Political, Economic Aspects and Prospects of Tajikistan's Integration Policy

Khadyrov Ravshan Yunusovich PhD in Politics Postgraduate student, Department of World Political Processes, MGIMO 115764, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, ul. Moscow, 63, of. Moscow khadyrov.r.u@mail.ru Other publications by this author

IntroductionOn May 29, 2014, the Presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Armenia joined the EAEU on January 2, 2015, and Kyrgyzstan on May 8.

It seemed obvious that in the political and economic elites of the Republic of Tajikistan (hereinafter referred to as the Republic of Tajikistan), the understanding of long-term economic and political benefits will prevail, their predominance over short-term risks of reducing customs and tax revenues ^[13] and the country will become the next member of this integration union. However, the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan did not take the initiative to join the EAEU. For 8 years, the possible membership of the Republic of Tatarstan in the EAEU has been actively discussed in the scientific and expert community, the media, but the government structures of the Republic of Tatarstan have actually stopped in the integration movement, justifying this by the need for a deeper consideration of national interests, a detailed calculation of benefits and risks when joining the economic union. Let's agree that the analysis of the balance of political and economic benefits and costs is really necessary for making strategic development decisions.

The purpose of this article is to consider the political, to a lesser extent, economic aspects of the integration of the Republic of Tatarstan, their impact on the adoption by the authorities of foreign policy and management decisions on joining the EAEU. Also of interest is the integration loyalty expressed at the state level by the positions of the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan, officials, academic circles, business elites. The peculiarity of the study is the predominant appeal to expert sources, since the corpus of official statements, publications of the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan and scientific sources on this integration topic is very limited.

The main partContent analysis of the texts of official statements, interviews, scientific papers and reports, publications in the media differentiated the positions of supporters, skeptics and opponents of integration, interpreting the political, economic prerequisites and barriers of integration in different ways, the impact of favorable and negative factors in the emerging economic space.

A large group of supporters unites various strata of Tajik society: these are some of the top security officials, leaders of political parties, political scientists, lawyers, experts-economists, sociologists, power engineers, businessmen-industrialists, agrarians and the majority of the country's population. According to the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) in 2021, 69% of the population of the Republic of Tatarstan is in favor of joining the EAEU, against - 4% ^[8]. The group of skeptics includes officials of the economic block of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan, tax and customs services, some independent political scientists, legal experts, representatives of small and medium–sized businesses associated with cross-border trade. A small but active group of opponents of integration is formed by part of the Tajik intelligentsia, experts living outside the Republic of Tajikistan, business elites focused on cooperation with Western and Chinese companies, activists of branches of Western foundations, institutes, international non-governmental organizations based in the Republic of Tajikistan.

Differences in positions, however, do not reveal signs of a political split in society, do not cause interdepartmental or party polemics, acute public scientific and public discussions, moreover, there is no proper activity in the information space on this vital issue. Let's try to identify and understand the causes of this political phenomenon, based on the judgments of scientists and expert assessments of this difficult topic.

By 2022, the member countries of the Union are Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus, Moldova (since 14.05.2018), Uzbekistan and Cuba (since 11.12.2020) have received the status of observer countries ^[7]. The peculiarity of the union is the observance of the principles of economic integration without the use of political and ideological mechanisms and with respect for the peculiarities of the political structure of the member states of the Union ^[1]. The report of the EDB experts states: "Neither Tajikistan nor the EAEU countries have a political task of joining in order to recognize the result of joining as such" ^{[14, 4]}.

Back in 2014, the expert group of the Central Asian Expert Club "Eurasian Development" developed a "Roadmap" to prepare for the accession of the Republic of Tatarstan to the EAEU, which outlines strategic approaches and priorities that ensure the balance of mutual obligations and expectations between the members of the EAEU and the Republic of Tatarstan. In 2016, the problems of integration were studied by a special working group, which sent the conclusion to the government for consideration. In 2018, the Government of the Russian Federation offered Tajikistan to become an observer in the EAEU, but there were no appeals and actions to formalize such a status from the Republic of Tajikistan.

In July 2019, the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan (CSI) announced the completion of the development and transfer to the working group under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tajikistan of a new expanded document that reflects the positive and negative aspects of the country's membership in the EAEU in their current migration, economic, political issues ^[22]. The leading expert of the CSI, A. Rakhnamo, stated that a clearly expressed position has been developed, a deep analysis of each aspect has been carried out, "on which the country's leadership will make decisions based on national interests" ^[6]. The Interdepartmental Commission under the government has been working with this 70-page document for the fourth year, studying the possibilities of joining the EAEU on the basis of respect for national interests, strengthening statehood, accelerating modernization, and ensuring regional security.

It should be noted that in the conceptual political documents of the Republic of Tatarstan after 2014, the problems of integration with the EAEU practically disappeared. Thus, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Tatarstan, which defines foreign policy priorities and national interests, does not provide for the participation of the Republic of Tatarstan in economic integration associations, and the EAEU is not mentioned in the document as priority international organizations ^[2]. The actual national interests of the Republic of Tatarstan in the interpretation of Sh . The objectives are: ensuring national security, political independence, territorial integrity, strengthening democracy and secularism of the state, stable development of society. The Republic of Tatarstan continues to build bilateral relations with the EAEU member states and other foreign policy players, pursuing a multi-vector policy of "open doors", focusing on cooperation with many external partners ^[17]. Here the warning of the Russian political scientist T.V. Bordachev is very relevant - countries pursuing a "multi-vector" policy "sooner or later become objects of resource exploitation by the West or China" ^{[5, 10]}.

On the contrary, F. Salimov believes that the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan implements a "pragmatic approach model" in integration policy, guided by national interests and their priority protection, taking into account positive and negative integration experience ^[18]. Indeed, the failures of past integration initiatives in Central Asia - the Central Asian Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), the Central Asian Economic Community (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan), the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), reformatted with the participation of Russia in the Eurasian The Economic community (the Republic of Tatarstan participated in the EurAsEC in 2011-2014) gave the leadership of Tajikistan an excuse not to rush to the EAEU.

A. Sattorzoda, an integration skeptic, warns that projects within the framework of such initiatives are not fully implemented, since these projects are considered by their initiators as geopolitical instruments ^{[19, 17]}. In this , Sh agrees with him . Rizoen: "It becomes obvious that the EAEU is more of a geopolitical structure and is aimed at recreating even closer ties between the former republics of the Soviet Union, limiting their sovereignty in favor of a supranational structure" ^{[17, 207]}. Most experts and observers do not yet foresee any fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the Republic of Tatarstan and doubt joining the EAEU even in the medium term, and many surveyed companies of the Republic of Tatarstan shy away from disclosing their positions on this issue ^[26]. For example, economic observer N. Safarov does not see the need for EAEU membership - the republic is already integrated with the EAEU countries within the framework of the CIS and bilateral agreements. In addition, the interests of large monopolies trading with China will hinder the country's entry into the EAEU, although the economic situation itself pushes the Tajik government to join the EAEU [cit. 12].

In 2020, Z. Zavkizoda, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Republic of Tatarstan, announced that the decision on joining the EAEU had not been made, and the time when it would be announced was unclear. The Minister believes that "Tajikistan should not rush to join the EAEU, currently the government is assessing the pros and cons of joining the EAEU, the decision on the republic's membership in the EAEU will be made after careful study and analysis, and it may take years to form model statistics on the economic activity of the organization" ^[15]. An attempt to activate the government's position on December 21, 2022 was made by the Russian Ambassador to the Republic of Tatarstan S.V. Grigoriev during a Conference on the activities of the EAEU, convincing of the possibility of joining the EAEU as an observer, which fully corresponds to the national interests of the Republic of Tatarstan ^[24].

RT President E. In his public speeches, Rahmon rarely talks about the prospects of joining the EAEU, his official position on integration is limited to the wording - Tajikistan is studying the conditions for joining the EAEU. On December 23, 2022, in his next message to the Majlisi Oli, President E. Rahmon, mentioning the main directions of international cooperation within the framework of a "balanced" foreign policy, did not consider it necessary to express to the parliament and the nation the government's attitude to the Eurasian Integration Project ^[4]. The reason for this silence and the skeptical attitude of the country's leadership towards integration, Tajik political scientist H.H. Khurramov finds in political caution – the government cannot afford to spoil relations with Moscow, but also "values its multi-vector policy, which brings certain financial and economic preferences" ^[25].

K.H. Rakhimov sees the reasons for the slowness of Tatarstan's participation in integration projects in the influence of China on the ruling political and economic elites. For them, it is a conscious choice of a strategy of unhurried decisions and actions, unwillingness to publicly argue their negative position. This is how China's influence on the economy and the elite of the Republic of Tatarstan manifests itself, limiting the choice of vectors of geo-economic and geopolitical development ^[16]. The expected synchronization of Russian and Chinese integration projects will make the scenario of Tajikistan's accession to the EAEU likely, although "Dushanbe will not force this process and will take a wait-and-see attitude in order to get as many preferences from Russia as possible" ^[21]. The author of this article has a similar assessment of the situation, realizing that the ruling elite of the Republic of Tatarstan, large companies affiliated with the authorities have close economic ties with China ^[10], but also believing that agreements and joint efforts of Russia, the EAEU and the PRC on the structural modernization of the economy of the Republic of Tatarstan will give a synergetic effect in the future.

In the meantime, multimillion-dollar, but targeted Chinese investments in profitable Chinese business projects do not play a decisive role in the industrial and socio-economic development of the Republic of Tatarstan. An objective analysis of modernization factors shows that the remitational nature of the economy and the complex tasks of reindustrialization of the country set in the National Development Strategy until 2030 (NSR-2030) (ensuring energy security and efficient use of electricity, breaking the communication deadlock and becoming a transit country, ensuring food security, expanding productive employment) ^[3] cannot be solved without Tatarstan joining the EAEU:

In August 2021 , Sh . Khakimov, one of the leaders of the opposition Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, described the situation as follows: "All the positive and negative aspects associated with Tajikistan's accession to the EAEU have long been determined not only by the political leadership of the republic, but also by the government and the expert community of the country." The reason for the delay is the lack of political will, this decision absolutely depends on the head of state ^[23]. Following him, the chairman of another opposition party, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, S. Usmonzoda, also called on President E. Rahmon to promote the accession of the Republic of Tatarstan to the EAEU. The politician believes that participation in the Eurasian project will put an end to the problems of migrants staying in Russia, will open the flow of products from the Republic of Tatarstan to Russian markets, will help to quickly repay debts to China, which poses a threat to the Republic of Tatarstan ^[20].

Thus, the influence of political aspects on the economy is revealed in the integration policy of the Republic of Tatarstan. The reverse influence of economic argumentation on political decision-making can be traced through the economic aspects of integration policy.

In November 2020, the EDB published an analytical report predicting the economic effects of Tatarstan's accession to the EAEU. According to the EDB estimates, remittances and migrants' wages are expected to grow by an average of 10-30%, which will ensure an additional inflow of cash receipts to the country in the amount of $1.3–1.5 billion within 5 years after joining the EAEU. Potential disadvantages are reduced to a possible decrease in trade turnover with third countries, the risks of losing Western sources of financing for economic development and difficulties in adapting the national legal framework to the requirements of the economic union ^[27]. Most experts who support integration point to the short-term risks of financial losses for the budget and long-term benefits, while the balance of benefits and costs for the Republic of Tatarstan upon joining the EAEU will be positive, and membership in the union will become a new impetus for socio-economic modernization, will have a beneficial effect on political stability in the country and the region.

The very existence of the EAEU is a reliable guarantee of the absence of geostrategic contradictions between Russia and China in Central Eurasia. And the most important long—term goal of the EAEU development is to strengthen the national sovereignty of the participating countries through their joint responses to common challenges inside and outside ^{[5, 11]}. Undoubtedly, the Republic of Tatarstan is interested in the large-scale common market of the EAEU, especially the labor market for migrants who support the economic and political stability of the country with their transfers. The registration of the external customs border of the EAEU in the Republic of Tatarstan will also remove the acute problem of border disputes with Kyrgyzstan and will contribute to the development of exports of Tatarstan enterprises' own products: electricity, aluminum casting, knitted, cotton, silk yarn, polished ornamental and jewelry stones, wine products, fruits and vegetables. One can agree with G.M. Maitdinova's statement that integration could contribute to the formation of a giant Eurasian economic zone linking the EAEU and SCO countries, which already requires adjustments to the NSR-2030, taking into account the reformatting of the world order and the formation of a new economic system ^{[9, 15]}.

All these arguments are known to the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan and are taken into account when preparing for a decision on the integration fate of the Republic. However, they also understand the arguments of skeptics and opponents of integration. Let's summarize and combine these arguments into an array of expert judgments and assessments of negative forecasts and consequences of the integration of the Republic of Tatarstan into the EAEU.

The first group of arguments combines negative assessments of the state of the EAEU as an economic institution. It is argued that the meaning of the Eurasian Economic Integration, its results are incomprehensible to the majority of the population and elites of the participating countries. For them, the EAEU is a geopolitical structure aimed at recreating Russia's influence on the former republics of the USSR and limiting their sovereignty by introducing supranational governance structures of the economic union. This will lead to a narrowing of the space of political opportunities of the Republic of Tatarstan to implement a multi-vector foreign policy, to even greater political and economic dependence on Russia. This situation is aggravated by the uncertainty of the geopolitical conjuncture, the sharp aggravation of relations between Russia and the West and problems within the EAEU.

These problems are expressed in organizational weakness, the formal nature of the established institutions of the EAEU, in the absence of constantly working intergovernmental institutions. The executive authorities of the member states, the institutions of the EAEU themselves often create bilateral political and economic problems for each other, do not fully fulfill their obligations. The formation of supranational institutions and structures (for example, the inter-parliamentary Assembly, the executive apparatus) of the EAEU itself, designed to guide, control and regulate the overall integration process, has not been completed. Cooperation between the countries within the framework of the EAEU has not led to strong and mutually beneficial integration ties, mutual support in the face of sanctions pressure, as demonstrated by the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Armenia.

The second group of arguments unites the attitude of the authorities and elites to the duties imposed by membership in the EAEU. The politicization of the world economy, the discussion within the union about the threat of anti-Russian and secondary sanctions, Russian countermeasures, and their negative effects on the countries of the EAEU undermine the already unstable principles of interaction, responsibility for compliance with integration agreements, and mutual obligations. This is compounded by the lack of a proper level of political consensus among the elites of the EAEU member states, the need for an official reaction of the authorities to international conflicts in which any EAEU member states are forcibly involved.

The third group of arguments is already connected with the assessment of financial and economic risks of business, citizens and losses of revenues to the budget of the Republic of Tatarstan. Here are some of them. Shifting the customs border of the EAEU to the borders of Tajikistan will cause an increase in prices on local markets due to the introduction of high customs duties on goods produced in the EAEU. Unified customs rules will cause the rise in price of goods from China, which will affect the deterioration of the standard of living of the poor. The Republic of Tatarstan will be forced to open its market to the goods of the EAEU members, which will displace the uncompetitive products of local small and medium-sized enterprises that are not in demand in the markets of other EAEU countries. The collection of duties and taxes to the budget, which account for 35-40% of budget revenues, will be sharply reduced, and qualified personnel and young people will leave the country en masse if migration requirements are relaxed.

Such fears, fears, threats, one way or another, were taken into account by the leadership, the elites of Kyrgyzstan before making a decision on membership in the EAEU, but unlike the Republic of Tatarstan, this important decision was made quite quickly. In many ways, the diplomacy of Russia and other EAEU member states has played a positive role here. Today, the results of integration diplomacy are not positive enough - the EAEU countries did not directly support Russia in the sanctions confrontation with the European Union and the United States. And it is difficult to call the foreign policy background favorable for solving the integration issue of Tatarstan's accession to the EAEU.

And yet, unlike Kazakhstan, Armenia, the political elites of the Republic of Tatarstan do not try to distance themselves from Russia, the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan expresses a neutral position on the events in Ukraine. At the same time, RT did not recognize Crimea as Russian, the independence of the DPR and LPR, then the entry of new regions into the Russian Federation, but abstains from voting in the UN on resolutions condemning the entry of Russian troops. There were no protests against Russia's actions in the country, as well as actions in support of the operation. The country's leadership has refused public assessments, and discussions on this topic are not brought into the official field ^[11]. The political position of the Republic of Tatarstan demonstrates that the country believes in Russia, is not only its strategic partner, but also an ally in this difficult situation, which gives some confidence in the favorable outcome of such a long integration process.

ConclusionThe EAEU has proved its viability while under Western sanctions (Russia, Belarus), having passed the severe test of the economies by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Today, the population of the Union is 191.3 million people, the total GDP is 2063.1 trillion dollars. The possible accession to the union of Tajikistan and observer countries (Uzbekistan, Moldova and Cuba) will increase the population of the EAEU by 63.6 million people, the GDP of the union by $ 200 billion (in the statistics of 2022). This is the future of one of the political and economic pillars of the new world order and security in Europe and Central Asia, it is an incentive for the RT leadership to make a responsible decision for the fate of the country.

While the scenario forecasts of the EDB, which assumed the accession of the Republic of Tatarstan to the EAEU in 2022 ^{[27, 53]} turned out to be unrealistic, President E. Rahmon has not yet made a responsible political decision. The obvious advantages of Tatarstan's entry into the EAEU do not push the ruling elites to accelerate Eurasian integration, they take a wait-and-see position for subsequent bargaining on preferences from Russia and other members of the union. Expert communities of the Republic of Tatarstan and the EAEU countries express cautious forecasts about the timing of the adoption of the integration decision of President E. Rahmon – it may be made before or during the transit of power in 2027.  Let's believe.