Library
|
Your profile |
International Law and International Organizations
Reference:
Gorian E.
"Digital Nationalism" as the Embodiment of the Chinese Doctrine of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
// International Law and International Organizations.
2022. ¹ 4.
P. 82-97.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0633.2022.4.39303 EDN: VLKBTK URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=39303
"Digital Nationalism" as the Embodiment of the Chinese Doctrine of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0633.2022.4.39303EDN: VLKBTKReceived: 02-12-2022Published: 30-12-2022Abstract: The article focuses on the special public international relations emerging among the subjects of public international law regarding the enforcement of state sovereignty in the conditions of digitalization of the economy and ensuring national interests in the field of security. The subject of the study is the Chinese doctrine of public international law. The author analyzes the legal regulations in the field of digital economy in China. The Chinese model of "digital nationalism" is being analyzed. The state sovereignty over the cyberspace is being embodied through the category of "cyber sovereignty" and the doctrine of "five principles of peaceful coexistence". The state has to implement the policy of "digital nationalism" to ensure its sovereignty. The Chinese theory of public international law is based on the doctrine of the peaceful existence of nations with different political, economic, social and cultural systems, based on a set of five fundamental principles, which facilitate the achievement of common goals while maintaining a balance of national interests. State sovereignty is the crucial point of this doctrine, since peaceful coexistence of nations is achieved through mutual respect for sovereignty. The concept of a "community of common destiny" defines the goal identified by China implementing the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese approach to the implementation of cyber sovereignty does not imply the "Balkanization" of global cyberspace, on the contrary, it is supposed to maintain the ground for the development of international legal norms in the field of information security. Therefore, the Chinese concept of cyber sovereignty, which is based on "digital nationalism", embodies the logical and expected reaction of national authorities to internal and external security threats. The Chinese theory of public international law is not a scholastic construct, but an objective reality. Keywords: digital nationalism, public international law, principles of peaceful coexistence, information security, national security, digital technologies, community of common destiny, cyber sovereignty, China, FinTechThis article is automatically translated. Relevance of the research topic. Autumn 2022 will be remembered for a number of events of national and international scale that are crucial for the development of international law and order: the summit of the heads of SCO member states in Samarkand, the meeting of defense ministers of NATO member states in Brussels, the meeting of the NATO Military Committee in Tallinn, the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the elections to the Congress of the United States, the meeting of the heads of foreign policy NATO member states' offices in Bucharest, the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Indonesia. All these events took place against the background of the crisis of the existing world system and the aggravated political confrontation of states, expressed in an ambiguous reaction to the events of the post-Soviet era. The inability of the existing international mechanisms to effectively prevent armed conflicts and resolve disputes between States, which was especially pronounced in 2022, testifies to the importance of revising the existing global paradigm of regulating international relations to ensure peace, security and prosperity of mankind. The "Westernization" of many states, accompanied by the idea of the rule of law in the Western sense, leads to a hidden and even open (ISIS, Taliban) rejection, followed by confrontation. International lawyers, theorists and practitioners explain the imperfection of the modern international legal system and the inefficiency of international mechanisms for regulating these relations in different ways. Thus, among the reasons threatening the world order, scientists point to such a phenomenon as "fragmentation of international law" [1]. The problem of fragmentation of international law is the subject of close attention of international lawyers (M. Koskenniemi, R.A. Kolodkin), it is included in the agenda of the UN International Law Commission, discussed in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Fragmentation is observed in the expansion of international legal norms and institutions, in the autonomy or self-sufficiency of some international legal regimes, in the extension of the norms of international law to those areas of relations that were not previously considered suitable for international legal regulation, regionalization and specialization of international law, in particular in areas such as human rights and international trade, the creation of international courts and other bodies that apply, interpret international law and have competence that fully or partially coincides. This leads to conflicts of legal norms and regimes, interpretation and application of the same norms in different situations, to the disintegration of an integral and homogeneous international legal system [2]. Researchers talk about such a result of globalization as the formation of a kind of "Eastphalian" system (Eastphalian, from the English east – east) in contrast to the Westphalian system of international relations, highlighting as an indicator a different understanding of the content of state sovereignty, which is a key element of the Westphalian system [2]. The term "Eastern sovereignty" was used by scholars (D. Fiedler, S. Ganguli, T. Ginzburg) to describe China's views on the political system in the same manner as "Westphalian" was used to describe sovereignty in the legal traditions of Western European states. In our opinion, these concerns arise among researchers because of the fear of perceiving international law differently as a legal system that can develop only in line with Western Christian civilization. Over the past two decades, the Chinese theory of international law has been crystallizing in the science of international law, which is a system of views and values formed by the Chinese authorities in the process of implementing foreign and domestic policy and expressed in international documents. The strengthening of the role and influence of the People's Republic of China at the universal and regional levels allows this State to initiate large-scale processes to change the existing international legal order. At the G20 summit in Indonesia, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the need to accelerate the creation of a balanced, coordinated and inclusive global digital economic paradigm that benefits everyone and provides for mutually beneficial cooperation and shared prosperity (China to continue working with G20 members on global digital economic paradigm: Xi, URL: https://english.news.cn/20221117/7c340a9367ce4d3eac399e21025dd06f/c.html ). For the first time, China included the digital economy on the agenda of the Group of Twenty summit in Hangzhou in 2016 and called for the search for innovative ways of development and the creation of new growth drivers. China's official position is to strive to make concerted efforts to create an open, inclusive, equitable, fair and non-discriminatory environment for the development of the digital economy, as well as to develop international cooperation in the development of the digital industry and promote the digital transformation of industries in order to unlock the potential of the digital economy in stimulating global growth. The Group of Twenty Action Plan on Digital Innovation and Cooperation proposed by the Chinese leader is aimed at promoting the innovative use of digital technologies and ensuring equal benefits for all states from the introduction of innovations (China to continue working with G20 members on global digital economic paradigm: Xi, URL: https://english.news.cn/20221117/7c340a9367ce4d3eac399e21025dd06f/c.html ). In his speech, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of bridging the digital divide between states and the need to take joint effective measures to improve digital literacy and skills of the population of developing countries. In the final Bali Declaration of the Group of Twenty, the digital economy was identified as a key area of cooperation within the framework of the Global Development Initiative (paragraphs 24-25) (Bali Declaration of the Leaders of the Group of Twenty, URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69844 ). The position of the Chinese Government reflects the developed and repeatedly used doctrine of "five principles of peaceful coexistence", which to one degree or another allows avoiding collisions in international relations and achieving goals in the short and long term [3, p. 86]. This doctrine is based on a special understanding of state sovereignty, which, in the context of the digitalization of the economy and the need to respond to the challenges associated with this process, allows us to speak of "digital sovereignty" as its separate aspect. The strict measures taken by the Chinese government to protect digital sovereignty since 2019 characterize its policy as protectionist, for which the term "digital nationalism" is used in the literature [4]. Large-scale regulation of cyberspace and the digital economy (critical information infrastructure, personal data, electronic commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech) is accompanied by a revision of information policy. The integral subjects of its implementation are not only public authorities and state corporations, but also representatives of the private sector [5]. According to Chinese researchers, the legislator seeks to improve the legal instruments regulating not only the production of data, but also their storage and processing, which will allow them to become world market leaders [6]. Big data is collected and processed by both government agencies and representatives of the private sector, which increases the value of such information and its impact on political, social and economic processes, as well as their regulation. The "digital nationalism" manifested in this way as a direction of state information policy is being implemented not only in China, but also in other states (Russia, India, Australia, Singapore). And if five years ago such an approach was considered unusual for the Western paradigm of freedom of the information space, now it is considered a necessary condition for state information security [4, p. 269]. Acting as a so-called trendsetter, initiator of changes in approaches to the legal regulation of various international relations, China declares its mission as a developing power that is aware of the non-uniqueness of the theoretical system of international law, its asymmetry, and, consequently, the disparity of its functions and advantages for "large" and "small" states. The theory of international law with Chinese specifics is not only an objective necessity to consolidate China as a world-class power, but also a subjective desire to fully participate in global governance and protect their own rights and interests [3, p. 86]. The position of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the impact on international relations and the contribution that should be made to the world legal culture - all this obliges the Chinese scientific school to respond to historical challenges, fulfill historical missions, meet the needs of national interests, as well as adjust and form the theory of international law with the national spirit and characteristics for the transformation of international law. communities for the purpose of maintaining peace and sustainable development. In the process of creating the Chinese theory of international law, the task has been set to fully assimilate China's own legal wisdom and cultural traditions in order to integrate Western history and reality, Western theories and practices with the theories defended by China, so that as a result it will lead to the formation of its own concept of international law. Thanks to the inclusion of Western ideas and Western processes, the Chinese theory will be more convincing for the international community [3, p. 86]. Chinese international lawyers emphasize the importance of a balanced development of the international legal system, taking into account the peculiarities of national legal cultures [3, p. 87]. The purpose of the study is to characterize the concept of "digital nationalism" as a natural result of the development of China's international legal doctrine "five principles of peaceful coexistence". The objectives of the study are to reveal the content of the doctrine of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" as an integral part of the Chinese theory of international law and to determine the content of the concept of "cyber sovereignty" in the aspect of the information policy of "digital nationalism". In order to obtain the most reliable scientific results, system-structural, formal-logical and formal-legal methods, as well as a culturological approach were used. The culturological approach in the study of international legal institutions is used by scientists quite actively. As an example, one can cite works on the Islamic theory of international law [7; 8], as well as Chinese [3]. Modern scientists are increasingly arguing about the need to use an interdisciplinary approach to the study of international law, since the events of the last century demonstrate the "inconsistency of a positivist, rational approach to regulating international relations", which forces researchers to resort to other approaches, for example, conflictological [9].The subject of the study, the source base of the study, contradictions in existing studies and the author's position. The subject of the study is presented by the Chinese doctrine of international law and sources of legal regulation of relations in the field of China's digital economy. The topic we have chosen for research is gaining popularity in the scientific literature. The events of recent years prove the need for interdisciplinary qualitative research not only by Sinologists, political scientists and economists, but also by international lawyers, since the idea of a "new international order" promoted by China as a natural way out of the impasse in the development of a unipolar world system dominated by the United States and other Western countries representing the tenth is becoming increasingly popular among developing countries. part of humanity. A new type of global order will emphasize peace, development, equality and democracy. This idea of the Chinese leadership is very popular all over the world and sharply contrasts with the anachronistic principles of the current system [10, p. 57].These and other ideas are embodied in the Chinese theory of international law, which has become the subject of close study by representatives of not only the Western school, but also the Eastern one. In 2015, we predicted the growing importance of China's foreign policy ideology [11, p. 240]: the more China's role at the regional level increases, the more successful its participation in peacekeeping initiatives will be, the more acceptable approaches to regulating international relations will be for the world community. The Chinese theory of international law is not a scholastic construct, but an objective reality. Chinese researchers emphasize the importance of the theory of the rule of law under socialism with Chinese specifics from the point of view of international law. They note that "clear formulations of the theory of the rule of law under socialism with Chinese specifics contribute to the fact that Chinese national identity exerts its influence on the world theories of the rule of law, and clear formulations contribute to the understanding by the world community of the results achieved by China on the path of creating law and order and legality" [12, p. 177]. They emphasize that Chinese legality has a type of expression and a way of implementation independent of Western legality, which is explained by the continuity of thousands of years of cultural traditions of legality in China and established by the ruling Communist Party and implemented over half a century of laws and law and order in a country where hundreds of millions of modern Chinese live [12, p. 177]. A distinctive feature of the Chinese theory of international law is noted by N.K. Kharlamdieva and T.M. Lemesheva: the use in political turnover of terminology that emerged as a result of the practice of international relations during the existence of the Chinese state. In particular, since China perceives modern international law as the "right of the strong", it has introduced into practice and often appeals to the term "unequal contract" (which was concluded at one time or another at the weakness of Chinese statehood and the associated inability to defend national interests). The authors emphasize that "despite the fact that the concept of an unequal contract is not widely used in international practice, a country with a developing economy and a billion-strong population appeals not just to an abstract tradition, but to some of its own terms, which it introduces into political circulation" [13, p. 59]. The problem of "digital sovereignty" has been the subject of several studies by Russian and Chinese scientists. This concept was considered both in the aspect of ensuring information security and autonomous Internet in Russia [14] and China [15]. According to S.Yu. Mirolyubova, the territorial segmentation of the Internet is a consequence of the policy of "new colonialism on the part of backbone providers and large online platforms, which, using geo-blocking, are able to paralyze the Internet in any country" [14, p. 31]. Examining China's experience in regulating cyberspace, the author concludes that it is necessary to develop an autonomous Internet, which gives a certain independence when sanctions and other isolation measures are imposed by other countries [14, p. 31]. During 2022, the concept of "informational sovereignty" has acquired particular relevance both in the practical sphere of the functioning of the Russian state as a sovereign and in the scientific environment. The array of scientific studies of constitutionalists [16; 17; 18], international experts [19] and representatives of other scientific fields [20; 21] that have appeared in recent years allows us to conclude that this concept is fundamentally justified as a system-forming one in the modern theory of state sovereignty (see, for example, the report "Responsibility to protect" (The responsibility to protect) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). The main part. Historically, the science of international law originated and developed in the bosom of the Catholic Church and its theological thought (Bartolome De las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, etc.), thanks to which international law (the law of nations) was called the law of "Christian nations". Later, the Protestant theologian Hugo Grotius became the first scientist who actually separated international law from Christian theology and created a rational concept of international law based on the natural law of reason. However, this did not prevent later defining international law as a set of "rules that Christian states recognize as binding in their relations with each other, as well as in relation to their citizens" [11, p. 237].However, modern international law is used as a regulator of relations, the participants of which represent a significant part of humanity that does not belong to Western Christian culture, moreover, they are descendants of "uncivilized peoples" who were denied international legal personality and whose land was called terra nullius during the great geographical discoveries. The term "civilization" has been used in recent decades in international legal discourse as a necessary category to describe the cultural diversity inherent in the world community (for example, during the UNESCO Forum on Dialogue of Cultures and Civilizations in 2007). Although initially this term was used to qualitatively define the population (peoples) of the metropolises, emphasizing their higher status compared to the population of the colonies. Therefore, international law developed as the law of "civilized nations" (see, for example, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations), which were carriers of European, so-called "Western" culture, which reflects the ideas and worldview of Western Christian civilization, in the terminology of S. Huntington [22]. In his research, he defines civilization as a cultural community of the highest rank, as the widest level of cultural identity of people: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African civilizations differ. In his opinion, the most significant conflicts of the future will unfold along the fault lines between civilizations, explaining this by their dissimilarity in their history, language, culture, traditions [22].Civilizations differ in values, principles on which relationships are built: interpersonal, social, public-power and, ultimately, interstate. At first glance, these values are similar, they are supported, at least at the level of signing and recognition of universal international legal documents by the overwhelming majority of States: human rights, the rule of law, State sovereignty, etc. But, as the practice of international relations shows, the understanding of the content of these values and, most importantly, the willingness to defend them, depend not least on the state's belonging to a particular "civilization", the peculiarities of the legal culture of a particular legal system. The starting point in the development of the Chinese theory of international law is the consolidation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the 1954 Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on Trade and Mutual Communications between the Tibetan Region of China and India. The term "peaceful coexistence" was mentioned as early as 1920 by the Soviet government [23], and in 1945 this principle was proclaimed by the Indonesian national leader Sukarno as the fundamental basis (pancasila) of the state fighting for independence. Nevertheless, the five principles of peaceful existence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence) were first officially announced by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in his conversation with the Indian delegation at the beginning of negotiations held in Beijing since December 1953 April 1954 between representatives of the Chinese and Indian governments on the relations between the two countries in Tibet [3, p. 144-145]. After being formalized in the joint communique of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, these principles were reflected in many other international documents and were widely recognized as the rules on which relations between developing and socialist countries were built over the next decades. The doctrine of the "five principles of peaceful existence" is the foundation of the foreign policy of not only the PRC, but also Myanmar, as well as the central element of confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs) between India and China [3, p. 145]. It should be mentioned that in the 60s of the twentieth century, the Soviet delegation to the UN sought to consolidate peaceful coexistence as one of the basic principles of international law. Patriarch of the Soviet and later the Russian school of International Law G. Tunkin repeatedly stated that "the principle of peaceful coexistence opens a new page in the development of international law" (1958) and that "there is every reason to call modern international law the right of peaceful coexistence" (1963) (quoted in [3, p. 146-147]). The Committee for Peaceful Coexistence of the Soviet Association of International Law (SAMP) stated in 1962: "The principle of peaceful coexistence is a universally recognized principle of modern international law; ... whereas international law in the past was the law of war and peace, today it has become the law of peace and peaceful coexistence" [3, p. 146-147]. In the draft declaration of principles of peaceful coexistence developed by the SAMP, which was sent to the UN, it was proposed to proclaim the principle of peaceful coexistence as a fundamental principle of modern international law. The core of the doctrine of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" is State sovereignty: the peaceful coexistence of States in itself is a positive consequence of respect for sovereignty. These principles reflect the basic requirements of all newly independent states, as well as China's intention to be an actor supporting peace rather than exporting revolution [3, p. 149]. As a justification for the thesis about the correlation between peaceful coexistence and state sovereignty, Chinese researchers cite the following arguments. Firstly, international relations have not yet moved to that qualitatively new level at which State sovereignty would not be the cornerstone of international relations. International negotiations on combating climate change, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, trade regimes of international trade – these problematic issues indicate that international law is still a law among nations, and not a global agreement, not a universal universal law for the benefit of all mankind. Secondly, it is an objective reality that confirms Hans Morgenthau's thesis that international relations are still something like a "power struggle", and not global governance at the cosmopolitan level. Despite the fact that very important structural changes have taken place in the international community and the progressive development of international law is taking place, it is too early to judge the fundamental changes in international relations: States are still the main, primary and most important actors in all international relations, national interests are still the motives for making diplomatic decisions and are being considered as competing, and international norms are still based on the agreement of the wills of States, and therefore do not have sufficient legal force [3, p. 150-151]. Finally, peaceful coexistence should be considered as the basic need of States in international relations. According to some researchers, like Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, "the state can move to higher things (structuring foreign regimes and the international system in its own image and likeness) only if more fundamental goals (protection of territorial and political integrity) are satisfied" [24, p. 341]. The WikiLeaks and PRISM cases prove that states often consider their security to be the most important concern. They can cooperate to face the challenges of climate change, terrorism and the financial crisis, but it is important for them to guarantee their security, independence and territorial integrity. Coexistence is always the primary need of States, and the principle of peaceful coexistence provides such a minimum requirement for international relations and lays the foundation for their further progress. Concluding their arguments, Chinese scientists resort to a conflictological approach, justified by V.F. Antipenko [9]: coexistence does not mean a clash of civilizations, but tolerance between civilizations. Disagreements and conflicts must be recognized as an immanent characteristic of international relations, but the theory and practice of international law can offer ways to resolve disputes and conflicts peacefully, it is enough just to have the desire and intention to use them. Moreover, even peaceful coexistence in itself is not easy to maintain in international relations. Tolerance of states is needed, the idea of respect for a multitude of cultures and values is needed, the spirit of intercultural exchange is needed [3, p. 155]. Therefore, the doctrine of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" is considered not just as a description of modern international relations, not as an indicator of mood or as an expression of something desired, but as something recognized as the basis of modern international law. In the world of cultural diversity, coexistence is the most important requirement of the world order [3, p. 156]. Closely related to this doctrine is the concept of the "community of one destiny" (hereinafter – the EUFOR). This humanistic concept has been elevated by the Chinese leadership to the rank of state policy. According to E.I. Safronova, it already brings tangible benefits to China, serving as a powerful mechanism of its "soft power" [25, p. 54]. In his research , the author identifies the following characteristics of this concept: 1) rejection of the "domination of one or several countries" and emphasis on the cardinal importance of involving all states in global governance and the establishment of international rules in order to distribute "development results among all"; 2) dependence of "universal" prosperity on mutually beneficial cooperation; 3) rejection of the confrontational block approach in partnerships; 4) three-tiered processes of formation of the CES [25, pp. 51-52]. The concept of cyber sovereignty developed in the scientific environment is a logical development of the doctrine of state sovereignty. As mentioned above, an integral part of state sovereignty is sovereignty in the information space, in the digital environment, the so-called information or cyber sovereignty. In his study of information sovereignty, A.I. Himchenko identifies its constituent elements: the mechanism of localization of personal data, the use of domain names on the territory of the state, the establishment of requirements for telecom operators, the establishment of the legal basis for the activities of foreign persons on the Internet [26, p. 90]. In his opinion, the legislation should implement the key areas of information sovereignty on a territorial basis, information infrastructure and be aimed at reducing threats to the stability, security and integrity of the functioning of the Internet and public communication networks, ensuring the sustainable and safe use of domain names on the territory of the state, localization of personal data, organization of the issuance of digital currency, etc. [26, p . 87]. Therefore, the use of a territorial approach to information infrastructure is justified in determining the scope of state sovereignty in the information space. In continuation of this thesis, D.V. Efremenko predicts the defragmentation of cyberspace: in his opinion, "two competing and increasingly incompatible global ecosystems will be created for the development of the Internet of Things, big data processing technologies, 5G mobile communications, additive technologies, robotics, etc. The choice of one of the ecosystems will simultaneously become a geopolitical choice, which, obviously, all state actors will have to make during the 2020s systems of international relations" [27, p. 25]. He is echoed by G.A. Drobot, noting the common position of Russia and China on collective Internet governance, broken down into sectors of state influence and strengthening international legal regulation of the information field [28]. Chinese researchers promote the thesis of the need to develop an international cyberspace management mechanism based on mutual respect for cyber sovereignty and sovereign equality of states [29, p. 97]. Scientists identify a tendency to localize the scope of state sovereignty of individual states on the basis of linking the relevant information spaces to the information infrastructure located on the territory of a particular state. At the same time, as possible approaches to determining the content of the information space, territorial, linking the relevant information infrastructure and information resources with the territory of a particular state, and extraterritorial, extending the operation of legal norms and the activities of state authorities of one state on the territory of others are distinguished [30, p. 40]. Exploring the concept of China's cyber sovereignty, E.A. Mikhalevich notes its key feature: it "does not imply the division of the common cyberspace into separate segments, but contributes to the creation of a secure "cyber community with a common destiny" in which states can exercise their rights to manage the Internet on the principles of equality, justice, cooperation, peace and the rule of law" [31, p. 263]. The researcher suggests that "if the concept of cyber sovereignty is successfully tested by the People's Republic of China on its territory, this model can be used by the international community as a basis for the formation of an international legal framework regulating the relations of states in the field of cyberspace" [31, p. 262]. As it was shown above, cyber-sovereignty finds its embodiment in the legal regimes of information, information technologies and systems. The tightening of these regimes is observed to one degree or another in all States, but not in all cases is equally positively perceived by individual groups within the international community. One or another model of the "autonomous" Internet has become a solution to the problem of national security for many states, the term "digital nationalism" (digital nationalism) has even appeared to characterize this phenomenon, of which "data nationalism" is a part. Its essence is to divide the online world by offline boundaries. The course of isolation from the global network is taken not only by Russia and China, but also by other countries – often with linguistic (India, Kazakhstan, Iran) or religious characteristics (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Islamic states implementing the "halal" Internet model). States block unwanted content or restrict the dissemination of information deemed illegal or threatening to the regime on their territory. But the sovereignty of one or another segment of the network is not limited to regulating the dissemination of information [32]. There are at least three additional factors contributing to digital nationalism: politics, security and protectionism [33]. To ensure security, the state needs to trust only its own cryptographic systems and platforms. But since it is impossible to implement the whole range of technologies in isolation in the modern world, the idea of limiting the use of certain foreign-made technologies is implemented in other ways, for example, by banning foreign investment in the digital sector, as is the case in the trade war between the United States and China [34, p. 46]. Scientists see a real threat to the "Balkanization" of the Internet for technical and economic reasons, without discounting political ones [35]. However, some authors are more optimistic about the current situation. According to I.A. Tsvetkov, "the modern phase of globalization - a combination of political and economic nationalism with an ever-accelerating cultural globalism - puts in a more advantageous position those countries that find the strength to stay away from the political xenophobia that has become fashionable. China, which retains the status of an unfree and politically authoritarian state in the Western sense, in the cultural sense sometimes begins to outpace its competitors, primarily the United States, thanks to the consistent support of the ideology of globalism" [36, p. 482]. And the ideology of globalism itself is expressed in the doctrine of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Conclusions. The Chinese theory of international law is based on the doctrine of the peaceful existence of States with different political, economic, social and cultural systems, based on a set of five fundamental principles, the observance of which makes it possible to achieve common goals while maintaining a balance of national interests. State sovereignty is the backbone of this doctrine, since peaceful coexistence of States is achieved through mutual respect for sovereignty. The concept of the "community of one destiny" of humanity defines the goal that the Chinese state strives for in implementing the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese approach to the implementation of cyber sovereignty does not imply the "Balkanization" of global cyberspace, on the contrary, it is supposed to be used as a basis for the development of international legal norms for regulating state relations in the field of information security. Therefore, the Chinese concept of cyber sovereignty, which is based on "digital nationalism", embodies the logical and expected reaction of national authorities to internal and external threats. The Chinese theory of international law is not a scholastic construct, but an objective reality. The research was carried out with the financial support of the RFBR as part of the scientific project 20-011-00454 "Ensuring the rights of investors in the banking and financial sectors in the context of the digitalization of the economy in the Russian Federation and the leading financial centers of East Asia: a comparative legal aspect" References
1. Brownlie, I. (1988). The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law // The Rights of Peoples / Ed. J.Crawford. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2. Kolodkin, R.A. (2005). Fragmentation of International Law. Moscow Journal of International Law, 2, 38–61. 3. He, Z., Sun, L. (2020). A Chinese Theory of International Law. Law Press China and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2882-8 4. Gorian, E. (2022). Genesis of Data Security Mechanism in China: The Next Step to Data Nationalism. China & WTO Review, 2, 255-276. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/cwr.2022.8.2.02. 5. Gorian, E. (2019). The development of the Russian legal mechanism of cybersecurity: “a special way” or following international trends? Administrative and Municipal Law, 5, 1-15. doi: 10.7256/2454-0595.2019.5.30140. 6. Ning, J. (2014). Actively Promoting The Development of the Big Data Industry and Promoting China's Transition from a Big Data Country to a Strong Data Country. World Telecommunications, 1, 44. 7. Zhdanov, N.V. (2003). Islamic Conception of Legal Order. Moscow: International Relations. 8. Gorian, E.V. (2013). Islamic Conception of International Law // Problems of Effectiveness of International Law / Ed. V.N. Kubalskiy. Kyiv, V.M. Koretsky Institute of State and Law, 34-38. 9. Antipenko V.F. (2014). Conflictology in the international anti-terrorism law-making. Odesa: Feniks. 10. Gorian, E.V. (2022). The Concept of China's National Security in the "New Era": Preliminary Results of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. National Security / nota bene, 6, 49-61. doi: 10.7256/2454-0668.2022.6.39220. 11. Gorian, E., Gorian, K. (2015). Chinese conception of international law as the response to the challenges of today. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 6(3), 236-241. 12. Nie, F., Li, S. (2016). Orientation and Innovation: Rule of Law Theory under Socialism with Chinese Characteristics from an International Law Perspective. Power, 10(24), 171-177. 13. Kharlampeva N.K., Lemesheva T.M. (2019). Political and legal features of the application of international law in the People's Republic of China. Eurasian Law Journal, 10(137), 57-59. 14. Mirolyubova, S.Yu. (2022). Development of the information and communication network Internet in Russia in the context of geo-blocking and geo-discrimination. Law and Economics, 7(413), 22-31. 15. Lin, D. (2020). Fundamentals of legal regulation and administrative control of the Internet in China. NB: Administrative Law and Administration Practice, 2, 1-9. doi: 10.7256/2306-9945.2020.2.33152. 16. Astapenko, P.N. (2022). Digital sovereignty as a condition for the implementation of state sovereignty in the Internet era. Law and law, 9, 27-33. 17. Petrochenkov, I.A. (2022). On the issue of the concept of digital sovereignty. Constitutional and municipal law, 7, 69-73. 18. Romanovsky, G.B., Romanovskaya, O.V. (2022). About digital sovereignty. Constitutional and municipal law, 9, 25-31. 19. Chernukhin, E.V. (2021). About Russia's approaches to ensuring digital sovereignty on the example of international organizations. International life, 7, 18-25. 20. Rebro, O., Gladysheva, A., Suchkov, M., Sushentsov, A. (2021). The category of "digital sovereignty" in modern world politics. International processes, 4(67)-19, 47-67. 21. Demyashina, V.V. (2022). Digitalization and digital sovereignty: to the problem of protecting the political subjectivity of the Russian state (assessments, positions and socio-philosophical reflection). Society: philosophy, history, culture, 8(100), 70-76. 22. Huntington, S. (1994). The Clash of Civilizations? Polis, 1, 33-48. 23. Karpov, V. (1964). The Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and Its Implications for International Law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 29, 858-860. 24. Krasner, S.D. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 25. Safronova, E.I. (2018). On the question of the interpretation of the Chinese concept of "community of common destiny". Decisions of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China and prospects for Russian-Chinese relations. Moscow: Publishing house IFES RAS, 45-54. 26. Khimchenko, A.I. (2022). On the relationship between the issues of ensuring the information sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the formation of a digital environment of trust. Bulletin of the O.E. Kutafin (MSUA), 4(92), 83-91. 27. Efremenko, D.V. (2022). Formation of a digital society and geopolitical competition. Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law, 2(13), 25-43. 28. Drobot, G.A. (2018). Information component of modern world politics. Information Society, 2, 16-18. 29. Xu, W. (2020). Challenges to cyber sovereignty and response measures. World Economy and International Relations, 2(64), 89-99. 30. Vinogradova, E.V., Polyakova, T.A. (2021). On the place of information sovereignty in the constitutional and legal space of modern Russia. Legal state: theory and practice, 1(63), 32-49. 31. Mikhalevich, E.A. (2021). The Concept of Cyber Sovereignty of the People's Republic of China: History of Development and Essence. Bulletin of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, Political Science, 2(23), 254-264. 32. Zhao, B., Deng, Y.F. (2021). Mapping the development of China’s dataprotection law: Major actors, core values, andshifting power relation. Computer Law & Security Review, 40, 1-16. 33. Ahmad, P. (2022). Digital nationalism as an emergent subfield of nationalism studies. The state of the field and key issues. National Identities, 1, 1-11. 34. Gorian, E. (2020). Critical information infrastructure of People’s Republic of China: special features of legal regulation of information security of financial-banking sector enforcement. Administrative and Municipal Law, 4, 45-57. doi: 10.7256/2454-0595.2020.4.32878. 35. Lajosi, K., Nyíri, P. (2021). Introduction: The transnational circulation of digital nationalism. Nations & Nationalism, 1(28), 263-266. 36. Tsvetkov, I.A. (2020). New nationalism and the struggle for dominance in the global digital cultural space. Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University. International relationships, 4(13), 478-487.
Peer Review
Peer reviewers' evaluations remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public. Only external reviews, authorized for publication by the article's author(s), are made public. Typically, these final reviews are conducted after the manuscript's revision. Adhering to our double-blind review policy, the reviewer's identity is kept confidential.
|