The Image of the Sevastopol Garrison and the Russian Army during the Crimean War in the Works of English-Speaking Authors (1970-2020)

Ilyichev Anton Vladimirovich Junior researcher, Museum of the Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol 299020, Russia, Sevastopol, General Ostryakov Ave., 250-V, sq. 11 ilichev-toni@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The British scientific discourse on the events of the Crimean War is associated with a whole range of acute issues related to the problems of campaign organization, the capacity of the armed forces of the Victorian period and corruption of the military administrative apparatus.

In their research, the English-speaking authors concentrate all their attention on the review of the events of 1853-1856, from the point of view of the English retrospective. Such an approach is not negative in itself, but rather appears as a clear example of the functioning of national scientific schools. Researchers from the Foggy Albion devote the predominant part of their narrative to the consideration and analysis of the problems of the British armed forces in the middle of the XIX century. A review of any military conflict is not possible without analyzing the goals of the opposite side and forming an image of the enemy based on the analysis of its armed forces and the political, social and economic system.

The problems of the topic chosen for the study can be characterized by a quote by Thomas R. from his work "The Russian army of the Crimean War 1854-56":

"For the West, the Russian heroes of the Crimean War continue to remain a nameless and impersonal mass of people..." ^{[25, p. 24]}

It is appropriate to begin the review of the ideas of English-speaking authors about the Sevastopol garrison and the Russian army with the research of a well-known historian in the West, a specialist in the history of Russia of the XIX century, Lieutenant Colonel A. Sieton. He has two works dedicated to Russian troops during the Crimean War: "Russian army of Crimea" ^[20] and "The Crimean War. A Russian Chronicle». ^[19]

In the first work A. Sieton analyzes the military system of the Nicholas era. His general assessment of the armed forces of the Russian Empire in the middle of the XIX century is in many ways similar to Soviet historians. Russian Russian Army Despite mostly negative connotations, A. Sieton notes the high level of training of artillery and engineering corps, which "rightfully occupy their high place in the pantheon of Russian military glory" ^{[20, p. 19-21]}. With regard to Sevastopol during the Crimean War, the author writes that "the city was well protected from the sea, but it was completely defenseless from the land" ^{[20, p. 24]}. A. Sieton also cites the names of two leaders of the defense of Sevastopol – "Admiral V.A. Kornilov and Colonel E.I. Totleben". In the first case, the author only mentions that V.A. Kornilov led the defense, and in relation to E.I. Totleben, he highly appreciates his talent as a fortifier engineer ^{[20, p. 27]}. In this work, the author has put the very defense of Sevastopol in one page, superficially and briefly retelling the events of the winter of 1854 – the autumn of 1855.

The second work of A. Sieton is notable for the fact that the focus of the narrative is concentrated on the Russian side, which is atypical for the British scientific school. It is immediately worth noting the very ambiguous assessment of A.S. Menshikov as commander-in-chief of the military land and naval forces in the Crimea. On the one hand, A. Sieton characterizes A.S. Menshikov as a "careerist prone to fatal optimism" ^{[19, pp. 50-51]}. On the other hand, he notes that the prince predicted not only the landing of the enemy in the Crimea, but also its approximate time (late summer – early autumn 1855) ^{[19, p. 51]}.

A. Sieton in this work identifies two outstanding "commanders" of the Crimean War on the part of the Russian Empire: Vice Admirals P.S. Nakhimov and V.A. Kornilov. At the same time, the author cites very dubious subsequent statements. So he says that P.S. Nakhimov was the "senior" of them and was the de facto commander of the Black Sea Fleet. His characterization "as a straightforward, capable sailor who was loved and respected by his people" is beyond doubt. Unlike his previous book, A. Sieton calls the correct rank V.A. Kornilov and speaks of him as a more restrained commander, with a broad and specialized education than P.S. Nakhimov ^{[19, p. 53]}. At the same time, the author rightly notes that V.A. Kornilov actively advocated both the introduction of steam ships into the fleet and the strengthening of the defense of Sevastopol before the Crimean War ^{[19, p. 53]}.

The order of A.S. Menshikov, approved by the military Council on September 21, to flood the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the bay of the city, A. Sieton interprets as ambiguous. At first, the author notes that, according to the military, the decision to sink some of the ships and use their resources for the defense of the city was correct and probably contributed to the fact that the city stood on October 5 (17) during the first bombing of Sevastopol. 

However, immediately after that, A. Sieton writes that the defense of Sevastopol was not the goal of Menshikov A.S., since immediately after that he gives the order to withdraw the "field forces" from Sevastopol. Such a decision, according to the English historian, could be influenced by "the low morale of the troops and the direct threat of an uprising" ^{[19, p. 113]}. So the author cites as proof the quote of Menshikov's assistant Panayev about: "drunken sailors and soldiers shouting at the whole of Sevastopol that Menshikov sold the city to the British" ^{[1, p. 499]}.

A very "interesting" opinion is expressed about P.S. Nakhimov in the context of the defense of the city. A. Sieton writes that the vice admiral did not believe that Sevastopol could stand, as well as that he would survive these events. ^{[19, c. 120]}. Nakhimov P.S. himself, according to the author, believed that he did not have enough experience or "temperament to command ground forces, but with the death of Kornilov V.A., the main burden of responsibility for defense fell on him, which contributed to changes in his views." ^{[19, pp. 120-121]}. It is fair to note that A. Sieton's subsequent statements are true that Totleben's "engineering genius" gave the Sevastopol defense a shape, and P.S. Nakhimov "breathed life into it" with his leadership qualities ^{[19, p. 121]}.

A. Sieton, who is consecrating the events of the first bombing of the city on October 5 (17), celebrates the courage and unprecedented steadfastness of Russian officers. Here is one of them:

"Kornilov, covered in blood and dirt, proceeded to the 5th bastion, where he was met by P.S. Nakhimov in his usual frock coat and epaulettes. This bastion was subject to no less fierce shelling than the 4th...Admirals, Baryatinsky wrote, quietly communicated, watching the work of the weapons teams. There was a small wound on Nakhimov's face, but he did not seem to notice it, and Baryatinsky watched as the blood flowing from his neck turned the White ribbon of the St. George Cross that he received for the Battle of Sinop into crimson.... At that moment, Lieutenant Commander Likhachev came up, whom I could only recognize by his dark gray coat and voice. Instead of his face, he had a bloody mess" ^{[19, p. 127]}.

After the first assault, the narrative moves away from Sevastopol, towards the field battles of the Crimean War (Balaklava, Inkerman, Chernorechenskoye). 

A. Sieton notes the high coherence and efficiency of naval and land units in the garrison of Sevastopol, which clearly correlates with failures in field battles. The author believes that one of the reasons is the problem of training officers of army units: "Russian admirals are much more energetic, much younger and more close in competence to their ranks than army generals" ^{[19, p. 182]}.

General Osten-Saken D.I., who replaced Lieutenant General Moller F.F. as the commander of the Sevastopol garrison, according to A. Sieton "was from a cohort of officers who did not correspond to their ranks, but his virtues were honesty and the ability to provide all the necessary resources for more competent officers" ^{[19, p. 186]}.

 The author continues to make ambiguous statements about Nakhimov P.S., who, in his opinion, has absolutely lost faith in St. Petersburg and has resigned himself to his fate: "Nakhimov has already dug his own grave next to V.A. Kornilov in the crypt of the Vladimir Cathedral" ^{[19, p. 187]}.

A. Sieton develops this idea within the framework of the discourse on the need to abandon the southern side of the city, which was realized by the new commander-in-chief of the military land and naval forces in the Crimea, M.D. Gorchakov. The author notes that M.D. Gorchakov, as well as A.S. Menshikov, was afraid to tell P.S. Nakhimov about this, but when it became known about the preparations, the admiral said: "I will not cross this bridge either alive or dead" ^{[19, p. 188]}.

The failure of the assault on Sevastopol on June 6, 1855, A. Seaton associates with poor preparation of the allied forces for the upcoming operation, underestimation of the enemy's capabilities and problems of interaction between British and French forces ^{[19, p. 190-191]}. 

Embleton G.A. in his work "The Crimean War 1853-56" almost completely ignores both the garrison of Sevastopol and the very defense of Sevastopol. The traditional praise of Totleben's genius is already noted ^{[7, p. 16]}. And also contains an assessment of the Russian soldier, which in general is openly Russophobic in nature.:

"Ivan" was mainly from serfs, who are usually pitied or despised as such. Uneducated, not used to thinking, military service was a duty for him, which could only be avoided thanks to great luck… The meager salary and food that he received as a soldier were only a continuation of his daily trials as a man accustomed to living on rye bread, cabbage soup and buckwheat porridge. He was strong, strong in spirit, and possessed a huge fatalistic capacity for silent suffering ^{[7, p. 20]}"Summing up the results of the Crimean War, the author makes a mistake, or a typo, noting the signing of a peace treaty in "March 1956" ^{[7, p. 23]}

The work of Pemberton B. "Battles of the Crimean War" ^[16] like many other English-language works on the history of the Crimean War focuses on the description of the events of the Crimean War by the Allied army. The author does not touch on the Russian troops for most of the work, focusing his attention on the successes of the British and French in field battles, as well as on a wide range of problems they faced in the Crimea. It is noteworthy, as in the cases of the description of the war on the Eastern Front in the During the Second World War, B. Pemberton calls "General Frost and the Hospital" the main reasons for such a protracted campaign on the peninsula and heavy losses. Addressing the garrison of the city and its leaders, the author notes only "E.I. Totleben, who made a huge contribution to the improvement of the fortifications of Sevastopol, as well as the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet V.A. Kornilov." At the same time, it should be noted that an error is allowed and instead of "Kornilov" it is written "Vornilov". In the last 6th chapter, the author proceeds to the two assaults on Sevastopol. The main reasons for the failure of the first assault are both shortcomings in the planning of the general staff and gross mistakes made already during the operation. At the same time, the author notes that the Russian artillery was not inferior to the Allied fire, and the garrison was ready for the assault. Let's quote one quote: "Who in Raglan's headquarters could believe that the Russians were able to restore fortifications overnight or that they could advance 450 yards along the fired glacis, make their way through the undisturbed zasek, cross a 30-foot ditch and storm the slope without first firing." After such a high assessment, a statement follows that, in its content, completely contradicts the above:

"After the first assault, the Russians, from the heavy losses they suffered, were torn between despair that it was no longer possible to throw the enemy back to the sea and zeal to defend Sevastopol to the last soldier."Describing the truce concluded after the first assault in order to bury the dead soldiers on both sides, the author quotes a Russian officer:

"Losses? You can't even figure out what it is (or what the word means). Look at our batteries and the piles of corpses on them. Soldiers cannot live under the hellfire that you bring down on our positions"The author does not provide a link to where this phrase was taken from.

The work as a whole is characterized by the absence of many references to the quotes given.

            In a number of English-language studies devoted to the Crimean War, the defense of Sevastopol appears as a kind of background for describing the problems of the military structure and organization of the British Empire, as well as the regime of the Second Empire. These include the work of E. Holt "The Crimean War", M. Barthorpe "The British army on campaign 1816-1902(2): the Crimea 1854-1856" ^[2] J. Whitman "The Crimean War" ^[23], "Crimean War. A History from Beginning to End", publishing house "Hourly History" ^[4], Hit "The Crimean War. European's Conflict With Russia" ^[22], T. Royle "The Great Criminal War" ^[18].

            There is also a whole series of studies devoted to certain aspects of the Crimean War. These include the work of E. Cliff and M. Smallman-Raynor "The geographical spread of cholera in the Crimean War: epidemic transmission in the camp systems of the British Army of the East, 1854-55" ^[21], in which the authors consider two waves of the spread of Asian cholera in the ranks of the British army in the East. After analyzing the massive source base, the authors determined where cholera came from in the Allied camp in Varna, which led to its rapid spread, and what measures were used to combat this disease. 

            British collector and researcher P. Duckers considered a little-studied issue in domestic and foreign historiography related to naval campaigns during the Crimean War ^[5]. Historians most often focus on the Allied land campaign, completely ignoring naval operations. In his research, P. Duckers demonstrates that Great Britain and France have launched active naval campaigns to counteract the Russian Empire along the entire length of its vast maritime borders. The author comes to the conclusion that naval campaigns were much more effective than land-based ones, inflicting significant blows on the enemy's infrastructure.

            The British biographer and historian K. Hibbert devoted his research to the commander of the British troops in the Crimea F.S. Raglan, entitled it "The Destruction of Lord Raglan. A tragedy of Crimean war». In it, the author demonstrated how the "Crimean adventure" became the end of the political career of one of the most influential British politicians, as well as the place of his death ^[13].

            The operational-strategic and tactical skills of the British officer corps were discussed in detail in R. McGuinn's monographs "Into battle. British orders of Battle for the Crimean War, 1854-1856" ^[14] and Harris S. "British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War 1854-1856" ^[12].

            In 2011, a monograph edited by J. Graham and M. Mace "Despatches from the front. Brittish battles of the Crimean Wars 1854-1856». In it, the author presented reports, dispatches and documentation of the command staff of the British Army in the Crimea, on land and at sea. Many of the documents became known to the public for the first time 150 years after they were written ^[11].

A. Farmer in his work "The experience of Warfare in Britain: Crimea, Boer and the First World War 1854-1929" highlighted the main mistakes of the Russian army and command in the Crimean campaign, which led to the defeat and fall of Sevastopol:

1.      The lack of railway tracks south of Moscow, which is why the delivery of supplies and reinforcements to the Crimea from Moscow and St. Petersburg took three months.

2.      A corrupt administrative system.

3.       The dispersion of forces, instead of concentrating them on the Crimean theater of operations. As a result, a group of 100,000 people was inactive on the border with Austria-Hungary ^{[8, p. 41]}.

Of the leaders of the Sevastopol Defense, A. Farmer mentions Kornilov V.A. and Totleben E.I. ^{[8, p. 30]}.

            T. Tate's work "The Criminal War", published in the series "A short history" by the publishing house "I.B.Tauris" demonstrates the author's good knowledge of the material presented. This study, like many English-language works, conducts its narrative from the point of view of the British-Allied retrospective. The key difference from the other works described above is a deeper analysis of the Russian side of the conflict. In particular, like many other authors, T. Tate writes that Sevastopol was well fortified from the sea, but weakly from the land side. However, unlike other researchers who simply state this fact as a fact, T. Tate writes that "eight bastions on the South Side were planned for construction back in 1830, but the work was not fully completed by the beginning of the war" ^{[24, p. 50]}.

            T. Tate assesses the decision to flood part of the sailing ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol Bay positively, since it "allowed strengthening defensive positions, and the sailors coped with their task perfectly" ^{[24, p. 51]}.

            The next advantage of the work is the mention of the "Small Inkerman", a battle that unfolded the day after the Battle of Balaklava ^{[24, p. 75]}. In many foreign and domestic studies, the collision that occurred on October 26 remained in the shadow of the "Big Inkerman".

            After describing the field battles of 1854, T. Tate returns to the Siege of Sevastopol. The researcher quotes K. Robins, who said that "for those who fought in the Crimea, field battles were not a "real war", for them it was in trenches and trenches near Sevastopol" ^{[24, p. 83]}.

            T. Trait gives a brief description of the situation inside the besieged Sevastopol, based on two main sources – these are "Sevastopol Stories" by L.N. Tolstoy and "A Voice From Within The Walls Of Sevastopol", by Captain R.A. Khodasevich. She notes that until the spring of 1855, the districts of the city that were at a distance from the bastions continued to live their normal lives filled with routine activities ^{[24, p. 86]}. On the one hand, the work contains excerpts demonstrating the horror and cruelty of the war, and on the other hand, the steadfastness, courage and heroism of Russian soldiers ^{[24, pp. 87-88]}.

            By May 1855, the situation inside Sevastopol was noticeably deteriorating. T. Tate writes:

            "When Russians are trying desperately to save Sevastopol, they are driven by a deep and terrifying love for the city. On the other hand, they feel betrayed, scared, devastated, as it slowly collapses, depriving them of protection" ^{[24, p. 88]}.

            An entire chapter of the study is devoted to how the fall of Sevastopol was perceived by the British public, officers, soldiers and civilians accompanying the Allied army that entered the city. The predominant part of them is filled with the bitterness of the loss of loved ones, describes the horrific consequences of the bombing, the plight of the wounded and the frustration of the senselessness of victory. Many regretted the beautiful city turned into ruins.

            Baugmart V. showed a professional approach to the study of the Crimean War in his study "The Crimean War: 1853-1856". The work carried out a competent analysis of the military system of the Nicholas era, the conclusions of which coincide with Soviet historians. Among the shortcomings of the Russian army of that period, V. Baugmart notes: "the recruitment system of recruitment, the use of outdated tactics of combat intended more for parades than battles, the lack of an established logistics system in the south of the empire, lack of initiative of officers and the problems of training the officer corps" ^{[3, p. 67-69]}.

            In the same part of the study, the author highly appreciates the talents and abilities of Admiral V.A. Kornilov and P.S. Nakhimov in organizing the defense of Sevastopol and its strengthening ^{[3, p. 70]}.

            Following T. Tate, V. Baugmart writes that the construction of eight bastions to strengthen Sevastopol was planned back in the 1830s. The author highly notes the role of M.P. Lazarev in the development of this plan, as well as in the development of Sevastopol. By October 1853, only the work on the eighth bastion was close to completion ^{[3, p. 125]}. In the spring of 1854, the construction of defensive fortifications was accelerated, but even so, by September, another three-quarters of the defensive line of the city remained "open". A huge contribution to the preparation of Sevastopol for defense was made, as V. Baugmart writes, by the "famous" engineer E.I. Totleben ^{[3, p. 125]}.

            The decisions of A.S. Menshikov to flood part of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the bay of the city and not to introduce field forces into Sevastopol caused a wave of criticism against the commander-in-chief of the military land and naval forces in the Crimea, both from contemporaries and descendants. V. Baugmart writes that from a military point of view they were expedient:

"The ships sunk in the bay of the city blocked the entrance for a powerful allied squadron; Menshikov probably saved his army from another defeat, not allowing it to be locked up in Sevastopol; he could use his forces to surround the Allied siege camp or create a threat to a flank attack. Which actually happened in the future. This led to a curious situation when the Allied Army besieging the city itself was besieged" ^{[3, p. 133]}.

            V. Baugmart, like other Western authors, criticizes the Allies' delays in the Crimea, noting that the rapid and massive attack on the city in September 1854, the Russian troops could not have repulsed ^{[3, pp. 133-134]}.

            Russian Russians, the author writes, took advantage of the delay of the Allied troops as effectively as possible: "Their efforts brought closer a miracle that has entered Russian history... Admiral Kornilov supervised the work, assisted by Admiral Nakhimov and Colonel Totleben. Many guns were removed from the remaining ships and used to strengthen the defense. The work was carried out day and night. They were attended not only by sailors, but also by the entire population of the city, including women and children.... Supply lines have also undergone improvements" ^{[3, p. 135]}.       

            Poor coordination between the French and the British, as well as a cease-fire on the part of the French camp after the explosion of an ammunition depot led to the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, according to V. Baugmart ^{[3, p. 136]}. About the death of V.A. Kornilov, the author writes the following:

            "The hero died, but he continued to live in the defenders of the city, military or civilian. Before his death, he said: "God save Russia and the Tsar, and save Sevastopol and its fleet" ^{[3, p. 137]}.

            Regarding the supply problems of all sides of the conflict in the Crimea, V. Baugmart notes that if the British and French managed to solve their logistical problems by the spring of 1855, then the Russian army continued to have chronic and intractable problems due to the problems of economic and transport development of the south of the Russian Empire ^{[3, p. 153]}.

            The author argues the failures of the first assault in more detail than other authors. So the author notes the reasons for the failure already familiar from the books above, adding to them that the Russians expected an assault after the bombing. They dispersed their forces. Reinforcements were at a safe distance from the shelling, but at the same time they could quickly come to the aid of the defenders ^{[3, p. 163]}. Since June 1855, according to V. Baugmart, the resources of the garrison began to expire, while the Allies continued to build up their forces ^{[3, p. 165]}.

            The Allies approached the preparation of the second assault more thoroughly. On September 3, 1855, a massive bombardment of Sevastopol began, which continued, with some interruptions, until the day of the assault on September 8. The time of the attack was sudden for the defenders – midnight. The Allies managed to surprise the Russian forces and dislodge them from Malakhov Kurgan, a key point in the defense of the city ^{[3, p. 170-171]}.

            The professional assessment of the armed forces of the Russian Empire in the mid-XIX century in the works of T. Tate and V. Baugmart can be compared with the analysis of R. Edgerton "Death or Glory. The Legacy of the Crimean War». Pointing to similar problems, the author puts them in an exclusively Russophobic shell:

"For a Russian peasant, service in the army was considered a death sentence.....In Russian military thought, infantry was considered a stupid mass…Many officers freely stole money that the government allocated for the purchase of food, clothing and gunpowder for the troops" ^{[6, p. 57, 59, 60]}           

R. Edgerton describes Sevastopol on the eve of the Allied landing as follows:

"The Russians in Sevastopol spent the whole summer of 1854 in an endless revelry. Officers at the parade attended endless scores with their ladies in elegant dresses. Brothels thrived on drunken sailors and soldiers, while officers found solace (and venereal diseases) in the arms of higher-class prostitutes who worked in hotel rooms or private residences" ^{[6, pp. 89-90]}.Such Russophobic descriptions vividly contrast against the background of that heroic description of the defenders of Sevastopol clothed in the image of Admiral V.A. Kornilov in A. Palmer's work "The Crimean War":

"But, like Suvorov and Kutuzov, Vladimir Kornilov was one of those folk heroes who for a century raised the morale of Russian soldiers from humiliated defeatism to ardent resistance" ^{[15, p. 115]}.

            A noticeable share of Russophobia in the presentation of the events of the Crimean War is distinguished by the work of K. Ponting with the pretentious title "Crimean War. The truth behind myth» ^[17]. Here are a number of quotes from his work:

"Menshikov's maneuver was necessary to raise discipline among drunken soldiers...""The Ally made the mistake of not attacking the city immediately, with its small, untrained and poorly armed garrison"

"The Russian army could only survive and did not represent any military force"

"There was an acute shortage of food and ammunition in the garrison of Sevastopol until supplies arrived in the spring of 1855."

Considering the currently available English-language studies on the Crimean War, it is impossible not to mention the historian O. Finges, a well-known expert on the history of Russia in the West and his work "The Crimean war.

The Last Crusade» ^[9]. One of the first advantages of the study, which is immediately noticeable upon first acquaintance, is the involvement of the author of a wide range of Russian-language sources, which is so avoided by other English-speaking researchers. Based on the analysis of the causes of wars, its tools, the role of Russophobia in fueling the conflict, Fringes draws practical parallels with the events of the Cold War. The author gives detailed descriptions of Sevastopol on the eve and during the war, highly appreciates the defense leaders and Russian sailors. A separate part of the research is devoted to the consideration of the mythological narrative that arose around the "Crimean War" in Russia.

Foreign authors have not created a Russophobic narrative around the Crimean War (1853-1856) similar to the depiction of the war on the Eastern Front during World War II. The problem lies in the whole spectrum of acute issues related to the functioning of the military-political apparatus of the British Empire, some of which resonate today. The idea of a "crusade" to the East did not find widespread support among researchers, who instead focused on studying the situation and functioning of the Allied army on the Crimean peninsula. The description of the Russian army and the Sevastopol garrison is very brief, dry and superficial. In a number of works, there are statements and assessments imbued with frank Russophobic lampoon. However, at the same time, from the studies that have been studied, this kind of narrative is not as common as in the case of studies devoted to the Second World War.