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International relations
Reference:
Jiang Y.
Peacekeeping in Chinese Leader Xi Jinping's Concept of Global Security Management
// International relations.
2023. ¹ 2.
P. 36-53.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2023.2.39555 EDN: RHTCHI URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=39555
Peacekeeping in Chinese Leader Xi Jinping's Concept of Global Security Management
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2023.2.39555EDN: RHTCHIReceived: 30-12-2022Published: 05-07-2023Abstract: The theoretical basis of Xi Jinping's concept of global security governance and its practical application to UN peacekeeping is the subject of this study. The aim of the article is to form a broader picture of Xi Jinping's concept of global security governance, including through an analysis of its practical application in UN peacekeeping activities. The author examines in detail such aspects of the topic as the crisis of the world order after the collapse of the bipolar world, the ideas of global security governance in Xi Jinping's policy, as well as the concretization of China's Global Security Initiative in peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN. From the perspective of global security governance, including peacekeeping activities, is disclosed much less frequently (in the Russian-language sources this direction is practically not covered), which indicates the relevance of this article. The conceptualization of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and its communication to the general public in April 2022 add to the novelty of the study. Using the systematic method, the author concludes that the Global Security Initiative (GSI), responding to a wide range of Chinese national interests, was a response to the imbalanced international security order dominated by the collective West. One foreign policy priority is to position the PRC as a new reliable provider of global security. The participation of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) in UN peacekeeping activities essentially solves this task. Keywords: GSI, peacekeeping, multilateral cooperation, unipolar world order, cold war, United Nations, Xi Jinping, national interests, The Belt and Road, PRCThis article is automatically translated.
Introduction During the entire previous ten-year period of Xi Jinping's rule, the Chinese strategy of global governance in the field of security was actively developed and filled with concrete content. The growing tension in international relations, provoked by the desire of individual countries to implement the idea of a unipolar world, has led Beijing to a clear understanding of the need to move towards cooperation with all actors in world politics. The main message of the Global Security Initiative (GIB), voiced by the head of China in a welcoming address to the participants of the International Asian Economic Forum in Boao (April 21, 2022), was to ensure security on a multilateral basis, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter [1]. The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Wenbin, explaining the significance of the GIB, drew particular attention to the fact that China intends to be not only the author of this initiative, but also its active implementer [2]. Given this statement, it can be assumed that the Global Security Initiative put forward by Xi Jinping will play a prominent role in Chinese public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy for at least the next 5 years, which increases its relevance and the need for a more detailed analysis. It is obvious that the study of the GIB cannot be complete without an analysis of the peacekeeping activities of the PRC carried out within the framework of the UN. Despite the fact that peacemaking as a way to solve the security problems facing humanity is not mentioned separately in the initiative, it is permissible to voice the following hypothesis – the experience gained by China in the process of participating in UN peacekeeping missions influenced the understanding of its own capabilities in world affairs and led to the publication of the Global Security Initiative (GIB). By conducting economic, political and military activities far beyond its territory, Beijing seeks to consolidate its status as a full-fledged subject of global and regional security, a responsible great power that can have a significant impact on the redistribution of the balance of power in international relations. In the scientific discourse, the problems of global governance, including the question of determining the role of the PRC in this system, enjoys great attention. As an example, the relevant works can be cited: Charles Grant [3], Bora Li [4], Zhu Jiejin [5], Ye Wenin and Yu Lonhai [6], E.N. Grachikov [7], Ya.V. Lexyutina [8], V.E. Petrovsky [9], O.P. Rubo [10], A.V. Shelepova [11], etc. However, the same subject of research, but from the standpoint of global governance in the field of security, including peacekeeping, is disclosed much less often (in Russian-language sources, this area is practically not covered), which indicates the relevance of this article. The conceptual design of the Global Security Initiative (GIB) and its presentation to the general public in April 2022 additionally adds novelty to the study. The purpose of the article is to form a broader understanding of the concept of global security management proposed by Xi Jinping, including through the analysis of its practical application in UN peacekeeping.
The crisis of the world order after the collapse of the bipolar world
The collapse of the USSR led not only to the appearance of 15 independent states on the political map of the world, it marked another transitional stage in the development of the system of international relations. The consequence of the end of the Cold war, as a reflection of the ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism, was the formation of a new world order based on the idea of the existence of a "single center of power", which was practically expressed in the sole dominance of the United States. Influential American analyst Fareed Zakaria in his 2019 article titled "The Self-Destruction of American Power" (The Self-Destruction of American Power) wrote: "Since the end of World War I, the United States has sought to change the world. In the 1990s, this turned out to be more possible than ever before. Countries all over the planet began to "move" along the American path" [12]. Agreeing with Zakaria, Russian scientist A. G. Arbatov clarified that China, Russia and other former socialist states, despite the differences in their political regimes, gradually managed to integrate into one global financial and economic system and common world institutions, although the former did not have much influence on the work of the latter [13]. The new idea of unipolarity, promoted by some supporters of the school of realism in the field of international relations, was gaining more and more popularity [14, p. 6]. It was considered as a full-fledged replacement for the bipolar system that had been in operation since the middle of the XX century, in which the two "poles" of power (the USA and the USSR) interacted with each other through confrontation. When the need for confrontation disappeared and at the same time the economic, political and military power of the Western world increased (first of all, bloc associations led by the United States – NATO, the Big Seven, ANZUS, etc.), in many ways its logical rise took place. As noted by Doctor of Political Sciences A.G. Dugin, instead of opposing poles and systems, one model of liberal capitalist democracy with a market society, promoted by the West, recognized by all as a "world leader", has acquired. In other words, the world was divided into the "West" and the "Remainder". The essence of unipolarity is simple – these "others" should no more than follow the West [15]. The manifestation of the unipolar world order is easy to see if you familiarize yourself with the map of the US military presence. The Pentagon has bases and facilities on all continents, with the exception of Antarctica (although an American research program is being implemented on this continent, in which the US Air Force transport aviation takes part) [16]. In order to demonstrate and assert the dominant position of the United States in the system of international relations, several doctrines have been developed. One of them was the concept of "American hegemony of a new type", justified by Z.K. Brzezinski, a political scientist who is considered the leading strategist of American foreign policy at the end of the XX century. His views, set forth in the book "The Grand Chessboard", translated into many languages, including Russian [17], as well as in numerous articles and speeches, became, in fact, the methodological basis of the US planetary domination in a unipolar world. According to Brzezinski, the main goal of the American geostrategy is "the transformation of the United States into the ruler of Eurasia", to achieve which preference should be given to the means of force to strengthen its dominant role. Moreover, if necessary, it is even possible to ignore the interests of not only partners, but also closest allies. In the scientific community, one can find the opinion that in just two decades America has gone through a kind of "evolutionary ladder" from a leader acting through the use of "soft power" tools to a hegemon, mainly using the method of coercion [18, p. 2263]. The idea of a unipolar world had a large number of supporters, and, most importantly, guides. However, the rich diversity of social, political, religious, legal and other systems led to the fact that the liberal world order proposed by official Washington and headed by him did not last long. The crisis of the unipolar world order was preceded by a whole chain of successive events, both related to each other and proceeding in parallel. Of great importance in this regard was the global financial crisis of 2008, which clearly demonstrated the danger of a high level of interdependence of economies. Internal contradictions were also growing in the United States itself [19, pp. 101-108]. L.V. Savin (Russian expert on multipolarity, editor of the journal Geopolitical.ru ) believed that the main reason for the end of the era of international superiority of the United States was the lack of a clear consensus of the elites, which challenged unipolarity "from within" [20, p. 43]. But, at the same time, he also admitted that Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and other countries that have strengthened their positions on the world stage have challenged it much more actively "from the outside" [20, p. 44]. It is important to pay attention to such a feature of modern analytics as the joint mention of two facts: the weakening of American hegemony and the promotion of the concept of multipolarity in the foreign policy of the PRC and the Russian Federation. For example, back in 2009, an associate professor at Lipscomb University Susan Haines said that since the mid-1990s, multipolarity has become one of the fundamental pillars of Sino-Russian relations. This term was included in almost all joint declarations, declarations and treaties [21, p. 159]. It is worth referring to Professor Xiang Lanxin of the Geneva Institute of International Relations and Development, who pointed out the presence in Chinese-Russian relations of signs of a stable strategic partnership and a common vision of the crisis of the unipolar world. According to him, both Beijing and Moscow realized that their countries are on the path of national revival, hence the fading United States, which is too sensitive to any signs of a forceful challenge from potential rivals [22]. It should be noted that in 2008, Fareed Zakaria called on the American leadership to try on the role of a global mediator and develop new rules of the world order in cooperation with other states. He wrote that the United States has two alternative ways. Or they will strengthen the existing world order by reaching a compromise with other great powers, agreeing that there will be different interests and different points of view in the future world. Or America will simply passively watch how the "rise of the rest" will tear apart the world order created over the past 50 years [23, p. 234-236]. However, Washington has chosen a third way – to maintain its position as the only superpower by undermining the power of its competitors. The practical results of the implementation of this path were the intense US-Chinese military-political rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region and the tough US-Russian confrontation over the Ukrainian crisis. This understanding of the situation was documented in the US National Security Strategy of October 12 , 2022 . The text of this act stated that the PRC harbors an intention and, increasingly, seeks to change the international order in favor of one that will change the global playing field in its favor. Whereas, the Russian Federation, which launched a special military operation against Ukraine, shook the peace in Europe and affected stability everywhere. Based on the above provisions, the global priorities in the Strategy are to surpass China in competition (a promising threat) and contain Russia as "still an extremely dangerous player" (a real threat) [24]. If we count the total number of phrases describing two key strategic dangers for today's America – the PRC and the Russian Federation, then we can see that the first country is mentioned in the document 55 times, and the second – 71, and their simultaneous enumeration is more common. It is noteworthy that the United States itself is proclaimed in the Strategy as a "world power with global interests", which seeks to strengthen its ties with "democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe", as well as expand its own presence there [24]. The main conclusion that can be obtained after reading this source largely confirms the previously announced forecasts, especially in terms of assessing the increasing role of China. Thus, Xiang Lanxin in his 2016 article warned about the problems that Sino-American relations may face and the strengthening of Sino-Russian cooperation in this regard. The researcher wrote: "Since no one seems to be able to convince American leaders to abandon their hegemonic fantasies and policies, the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow will remain a reliable test of Washington's "unipolar madness" [22]. At the same time, A. Budnikova and co-authors, naming in 2019 The PRC is the country that poses the greatest danger to American hegemony, pointing not only to the growing economic power of China, but also to the spread of its political influence to many African, Latin American, etc. states [18, p. 2261]. In the speech of the Chinese leader, who opened the XX Congress of the Communist Party of China (October 16, 2022), the foreign policy part was extremely informative. Among the problems highlighted were: the growing negative reaction to globalization; the strengthening of unilateralism and protectionism; the weak pace of global economic recovery; frequent regional conflicts and unrest. At the same time, it was stressed that against the background of significant shifts in the international balance of power, China is provided with new strategic opportunities in the pursuit of development, while maintaining its "firm determination" and demonstrating "fighting spirit". No less attention in the leader's address to the members of the Communist Party was paid to the issues of global governance. According to him, China, being a responsible power, actively participates in the reform and improvement of the global governance system. The Chinese concept of global governance presupposes joint growth through discussion and cooperation. The PRC supports a genuine multilateral approach and is working to make global governance more equitable [25]. The Global Security Initiative (GIB), put forward by Xi Jinping, can be described as an uncharacteristic document of Chinese traditional foreign policy, containing a direct challenge to the established world order dominated by the West.
Development of the ideas of global governance in the field of security in Xi Jinping's policy
Xi Jinping fully expressed the conceptual foundations of his own vision of global security governance on April 21, 2022 at the opening ceremony of the prestigious International Asian Economic Forum in Boao. The speech began by quoting a saying from the collection of ancient Chinese writings "Guanzi": "Stability brings prosperity to the country, and instability leads the country to poverty." Thus, Xi drew a parallel between stability and security, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for development. "We, humanity, live in an indivisible security community. It has been proven time and again that the cold war mentality only destroys the global structure of the world, hegemonism and power politics only endanger world peace, and block confrontation only exacerbates security problems in the XXI century," he said. The Global Security Initiative proposed by him, which emphasizes the need to adhere to the vision of common, comprehensive, joint and sustainable security, in fact, opposes the above–mentioned risks - it rejects the perception of the world order that developed during the Cold War, opposes unilateralism and says "no" to group policy and block confrontation [1]. Ovigwe Eguegu (a political analyst at Development Reimagined, specializing in geopolitics) specifically points out the fact of the timing of the announcement of the GIB and its principles. As the main reason, the expert cites the multidimensional crisis that the world faced in 2022: economies are still forced to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to an increase in commodity prices and raised concerns about energy and food security, and Ukraine itself has joined Yemen, Afghanistan and North Korea. Ethiopia as a place where the war has sharply exacerbated humanitarian problems [26]. It was at this moment that countries around the world, especially developing ones, were in dire need of a new paradigm of global security based on equality and mutual trust in the face of rapid changes in the international landscape, says Tian Wenlin (Professor of international Relations at Renmin University of China). According to the scientist, the period of world history under the leadership of the West can be considered as a history of wars and conflicts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the elimination of external checks and balances, the United States became increasingly militaristic and belligerent. The expansion of NATO to the East has led to an aggravation of the situation. The "proxy war" that has begun in Ukraine, provoked and supported by the United States and other Western states, has brought the international order to a dangerous crossroads. Under these conditions, GIB has become a strategy that corresponds to the "spirit of the times", proposing to replace Western hegemony with a collective security system that takes into account both common and national interests [27]. At the same time, no matter how valuable the initiative may be, it can be assumed that Beijing alone will not be able to create a global security management system. It is important to include other countries in this process. Realizing this, Xi Jinping strives to bring the basic principles of GIB to the attention of his partners at various venues. Thus, on May 19, 2022, in a video message to the foreign ministers of the BRICS member countries, the head of China, having told about the advantages of the GIB, called on the participants of this interstate association to work together to create a global security community. Xi Jinping stressed that history and reality clearly demonstrate that attempts to ensure their own security at the expense of the security of other countries only lead to new conflicts and risks. Therefore, the Global Security Initiative put forward by the PRC is designed to achieve indivisible security throughout the world. The BRICS countries should strengthen political mutual trust and cooperation in the field of security, increase coordination and interaction on topical international and regional issues, as well as resist hegemonism, power politics, cold war mentality and block confrontation [28]. In the following days, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced a public expression of support for the GIB from non–BRICS states - from Cuba, Nicaragua and Uruguay in Latin America to Syria in the Middle East and Pakistan and Indonesia in Asia. Emphasizing the interest of a wide range of countries in Chinese security initiatives, Professor Bates Gill of Macquarie University in Sydney drew attention to the fact that if earlier, when Chinese officials talked about conflict resolution and ensuring security in the world, they put development and prosperity of problem regions at the forefront, now there is a change of priorities. Seeing the serious disposition of the United States to actively involve China's regional partners in its sphere of influence, Chinese diplomacy sets the task of finding common ground with as many States as possible interested in a multilateral format of cooperation in the field of global security [29, p. 6-7]. Another call for joint implementation of the GIB was made by Xi Jinping on September 16, 2022, when he personally participated in the 22nd meeting of the heads of the SCO member states. The emergence of the initiative was justified by the current difficult situation, indicating a shortage of peace and global security. According to Xi, today it is extremely important to observe the concept of common, integrated, joint and sustainable security, as well as to form a balanced and effective architecture of it. Practical steps in this direction included: conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises on a regular basis, resolute struggle against the "three forces of evil" (drug trafficking, cyber and transnational organizational crime), adequate counteraction to non-traditional security challenges, such as data security, biological and space security [30]. The Global Security Initiative (GIB) supported by Xi Jinping coincides in many aspects with the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which he also addressed to the world community during the 76th session of the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2021 [31]. He thinks so. According to the Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Armenia Fan Yun, both initiatives complement each other, correspond to new trends in the world and characterize China as a highly responsible great power [32]. At the same time, Doctor of Law V.S. Ovchinsky sees a certain continuity between the GIB and the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R), put forward by Xi Jinping in 2013 [33]. Assessing the validity of the above judgments, it is worth turning to the origins of the formation of the Chinese concept of global governance in the field of security, which appeared in its finished form as a GIB. The first thing to pay attention to is the consistent approach of the leader of the People's Republic of China to the importance of building not unilateral, but interdependent relations between the countries of the world. After taking up the post of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee in 2012 (during the XVIII CPC Congress), Xi Jinping addressed the party members with a new concept called the "Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind", SESCH (?)), which has become a key element of the modern Chinese diplomatic strategy. In the scientific community, the concept of the SES is evaluated as a tool for China's promotion of its own strategy of global governance and the world economy, by presenting to other countries and cultures the antipodes of the "American dream", colonialism and realism [34, p. 123]. In accordance with the EUHR, States, when faced with difficulties, should take joint measures based on common interests. Beijing's Belt and Road foreign policy initiative is closely linked to the idea of a "Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind". Its authorship also belongs to Xi Jinping. For the first time, he announced the "contours" of such an initiative in a speech in Astana (Kazakhstan) in September 2013. Subsequently (in March 2015), it was embodied in the concept of building the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "Maritime Silk Road of the XXI Century" [35]. Today, the Belt and Road is mainly considered as the main direction of China's foreign policy, it is included in the Charter of the Communist Party and the Constitution of the country, and its completion dates back to 2049 – the year of the 100th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. As part of this initiative, as of February 2022, China has signed cooperation agreements with 148 States (including 40 African States) and with 31 international organizations [36]. It can be said that, as in the case of the Belt and Road, the Global Security Initiative (GIB) clearly traces China's strategic goals for the final replacement of the existing unfair world order dominated by the West.
The content of the Global Security Initiative in the New Era of China's Development (goals, principles and methods)
The Global Security Initiative (GIB), presented in April 2022 by Xi Jinping, is still clothed in the form of statements by officials, it is not available in the form of a document. At the same time, if we summarize its main provisions, we will be able to identify a list of six key rules, taking into account which the system of "ensuring security for everyone in the world" should be built. Are necessary: - following the concept of common, integrated, joint and sustainable security, ensuring peace and security in the world together; - guided by the principles of sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination; - strict observance of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, rejection of the Cold War mentality and unilateral actions, prevention of block or confrontational thinking; - paying due attention to the rational concerns of each country on security guarantees, following the principle of indivisibility of security in the interests of building a balanced, effective and sustainable security system, excluding attempts to build their own security at the expense of others; - settlement of interstate disagreements and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations, welcoming all efforts for a peaceful settlement of the crisis without the use of double standards and unilateral sanctions; - an integrated approach to traditional and non-traditional security issues, combining efforts in countering regional conflicts and global problems such as terrorism, climate change, cyber and biosecurity. The listed rules are interrelated and complementary to each other. They represent an integrated and meaningful system reflecting long-term goals for maintaining and implementing global security. In an article by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi published in the newspaper "People's Daily" (People's Daily) On April 24, 2022 (i.e. three days after Xi Jinping's speech at the Boao Asian Forum – 2022), special attention is drawn to the fact that the world is currently on the verge of division. This was caused by the desire of some countries to "cling" to the outdated thinking of the Cold War confrontation and form exclusive "small circles". Thus, the international security order is seriously undermined and the deficit in global security management is aggravated. The initiative proposed by China denies the approaches established in world politics, its basis is the concept of true multilateralism, which meets the common desire of people of all countries to overcome difficulties together and work together to create a better world after the epidemic [37]. As Fan Yun notes, GIB strongly refutes the realistic concept of Western security, characterized by zero thinking and the desire for unlimited power. The initiative meets the urgent needs not of a minority, but of the majority of the international community, it offers not confrontation, but dialogue, not an alliance with blocs, but partnership, not a "non-zero sum game", but mutually beneficial cooperation [32]. Along with this, some experts, assessing the main provisions of the GIB, point to their broad nature, and even vagueness. In particular, the problem of ambiguity of the instruments through which the initiative will be implemented is highlighted [38; 39]. Recognizing that there is some truth in such judgments, it can be assumed that by mentioning the purposes and principles of the UN Charter in the Document, China sees this organization as the main platform for resolving global conflicts. At the same time, the consistent presentation by China's top officials of the Global Security Initiative during various forums (SCO, BRICS, ASEAN, etc.) also shows that multilateral cooperation in the field of security can also develop within the framework of other international organizations. The SCO, established in 2001 by six countries (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) in order to coordinate joint efforts to combat terrorism and extremism in the region, has the greatest prospects in this regard. At the same time, to date, the SCO agenda has been supplemented with other common problems (economy, energy, etc.), in addition, the membership of the organization has increased to nine participants (India and Pakistan received membership in 2021, and Iran in 2022). As was pointed out by associate professor of the University of Sydney (Australia) Zidong Yuan, currently the SCO is a critically important regional institution that meets the interests of China in Central Asia/Eurasia. Beijing is increasingly seeking to influence the organization and use it to support its institutional balancing strategy, including seeking Russia's approval of a number of diplomatic programs, ranging from energy security and greater economic integration, thereby reducing the degree of US influence in the region [40]. According to the scientist, in addition to the multilateral dialogue, the PRC has already been able to make the most of the ongoing joint exercises, both to increase the combat capability of the PLA, and for the legal transfer of its armed forces and law enforcement agencies to Central Asian states within the framework of bilateral agreements [40]. Foreign Policy Analyst, Master of the University of St. Andrews (Scotland) Ian J. Lynch emphasized that Beijing's changing views on security have turned the military sector into the most dynamic source of its competition with Moscow for regional influence. And, despite the fact that most joint military exercises in Central Asia are still taking place under the leadership of Russia, the number of exercises under the command of China is constantly increasing. Since Xi Jinping declared military diplomacy a key element of his foreign policy in 2015, an increasing number of bilateral counter-terrorism and other more traditional military operations have been conducted on the initiative of the Chinese side and with its direct participation, in addition to exercises conducted within the SCO [41]. According to the position of A. Serikkalieva (Kazakh National University), A. Amirbek and E.S. Batmaz (International Kazakh-Turkish University), the creation of the SCO can be considered as the first successful experience in the implementation of the "new diplomacy" of China [42, p. 131]. Consequently, the organization can quite cope with the role of a "conductor" of the ideas of the leader of the People's Republic of China on how global security should be ensured.
Concretization of the PRC's Global Security Initiative in Peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN
According to the author of the article, China's specific peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the UN demonstrate both Beijing's global interests in the field of international security and its increasing capabilities in this area. Let's look at this problem in more detail. The history of China's participation in UN peacekeeping activities dates back to 1981, when the Chinese delegation first took part in the UN Security Council vote on the conduct of a peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. Eight years later, in 1989, 20 Chinese military observers were seconded to the UN Transitional Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG). The expanding presence of the PRC in the UN peacekeeping activities in subsequent years has led to the fact that currently (as of June 30, 2022) the Chinese contingent (troops, police and its units, staff support, expert support) is represented in eight of the twelve missions and operations of the Organization. The total number of representatives from this country in the peacekeeping forces, according to the UN, is 2,240 people [43]. It turns out that the Chinese leadership's concept of peacekeeping activity was formed earlier than the concept of global security management. In addition to this conclusion, the following pattern should be pointed out. The transformation of official Beijing's views on cooperation with the UN in the field of peacekeeping coincided with the coming to power of Hu Jintao. After his election in March 2003 to the post of President of the People's Republic of China, he almost immediately announced a course to increase the international status of the country. In this regard, peacemaking was a tool for involving China in solving key world problems. Whereas under Xi Jinping, this direction began to be considered as an instrument for the development of multilateral cooperation. Speaking at a special UN summit dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the organization and held in September 2015 in New York, he declared his country's readiness to allocate a permanent contingent of police and reserve component of the forces consisting of 8 thousand military personnel. They were also promised to provide gratuitous military assistance in the amount of $ 100 million. The need for the formation of a $1 billion peace and development fund has been justified to the African Union [44]. A number of analysts saw Xi Jinping's speech as an attempt to respond to the increasingly frequent calls of the United States and other Western countries for China, as the world's second largest economy, to become a "responsible stakeholder" and take on greater responsibility at the UN [45; 46]. At the same time, almost no attention is paid to the other part of the address of the leader of the People's Republic of China, where a call was made for a "new approach to interstate relations", in which "large countries should treat small countries as equals", and conflicts should be resolved through dialogue, but not confrontation, with a commitment to multilateralism and rejection of unilateralism. It is not difficult to notice a coincidence in the goals with the Global Security Initiative. The active involvement of the PRC in the UN peacekeeping activities raises concerns among some representatives of the world community. In particular, it is said that China pursues its economic interests, and not the stated goal of maintaining peace and security. This position can be confirmed by the reports of the American analytical organizations "American Enterprise Institute" and "International Peace Institute", containing information according to which, in the period from 2012 to 2018, Chinese peacekeepers participated in missions in thirteen countries, nine of which received investments from China 1-3 years before the arrival of the peacekeepers themselves. Among the most striking examples, American experts cite South Sudan and the Republic of the Congo. They believe that through peacemaking, through the "blue Helmets", the PRC protects its investments there [47]. However, this kind of argument can be refuted quite easily. According to Yin He (an employee of the Chinese Peacekeeping Police Training Center), when pointing to South Sudan and claiming that China's participation in UN peacekeeping is conditioned by its growing need for natural resources, including oil, it does not take into account the fact that a large number of peacekeeping forces are deployed in Darfur, Lebanon and Haiti, where significant reserves there are no natural resources [48, p. 254]. It seems that the opportunity to receive additional financial benefits from sending military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions and operations, although important, is hardly a key reason for the development of cooperation in this area, especially in the conditions of the already substantial economic power of the PRC, as well as its taking second place (after the United States) in the amount of contributions to the UN budget. The ambitions of modern China are not only to invest finances and personnel in UN peacekeeping. This growing State is making serious efforts to include it in the management of peacekeeping forces [49, p. 18]. Therefore, it is more appropriate to talk about the fact that Beijing considers peacekeeping an effective tool for forming a positive foreign policy image, deep integration into international affairs, and gaining the status of a responsible world power. Today, there is every reason to believe that in the near and medium term, China's peacekeeping activities as an integral part of the GIB will only grow. Xi Jinping has signaled to the outside world that China and its armed forces are responsible and interested members of the international community, especially in contrast to the collective West. At a time when the global security system is in a situation of uncertainty, the Chinese Government has the opportunity to further intensify its peacekeeping efforts and, thereby, expand its diplomatic influence in developing regions and strengthen military ties. Peacemaking may well become an effective means for securing one of the key places in the global governance system for the PRC.
Conclusion Within the framework of the annual Boao Forum, held in April 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the participants via video link with a speech, for the first time at the official level proposing the Global Security Initiative (GIB) aimed at building a system of common, comprehensive, joint and sustainable security. The initiative names the Cold War mentality, hegemonism, power and block politics as problems "endangering world peace" and "aggravating security challenges in the 21st century." Recognizing international security as "indivisible", China proposes to lay the basis for ensuring its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and cooperation for the sake of common peace and security. After the International Asian Economic Forum in Boao (April 21, 2022), the question of the advantages of this initiative was raised in the speeches of the first person of the PRC at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the BRICS member states (May 19, 2022) and during the meeting of the heads of the SCO member states (September 16, 2022). The Global Security Initiative (GIB), brought to a wide range of people, on the one hand, is a new proposal by Xi Jinping, on the other hand, its content is quite familiar to specialists studying the evolution of China's foreign policy. Xi has defended the basic principles laid down in the initiative throughout his term of office and continues to defend them today. This initiative is likely to become the central point of his strategy for a third term as the leader of the Celestial Empire. Xi Jinping's call for multilateral cooperation in the field of security, which was eventually formalized in the GIB, largely became a response to the increasing competition between China and the United States in most international institutions on many issues on the international agenda. It can be assumed that the growth of economic power, global influence and Beijing's claims to a leading position in the global governance system, along with the trade and technology wars unleashed by D. Trump, sanctions policy, accusations about COVID-19, provocative actions of the administration of J. Trump. Biden's actions against Taiwan, etc., led to increased confrontation and created an atmosphere of a new "cold war" in international relations. The Global Security Initiative formed against the background of these events serves a wide range of interests of Chinese foreign policy, one of which is to present the PRC as a new reliable supplier of global security. In fact, the PLA's participation in UN peacekeeping corresponds to the same goal. According to Beijing, peacemaking is an important tool for giving the country a positive foreign policy image, its deep integration into international affairs and gaining the status of a responsible world power. References
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