Minilateral Alliances in the American Strategy of Containing the PRC in the Indo-Pacific Region

Gumbatov Nazim Farizovich ORCID: 0000-0002-3247-3027 Master, Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 109652, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, st. Maryinsky b-R, 4, sq. 496 nazimgumbatov@gmail.com

Kun Syanyui ORCID: 0000-0003-2346-2315 Master,Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho Maklaya str., 15, of. k.1 1032175725@pfur.ru

 Introduction.

Starting with the designation of the importance of minilateralism in the Pacific region, it is necessary to justify the importance of the growing popularity of this format of interaction both for the United States and for states that have close economic and political relations with them. Over the past decade, the American political leadership has been striving to form a certain cluster of major powers that support American aspirations to preserve regional security and the traditional way of the international system of relations, where the United States acts as a natural dominant, but taking into account the opinions of its partners.

Nevertheless, the issue of security in recent years has become an important aspect for the creation of new closed systems for cooperation. Minilateralism has found support from several major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily because of the issue of trust in the US alliance system in solving problems related to China.

The reasons for the formation of mini-material unions. Military aspectThe issue of trust has become an urgent necessity for the US partners in the alliance, it has become obvious that, first of all, it is necessary to establish closer strategic ties with other key powers in the region.

Despite the fact that the alliance with the United States is an essential component of their management of their own security, Australia and Japan, for example, sought a closer strategic partnership with India, which is illustrated by the development of strategic cooperation within the framework of the minilateral union in the Indo-Pacific region. (John Nilsson-Wright, “Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Opportunities for Security Convergence and Cooperation Between Australia, India and Japan”)^[3]So, according to Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, the mini-liberal unions act as a restoration of the balance of power, since the United States in today's realities is not able to stand alone against the second economy of the world and the practical one and a half billion population of China.

In his research, Pillai pays attention to the importance of India in these minilateral processes, it is noted that the country avoided playing a role in the formation of power in the region. However, the ambiguous China forced India and many other countries of the Indo-Pacific region to adopt a force-oriented and pragmatic approach to the formation of a regional order. (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India’s Vision of the East Asian Order”)^[4]Table 1

Comparison of military expenditures

Years

Source: Take Profit.org . [Electronic resource]/ Access mode: https://take-profit.org/statistics/military-expenditure/japan / 

To consider the cause-effect relationship in the formation of minilateral associations, the authors compared the military expenditures of key states of the Indo-Pacific region [SEE Table 1]. With the growth of regional tensions associated with the emergence of nuclear potential in North Korea and the growth of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, there is a growth dynamic among the military and political partners of the United States, namely South Korea and Australia. Japan, having closer military-political contacts with the United States within the framework of the "Agreement on Mutual Cooperation and Security Guarantees" (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty)^[5], has been maintaining its military spending at a stable level of 1% of its GDP for a decade. India, in an effort to gain and consolidate its status as a sovereign state, has been building its own security system for the specified period of time.

The Trump and Xi Jinping Factor on building an American strategy in the Pacific region

Speaking of China, against the background of the growth of its economic and political potentials, the Chinese government has significantly increased its military spending on ensuring the security of the state.

It should be noted that it was under the leadership of Xi Jinping since 2012 and his rhetoric about a "Strong and Independent China" that the mechanism for building new military and economic American-oriented alliances was launched.

We compare the indicators of the reactionary perception of the American public on the election of Xi Jinping to the post of general secretary of the Party of the CPC Central Committee [See Table 2]. It is noted that with the proclamation of the concept of the "Chinese Dream" by Xi Jinping on November 29, 2012, the vector of perception of China's foreign policy by the American establishment changed, which later turned into a reassessment of bilateral relations between the United States and China at the political and economic level. Previously, the United States considered China as a potential partner in building democratic foundations in the Asian region. (Autova F.H., Golik M.Ya., Dolgopolov V.A. Assessment of mutual perception of the USA and China based on content analysis)^[6] Table 2

Content analysis of the speech of D. Trump and Xi Jinping

               References

In the future, the Trump administration and the future heir to his chair in the oval office of the White House, Joseph Biden, established and began to develop their new regional Indo-Pacific policy, instead of the Asia-Pacific one.

The creation of small integration formats in the Indo-Pacific space is obviously associated with the strengthening and affirmation of its geopolitical positions of the United States. First of all, within the framework of cooperative associations, the thesis of "building regional security" prevails.

Minilateralism has found support from several major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily because of the issue of trust in the US alliance system in solving security problems in the region. The issue of trust has become an urgent need for US alliance partners to establish closer strategic ties with other key powers in the region. Despite the fact that the US security alliance is an essential component of their security management, Australia and Japan, for example, sought a closer strategic partnership with India, which is an illustration of the developing strategic minilateral alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. But in a few years, the strengthened partnership between Australia, India and Japan has grown into a quadrilateral format with the inclusion of the United States.

Nevertheless, the uncertainty around the United States, especially during the years of Trump's leadership, gave rise to a number of loose coalitions. An example is the Australia-France-India trilateral ministerial dialogue, the first meeting of which took place in May 2021, but whose origins go back to the Track 1.5 dialogues coordinated by three analytical centers from three countries. The trilateral meeting of Australia, India and Indonesia in the "track 2" formats, held in September 2013, a few years before the meeting of the first high-ranking officials of the three countries in November 2017, is considered to have failed. (Carnegie India)^[7]Reactionary perception of the Chinese public.

The role of Q UAD and AUKUS.

Having understood all the "ins and outs" in Sino-American relations in order to facilitate the creation of mini-material associations by the latter, the authors will consider key organizations that have a significant degree of effectiveness for pressure on China.

These organizations are QUAD and AUKUS, tied to the military sphere of interaction with the United States.

Comparing them, one can make a premature statement that until 2017 QUAD was an insignificant organization, and in some ways even a failure, since before President Donald Trump came to power, his predecessors paid little attention to the rapidly developing China.

It is important to note that as part of the change in American strategy in the Pacific region, the US Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, which claimed an expanded US area of responsibility. In accordance with this, the growth of spending on the military needs of the American group in this region began,^[8] [See. Table 3] as well as the sponsorship of military allies (for example, a grant of $ 100 million for military spending was allocated to the Philippines on October 14, 2022). (Reuters)^[9] Table 3

Pacific Initiative

2021

Source: Reuters, “U.S. grants Philippines $100 million in foreign military financing", October 2022. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/us-grants-philippines-100-million-foreign-military-financing-2022-10-14/ 

         Returning to QUAD, as noted in the well-known Chinese information publication Global Times, meetings of the leaders of the participating countries took place in September and May 2022. The September meeting was held in Washington, and in May in Tokyo, Chinese analysts noticed the desire of the Americans to give QUAD a multidisciplinary character, responsible not only for the strategic dialogue on security in the Pacific region, but also for aspects of partnership beyond it. So the Tokyo meeting was distinguished by less significant statements regarding China, the main focus was on infrastructure development, climate change, the fight against a new epidemic, supply chains and other issues. To the surprise of the press, the issue of the Taiwan Strait was not discussed during the meeting, although most states expected to hear a clearer interpretation of the significance of the relationship between the United States and its partners with the Republic of Taiwan.

         A joint statement at the Tokyo meeting promised more than $50 billion in infrastructure assistance and investment for the region over the next five years, as well as scholarship programs in the United States, among other things. (Wang Da and Li Zheng, "U.S. Separation Strategy and Response to China in the Context of Global Epidemic Shock")^[10] It would be good if they were implemented, but the question arises: if the United States has already established itself as a "full-fledged country of the Indo-Pacific region", why do they not implement similar investment projects through already established mechanisms, such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), if Do they really want to play a decisive role in this region, instead of using these means to deter China's military capabilities? As indicated in the same Chinese article, this is another "master plan" of Washington, which consists in creating a sufficient number of minilateral associations where the United States "plays the role of the boss."

         The conclusions of the Global Times make it clear to us that not only the top management, but also the ordinary Chinese reader, has an understanding in the implementation of the American strategy for mini-liberal unions. The Chinese government is trying to counteract the strategy of the minilateral partnership, through long-term and short-term investments in both friendly countries and states with certain claims to it.

         An important role in the Chinese counteraction, as well as the Americans, is given to India. After the beginning of the "rebalancing" of the established political forces in the world by Russia on February 24, China seized the moment to strengthen its relations with India within the framework of the BRICS and SCO partnership, meetings on which were initiated largely by the Russian side due to avoiding the policy of isolationism. The position of the Indians at the time of the need to "choose sides" showed their pragmatism in the international sphere towards Russia and China. India has adopted a policy of neutrality beneficial to both itself, China, and Russia, but not for the United States.

         Turning to AUKUS, we can say that the Chinese government reacted more alarmed to its appearance. Based on an interview with former Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Yucheng for the China Global Television Network (CGTN), it was indicated that "the trilateral security partnership between the United States, Great Britain and Australia (AUKUS) incites hateful sentiments for a new cold War and provokes a zero-sum geopolitical game that will not bring anything good, except harm." (Statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on AUCUS)^[11]Another point of concern for the Chinese country is the text of the AUKUS partnership agreement, which assumes the possibility of transferring nuclear technologies to one of the partners, which will inflame the situation in the region and violate the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

From this, it can be cited that the agreements between the French and Australian governments on the supply of 12 diesel-electric submarines have been severed, in favor of Australia receiving nuclear submarines that Washington will build as part of the AUKUS defense project. (RIA Novosti)^[12] Speaking about technological pressure on China, the current President Joseph Biden, in addition to the idea of creating AUKUS, signed the Law on Microcircuits and Science 2022 (The White House Government)

^[13], officially introducing legislation on new technologies, especially on semiconductors. In addition to focusing on increasing U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity, the legislation notes U.S. cooperation with like-minded allies to create a reliable semiconductor supply chain. Thus, the American leadership is trying to form a new mini-lateral association CHIP4, which involved key technologically advanced Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and the unrecognized Republic of Taiwan. If the United States has no complaints about increasing cooperation with its traditional ally Japan and Taiwan, supported by Washington, then certain contradictions arise with South Korea. For Korean technology corporations, the Chinese market and cheap Chinese raw materials play a significant role in their potential growth strategy and Korea's GDP as a whole. China is aware of the importance of this contradiction among American allies and is trying to maintain the status quo on this issue. Otherwise, the situation may reach the stage of nationalization of already created technology clusters on the territory of mainland China, where colossal sums have been invested by South Korea (Global Times) ^[14] and from where practically all resource materials for the production of semiconductors and chips in Taiwan come from. 

ConclusionIn conclusion, the following conclusions and forecasts can be outlined within the framework of building the American strategy of containing China on the basis of mini-material alliances:

· The minilateral unions only accelerate the process of dividing the Asian region into pro-Chinese and pro-American. Such a competitive policy to attract Asian states to their trade, economic and political space will only complicate the process of finding a compromise point of view between the two great economic powers, and will also damage peace, prosperity and stability in the region in the future;

· The growth of popularity in the formation of minilateral structures is a consequence of the growing confrontation between China and the United States over the past decade, and not the primary cause of contradictions;

·        To date, most of the programs that have a "minilateral connotation" have ineffective returns for the American government, nevertheless they cannot be called unfulfilled. Taking into account the relatively recent acceleration in attracting an increasing number of countries to existing and newly formed formats, Washington expects to get positive results for itself in the next decade, provided that China's economic and technological development is consolidated.