructions that existed before in Ancient China. In their theory of argumentation, the logical aspect was closely related to the rhetorical aspect, to which the theory of dispute was mainly devoted.

Thus, the core of the theory of argumentation of the Moists was the theory of reasoning and the theory of dispute. The first described the following model: at the first stage – the formulation and presentation of the thesis, at the second – the actual procedure of its justification (San wu lun shi), consisting of three successive stages (three bases). The structure of the justification included: 1) argument (gu) is a small and large foundation (in the ancient Greek tradition, a necessary and sufficient condition); 2) argument (li) is a normative requirement regarding the conclusion; 3) examples (lei) that occupied an important place in the moist argumentative discourse due to their effectiveness in convincing the audience. The examples given formed the basis of paralogical reasoning by analogy (understood very broadly at the same time) ^{[34, p.175]}. Ignoring these structural requirements, which, despite the obvious lack of consistency, formed the basis of the argumentative normativity of the moists, was considered in public disputes as a path fraught with errors ^{[36, pp.155-156]}.

The Moist theory of dispute ("bian") proceeded from the fact that the theses of the disputants should be in relation to the contradiction, otherwise the subject of the dispute remains unclear, which leads to errors and misconceptions. To avoid them, you need to follow a number of rules, for example, if one side used a method, then the second can also use it, and vice versa, if one does not allow it, then the other should abandon the use of this method. This indicates that the moists had in mind, first of all, a cognitive dispute with correct techniques. A significant place in the theoretical understanding of the argumentation of the moists is occupied by the analysis of errors. It is important to note that both in antiquity - in Aristotle ("On sophistic refutations"), and in Modern times – in J. Locke ("errors of appeal"), and in modern models of argumentation (C. Hamblin) ^[39], and in textbooks on logic and theory of argumentation, the analysis of errors and tricks occupy a very significant place (sometimes up to a third of the volume) ^{[40, pp.162-197]}. The errors in the dispute were divided by the moists into several groups for various reasons, among them were those caused by fundamental cognitive difficulties and limitations, and those that were of a logical-semantic nature, as well as those related to ignorance of the rules of reasoning and inability to raise questions.  The latter, questioning, occupies a special place in the theory of argumentation, because a correctly posed question is not only the "key to the answer" (Plato), guiding the research search, but also a guide to action. The Chinese were well aware of the motivating function of the question – the demand (or offer) to perform an action. The question, as a method of argumentation, as an active factor conducting the will of the questioner, can be used as a control lever ^{[22, p.106]}.

Also in the theory of the late Moists, the rules of dispute management are clearly and in sufficient detail. The argumentative canon developed by them is set out in the chapter "Small Choice". Its observance allows, according to the moists, to avoid disputable errors. The canon consists of seven universal rules – the so-called "methods of arguing about the true and untrue." These include: (1) "probability" (ho) — an opinion in the form of a judgment about probability (preliminary thesis); (2) "assumption" (jia) is a hypothesis, (3) "imitation of a pattern" (xiao) is an analogy of features; (4) "comparison" (bi) is an analogy of examples; (5) "comparison" (mou) is also a kind of reasoning by analogy when comparing elements of a structure two statements, as well as different opinions of the disputants; (6) "reference to the opponent's opinion" (yuan); (7) "dissemination" (tui) – extrapolation of the agreement reached to other issues ^{[30, pp.189-192]}. The very fact of developing a system of standard steps to substantiate one's own point of view in a dispute represented a serious contribution to the development of the theory of argumentation. At the same time, the hierarchy of the canon's rules, despite the Moist declaration of its universality, turned out to be unsettled, as a result of which, instead of normativity, it had a descriptive character and allowed for the possibility of variations of methods taking into account the participating subjects and the topic of discussion.

It is interesting that the conventionally accepted rules of dispute resolution echo and are comparable in the degree of normativity with the so-called "code of rational behavior of participants" (a set of procedural rules)  in the practice-oriented concept of "critical discussion" (the modern form of dialectical dialogue), developed in the 80s of the XX century by a very influential Dutch school of pragmatic dialectics (F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, S. Henkemans, R. Houtlosser) ^{[41, pp.387-403]}. The use of regulatory rules in the role of constitutive. It is significant that the improvement of the pragmatic-dialectical model of argumentation, which today opposes the model of informal logic, is seen not in achieving a stricter (logicocentric) normativity, but in the way of a deeper understanding of pragmatic conventions and linguistic means used in argumentative discourse by native speakers ^{[42, p.198]}, the importance of which was well realized by later economists.

An analysis of the rules of the argumentative canon of the Moists shows that analogy was considered a priority type. It, like the examples, is the hallmark of the polemical culture of Ancient China. Its widespread and widespread use was explained by the pragmatic orientation (in the ethical and political aspect) of Chinese thinking in general: conclusions by analogy were considered the most effective means of conducting a discussion, the purpose of which was to encourage the right thing to do. The next step is the transition to the use of induction and deduction, because, according to the late mohists, two strategies help to distinguish between right and wrong: (1) imitation – a method resembling deduction, and (2) propagation, a method close to the inductive type of reasoning in Western logic.  However, this next step, due to political changes in the social life of ancient China, was not made. This also happened due to the dominance of Confucians, whose methodology and conceptual apparatus played a major role in intellectual culture, as well as legists, with their ideological attitudes towards unity and unification, leaving no space for polemical practices. As a consequence, the era of intellectual pluralism ended and Moism, with its achievements in the study of epistemological issues, in the middle of the reign of the Han Dynasty (III century BC).  he was organizationally defeated, and his huge contribution to the ideological heritage of that time for many centuries, until the second penetration of previously exiled Buddhism into China (VII century AD), will fall out of the Chinese intellectual context, because it turned out to be impossible to develop the ideas of the late Buddhists.

If the ancient Chinese rationality turned out to be incomparable in a number of aspects with the ancient Greek formal-logical tradition laid down by Aristotle, then the degree of normativity of the ancient Chinese theoretical reflection on the processes of argumentation was not only not inferior, but was at about the same level as in the ancient Greek tradition. However, due to a sharp change in the socio-cultural and political context, Chinese philosophical thought in the future will deviate significantly from the direction that Western European science has taken in understanding rhetorical practice. The discoveries of the late Moists will be forgotten ^{[43, p.6]}, and only in the period of Modern times the tradition of theoretical understanding of argumentation (as a subject of special study) will be continued. Only then will the scientific contribution of the late Moists be in demand and appreciated. 

Summing up, it should be noted that the ideas of argumentation scattered across various works occupied a subordinate place in Ancient China in relation to ethical and political issues. At the same time, the theoretical achievements of the moists, first of all, the idea that it is necessary to follow a certain method in reasoning, as well as attempts to formulate requirements for such a method, the search for criteria for the truth of knowledge, the development of algorithmically specified classification schemes, undoubtedly had independent scientific value. And although they were not specified into a theory in the strict sense of the word and did not take the form of a universal methodology, nevertheless, we have before us not just eristics (as the art of argument), but the theory of argumentation in the form of applied logic. In this regard, the conclusion of the sinologist K. Harbsmeier, who came to the conclusion that there is an explicit theory of argumentation in Chinese literature describing almost all the main forms of logical argumentation, is indicative ^{[8, p.265]}. Its methodological basis was based on correlative thinking, which acted as a fruitful methodology of ancient Chinese science. Another support was symbolic associativity, which was expressed in the widespread use of such types of reasoning as analogy and conclusions based on examples. The practice of using examples was so skilful and even sophisticated that they often ensured the success of the entire argument. Particular attention to analogy was due to practical reasons and specific attitudes of stratagem thinking, in particular, the need to express one's position allegorically in order to achieve consensus, which was a desirable goal due to the general attitude towards Harmony and Order.   At the same time, the normativity of the analogy was not so much logical as rhetorical in nature, since most often it acted not so much as a means of justification, as persuasion, which allowed the use of unsubstantiated premises.

The specifics of the theory of argumentation in Ancient China was the awareness of the dependence of argumentation on the linguistic form (the theory of the correct use of names), however, the general naturalistic attitude, which did not distinguish between an ideal concept and a material word (A.Kobzev), manifested itself in the polemical use of the same term in different meanings. This technique had a pragmatic (value, normative) justification, and its use did not at all indicate terminological illegibility. Also characteristic was the dominance of unproven types of argumentation based on non-demonstrative reasoning, as well as the emphasis on their substantive side, which was a consequence of the non-distinction of the eristic and logical, in turn, which did not contribute to the isolation of the logical form in its pure form, as it was in the European logic of truth values.

At the same time, the analysis shows that from the point of view of assessing the methodological potential, Chinese thought was "quite argumentative, polemical and even, perhaps, approaching formalizations in the spirit of "analytical philosophy" ^{[44, p.114]}. Similar conclusions of a number of sinologists (V.S. Spirin, A.M. Karapetyants, A.A. Krushinsky) ^[45] that the late Mohists came close to formal logic, as well as references to the experience of reconstructing their reasoning using mathematical logic, and attempts to evaluate them from the point of view of modern analytical philosophy (Cheng Zhongying), those who have discovered the presence of tools resembling mathematical calculus are of considerable scientific interest. However, these statements, as well as the conclusion about the similarity of the ancient Chinese methodology with modern constructivist logic, still seem to be an exaggeration.

Thus, despite the derivation from rhetoric and the predominance of critical analysis of argumentative practices in the ancient Chinese heritage before the actual methodologically theorizing, as well as taking into account the fact that the theory of argumentation (even taking into account the "communicative turn", which allowed to present the relation of logical follow-up in a dialog form) and today does not reach the rigor of formal logical techniques of justification, Since it includes a number of extra-logical components related to the peculiarities of reasoning in the humanities, the theoretical and methodological constructions of the thinkers of Ancient China, however, can be considered as a theory of argumentation, which is based on a psycho-linguistic model of persuasion.

And although the structural complexity of Chinese argumentation was inferior to the ancient one, but being aimed at "being embodied in reasonable deeds and trustworthy deeds" ^{[46, p.37]}, it was more "effective" and convincing, but not due to the logical sequence of reasoning, but due to the syncretic unity of rhetorical, stylistic and psychological mechanisms, such as imagery, symbolism, emotionality, energy, rhythm, authority and tradition ^{[11, p.35]}. And the associative connection of specific images perfectly conveyed to the listeners a volitional impulse, the purpose of which was to encourage desirable behavior.

Today, the task of finding normative rules, algorithms and new standards of polemical art (normative, communicative-productive, cognitive, etc.) continues to be relevant. The practical need to create a theory of argumentation encourages a new philosophical understanding of the argumentative heritage of the ancients, which in turn can stimulate not only the conceptualization of key concepts as a condition for consensus of representatives of different theoretical and methodological approaches to the construction of the theory of argumentation, but also the development of a constructive strategy to create a generally valid normative model. The latter, if such a requirement of communication as targeting is taken into account, may be able to overcome the constant receptions of the traditional alternative of the logical and rhetorical, which we see in modern theories of argumentation.