Correlation of Interests of Russia, China and the United States on the Korean Peninsula and their Implementation under Possible Scenarios of Development of the Situation

Marina Anastasiia Andreevna Student, Department of Global Political Processes, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia 76 Prospekt Vernadskogo str., Moscow, 119454, Russia marina.a.a@my.mgimo.ru

The conflict on the Korean peninsula, which has remained unresolved for more than half a century, today has the potential for escalation. During 2022 and early 2023, the DPRK conducted missile tests more than 50 times, which is a record in the country's history. In addition, at the end of December, the DPRK tested five unmanned aerial vehicles that crossed the military demarcation line with South Korea, which was perceived by Seoul as an unprecedented provocation. The presence of Pyongyang's nuclear potential and the deployment of the American THAAD anti-missile complex on the territory of the Republic of Korea indicate that in the event of an escalation of the conflict today, it will be more destructive than military actions during the Korean War. All this makes it possible to consider the conflict between Pyongyang and Seoul as a potential hotbed of the Third World War.

And at the time when this crisis developed, and today, the conflict on the Korean peninsula was and remains highly susceptible to external influence. This fact requires taking into account the realization of the interests of external players in the implementation of potential scenarios for the development of events on the Korean peninsula. Despite the fact that Russia, China and the United States, as the leading powers in the region, consistently and systematically declare their interest in resolving the Korean issue, today the efforts of the countries are multidirectional. In this regard, the question is raised why, given the existence of multilateral formats for the settlement of the conflict on the Korean peninsula and the declared interest of external players in its solution, as well as the risk of aggravation of the conflict, efforts are not being made in this direction. To solve this problem, the author analyzes the interests of the leading regional players through the prism of their relationships with each other and with the countries of the Korean peninsula, and also considers the implementation of their interests in each of the possible options for resolving or further escalation of the conflict in Korea.

Despite the fact that the conflict is in a sluggish state, provocations from Pyongyang motivate political scientists and international relations specialists to build various scenarios for the further development of events on the Korean peninsula and predict ways to resolve relations between the South and the North. The most extensive analysis of Korean issues on this issue is presented in the works of A.V. Torkunov, G.D. Toloraya ^{[1, 2, 3, 4]}, and also in the collective report of Russian Korean specialists ^[5,6]. It is important to note that all the authors agree that in any of the scenarios, special attention should be paid to nuclear issues, and the decision on this issue should be taken in the format of multilateral negotiations. At the same time, the issue of unification of Korea is perceived primarily as a problem of direct relations between the North and the South, the solution of which depends on them, and the world community should not put pressure on the DPRK and the Republic of Korea to realize their national interests.

Based on the proposed options for the development of events, taking into account the modern features of North Korean relations, the author of the work identified the following scenarios, the variability of which is explained in Appendix No. 1.1) The least optimistic scenario is associated with a political collapse on the peninsula caused by the indignation of the North Korean opposition or the collapse of the North Korean regime.

This scenario is most often discussed by American observers ^[7], but despite this, the North Korean regime, even after experiencing internal political crises, remains relatively stable, and the issue of the existence of any opposition to the current government is solved by the government as radically as possible ^[8]. This scenario is primarily dangerous for China and Russia, whose borders are in close proximity and where the refugee flows will go. At the same time, in the long term, in such a scenario, the interests of the United States will also suffer, which will have to fight for influence in the region with China. At the same time, it is highly likely that North Korea will seek support from China in this scenario.

2) The reconstruction of the two blocks that existed during the Cold War (Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang and Washington-Seoul-Tokyo) and the growth of further confrontation is the trend that has been most noticeable in recent years. Such a scenario would be most likely if it were not for the close interweaving of economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, which promotes cooperation between the countries of the antagonizing blocs. Nevertheless, hypothetically, there remains the possibility of a confrontation between two "triples" in the Asia-Pacific region, however, it should not be ruled out that the pendulum of the Republic of Korea's foreign policy may swing towards China, especially if this country has historical claims against Japan ^[9]. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the US–Japan–South Korea triangle finally mentioned will crumble only when the DPRK is not considered as a source of threat to the Republic of Korea and the US military presence in the region decreases.

3) a repetition of the Berlin scenario, which assumes the collapse of the North Korean regime and the gradual integration of the DPRK into the South Korean legal space. The improbability of this scenario is manifested in the fact that if some external actors are interested in this, then the Republic of Korea, whose economy will be severely depleted under the pressure of the North, will benefit least of all from this. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the social sentiments of Southerners, because despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Korea formally enshrines the goal of uniting the motherland, not the first generation who grew up in a divided Korea does not associate itself with the northern neighbor in any way and does not see the prospects of a joint state ^[10]. As for the north, many years of propaganda against its southern neighbor have also not passed by, as a result of which the Republic of Korea is still perceived by certain segments of the population as an ideological opponent.

3) One of the most optimistic scenarios is associated with the policy of involvement and reducing the level of tension on the Korean peninsula. Similar attempts at rapprochement were made after President Kim Dae-jung came to power in the Republic of Korea and was called the "solar heat" policy ^[11]. Returning to it and involving all participants of the "Korean node" in the dialogue can bring the best results.

4) The scenario once put forward by Kim Il Sung as "one country-two systems" and implying the creation of a confederation remains not the most realistic, but has a chance of existence. If such a scenario is realized, it is very likely that export production facilities created by South Korean, Chinese and other investors using cheap labor will be located in North Korea. Actually, the functioning of the Kaesong Industrial Park, created in the 2000s in the DPRK with the participation of South Korean investors, was based on this principle ^[12]. The activity of such projects will require legal regulation of trade and economic exchanges, including relying on WTO rules. With such a development of events, there is a chance of successful integration of the united Korea into the international legal space.

G. Morgenthau ^[13] paid special attention to the role of state interest in international relations, paying attention to the existence of areas of cross-interests, the struggle for the realization of which provokes world conflicts. In the process of restructuring the bipolar world, the trend towards regionalization and, accordingly, the strengthening of the role of regional powers in these processes has become obvious. The crisis over the North Korean nuclear missile program is not a local conflict of limited scale, through its prism the priorities of the largest states in terms of their international influence are manifested, influencing the formation of a system of political and economic relations in Northeast Asia, the key provisions of which could be projected to the global level.

Russia's interests on the Korean peninsula are determined primarily by its desire to strengthen its position in Northeast Asia, which is why relations with Pyongyang and Seoul are equally important for Russia. Nevertheless, it is traditionally cooperation with the DPRK that contributes to increasing the attention of the world community to the role of Russia in this region ^[14]. On the other hand, it would be wrong to give full support to Pyongyang not only from the point of view of the current situation, but also from the standpoint of Russia's long-term prospects and interests. Russia's interests in Korea determine the priorities of Russian policy on the Korean peninsula: maintaining relations with the DPRK, developing partnerships and economic cooperation with South Korea, and Russia's participation in international efforts to resolve the situation on the Korean peninsula.

In this context, it is important to recall that it was Russia that initiated the six-party format of negotiations on the problems of the Korean Peninsula in 1994 ^[15]. In addition, it is probably one of the few reliable platforms for Russia to protect its interests in this region.

Russia, like no other state, is interested in liberalizing the political regime of the DPRK, since the constant conflict between the North and the South narrows the possibilities of interaction between Russia and the Republic of Korea. Another important reason for the need to soften the North Korean regime is the problem of illegal migration. Although this process is generally characteristic of relations between Korea and Russia, and the flow of migrants to South Korea and China is much higher, this issue still cannot be ignored.

The nuclear potential also raises concerns of the Russian side, but not so much because of the danger of its use against Russia, but because of the possibility of a man-made catastrophe near its borders or the creation of an alternative nuclear club with the further proliferation of these weapons outside the DPRK, so Russia reacts extremely negatively to North Korean nuclear tests. In general, Russia opposes the expansion of the nuclear club, which is especially important in the context of the existence of a potential possibility of unification of Korea on South Korean principles. Thus, the DPRK's nuclear developments will be transferred to Seoul, and Russia, in addition, will border on a nuclear power on whose territory there are US military bases.

For Russia at the moment, and taking into account its capabilities, it is not the struggle to gain predominant positions in Korea that is relevant, but rather the prevention of such a situation when the entire peninsula would be under the influence of some one, especially not quite friendly to Russia, state.

China's interest in Korea is primarily due to its cultural, historical and geographical proximity. For Beijing, as for Moscow, the threat is not so much the presence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK, as the flirtation of the DPRK with the United States and the presence of the latter in the region. China, like Russia, is interested in resuming the six-Party talks, but Beijing does not set this as a primary task for itself, since it has sufficiently powerful direct levers of pressure, both to the South and to the North.             As is obvious, the fall of the North Korean regime does not correspond to China's interests, as well as any military actions on the peninsula, however, the gradual liberalization of power in the DPRK would correspond to its interests and would contribute to further fruitful cooperation ^[16]. The current version of the existence of a divided but neutral Korea also satisfies China's interests, although in the future Beijing may not slow down the gradual solution of the unification issue, but only if the political orientation of the united state towards China is certain, however, even if this scenario is implemented, there is a possibility of territorial claims against China from the united Korea. At the same time, in the case of unification of Korea, the issue of denuclearization will become acute, since South Korea's seizure of the North's nuclear facilities does not correspond to China's interests. China is also interested in further forming block cooperation with South Korea and Japan to solve the problems of the Korean peninsula and reduce the influence of the United States on these countries. At the same time, China expresses its readiness to coordinate its further actions with Russia, since their interests in this region coincide, although China does not position them as sharply as Russia. The main document today reflecting the similarity of interests of Russia and China in Korea is the “Action Plan” for a comprehensive settlement of the problems of the Korean Peninsula, expanding the proposals developed by Moscow and Beijing since 2017 to normalize the situation on the Korean peninsula.

Unlike the situation of Russia and China, US interests in Korea are primarily explained by geopolitical ambitions, not national interests. Initially, the US presence on the Korean peninsula was caused by extraordinary conditions, which in some ways were deliberately preserved by the American side. On the nuclear issue, which is an explanation for the US presence, Washington is extremely determined, and its position has not changed for many years, but at the same time, the implementation of the policy of double deterrence proposed by the US is extremely unlikely, since the illegal nuclear program of the DPRK, condemned by the UN Security Council, is not an equal bargaining chip for military exercises conducted by in accordance with world practice ^[17]. Accordingly, without the lifting of economic sanctions, it is impossible to continue the dialogue, the purpose of which is to solve the nuclear problem.                       

Unlike the nuclear issue, the unification issue depends least of all on Washington's position. In general, for the United States, any scenarios of unification of the North and South will pose a special challenge not only for the economy in terms of supporting the Republic of Korea, but also for foreign policy. Firstly, with the unification of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, the question of the withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula may arise, thus reducing the influence of the United States in the region. The US-South Korean military maneuvers are also likely to stop. Secondly, the unification of Korea is expected to contribute to the development of internal ties in the region and the advancement of China's positions. Thus, in the struggle for influence on the Korean peninsula, Washington's already difficult relations with Beijing will worsen.                                        

Despite the fact that Washington officially supports the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula on terms acceptable to the peoples of North and South Korea, and also recognizes that the future of the Korean Peninsula depends solely on the bilateral decisions of these two countries, in practice, the United States is taking step by step measures that do not contribute to the rapprochement of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea ^[18]. It can be assumed with great confidence that if a compromise is found on the DPRK nuclear issue, the US position towards this country will not change, and claims about non-compliance with human rights may replace claims about the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The United States is not able to resolve the problems of the Korean peninsula on its own, and the military option of resolving the crisis has already shown its ineffectiveness. Perhaps the solution to the Korean problem lies in the search for dialogue not so much between the United States and the DPRK, but between the United States and China with the involvement of other key states in this region - China, Russia, Japan, South Korea.

If the denuclearization of the peninsula takes place without ensuring a solid and mutually reinforcing system of collective security in the region, military risks may even increase, while an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula does not meet the interests of any of the Powers on the Korean peninsula. It is also interesting that the leading powers, while officially supporting the peaceful unification of Korea, are not really interested in its practical implementation.

The number of actors whose interests are intertwined in the "Korean knot" makes it impossible to resolve this conflict without the participation of all interested parties. It was the reduction of tension between the United States and Russia that made possible the six-party talks on Korean issues in the 1990s, within the framework of which concrete efforts were made to resolve the conflict. In this context, the situation is aggravated by the fact that relations between countries that have historically been involved in the settlement of the Korean issue are also experiencing a crisis. At the moment, there is a significant deterioration in relations between Russia and the United States against the background of both the Ukrainian crisis and the aggravation of security issues in general, relations between the United States and China are also at a crisis point amid the ongoing economic confrontation and the incident with the Chinese balloon. In this regard, any multilateral formats involving the participation of the above-mentioned countries are not viable.

The analysis of the interests of the leading regional players allows us to draw the following conclusions. It is obvious that the United States and China are the most active in this region, while Russia remains on the sidelines. The approaches of China and the United States towards Korea are very different. The interests of China and Russia in Korea have much in common and are explained by the presence of borders with the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. Both countries are interested in further economic development of the peninsula and expansion of regional economic cooperation. The interests of the United States in Korea are primarily explained by the desire to preserve and expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region, which is manifested in competition with China. While Washington is acting in the wake of the traditions of Cold War politics and refuses to recognize the DPRK, and builds relations with the Republic of Korea on the basis of a military alliance, the PRC is striving to maintain friendly relations with both countries of the Korean peninsula, increasingly involving them in the sphere of its economic influence. Russia, like China, seeks to build relations with both the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, but the dialogue with North Korea is characterized by greater trust and traditionally close relations with the North Korean elite, which is Russia's unique potential in this region.

The most realistic scenario for the development of events in Korea today is a confrontational one, which is primarily due to the low effectiveness of the negotiation process between the United States and the DPRK in 2018-2019 and the refusal of the American side to compromise solutions, including a return to multilateral negotiations. In this scenario, the positions of Russia, the United States and China are most likely to be maintained, while it is possible to develop cooperation both within the antagonizing Washington-Seoul-Tokyo and Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang blocs, and between them within the framework of the Chinese policy of engagement.