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International relations
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Brebdane, A. (2022). China in the Middle East: Confrontation with the United States. International relations, 4, 36–45. https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0641.2022.4.39082
China in the Middle East: Confrontation with the United States
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2022.4.39082.2EDN: EGKKFAReceived: 01-11-2022Published: 30-12-2022Abstract: The importance of the Middle East for China has recently increased, since it not only contains the energy sources necessary for China's growth, but also represents an arena of rivalry with great powers, primarily with the United States. The author considers China's presence in the Middle East as a strategically justified necessity in the context of confrontation with the United States of America. In light of Washington's "encirclement strategy" in East Asia, Beijing's behavior in the Middle East is largely influenced by it. It is emphasized that China is not ready and does not seek to play the role of a guarantor of security or replace the United States in the Middle East in this area in the foreseeable future, however, security issues at both national and regional levels are becoming increasingly relevant. China's strategic priorities and the main directions of its political presence aimed at balancing threats and opportunities in such a turbulent region have been identified. The study concludes that the future of China's presence in the Middle East is determined by China's global strategy, where internal and external factors have a significant impact on Beijing's position and role at the regional and international levels in such a rapidly and unexpectedly changing world. Keywords: China, Middle East, North Africa, USA, political pragmatism, strategy, rivalry, Beijing, Washington, confrontationIntroduction: China as a kind of "newcomer" in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. Geographically, MENA’s importance to Beijing has long been low, but this began to change in the early 2000s. Thanks to China’s rapid economic development, marked by its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and its energy consumption growth rate sharply increasing, the importance of the MENA region for China's energy security has also increased. The destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa, caused by events such as the global war against terrorism declared by the United States as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the events of the Arab Spring, have put China's interests at risk. The most significant change in the region after the end of the Cold War was the collapse of its previously built security architecture [1]. According to a number of experts, America’s attitude towards China’s presence in the Middle East changed significantly even before the Arab uprisings of 2011 [2], and Washington ceased to be a guarantor of regional security and stability [3]. As the US "soft power" in the Middle East has declined, the region has become particularly vulnerable to the new competition of the great powers, and Beijing is ready to take advantage of the growing vacuum left by the United States [4]. Strategically, the MENA region has become even more important for Beijing than for Washington; it is here that China can cooperate and/or compete with other great powers, and strategic priorities and opportunities are outlined here: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296.pdf [5]. Chinese experts consider the Middle East a complex political reality where many great empires have collapsed throughout history and where, under certain conditions, China's policy and strategy may fail [6]. Accordingly, the challenge China faces today is the role it can play in such an unstable region.
The Chinese presence in the Middle East as a strategic necessity in the confrontation with the United States. China's growing interest in the Middle East has become a response to the encirclement strategy that the United States adheres to in East Asia [7]. One of the most influential Chinese international scholars, Wang Jisi, first spoke about the "March Westward" strategy in an article published on October 17, 2012, in the Chinese version of the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao). For Wang, the "March to the West," i.e., a special focus on Eurasia, was a "strategic necessity" as a result of the Obama administration's "turn to Asia" during the period of "rebalancing." This could potentially turn Sino-American interactions in East Asia into a "zero-sum game." If China "moves to the West," "the potential of US-Chinese cooperation" in various fields will increase, and "the risk of military confrontation between them will be minimized" [8]. From a geopolitical point of view, the Chinese initiative "One Belt, One Road" is a strategic countermeasure of Barack Obama's "pivot to East Asia" strategy of 2012, which Beijing interpreted as an attempt by the United States to contain China [9]. In the context of President Donald Trump's "America first" foreign policy, the Chinese "March to the West" is seen as a strategic imperative [10]. There is a growing trend in the importance of the Middle East region for China and the need to strengthen Beijing's position there in light of the growing American presence in East Asia. Accordingly, China's behavior in the Middle East is not only related to the situation in East Asia but is also influenced by it [11]. Apparently, China is ready to further strengthen its economic and diplomatic influence in the region, but it is interested in maintaining "even relations" with the United States [12]. Chinese pragmatism is clearly manifested in the position regarding the problem of Iraq. China strongly opposed the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 but then supported the presence of American troops in Iraq as a stabilizing force [13]. From 2005 to 2010, China invested $8.58 billion in Iraq [14]. Although China opposes external interference in the region, it has not developed its own strategy to prevent it and tacitly accepts Washington's role in promoting regional stability, deriving its own benefits from it [15]. This, of course, is a testament to Beijing’s pragmatism, which is actually spared from the difficulties and problems associated with ensuring its own military presence [16] and which has financial capabilities within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative to develop infrastructure in the region’s countries, investing in the construction of ports, roads, and 5G networks. In this regard, US officials warn the Gulf countries against acquiring Chinese technologies for their 5G equipment [17]. In addition, China's successes in the development and operation of several port infrastructure facilities in the Middle East, such as the port of Khalifa (Abu Dhabi, UAE), Dukm (Oman), Jizan (Saudi Arabia), Ain Sukhna (Suez, Egypt), and Haifa (Israel), also did not pass Washington by unnoticed. Some American politicians and experts have expressed concern that the escalation between China and the United States may affect the ability of the latter to maintain reliable volumes of international trade, and Beijing may use its control over these and other ports to prevent trade access to other countries, including the United States [18]. There were also disturbing statements about the possible dual use of some ports for civilian and military purposes. Speaking in the US House of Representatives in February 2018, General Joseph Votel, Head of the Central Command, expressed concern about China's strategy to strengthen its global military positions through access to infrastructure between Gwadar and Djibouti [19]. In this light, Washington recently put pressure on the UAE to stop construction work carried out by the Chinese at a military facility in the commercial port of Khalifa [20]. These actions can indeed have far-reaching consequences for the stability of the Middle East and North Africa region [21]. On the other hand, concern about the threat to national interests is also heard from Beijing. Chinese merchant ships, including oil tankers bound for Chinese ports, must pass through waters where the United States and India have a significant maritime presence, with all the ensuing consequences. In addition, the energy factor plays an important role in the American strategy to contain China [22]. It is not by chance that the first Chinese naval base outside the state opened in Djibouti, not far from the world's transport routes and the Suez Canal. China has also used its contacts with countries in the region that are hostile to the United States to limit American influence and global hegemony policies. China views Iran as a partner that not only provides ground access to energy resources in the region but is also the only country in the Persian Gulf that is not bound by security relations with Washington. Despite US sanctions, Beijing maintains minimal oil supplies as a "lifeline" for Tehran, thereby demonstrating an unwillingness to obey what America dictates [23]. At the same time, China is very careful not to cross the "red line" and cause Washington too much irritation over Iran [24]. Beijing is carefully weighing the political aspects of its presence in the Middle East in terms of its relations with the United States of America. At the same time, while Washington remains committed to zero-sum military alliances, Beijing's partnerships with the countries of the CU region will serve to undermine and displace American influence and demonstrate an alternative concept of bilateral relations [25]. According to Michael Singh of the Washington Institute, the overlapping interests of the United States and China in the Middle East can lead not only to conflict but also to bilateral cooperation. Neither side is interested in bearing the burden of ensuring regional security alone or turning the region into an arena of conflict between major powers. And if Washington and Beijing approach a zero-sum strategic rivalry, then the common interests of the United States and China in the Middle East can become a factor in easing bilateral tensions in Asia rather than its continuation [26]. China does not intend and is not ready to assume the role of the main guarantor of security in the region, which is played by Washington. [27]. It seems that in security matters, Beijing is focused most of all on its neighbors and does not seek to replace the United States in the Middle East or anywhere else except East Asia [28]. However, given its economic and demographic potential, China will likely become a real threat to US influence in the region in the coming years. Conclusion: From the point of view of ensuring security, the stability of the economy and political system, as well as the protection of China's territory and waters within its maritime borders, China continues to prioritize its attention to neighboring countries. In the Middle East, China is apparently "looking for ways to compete without becoming a competitor" to the United States. Despite this, it is clear that China will play a more important role in Middle Eastern affairs in the coming decades. Although China still does not want to interfere deeply in the affairs of the region and strives to maintain the position of a neutral economic power, it must respond to the current situation as its authority grows and interests expand. It is necessary to take into account both internal and external factors that have a significant impact on the position and role of Beijing at regional and international levels in such a rapidly and unexpectedly changing world.
References [1] Michael Singh. (2016). Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings. In Niv Horesh (ed.), Toward Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring (pp. 166–167). The Nottingham China Policy Institute series. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137539793.pdf [2] Bruce Drake. (2014). Obama Charts a New Foreign Policy Course for a Public that Wants the Focus to be at Home. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/28/obama-charts-a-new-foreign-policy-course-for-a-public-that-wants-the-focus-to-be-at-home/ [3] Jordi Quero & Andrea Dess. (2021). Unpredictability in US Foreign Policy and the Regional Order in the Middle East: Reacting Vis-a-Vis a Volatile External Security-Provider. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 48(2), 311–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1580185 [4] Lars Erslev Andersen, Camille Lons, Tamás Peragovics, Erzsébet N. Rózsa, & Katarzyna W. Sidło. (2020). China-MENA: Relations in the Context of Chinese Global Strategy. In Katarzyna W. Sidło (ed.), The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? (p. 17). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf [5] James M. Dorsey. (2016). China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom. RSIS Working Paper No. 29618. S. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore). https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296.pdf [6] Ibid. [7] Andrew Scobell & Alireza Nade. (2016). China in the Middle East: The Wary Dragon. RAND. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1229/RAND_RR1229.pdf [8] Wang Jisi. (2012). Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy. International and Strategic Studies Report. Peking University: Center for International and Strategic Studies. pp. 7–8; Wang Jisi. (2014). Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy: The World in 2020 According to China. pp. 129–136. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004273917_008. [9] Michael Clarke. (2020). Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’? Journal of Contemporary China, 29(123), 336–353. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645485 [10] Erzsébet N. Rózsa & Tamás Peragovics. (2020). China’s Political, Military and Cultural Engagement in the MENA Region. In Katarzyna W. Sidło (ed.), The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? (p. 59). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf [11] Yitzhak Shichor. (2016). Connected Vessels: West Asia and East Asia in China’s Geopolitics. Araucaria, 18(35): 319–339. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Yitzhak-Shichor/publication/304895088_Connected_Vessels_West_Asia_and_East_Asia_in_China's_Geopolitics/links/587517c908aebf17d3b3f338/Connected-Vessels-West-Asia-and-East-Asia-in-Chinas-Geopolitics.pdf [12] Niv Horesh & Ruike Xu. (2016). China's Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring. In Niv Horesh (ed.), Toward Well-Oiled Relations? China’s Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring (p. 216). The Nottingham China Policy Institute series. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137539793.pdf [13] Pan Zhenqiang. China and the Middle East. (2010). China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond. Washington DC: Nixon Center. pp. 73–95. http://www.cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf [14] China Global Investment Tracker. https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/ [15] Michael Singh. (2016). Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings. In Niv Horesh (ed.), Toward Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring (p. 166). The Nottingham China Policy Institute series. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137539793.pdf [16] Exclusive Interview: Obama on the World. (2014). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas-l-friedman-iraq-and-world-affairs.html [17] Cornwell, A. (2019). U.S. Flags Huawei 5G Network Security Concerns to Gulf Allies. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-security usa-gulf/u-s-flags-huawei-5g-network-security-concerns-to-gulf-allies-idUSKCN1VX241 [18] United States House of Representatives. (2019, October 17). Hearing: China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Implications for the Global Maritime Supply Chain. https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=109805 [19] United States Central Command. (2018, February 27). House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Terrorism and Iran. CENTCOM CCCI. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/TRANSCRIPTS/Votel-HASC-Testimony-27-FEB-2018/ [20] Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand & Kylie Atwood (November 19, 2021). Construction Halted on Secret Project at Chinese Port in UAE After Pressure from the US, Officials Say. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/19/politics/china-uae-us-construction-port/index.html [21] Lars Erslev Andersen & Camille Lons. (2020). The Geopolitical Implications of China's presence in the MENA region. In Katarzyna W. Sidło (ed.), The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? (p. 95). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf [22] Israilov A.H., Shiriyazdanova I.F., Gatamova M.M., Ekazheva E.B. (2020). The energy factor of the Persian Gulf countries in the American strategy of containing the PRC. World Politics, (3), pp. 1–13. DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2020.3.33779 URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=33779 [23] Lars Erslev Andersen & Camille Lons. (2020). The Geopolitical Implications of China's Presence in the MENA Region. In Katarzyna W. Sidło (ed.), The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? (p. 99). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf [24] Jonathan Fulton. (2021). China Between Iran and the Gulf Monarchies. Middle East Policy, 28(3–4), 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12589 [25] Lars Erslev Andersen, Camille Lons, Tamás Peragovics, Erzsébet N. Rózsa, & Katarzyna W. Sidło. (2020). China-MENA: Relations in the Context of Chinese Global Strategy. In Katarzyna W. Sidło (ed.), The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? (p. 19). Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf [26] Michael Singh. (June 1, 2018). China in the Middle East: Following in American Footsteps? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/china-middle-east-following-american-footsteps [27] Fulton, J. (2019, June). China’s Changing Role in the Middle East. Atlantic Council Rafic Hariri Center for the Middle East. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/china-s-changing-role-in-the-middle-east-2/ [28] Yitzhak Shichor. (2016). Connected Vessels: West Asia and East Asia in China’s Geopolitics. Araucaria, 18(35), 319–339. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/YitzhakShichor/publication/304895088_Connected_Vessels_West_Asia_and_East_Asia_in_China's_Geopolitics/links/587517c908aebf17d3b3f338/Connected-Vessels-West-Asia-and-East-Asia-in-Chinas-Geopolitics.pdf References
1. Michael Singh. Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings. // Toward Well-Oiled Relations? Ñhina’s Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring / Edited by Niv Horesh. The Nottingham China Policy Institute series. 2016. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137539793.pdf
2. Bruce Drake. Obama Charts a New Foreign Policy Course for a Public that Wants the Focus to be at Home.// Pew Research Center.2014. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/28/obama-charts-a-new-foreign-policy-course-for-a-public-that-wants-the-focus-to-be-at-home/ 3. Jordi Quero & Andrea Dessì. Unpredictability in US Foreign Policy and the Regional Order in the Middle East: Reacting Vis-à-Vis a Volatile External Security-Provider // British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.2021. 48:2, 311-330 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1580185, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2019.1580185. 4. Lars Erslev Andersen, Camille Lons, Tamás Peragovics, Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Katarzyna W. Sidło. China-MENA: Relations in the Context of Chinese Global Strategy.// The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa: beyond Economic Interests? /Edited by Katarzyna W. Sidło. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, July 2020. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf 5. James M. Dorsey. China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom // RSIS Working Paper. S. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore) No. 29618. March.2016.https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WP296.pdf 6. Andrew Scobell, Alireza Nade. China in the Middle East The Wary Dragon // RAND. 2016. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1229/RAND_RR1229.pdf 7. Wang Jisi. “Marching Westwards”: the Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy’ // International and Strategic Studies Report. Peking University: Center for International and Strategic Studies. October 2012. P. 7–8; Wang Jisi “Marching Westwards”: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy.//The World in 2020 According to China . 01 Jan 2014. P. 129–136. - https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004273917_008. 8. Michael Clarke. Beijing’s Pivot West: The Convergence of Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik on China’s ‘Belt and Road’? // Journal of Contemporary China. Volume 29, 2020 - Issue 123. Pages 336-353. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645485 9. Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Tamás Peragovics. China’s Political, Military and Cultural Engagement in the MENA Region// The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests?/ Edited by Katarzyna W. Sidło. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, July 2020. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf 10. Yitzhak Shichor. Connected Vessels: West Asia and East Asia in China’s Geopolitics.// Araucaria 2016. 18(35):319-339.https://www.researchgate.net/profile/YitzhakShichor/publication/304895088_Connected_Vessels_West_Asia_and_East_Asia_in_China's_Geopolitics/links/587517c908aebf17d3b3f338/Connected-Vessels-West-Asia-and-East-Asia-in-Chinas-Geopolitics.pdf 11. Niv Horesh and Ruike Xu. China’s Growing Presence in the Middle East. //Toward Well-Oiled Relations? Ñhina’s Presence in the Middle East Following the Arab Spring ./ Edited by Niv Horesh. The Nottingham China Policy Institute series.2016. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137539793.pdf 12. Pan Zhenqiang. China and the Middle East // China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond, (Washington DC: Nixon Center, 2010), pp. 73–95. - http://www.cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf 13. Lars Erslev Andersen, Camille Lons. The Geopolitical Implications of China's presence in the MENA region // The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests? /Edited by Katarzyna W. Sidło. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, July 2020. https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/JPS_The-Role-of-China-in-the-MENA.pdf 14. Israilov A.H., Shiriyazdanova I.F., Gatamova M.M., Ekazheva E.B. The energy factor of the Persian Gulf countries in the American strategy of containing the PRC // World Politics. 2020.– No. 3. pp. 1-13. DOI: 10.25136/2409-8671.2020.3.33779 URL: https://nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=33779 15. Jonathan Fulton. China between Iran and the Gulf Monarchies//. Middle East Policy.Volume28, Issue3-4 Fall-Winter 2021 Pages 203-216.https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12589 16. Michael Singh. China in the Middle East: Following in American Footsteps? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (Junå 1, 2018). https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/china-middle-east-following-american-footsteps 17. Fulton, J. China’s changing role in the Middle East. Atlantic Council. Rafic Hariri Center for the Middle East. (2019, June). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/china-s-changing-role-in-the-middle-east-2/
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