Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of Official Development Assistance of the United States and China on the Voting of Sub-Saharan Africa in the UN General Assembly

Introduction

The strategic goal of foreign development assistance is to help underdeveloped countries solve socio-economic problems and independently develop their economies, politics and societies through economic and political support. However, in practice, foreign aid to the source of the donor country pursues not only this superficial and foreign policy goal. A number of existing studies on the motives for providing assistance claim that aid is usually used as a means to achieve the interests of the donor, and is not distributed in accordance with the needs of States. In particular, Hans Morgenthau argued that foreign aid has the character of a "bribe" in order to "buy" political support from recipient states ^{[1, 305]}. To verify these claims, various studies have been conducted on the impact of foreign aid on the political support of recipient States by donor countries in the international community^[2-8].

The existing studies mainly used the impact of aid from the United States or European donor countries as an independent variable and as a dependent one, in addition, the analysis was carried out for all recipient States receiving aid from the United States or European donor countries, and not for a specific region or country. However, in recent years, China has become one of the largest donor countries in the world and the need for research on the impact and effectiveness of Chinese aid has increased ^{[9, 145]}.

In addition, the authors conducted a comparison of all recipient countries in the same place without taking into account regional characteristics, which include the countries receiving assistance, and recently published studies analyzing the effectiveness and impact of aid taking into account regional characteristics ^[10].

In addition, existing studies have focused only on whether aid from individual donor countries leads to political support by donor countries for recipient countries in the international community, and when aid from two donor countries in a competitive relationship is supported by one recipient country in the international community, they were not concerned about the impact on the political recipient support. In other words, no studies have been conducted on the impact of aid from one donor country in competitive relations on the political proximity of the donor country and the source country of aid in other competitive relations.

In this sense, this study will analyze the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and examine the impact of foreign aid from the United States and China on the political support of the United States and China in these countries from the international community. In particular, in order to measure political support in the international community, the votes of African recipient States on Resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly should be analyzed, and based on this, it should be analyzed whether the volume of assistance from the United States and China from 2000 to 2014 will affect the voting decisions of 44 recipient States in the Sahara at the UN General Assembly.

Below are the reasons why it was decided to investigate the case of the United States, China and African countries. Firstly, Africa is the region that has received the largest amount of foreign aid in the world since 2000, and it is the region that is most dependent on foreign aid for the country's economic development and poverty reduction ^[11]. Secondly, the United States and China have formed the strongest competitive relations not only in the international community, but also in Africa since 2000 ^{[12, 5]}, and they belong to the countries that send the most aid to Africa ^{[13, 60]}.

In this study, regression analysis will show whether official development assistance to 44 Saharan States from the United States and China has a positive or negative impact on the degree of unity of the vote of the United States and recipient states at the UN General Assembly. In other words, if a large amount of American aid had been received, recipient States would be more likely to express the same opinion as the United States when voting on the proposed proposal to the UN General Assembly. The same will be analyzed with China.

However, this study did not stop there, and further it will be analyzed whether Chinese aid can weaken the political support of recipient States for the United States, a competitor country in the international community, even if China does not receive political support from recipient states for its own country.

According to the analyzed studies, the impact of US aid measures on the degree of unity of voting in the United States and recipient states at the UN General Assembly disappeared as the population of China grew. In other words, if China receives a lot of aid, the recipient states did not continue to vote in the same direction as China at the UN General Assembly, but no matter how much aid they receive from the United States, at least the tendency is to vote in the same direction as China's rival, the United States weakened.

In conclusion, these results mean that African recipient States, which are forced to rely on foreign aid for most of their national economies due to their low level of development, cannot take into account the preferences of aid donors when choosing foreign policy, and at the same time, if there are several donor States, the influence of certain donor countries in determining foreign policy preferences will be reduced.

Research methodology

The purpose of this study is to empirically find out whether the assistance of the United States and China has influenced the political support of African recipient states. To this end, the study analyzed the amount of aid received by 44 sub-Saharan African countries from the United States and China from 2000 to 2014, and the trends of their voting at the UN General Assembly.

 The study period has been since 2000, since China's aid to African countries began in earnest in 2000, and data on the amount of China's aid to African countries have been available since 2000.

The dependent variable of this study is political support. To measure the concept of "political support", an indicator of ideal scores was used, based on the similarity of foreign policy preferences between countries. This indicator was first used in the work of experts Bailey M. A., Strezhnev A., Voeten E ^{[14, 448]}.

This study uses indicators to measure the political support of African recipient States for the United States (or China). The indicators are created using the IRT statistical model based on votes at the UN General Assembly in individual countries. If the assessment of the indicator of two countries is the same, then these two countries can be interpreted as having fully voted in the same direction when voting at the UN General Assembly. On the other hand, the further the indicators of the two countries are, the further the two countries voted in different directions when voting at the UN General Assembly. Thus, the degree of support that the donor received from the recipient State at the UN General Assembly can be measured through the distance between the ideal point indicator of the donor country and the ideal point indicator of the recipient country. Based on this logic, the point of the recipient state is subtracted from the ideal point of the USA to measure the political support of the recipient states of the USA, and then we multiply it by -1 for ease of interpretation. Consequently, the greater the number of political supporters of the recipient States of the United States (the distance between the votes of the United States and the recipient States at the UN General Assembly), the closer political preferences between the two countries can be interpreted.

The variables of the recipient States' political support for China (the distance between China and the recipient States' vote at the UN General Assembly) were measured in the same way.

The main statistical values for both variables are given in Table 1.

Table 1.

Indicators of the main variables

Data sources

The independent variable of this study is the amount of aid to African countries from the United States and China. The volume of aid to African countries in the United States was measured in increments of one year in addition to ODA (Official development assistance) and OF (Other official flows).

According to the OECD definition, ODA means a form of assistance with a ratio of at least 25% of "free" support, and OF means a financial transaction with an official part with a ratio of less than 25% of free support. However, like ODA, OF is also a source of funding that can exert political pressure on recipient States, therefore, in this study, ODA and OF were used without distinction in the framework of assistance.

The data on ODA and OF supported by African countries in the United States were measured on the basis of OECD statistics ^[15]. The aid data for China's African countries were calculated based on AidData data. As in the case of the size of US aid, ODA and OF were measured in increments of one year. To date, there is no official agency that would provide quantitative data on China's aid, except AidData.

In addition to the amount of aid to African countries in the United States and China, the work includes variables that may influence the UN General Assembly vote on African recipient States in the statistical model as control variables based on existing studies ^[16].

Control variables included the political system of African countries (democratically authoritarian), the volume of trade with the United States (or China), GDP per capita and the size of military spending. The political systems of African countries were assessed using the Polity IV indicator. The Polity IV index ranges from -10 to +10, and the closer to +10, the more democratic it is, and the closer to -10, the more authoritarian it is. The volume of trade with the United States (or China) was measured in addition to the imports and exports of the United States (or China) and the recipient State. The data were measured based on the World Integrated Trade Solution provided by the World Bank ^[17]. GDP per capita was collected using the World Bank Data Bank, and the amount of armament expenditures was measured based on correlates of national material capabilities of the Correlates of WAR project.

Research model

This study uses panel data where cross-sectional data and time series data exist together for empirical analysis. A cross-sectional analysis of 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, an analysis of time series from 2000 to 2014, is carried out. A Fixed Effect Model (FEM) was chosen as a statistical model for analyzing panel data ^{[18, 105]}. The fixed-effect model assumes that the error conditions affecting the dependent variables for each panel group are fixed according to the characteristics of the panel group. On the other hand, the Random Effect Model (REM) assumes that this error term is random ^{[19, 103]}. Applying this to this study, it would be reasonable to see that the five main terms influencing the votes of the UN General Assembly in 44 African countries exist with fixed characteristics for each country, and not by chance.

In addition, the Hausman test (Hausman test) results of a statistical test for choosing a probabilistic effect model and a fixed effect model p-value in accordance with the chi-squared value below the general statistical test significance level a = 0.05% and a fixed effect model was selected. On the other hand, this study provides values one year late for independent variables and control variables that influenced the difference between the United States (or China) and the voting of African recipient States in the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, the statistical model of the impact of US and Chinese aid on recipient states and the difference in the vote of the US (or China) in the UN General Assembly can be shown as follows:

The difference of voting in the UNGA of the USA and African recipient states t = a + b1 US aid t-1 +[Control variables] t - 1 + e

The difference of voting in the UNGA of China and African recipient States t = a + b1 China's assistance t-1 + [Control variables] t - 1 + e

This study further confirms the thesis that the ratio between the amount of aid from donor country A and the political support of recipient State B for donor country A will be influenced by the amount of aid to recipient State B from donor country C in competition with donor country A. In particular, according to the context of this study, the correlation between the size of U.S. aid and U.S. political support for African states may vary depending on the size of China's aid to African countries. A statistical model to test the thesis that the impact of US aid on the voting distance of the United States and recipient states in the UN General Assembly may vary depending on the amount of aid to recipient states of China and can be expressed as follows:

The difference in the voting of the USA (China) and the recipient state in the UN General Assembly t = a + b1 US ODA t-1 + b2 Chinese ODA t-1 + b3 US ODA t-1? Chinese ODA t-1 + [Control variables] t - 1 + e

Analysis of research results

The article put forward the thesis that the greater the amount of official development assistance received from a particular country, the more likely it is that the donor country will vote in the same direction at the UN General Assembly as the donor country that supported the aid. In particular, in the case of African countries, foreign aid plays a very important role in economic development and maintaining national security, so it is inevitably influenced by political pressure from donor States. Based on this, this study attempted to examine the political support of the United States and China for African recipient countries of ODA based on the volume of aid from the United States and China, which send a lot of foreign aid to African countries. The political support of sub-Saharan African States by the United States and China was calculated using an indicator that calculated the degree of unity in the direction of voting at the UN General Assembly. In the case of dependent variables, the larger the number, the higher the consistency of the direction with two votes at the UN General Assembly of donor and recipient countries.

Table 2 shows the impact of US and Chinese aid on the degree of coincidence of votes at the UN General Assembly of the USA and the recipient countries of ODA, respectively, and on the degree of coincidence of votes at the UN General Assembly of China and African countries receiving ODA using regression analysis using a fixed-effect model.

First, Model 1 in Table 2 shows how the amount of US aid affects the degree of agreement in the voting between the US and African recipient States at the UN General Assembly. The US aid variable had a positive regression coefficient, showing statistically significant results. These results indicate that the volume of American aid has a direct impact on the degree of agreement on orientation in the United States and recipient states when voting at the UN General Assembly. In other words, the more African countries have received US aid, the more likely they are to hold the same opinion as the US when they vote on various international issues at the UN General Assembly.

Table 2.

The impact of US ODA on the political support of African recipient States

Source: compiled by the author based on calculations.

Note: * * * P < 0.001, * * P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, the unit of ODA used in this regression is $100, the unit of trade, arms spending and GDP per capita is $1.

On the other hand, among the control variables, the volume of trade between the US and African recipient states and the GDP per capita of the recipient states were statistically significant. In particular, the greater the volume of trade between the United States and the African recipient States from that country, or the higher the GDP per capita of the African recipient States, the more recipient States, as a rule, voted in the same direction as the United States at the UN General Assembly.

On the other hand, the democracy Index, or the political system of sub-Saharan Africa, did not have a statistically significant impact on whether the recipient countries of development assistance voted in the same direction as the United States when voting in the UN General Assembly.

Model 2 shows the impact of China's aid on the unity of the vote of China and the recipient states of China's ODA in the UN General Assembly. China's foreign aid to Africa was less than U.S. foreign aid to Africa before the early 2000s, but it has grown rapidly since the mid-2000s, reaching about $1.1 million in 2012 ^{[20, 11]}. In 2013, the volume of ODA returned to the original trend, but there was an increase again in 2014, when China announced its "One China Policy" ^[21]. However, there has been little research on whether this increase in Chinese aid to African countries has led to China's political support. However, Model 2 provides an answer to this question. Unlike the United States, China's aid did not have a statistically significant impact on the voting of African recipient States in the UN General Assembly. In addition, control variables, such as the size of trade with China and the democracy index, also had no significant impact on the degree of voting unity between China and the African recipient States of ODA from that country. In other words, if US aid has led to political support by African recipient states by voting at the UN General Assembly, this can also be interpreted as the fact that China's aid has not yet caused such political influence.

Even if China's assistance to African countries does not lead to China's direct political support in the UN General Assembly, at least if it weakens the political support of African countries for the United States, a competitor country in the international arena, China's position, as can be seen, will receive political benefits due to the fact that the United States will cease to receive support when voting. Therefore, the question was studied whether China's assistance to African countries could weaken the political ring between the United States and African recipient States of American ODA. To this end, the study included the term unified aid in the model: the multiplied volume of US ODA to African recipient states and the volume of Chinese aid. Model 3 and Model 4 show the results of including a combined variable between the volume of US aid and the volume of Chinese aid in the statistical model. The dependent variable of Model 3 is the degree of coincidence of votes at the UN General Assembly between the United States and sub–Saharan Africa, and Model 4 is the degree of coincidence of votes at the UN General Assembly between China and sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of China, even before the use of the combined variable, Chinese aid itself did not have a significant impact on the degree of unity of voting in the UN General Assembly between China and the recipient countries of ODA. In other words, it can be assumed that China's assistance does not have a statistically significant impact on the unity of the vote of African countries and China in the UN General Assembly, regardless of the amount of assistance from other countries (the United States).

On the other hand, according to Model 3, both the US aid quantity variable and the combined US and Chinese aid quantity variables are statistically significant. In addition, the US aid volume variable has a positive regression coefficient, it can be seen that the combined variable is a negative regression coefficient. Thus, the larger the amount of US aid, the higher the degree of unity between the African recipients of ODA and the vote of the United States at the UN General Assembly.

China's ODA to African states ranges from zero to $2 billion a year, and the more U.S. aid increases, the more African recipient states tend to vote in the same direction as the United States at the UN General Assembly. However, if China's aid exceeds $2 billion, the impact of US aid on the voting of African recipient states of the UN General Assembly will be lost. These findings mean that China's aid to African countries does not lead to China's direct support in the international community, but may weaken the political support that African countries provide to the United States. In this study, a total of 19 cases were recorded when China's annual aid exceeded $2 billion. In particular, Angola (2006, 2007, 2009, 2012), These are Cameroon (2013), Ethiopia (2012), Ghana (2011), Mozambique (2014), Nigeria (2007, 2013), South Africa (2014), Sudan (2004, 2008, 2010), Tanzania (2009, 2011, 2013), Uganda (2012), Zimbabwe (2013).

Thus, the greater the volume of aid to the recipient State, the more likely it is that the recipient country of ODA will have no choice but to comply with the political demands of the donor country or to yield to pressure. In the case of the United States, in particular, U.S. assistance to African States has led to the United States' political support for African countries in the international community, based on the vote of the United Nations General Assembly. On the other hand, in the case of Chinese aid, aid to African countries has not yet led directly to direct political support for African countries, that is, to a vote in support of China's position at the UN General Assembly, but at least it has done enough to weaken US political support from African countries.

Conclusion

This study focused on the U.S.-China rivalry for aid in diplomatic support of Africa and examined the impact of aid as a means of foreign policy. In particular, this article analyzes the relationship between official development assistance to sub-Saharan African countries and political support from donor countries, taking into account the regional characteristics of Africa, in contrast to existing works focused on the entire recipient State of ODA without taking into account the regional characteristics of Africa.

In addition, compared to existing studies that attempted to analyze the relationship between aid and political support of one donor, this article analyzes the impact of aid on political support in the case of several influential donor countries, reflecting the international political situation when several donor countries can simultaneously compete for diplomatic support. For this analysis, the study put forward the thesis that the more aid received from a particular country, the more likely it is that the donor country that supported the aid will vote in the same direction at the UN General Assembly.

In addition, the thesis was put forward that the correlation between the aid from a particular donor and the political support of this donor (the degree of unity in the vote of the UN General Assembly) will weaken with the increase in aid from other donor countries. In particular, replacing this hypothesis with the United States and China, the article predicted that the more aid from the United States (China) increases, the greater the unity of the United States (China) and the vote of the African recipient states of ODA in the UN General Assembly. To empirically test the above hypotheses, from 2000 to 2014, 44 sub-Saharan African countries analyzed variables measured based on voting options in the US and China aid groups and the UN General Assembly each year using a fixed-effect model. The more African countries receive more aid from the United States, the more they tend to vote for the same opinion as the United States in the UN General Assembly. On the other hand, China's aid did not have a significant impact on the similarity of foreign policy between China and the recipient African States.

Although the increase in US aid has led to diplomatic support for voting on resolutions from recipient states, if China supports massive US aid, this may be interpreted as the fact that US aid has failed to gain political support from the UN.

Thanks to the results of this study, it is possible to see how ODA plays the role of a political and diplomatic means of donor countries for African recipient States. ODA in Africa leads to the diplomatic support of donor countries by recipient States. This article uses published AidData data to empirically analyze the political impact of Chinese aid with quantitative data to help understand the effectiveness and political impact of Chinese aid, which has been growing rapidly in recent years.

 Moreover, this study analyzed what happens when two major donor countries work together to support aid and receive diplomatic support from African recipient States. In particular, when the aid of two great Powers jointly competes in one recipient State of ODA, the recipient State can use it to be relatively free from the diplomatic pressure of donor countries. However, on the other hand, the conclusions of this article show that assistance to a particular country does not necessarily lead to favorable diplomatic support for itself, but can be used by the international community as a means of weakening the diplomatic support of the recipient State of ODA.