Russian-Latin American Strategic Partnerships in New Geopolitical Context

Konovalova Kseniya ORCID: 0000-0002-9848-0035 PhD in History Assitant of the Department of World Politics, Saint Petersburg State University 199034, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Universitetskaya Embankment str., 7, building 9 misssienna@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

A new round of aggravation of relations with the "collective West" makes it imperative for Russia to find partners in the global East and South. Latin America (LA) in this regard is both a complex and promising direction. It is historically closely linked to the political values of the Euro-Atlantic States and continues to depend on their capital and technology. But at the same time, in the XXI century, most LA nations are focused on a diversified pragmatic course, the purpose of which, first of all, is to attract resources for development and solving pressing socio-economic problems. Another aspect is that the Latin American elites need ties with non-Western influential players, such as Russia, China, India, Iran, as a support for a more independent foreign policy course. The modern – transitional - stage of international relations further actualizes this priority. Russia's vector is becoming both more risky and significant for LA, since it is its actions that are one of the main challenges to the liberal world order.

In these circumstances, in our opinion, the problem of the impact on Russian-Latin American cooperation of the current crisis around Ukraine and its broader international consequences deserves special attention. In this article, it is raised through the prism of strategic partnerships between Russia and the LA states, which can be considered as a special class of the most actively developing bilateral relations within the framework of the entire dialogue with the region.

Strategic partnerships in Russian-Latin American relations

Russia's relations with Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru and Ecuador are currently qualified as a strategic partnership. The essence of such relations is defined as particularly close, multidisciplinary and long-term cooperation with similar positions on international issues ^{[2] [13] [46]}.

In practice, relations within the joint venture can be of any intensity, the key point is the high value of such relations for partners, based on their national interests. For example, Brazil is Russia's largest trading partner in the region, and back in 2006 a "technological alliance" was initiated, covering, among other things, the space and military-technical spheres. A "comprehensive joint venture" has been formed with Argentina, which involves trade, investment, cultural, and scientific cooperation. In 2021, Argentina, which localized the production of the Sputnik V vaccine, became a kind of "hub" of Russian vaccine diplomacy in LA. But most joint ventures are narrower, concentrating on trading mutually attractive commodity nomenclature or large projects (in energy, transport, military-technical sector, etc.).

Despite the theoretical emphasis on the long-term nature of joint ventures and their independence from the political conjuncture ^[46], these parameters are very relative. Firstly, it is difficult to assess the long-term prospects of Russia's partnerships with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, since they are initially focused on cooperation with specific governments, including in politically sensitive industries. Secondly, in any case, the stability of the joint venture is influenced by the foreign policy programs of governments, which are based on pragmatic considerations, ideological and value aspects. Thus, the continuity of the joint venture between Argentina and Russia under Mauricio Macri (2015-2018) was ensured by the business-centric course of his government. And with the coming to power in Bolivia of the ideologized right-wing figure Jeanine Agnes (2019-2020), gas projects with Russia, which form the basis of the joint venture, have stalled ^[35]. Thirdly, the joint venture is often supported by the diplomacy of leaders: absolutely all formalized joint ventures were "born" following the meetings of the presidents. The political conjuncture also has a diverse influence on the leaders' diplomacy channel. Thus, after the resignation of Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), who signed the Peru-Russia joint venture, the dynamism of bilateral relations, if we count the number of presidential meetings, meetings of intergovernmental commissions, has significantly decreased ^[14]. This can be explained not only by the coming to power of liberal-globalist politicians in Peru, but also by the beginning of a period of internal turbulence that complicates the implementation of an active international course.

The joint venture involves demonstrating a common vision of the international situation, but even here the level of this community may be different. Thus, a Joint Statement on strategic foreign policy Dialogue was agreed on the Brazilian direction in 2017. Nevertheless, his formulations look streamlined and contain explicit "figures of silence", for example, about the conflict in Syria ^[12]. Brazilian leaders, speaking at the national level, made it clear that they did not support the Russian campaign in this Middle Eastern country ^[18], but this did not have any special consequences for bilateral cooperation. At the same time, for example, the Russian-Cuban declaration on Joint Venture (2018) contains a separate reference to the "condemnation of sanctions" ^[22], which is a historically painful issue for Cuba and relevant for modern Russia.

The commonality of international political views is demonstrated not only between partners, but also to third parties. In particular, in the Argentine direction, Russia's support for the position of Buenos Aires on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, carried out, including at the UN, is important ^[4]. Regarding Ecuador, where energy projects are the "core" of the joint venture, researchers note that the Rafael Correa administration that signed the partnership (2007-2017) counted on rapprochement with Russia to strengthen the country's position in OPEC ^[7]. Another question is about the "anti-Western geopolitical symbolism" of Russian-Latin American strategic partnerships. Russia's official position on this matter is unambiguous: "Our policy towards Latin America ... is not directed against anyone" ^[6]. Nevertheless, Western observers tend to see the "special relations" with a number of states in the region as the meaning of confrontation between the United States and its allies ^{[29] [44]}. This idea is carried out by some Western diplomats ^{[32] [38]} and international scholars ^[20]. The main line of such judgments is that strategic partnerships unite "anti-liberal regimes", are designed to ensure the value split of the Western Hemisphere and the "expansion" of Russia in it.

Thus, Russian-Latin American strategic partnerships are a broad and mobile format, the content of which varies from country to country and is constantly influenced by internal and external factors.

 Latin American Strategic Partners of Russia and the Ukrainian crisis

The ongoing crisis around Ukraine has a multifaceted impact on Latin American countries, not only on their international relations, but also on the internal situation. Based on this, considering the impact of the crisis on strategic partnerships with Russia, it is important to take into account the totality of circumstances. On the one hand, as a starting point for analysis, it is possible to focus on the results of the voting of LA states in the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) on the landmark anti-Russian resolutions and declarations; they are presented in Tables 1 and 2. On the other hand, this official position, declared as if "in the face of the world community", it was often accompanied by various "reservations". The political signals given on other platforms and in the bilateral field are also important. Finally, the real dynamics of interstate interaction does not always correspond to political rhetoric.

Table 1.  

Voting on anti-Russian resolutions at the UN

Table 1 (end)

  Source: compiled by the author according to the UN Digital Library. URL:https://digitallibrary.un.org/

Table 2.

Voting on anti-Russian resolutions and declarations in the OAS

Sources: OEA suspende a Rusia como pa?s observador de la organizaci?n. 22.04.2022, URL: https://apnews.com/article/noticias-daf58f5127cc0ffe2e96f20bab27b11e; Chile y otros 23 pa?ses de la OEA condenan invasi?n rusa a Ucrania: Ni Argentina ni Brasil apoyaron declaraci?n. 26.02.2022, URL: https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2022/02/26/1047847/argentina-brasil-no-apoya-oea.html&hl=es&gl=ru&strip=1&vwsrc=0; La OEA pide el fin de posibles “cr?menes de guerra” en Ucrania. 25.03.2022. URL:https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/la-oea-pide-el-fin-de-posibles-crimenes-de-guerra-en-ucrania/202258/; Declaraci?n de la OEA para condenar “invasi?n ilegal e injustificada” de Rusia a Ucrania no fue firmada por estos pa?ses. 06.10.2022. URL: https://www.semana.com/mundo/articulo/declaracion-de-la-oea-para-condenar-invasion-ilegal-e-injustificada-de-rusia-a-ucrania-no-fue-firmada-por-estos-paises/202211/

In general, four groups can be distinguished among Russia's strategic partners, depending on the nature of the impact of the new international conditions on bilateral relations.

The first is a "consistently loyal" group, where we will include Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba. The peculiarity of the approach of the leaders of these states is that they supported Russia's defense in Ukraine, sharing the idea of its response to the provocative actions of NATO and the United States. In all three cases, such signals were broadcast via two-way channels of the highest level ^{[23] [39] [42]}. The head of Cuba, Miguel Diaz-Canel, visited Russia in November 2022, and this is so far the only visit of the Latin American leader to Moscow during the SVO. Political support in these cases is coupled with the attitudes to strengthen the joint venture "in all spheres" ^[10]. At the same time, it is these three strategic partners that attract the maximum attention of some external observers, who consider them as anti-American "outposts" of Russia in Latin America. Thus, the resonance both in the United States and in Latin American circles supporting Washington was caused by the decision of the Nicaraguan authorities to extend the right of presence on their territory of a limited military continent from Russia in June 2022. Although such cooperation between Moscow and Managua is a long–standing practice, in the conditions of its own, a number of Western experts interpreted this step as an attempt by Russia to threaten the United States ^{[28] [29]}.

Bolivia, although it also did not support anti-Russian resolutions in the UN and the OAS, from our point of view, constitutes a separate category. This joint venture is now characterized by maintaining high dynamism of bilateral ties, but without emphasizing political solidarity with Russia. So, in 2022, Russia and Bolivia implemented initiatives of a strategic nature in the context of the national interests of both. In August, the first facilities of the Nuclear Research Center created with the participation of Rosatom were experimentally launched in the city of El Alto. The project involves the transfer to Bolivia of technologies for the peaceful use of the atom for medicine, agricultural and scientific purposes, the continuation of large-scale scientific cooperation and potentially has a significant socio-economic effect for Bolivia ^[45], supporting the value of cooperation with Russia. The strategic importance of exports from Bolivia for Russia has also increased due to the fact that, with the beginning of the SVO, Argentina and Chile suspended supplies to Russia of lithium raw materials needed for electronics, military-industrial complex and other high-tech industries. In August 2022, Rosatom announced plans to strengthen cooperation with Bolivia in the lithium industry – from the extraction of raw materials to the creation of batteries ^[1]. As of February 2023, the Uranium One Group company (associated with Rosatom), despite the sanctions climate and great competition from other foreign firms, primarily Chinese, was negotiating a contract for the development of lithium deposits in the Andean country ^[11]. As demonstrated by the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and Bolivia on the sidelines of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (September 2022), the communication of delegations in Brasilia in January 2023, through bilateral channels, the countries formed an opinion on the need to maintain and develop dialogue not only in trade, economic, scientific spheres, but also in defense and security issues. But in the foreign arena, in particular, speaking out in the OAS, the Bolivian leadership avoids being associated with both condemnation and support of Russia and concentrates on calls for a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, in the political class of Bolivia, the topic of Russia and Ukraine turned into an occasion for confrontation: in March 2023, for example, a group of opposition parliamentarians sent an open letter to the UN Secretary-General criticizing both Moscow and the "complicit silence" of the government of Luis Arce (2020-present) ^[34].

Argentina and Brazil, which make up the third group, are characterized by neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict and pragmatization of partnership with Russia. After it turned out that the visits of Alberto Fernandez (2019-present) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) to Russia in February 2022, accompanied by friendly rhetoric and packages of agreements, preceded their own, both leaders were criticized in their countries and in the West as a whole. As in Bolivia, anti-Russian sentiments here gripped part of the political elites (Brazilian Vice President Amilton Mourau openly condemned Russia, although Bolsonaro subsequently disavowed his words) and society ^{[27] [47]}. At the UN, both countries were inclined to support anti-Russian resolutions. On the Pan-American stage, at the same time, the Argentine and Brazilian representatives did not formulate a special opinion, motivating the diplomatic "silence" by finding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict outside the continent and the competence of the OAS ^{[21] [33]}. Brazil has consistently opposed the adoption of common declarations on the Russian-Ukrainian topic at the Mercosur and Prosur forums ^[30], which also illustrates the tendency to oust the topic from regional discourse.

A characteristic feature of the approaches of both states has become the desire to preserve the freedom of hands and emphasize the multilateral nature of their foreign policy, where cooperation with Russia and its opponents can equally fit in. In the case of Argentina, which is experiencing a severe economic crisis and needs to diversify sources of investment and funds to alleviate the aggravated debt problem, a pragmatic balancing is noticeable. In September 2022, Argentina formalized its application to join the BRICS, but it is obvious that this is not so much a "pro-Russian step" as a measure for economic rapprochement with China, and in the same month President Fernandez paid a visit to the United States, an important part of which was a meeting with the head of the International Monetary Fund. Brazil is characterized by a kind of "active neutrality" in the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and the United States and NATO standing behind it. This line, in particular, is illustrated by the comments of the Brazilian representative to the OAS on anti-Russian decisions: he stated that the topic of Russia and Ukraine should be discussed at the UN ^[21] (where in 2022 Brazil received a non-permanent member of the Security Council). A large interview of the current president Lula da Silva to Time is indicative, in which, despite the efforts of correspondents to bring the politician to criticize Russia, he replied that "Zelensky is also to blame for the war" and pointed to the destabilizing role of NATO and the insufficient will of Western countries to ensure peace ^[37]. We can also recall the program of meetings of the new head of Brazil on the "fields" of his inauguration on January 1, 2023. Then he received both the delegation of the Russian Federation, headed by the Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Sviridenko, promising to "talk to anyone about peace in Ukraine" ^[17].

Regarding the content of strategic partnerships, it can be noted that Argentina and Brazil have testified to the desire to preserve and develop them, despite international tensions. The Argentine Senate and the government specifically spoke about this in June 2022. However, a limited range of issues was actually singled out from the "comprehensive strategic partnership", such as the promotion of investment and banking cooperation, agriculture and fish farming, environmental protection, cooperation through individual scientific institutions ^[16]. In early January 2023, it was possible to agree with Brazil on "restarting strategic partnership" in all areas of cooperation and holding a meeting of the High-level Commission ^[9], which has not met since 2015.  But there are also alarming signals. In addition to the aforementioned actions of Argentina in the lithium sector, the accession of the Brazilian aviation giant Embraer to sanctions, which led to the termination of the supply of aircraft parts and maintenance of previously sold aircraft, became sensitive for Russia. Secondly, anti-Russian restrictive measures, disruptions of logistics and financial chains create difficulties even for projects whose high importance has now been recognized by Latin Americans. The most striking example is Russian fertilizers. The dependence of Brazil's agriculture on fertilizer imports from the Russian Federation in 2022 was about 22%, which made Russia a key foreign supplier of this type of product to the South American country. Despite the sanctions, the import of fertilizers even increased, reaching record values. At the same time, as a number of experts show ^{[3] [24] [47]}, not only in Brazil, but also in Argentina, the authorities see the riskiness of the Russian direction and strategically intend to focus on increasing domestic production of fertilizers and diversifying their imports, including at the expense of the United States, Canada ^[47].

Finally, Peru and Ecuador stand apart. Despite the fact that the political context in the two countries is not identical - the ruling forces of Ecuador, on the whole, are pro-Western, and in Peru the decisive factor is political discord and ongoing instability - both of these actors, firstly, have aligned themselves with the West in criticizing Russia, without making "discounts" on partnerships. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru condemned Russia on February 25, 2022 ^[19], and in October, the country's ex-president Pedro Castillo (suspended in December 2022) opened a meeting of the OAS General Assembly, at which they put forward a resolution on support for Ukraine. As for Ecuador, this country - the only one in Latin America - supported the exclusion of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council after the start of its ^[25]. Secondly, we can say that the elites of both states have an idea of the political expediency of limiting cooperation with Russia. For example, if Peru has traditionally been one of the leading operators of Russian helicopter technology, then with the beginning of its, according to a number of experts, the Peruvian authorities began to promote the transition from Russian machines to Western ones ^[31]. In the Ecuadorian direction, the signing of a major trade agreement with Russia has failed. According to the Minister of Foreign Trade, Investment and Fisheries, Julio Jose Prado, the agreement will not take place because his country "will not put any values below commercial topics" ^[26]. Nevertheless, through bilateral channels of diplomatic and inter-parliamentary dialogue, Ecuador still sends more favorable signals that it "views Russia as a friendly country" and would like to develop "trade, economic and cultural relations" with it ^[5]. For example, it is known that the participation of the Russian company Tyazhmash in the Toachi Pilaton HPP complex, which represented one of the key initiatives in the context of the joint venture, is now continuing ^[40].

 Conclusions and opportunities

The reaction of Russia's strategic partners in Latin America to the Ukrainian crisis, as shown above, is diverse. This raises the question of the opportunities that strategic partnerships in the Latin American vector give Russia in the current problematic situation.

The main thing that needs to be paid attention to is that none of the eight States under consideration has disavowed the partnership itself. If Guatemala recalled the ambassador from Russia with the beginning of its military operation, and the President of Chile Gabriel Borich (2022-present) directly promised Ukraine assistance and called himself a "South American friend" of Vladimir Zelensky ^[43], then the strategic partner countries did not react in this way. Even those of them who have not sided with Russia in the political sense, are interested in mutually beneficial cooperation. The majority of Latin American strategic partners of the Russian Federation are characterized by a dual position, which combines condemnation of the fighting in Ukraine and efforts made through bilateral channels aimed at minimizing damage to projects within the framework of cooperation with Russia.

Further, the symbolic and material components are clearly distinguished in all joint ventures. If the material component is projects, then the symbolic component is the ideas that the parties invest in the partnership. This poses the primary problem of forming a "message" to Latin American partners about the Russian view of international relations and finding common ground. In this sense, it seems appropriate to focus on the need to reform the international order. Firstly, in the direction of its greater balance, the destruction of hegemonic structures and the corresponding type of thinking. Secondly, for the sake of real universalism and the promotion of multilateral approaches. Thirdly, to get out of the system of "sanctioned arbitrariness" of the West, when the authors of the market order can exclude players from it at their discretion. These installations are wide enough to cover the entire range of Latin American strategic partners of Russia, from Brazil to Ecuador. It seems possible to make the commitment to polycentricity as a result of global changes, the trigger for which is the current conflict between Russia and the West, a symbolic core of the Joint venture.

Another significant circumstance is that the collective West, while fighting Russia, relies on block methods. The actions of the OAS are a continuation of this block logic in Latin America. The proof can already be that the Ukrainian crisis is the first extra–regional crisis in the XXI century, to which the organization has treated so carefully (in 2022, as can be seen, four decisions were made). One way out of the situation is to continue promoting the joint Venture as emphatically flexible structures focused on mutual support of national interests wherever possible. Another is the development of multilateral joint ventures on the vector of interregional cooperation between Russia and LA. Note that BRICS has already been described as a "multidisciplinary strategic partnership" ^[8]. At the same time, it seems reasonable to intensify the Russia–CELAC dialogue, which Lula da Silva's Brazil plans to give a new impetus to, and to strengthen cooperation between Russia and ALBA.

In general, the current stage of geopolitical tension requires Russia to update and strengthen its Latin American strategy. The Latin American course should not be limited to general attitudes towards Russia's global presence and ties with all continents, which arose back in the 1990s, but correlate with specific foreign policy and foreign economic objectives, such as promoting de-dollarization, searching for new investment niches to support industry and high-tech industries, expanding elements of the global security architecture that are not tied to the West, and many others. From our point of view, rethinking the format of the joint venture may be a logical first step on this path.