Elaboration of the Yeltsin-Gaidar radical reform in the programs of the Government of the Russian Federation

Baydakov Ivan ORCID: 0000-0003-0651-3029 Director of the Centre for Public History, Research Fellow, Laboratory of Contemporary History, Institute of Social Sciences, the Russian Presidential academy of National Economy and Public administration 119192, Russia, Moscow, Michurinsky ave., 12k1, sq. 69 Baydakovim@gmail.com Other publications by this author

IntroductionStudying the Government programs of the 90s of the last century, it is important to imagine how the socio-economic conditions prevailing in Russia were assessed at that time.

Specialists of the Institute of Economic Policy, headed by E. T. Gaidar, in the document "The Russian Economy in 1991. Trends and prospects" ^[31] noted that the inflation rate and the decline in production have significantly increased. The economic crisis had reached its most severe phase, and the country was living in anticipation of social cataclysms of a global nature ^{[31, p. 5, 13]}. There was a difficult situation with food in large cities (E.T. Gaidar wrote that it "resembled the one that was in 1917" ^{[6, p. 360]}), there was not enough grain either for baking bread or for future sowing, there was no currency for its purchase ^{[7, p. 46]}.

There was a "systemic critical dysfunction of public administration in vital areas" ^[5]. The collapse of Soviet extractive institutions took place ^{[33, p. 85]}. The collapse of the financial system reached the stage when monetary settlements between economic entities were forcibly replaced by the naturalization of relationships ^{[31, p. 5]}.

The difficult economic situation and the weakness of the central government inevitably pushed the regions, which had the opportunity to somehow exist independently, to separatism ^{[18, p. 25]}. As a result, the process of disintegration of the formerly unified economic structure of the USSR became irreversible. This was aggravated by the uncontrolled increase on the part of the former Soviet republics of the ruble issue of non-cash money ("which then easily turned into cash"), which not only "transferred" the actual financing of their social problems and economies to Russia ^{[7, p. 46]}, but also allowed "redistributing its property and resources in its favor" ^[26].

Summing up, it can be argued that the problems in the Soviet-Russian economy were characterized by three interrelated crises: an inflationary crisis accompanied by an acute deficit in all commodity markets, a payment crisis and a systemic crisis associated with the loss of the ability of state authorities to regulate in the field of management ^{[37, p.102]}.

In the socio-ideological sphere, the "Soviet heritage" affected the mentality of the population ^[32], whose stereotypes in matters of economic activity, distributive consumption, work ethics, understanding of wealth and private property did not correspond to the attitudes of market participants. The majority of citizens "in one day" were not ready to take responsibility for their own standard of living through inclusion in entrepreneurial and intensive work activities.

The situation in Russia by the early 90s was recognized by a number of researchers as the Second Russian Revolution (see.: ^{[6],[22],[25],[33]}).

According to K.I. Sonin, the only reason for sometimes existing objections to this lies in the plane of assertions that revolutions are always accompanied by progressive social progress, and the crisis and "turmoil" of the last years of Soviet power were completed by a return to capitalist relations and the market, i.e. canceled the "conquests" of the First Russian Revolution of the early XX century. But it follows from this that in future research it is necessary either to "update our understanding of what a revolution is – in the part in which this concept implies moving forward (or up) on an imaginary "ladder of development"" ^{[33, pp. 71-72]}, or to critically comprehend which of the Russian events of the XX b. are factors of progressive progress. In addition, there is an opinion that "every counter-revolution is only a private form of revolution, reflecting its concrete historical specifics and not canceling its fundamentally revolutionary nature" ^{[25, p. 255]}.

According to V.A. Mau, two factors are at the heart of the revolutionary transformation that covers all spheres of life, including the economic system, and turns the country into a "weak state": firstly, a systemic crisis that destroys state institutions that are not adapted to new conditions and manifests itself in the economy in the form of a deep financial crisis and, secondly,secondly, the fragmentation of the social structure of society ^[19],[20]. This manifests the political, economic and social components of the revolutionary process.

Hence, three strategic tasks arise that require appropriate solutions from the revolutionary and reform forces: the restoration of state institutions as prerequisites for economic stability; financial and economic stabilization, primarily restoring the financial capabilities of the government, which gives it the potency to solve a complex of socio-economic and political problems; consolidation of society in new conditions.

The logic of decision-making on the strategic content of the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms, as well as on the tactical steps of the reformers dictated by specific current problems, is quite thoroughly outlined by the authors of the program and participants in the events ^[6],[7]. 

The purpose of our research is to compare the main steps of the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms with the authors' understanding of the revolutionary process and to consider how the movement on them was reflected in the relevant medium-term plans of the Government, the analysis of which is absent in historical works (in the period from 1992 to 1997 The Government has adopted three programs of socio-economic development of the country).

Since the beginning of the XXI century, several historical works have been published on the time of the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms ^[20],[38], voluminous in both size and content, as well as a large number of economic works on this period (e.g.: A.G. Aganbegyan, E.T. Gaidar, E.G. Yasin, etc.). However, there is a lack of historical research. What the Russian historian A.A. Yanik associated with the fact that most of those writing about the 90s, being themselves involved in the "flow of history" that passed thirty years ago, objectively "are not able to rationally comprehend their observations" ^{[38, p. 14]}, as a result of which their works are often very emotionally and ideologically colored.

The author of the article was neither an accomplice nor an eyewitness of the events under consideration and sets himself the task of examining the historical process impartially – neither by extolling reform programs, nor by condemning them or discussing the existence of alternatives to them. In addition, the works studying the implementation of radical economic reform through the strategic documents of the Government are absent both from domestic and foreign researchers. These factors determine the novelty and relevance of the study.

Results and their discussionIn the current circumstances, Boris Yeltsin instructs Secretary of State G.E. Burbulis to prepare proposals for urgent measures in the economy, who, for his part, engaged the group of E.T. Gaidar.

The involvement of E.T. Gaidar and his staff was not accidental. As L.M. Grigoriev, who was an expert of the Commission on Economic Reform of the Soviet Government in the early 90s, recalled, "at the end of 1989, the first program for overcoming the crisis appeared… It was written by E. Gaidar, V. Mashchits and V. Rapoport sometime in the fall and transferred to M. Gorbachev and N. Ryzhkov. The Prime Minister [N.I. Ryzhkov - I.B.] approved the program, said that he was using it, and in early December 1989 some pieces of it were added to the usual plan for 1990" ^{[9, p. 7]}.

It should also be noted an important circumstance that the choice of the team, which would later be called the "young reformers", was caused by the fact that from the point of view of President Boris Yeltsin's inner circle, the main representatives of domestic economics were ideologically connected with the Soviet system of thinking and their proposals were options for "replaying" already historically bankrupt schemes (As B. Yeltsin recalled).N. Yeltsin, "it was very tempting to take a person of a "different breed"" ^{[13, p. 88]}). E.T. Gaidar himself formulated his attitude to the Soviet experience briefly: "The history of the USSR was completely played out" (Why did the Soviet Empire collapse? // Interview with E.T. Gaidar "Echo of Moscow", 03.07.2006. URL: https://www.iep.ru/images/gaidar/pochemu_ruhnula_sovetskaya_ imperia.pdf (accessed date: 12.11.2022)).

The result of the work of Gaidar's team were the documents "Russia's Strategy in the Transition period" (later called the "Burbulis Memorandum") and "Russia's Immediate Economic Prospects" ^{[37, pp. 80, 101-103]}, containing "extremely specific and technological" proposals for Government actions: "[in them – I.B.] the idea was immediately accompanied by steps, a tool: law – decree, decree – law, decree" (from the memoirs of G.E. Burbulis, quoted by ^{[17, p. 54]}).

The developers of the reforms realized that the content of the program of further life and development of the country should correspond to the resolution of the revolutionary situation. Already in the first lines of his generalizing work "For a Long Time", E.T. Gaidar wrote that work on it, having begun in August 1991, was postponed because the author (who "did not see anything interesting and romantic in revolutions") was "more interesting [i.e. more important – I.B.] to make a revolution than to write about it" ^{[6, p. 13]}. It should be noted that 10 years after the start of the reforms, E.T. Gaidar insisted on his understanding that a revolution was taking place in the country (see for example: Gaidar E.T., Ivanova T.A. Egor Gaidar: what has been done? what to do? // New time, 09.04.2000. URL: https://www.iep.ru/ru/publikatcii/publication/1996.html (date of application: 12.11.2022)).

V.A. Mau, who was a member of Gaidar's team and worked as an adviser to the head of government in the early years of the reforms (also from September 1997 to May 2002 he headed the Working Center for Economic Reforms under the Government), in the second half of the 80s declared the emergence of a revolutionary situation in Soviet society ^[24]. Which also confirms that Gaidar's team worked on a reform plan in understanding the need to overcome the revolutionary situation in the country.

After the failure of the August 1991 coup, all the fullness of actual power on the territory of the RSFSR and responsibility for the future of the republic passed to the Russian leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin. It is also important to note that, as the sociological surveys of the first years of the 90s showed, "the hope [of the citizens of the country - I.B.] on the ability of the elected President to lead the country out of the crisis became of paramount importance" ^{[3, p. 11, 41]}.

 The Russian leadership unequivocally made a choice to transition the country (or rather, its return) to the market path of development, which strategically meant solving a three-pronged task: transforming the economy, forming national statehood and institutions focused on market economic relations, and creating the foundations of a mental change in society in favor of entrepreneurship, a variety of forms of ownership and social self-responsibility. (In an interview in December 1991, Boris Yeltsin said that it was unthinkable "to combine the impossible: communism with the market, the property of the people with private property, multiparty system with the CPSU. These are impossible alliances." Ist.: Boris Yeltsin about Mikhail Gorbachev // Izvestia, 19.12.1991. No. 301.)

            It is unequivocally clear that the issues that the Russian leadership had to solve in the early 90s, in his opinion, generally coincided with the problems of resolving the revolutionary situation indicated above in the introduction to this article.

The program proposed by Gaidar's team, strategically and tactically integral, formed the basis of the speech of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on October 28, 1991 at the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, which outlined the upcoming economic reform ^[12], based on four key theses: ensuring Russia's economic sovereignty, liberalization, stabilization and privatization, rejecting the way of reanimating the "rudiments of the Union state" and its corresponding methods of management and command system ^{[37, p. 95]}.

The incompatibility of command and market relations (convincingly shown a little earlier by E.G. Yasin ^{[39, pp. 106-182]}), the moral (and, in fact, actual) bankruptcy of the Soviet economic system required either an alternative choice between them, or finding a "middle" path, for the implementation of which in the conditions of financial and economic collapse, the lack of money the state had no funds, the threat of food shortages in large urban agglomerations and the protest intensity of the population had neither time nor resources. 

As E.T. Gaidar wrote later, an important role in the public willingness to accept the refusal to continue the path of a planned economy was also played by the fact that by the end of the Soviet historical period, the population's faith in "the ability of state bodies to effectively solve [socialist methods – I.B.] the problems facing the country and the beneficence of state regulation was undermined" ^{[4, p. 133-134]}.

The first task and the basis of the reforms was declared radical economic liberalization, including the "most painful measure" ^{[12, p. 8]} – price liberalization, i.e. the transfer of the pricing function from the state to economic entities, which, based on the existing supply and demand, will set competitive prices. This, creating the basis for the formation of market mechanisms in society, made it possible to urgently resolve, at least partially, the commodity and food deficit and equalize the negative relationship of the money supply to the commodity supply (in the first half of 1991, the head of the Soviet Government, V.S. Pavlov, estimated that 1 ruble of the money supply was provided with goods for only 18 kopecks ^{[11, p. 90]}.).

As the director of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, R.S. Grinberg, later admitted, other options at that time were "utopian through and through, since it is basically impossible to create competitive relations at fixed prices" ^{[10, p. 114]}.

The combination of tight monetary and credit policies, tax reform, the strengthening of the Russian ruble and free prices, which "should become an instrument of production growth" ^{[12, p. 8]}, were identified as the basis for economic stabilization.

It should be noted that financial stabilization is the basis for overcoming the most important component of a "weak state" in a revolutionary situation. This is due to the provision of opportunities for the Government to solve not only urgent socio-economic problems, but also its actions for social stabilization through the availability of funds and forces for the construction of political institutions (and their functioning) and the establishment of "rules of the game" for the execution of decisions in the space of state power ^{[19, pp. 158-159]}.

Simultaneously with liberalization, the most important link of cardinal reforms was designated privatization, the purpose of which was defined as "the creation of a healthy mixed economy with a powerful private sector" of small and medium-sized businesses, which would undermine the monopolism of state-owned corporations and create competition in industry and trade. In agriculture, the task was set to "give greater dynamics to land reform" by allowing the purchase and sale of land and implementing in the shortest possible time the "privatization of the peasant's environment" ^{[12, p. 8, 14]}.

Privatization, according to the reformers, also solved the problem of stopping the illegal and uncontrolled appropriation of the subjects of the national economy by the Soviet party-director nomenclature ^{[7, pp. 61-62]}, which created potential future political risks for the reforms.

Liberalization in general and privatization laid the foundation for the emergence of a stratum of owners and changes in property relations in general, which, in turn, was one of the main factors that set the vector of changes in the socio-political structure of society. Namely, such transformations are the main results of the revolutionary process ^{[19, p. 154]}.

The focus on small and medium-sized businesses also gave rise (taking into account the experience of the development of the cooperative movement during perestroika) to the process of changing the mentality of the population and activating its human capital.

As the Russian philosopher E.N. Moshelkov wrote, the state of the "power–property dichotomy" developing in post-Soviet society, i.e. the choice in favor of property and owners, made it possible for society to move towards the formation of new social relations instead of continuing attempts to evolve the previous system ^{[27, pp. 131-132]}.

Banking reform – the creation of a reserve banking system with hard money – has become the next component of the reform of the Russian economy. A strict deadline (two weeks) was set for an agreement with the former Soviet republics to create a single issuing center based on Russian requirements and principles or switch to a new national currency ^{[12, p. 10-11]}.

Either option implied finding the main "lever" for establishing banking rules (i.e., the banking regulator) in Russia, which meant the sovereignty of the banking system. This potentially created the prospect of financing innovative programs, activating small and medium-sized businesses, i.e. the financial foundations of new socio-economic social relations. Special attention in the speech was paid to the liberalization and marketization of foreign economic activity, formulated as "the destruction of the Iron Curtain" and implementing the first steps from the category of possible gradual free entry of the Russian economic system into the international market ^{[12, pp. 16-17]}.

The fundamental restructuring of the foundations of the economic life of society required the definition of measures for the social protection of the vulnerable part of the population. For the first time, along with the tasks of creating social funds, developing pension insurance, and measures to support the military, the focus of social policy was placed on "stimulating the development of entrepreneurship, creating new jobs and a fairly high salary … The most important condition for the protection of the population in the conditions of reforms ... [was determined by – I.B.] an early revival of economic activity", the stimulation of which was expected through the lifting of restrictions on the growth of individual earnings and the disclosure of personal initiative of workers, suggesting that the population could "self–compensate for the growth of [unfrozen - I.B.] prices" ^{[12, p. 21]}. What R.S. Grinberg called "the elimination of historically acquired dependent complexes [by the able–bodied population - I.B.]" ^{[10, p. 110]}.

The orientation of the social vector to provide opportunities to realize the potential of the active part of the able-bodied population (as Boris Yeltsin wrote in his peculiar manner: "for men who do not wait for someone else's help" ^{[12, p. 130]}) was also aimed at creating a core of civic consolidation in the implementation of reforms, which could help overcome the social fragmentation that arose in the previous "perestroika" period on new foundations.

The complexity of the proposed program steps for socio-economic transformation emphasized the rejection of a "special path" in Russian reforms, discussed during theoretical discussions by various schools of domestic economists (see the history of concepts, for example, in ^[35], and in ^[16] the opinions of economists - "supporters of gradual reform"), and reliance on the world the experience of crisis management with an attempt to "borrow" from it only necessary, from the point of view of the developers of the program, institutions of developed countries that have shown their effectiveness. As E.T. Gaidar later said, trying to go through the path of formation of inclusive institutions in a short period of several years, "which have been built in the Western world for centuries" (Pozner V.V. Visiting Egor Gaidar // Channel One, 02.03.2009. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_Kcxqmz3ik ! (accessed: 06.10.2022)).

The possibility of faster development of backward economies by borrowing institutions of more developed systems, which allows them to skip over some stages of development, was justified by the American economist and historian A. Gershenkron ^[8] and developed by the domestic economist V.M. Polterovich, who proposed not to borrow directly institutions of advanced systems, but to create in order to better adapt to specific social conditions intermediate "chains of institutions replacing each other" ^[29].

The proposed action program undoubtedly also took into account the non-positive experience of the attempt by the Soviet Government of N.I. Ryzhkov to create a socially oriented market economy in the country, among whose main mistakes L.I. Abalkin called the lack of complexity and slowness of reform steps, the lack of firmness in carrying out the developed line ^{[1, pp. 110-113]}.

The second direction of the reforms proposed by the President was the formation of the national statehood of Russia through the creation of appropriate institutions: customs and border service, army, national bank and currency system, sovereign economic legislation, state property management system, instruments of state regulation of the economy.

This, of course, completely coincided with the task of creating new state institutions during the revolutionary process.

The Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, having adopted the Resolution "On the organization of Executive power in the period of radical economic reform" (Resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR of 1.11.1991 No. 1830-I "On the organization of Executive power in the period of radical economic reform" // Vedomosti of the SND and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. 1991. No. 44. St. 1455), assigned all responsibility for the reform to the President and his Government, declaring them the opportunity to act in accordance with what was proposed in the presidential speech.

For almost two years, the Yeltsin-Gaidar government in its work relied not on an officially adopted program document, but on the provisions of the President's speech. (It should be noted that in the summer of 1992, the team of E.T. Gaidar developed a strategy, which, however, did not become an official program. "These documents – and there are several dozen of them – are rather technological maps that determine what needs to be done" ^{[37, p. 101]}). It should be noted that in the conditions of the ongoing acute public discussions on the ways of the country's development in the early 90s, the approval of strategic plans in the field of economic policy "had the character, in fact, of a political act" ^{[38, p. 414]}. As a consequence, it should be assumed that the absence of a formally approved document, on the one hand, did not interfere at all with the Government's implementation of the reforms outlined in the materials "Russia's Strategy in the Transition Period", "Russia's Immediate Economic Prospects" and the presidential speech, provided the possibility of variability in reactions to the challenges of the current moment and did not require the diversion of forces to fight around the "political act", for which there was neither the desire nor, most importantly, the time.  On the other hand, this created a wider space for President Boris Yeltsin to find and implement any political compromises in the process of discussions taking place around the reforms.

As the reforms progressed, the political struggle between the representative, mainly having a pro-communist ideology, and the executive branches of government escalated. On the one hand, the reforms did not meet the current interests of the main groups of former Soviet enterprises, and on the other, the public mentality, which the people's deputies could not ignore, was not yet ready for harsh market conditions (Russian philosopher S.B. Chernyshev wrote about this: "Our society is actually a society of marginals, they have us they make up the majority" ^{[28, p. 373]}).

Also, a very authoritative scientific economic school, represented by the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a few months after the start of the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms, against the background of the ongoing very difficult situation in the country, publicly presented its detailed critical analysis of the Government's actions ^[30], which, to a certain extent, could not but contribute to the polarization of the political and economic elites.

It was the government of Gaidar's team that was the "key irritating factor" ^{[38, p. 404]}.  And on December 14, 1992, a new cabinet was formed under the chairmanship of V.S. Chernomyrdin, whose personality gave hopes, then unjustified, for the curtailment of reforms by both the left parliamentary majority and the industrial and agricultural post-Soviet lobby.

At the time of appointment, V.S. Chernomyrdin did not have his own comprehensive program, but at the end of February 1993 The Government approved the "Action Plan of the Council of Ministers for the implementation of economic reform in 1993" (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 160 of 23.02.1993), which was based on the continuation of the work expected to be performed by the former Cabinet. V.S. Chernomyrdin from the first weeks of his premiership stated that "the cabinet intends to maintain the existing course of reforms, focusing on primarily for short- and medium-term program projects" (ist.:  Serov V. Chernomyrdin reveals his plans // Kommersant, 09.01.1993. No. 1). 

The commission formed in July, chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister O.I. Lobov, which was tasked with developing a draft program of urgent measures to overcome the crisis for the period up to 1995, prepared a draft of the required document already in August (The Program of the Council of Ministers – Government of the Russian Federation for 1993-1995 "Development of reforms and stabilization of the Russian economy" // Russian vesti, 09/21/1993, No. 182), but the escalated internal political struggle, which led to a violent confrontation between the branches of government in October 1993, postponed the start of the implementation of the Government Program "Development of reforms and stabilization of the Russian Economy" until November (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1152 of 6.11.1993), after which the plans of Russian socio-economic reforms transition to the market economy has acquired official outlines.

This was also facilitated by the cessation after October 1993 of the acute phase of political confrontation between the executive and representative branches of government, which brought government programs out of the sphere of political discussions into the field of pragmatic work, where medium-term plans began to have a technological and instrumental character.

The program proceeded from the same understanding as Gaidar's team of ways of anti-crisis solutions: financial stabilization and inflation control, consistent liberalization of prices and economic relations, including foreign economic activity, privatization and reform of state-owned enterprises, changes in structural policy from mass production support to project financing, integration into the world economy. (At the end of September 1993, E.T. Gaidar returned to the Government as First Deputy Chairman and Minister of Economy).

In the field of institutional reforms in the development of the legal framework of market relations, in accordance with the Government's plans, the development of the Civil Code, draft laws on joint stock companies and securities began, in the freedom of foreign trade – regulatory documents on the rejection of export quotas, centralized exports, the practice of multiple exchange rates and the mandatory sale of part of foreign exchange earnings to the Bank of Russia.

For the first time, the achievement of the welfare of the population at the "level of world civilizations" was determined among the strategic program social tasks. This goal was set in the conditions of the realities of the first half of the 90s - high hidden unemployment associated with the inefficiency of many still Soviet economic entities due to their lack of competitiveness, with a reduction in the production capacity of even successfully operating enterprises in the new market situation by 40-60% and the resulting forced "vacations" of their employees ^{[15, p. 30]}, the emergence during the reforms of a layer of "persistently poor families, most of whom used to belong to the middle class of Soviet society," including from among those previously engaged in highly professional and intellectual work ^{[2, p. 3869]}. The fulfillment of the strategic social task meant the creation of conditions for the use of human capital that had fallen out of the production sphere through the support of nascent entrepreneurship, the possession of property by citizens and ensuring their rights and freedoms, the development of market infrastructure, the formation of a market and a competitive environment that provides opportunities for social self-sufficiency of people.

The priority of tactical tasks was to reduce social tension, "shock-free" restructuring of the monetary and financial sphere, transferring the social burden of reforms "to the ground" with the transfer of a number of rights and opportunities to the subjects of the federation.

In its program, the Government planned to implement the reform in three stages (up to and including 1996), gradually achieving stabilization.

The preparation and adoption of the next Government Program (1995) was preceded, on the one hand, by the fulfillment mainly of the tasks of the previous program to localize crisis phenomena and create prerequisites for the transition to a new stage of reforms, and on the other hand, another increase in political tension in society caused by military actions in Chechnya, a new round of inflation (which led to the previous year was 840% at the end of 1993. Ist.: Inflation rate // The State Bureau. URL: https:óðîâåíü-èíôëÿöèè .Russian Federation/tables-inflation (date of circulation: 06.10.2022)), the formation of large private financial and industrial groups (oligarchy) in the country, payment problems caused by unsecured monetary emission occurring through "the shaft of loans issued by the Central Bank under the influence of the agrarian lobby, military-industrial and fuel and energy complexes" ^{[7, p. 74]}. That for the population manifested itself in October 1994 in the form of "black Tuesday" – a sharp depreciation of the ruble.

In November 1994, A.B. Chubais joined the Government as First Deputy Chairman with the task of forming a new economic team in the current conditions, who from November 21 headed the commission, among the key tasks of which was the coordination of work on the preparation of proposals and projects on economic reform and acceleration of economic transformations in the country (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1276 dated 21.11.1994).

On March 10, 1995, a joint statement of the Government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation "On Economic Policy for 1995" was adopted (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 334 of 15.04.1995), and on April 28, a new Government program "Reforms and development of the Russian Economy in 1995-1997" was approved (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 439 of 28.04.1995).

The program summed up the results of the past years.  On the one hand, there were problems in the economy: a decline in production (over the five years 1991-1994, GDP fell by 39%, and industrial output by 44%), the country was in deep inflationary and investment crises. On the other hand, the experience gained was summarized, the reasons for the successes and failures of the first Russian program were analyzed, new difficulties and failures that arose during the transformational crisis were justified, the necessary further steps were justified.

In the current political conditions of acute discussions between the Government and influential lobbying parliamentary groups ^{[21, p. 152]}, the program declared the search for a compromise between the continuation of radical market reforms and the use of "methods of state regulation acceptable to the market economy" (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 439 of 28.04.1995).

According to the authors of the program, it was necessary to intensify investment policy by improving the relevant legislation and creating a federal investment program for long-term investments in new technologies, strategically important industries, and regional development. But first of all, it required solving previously accumulated issues: achieving macrostabilization, reducing inflation and intensifying institutional transformations. (As was figuratively stated in the Message of the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly in 1995 ^{[14, p. 17]}, and then repeated in the Government Program: "to build a bridge between the inflationary past and the investment future". Ist.: Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 439 of 28.04.1995).

Macrostabilization put forward a wide range of new emerging problems: the lack of competitiveness in the world markets of Russian products as a result of high production costs and the need to spend on upgrading production facilities, the possible deterioration of the social situation due to bankruptcies and restructuring of inefficient enterprises.

That is why the creation of economic and institutional conditions for attracting investments and their effective use, "giving a quick return, allowing to maximize the incomes of enterprises, the population and the budget" (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 439 of 28.04.1995), was put at the head of the Government program.

The most important role in attracting resources was assigned to institutional reforms in the tax sphere with the transfer of the tax burden from enterprises to the income and property of individuals, as well as raising funds in the domestic market, including through the issuance of government securities.

Declaring the inadmissibility of supporting group interests, lobbying and protectionism, the program included the tasks of reforming judicial institutions and law enforcement agencies.

In the social sphere, the program assumed, with limited targeted support for the poor, the expansion of the population's opportunities for self-realization and stimulation of entrepreneurial activity and investment in it, the lifting of restrictions on the use of consumer funds from enterprises of any form of ownership.

Thus, this program was fully correlated with the strategic objectives formulated in the speech of Boris Yeltsin on October 28, 1991 (which was noted even in the press of those years, for example: A. Vodianov et al. The three-year economic program // Kommersant Power, 04.04.1995. No. 12), and was created with the aim of completing the transformations announced in it, but already in conditions when "reforms are moving down and require changes in the work and life of each" member of society (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 439 of 28.04.1995) through his labor participation in new forms of management and his self-responsibility for himself and his loved ones.

The last of the studied programs, approved by Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin in the spring of 1997, "Structural adjustment and economic growth in 1997-2000" (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 360 of 31.03.1997), continued to fulfill the tasks of previous programs. The need for its adoption, as indicated in the text, was determined by the end of the powers of the former Government of the Russian Federation (due to the past elections) and the need to make some current adjustments to economic and social policy, including in connection with the fulfillment of the commitments made by Boris Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential election campaign, which, according to the authors were "really feasible" in the four-year period of the newly elected President's activity.

As in previous government programs, the main line of logic of the document consisted in the development of macroeconomic stabilization, the creation of favorable macroeconomic, legal and other conditions for stimulating economic growth, through which it was supposed to ensure the social stability of society. (It should be noted that during the presidential election campaign of 1996, it was the main goal of "stimulating economic growth" that distinguished the program of Boris Yeltsin (and the Government) from the main competitor G.A. Zyuganov, who spoke about "restoring the destroyed national economy" ^{[23, p. 186]}).

The program stated the actual completion of radical economic reform in the main: privatization and liberalization were carried out, the economy developed largely under the influence of market regulators, it was possible to form the basis for financial stabilization, ensuring a reduction in inflation rates: for example, the document noted that in 1996 the growth rate of consumer prices was 6 times lower than in 1995, however, it was confirmed that there was a lag in the implementation of the tasks of the previous Government program. To achieve a breakthrough in achieving the goals with "energetic and consistent actions" was determined by the "essence of the new Government program" (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 360 of 31.03.1997).

The works of economists and statistical materials reflect the results of the reforms of the 90s. "in numbers". For example, the dynamics of GDP, real monetary income, wages and pensions by year in relation to 1990 is given in the report of the team led by E.G. Yasin ^{[34, p. 11]}, and the results of the economic development of the country in a generalized form – in the work of G.I. Khanin ^{[36, p. 307-350]}.

As E.G. Yasin estimated, "liberalization was basically completed by 1992, and privatization, if we take its mass part, was completed in mid-1994 ... financial stabilization was completed somewhere by 1997" (cit. by: Burmistrov P., Dyatlikovich V. Chernomyrdin's method // Expert, 11.11.2010. No. 41).

From the point of view of assessing the historical results of the Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms, for the purpose of impartiality, it makes sense to be the first to cite the opinion of the representatives of the Russian "supporters of gradual reform" criticizing the "young reformers": there was "overcoming the total nationalization of the economy, the scrapping of the administrative command management system, the beginning of the creation of the structure and infrastructure of the modern market, the emergence of a mass ... layer of Russian entrepreneurs" ^{[16, p. 42]}.

The well-known opinion of Boris Yeltsin, expressed in his "Notes", concerned only the economic part of the reforms: "The reform provided a macroeconomic shift. Namely: the destruction of the old economy… There was simply no other way" ^{[13, p. 166]}.

E.T. Gaidar briefly assessed the results of the reforms as follows: "There was a large-scale, completely unprecedented in terms of speed, process of formation of new market skills, institutions, institutions… And they are accepted by society. Secondly, a culture of democracy and civil society has been formed in the country… This very creation of a market economy and a civil society, even a very young one, is striking in its historical significance" (Gaidar E.T., Ivanova T.A. Decree. op.).

Thus, the radical reforms of Yeltsin-Gaidar, based on a radical transformation of society, fell into the logic of their authors to solve revolutionary problems: the creation of new economic and political institutions, relative financial and economic stabilization and restructuring of socio-social relations on a market basis.

The medium-term government programs of 1993, 1995 and 1997 in strategic planning focused on the goals of transition to the market and the rejection of the administrative command system, announced by the President at the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. However, as the most acute current problems were resolved and society and the economy began to adapt to new conditions, the focus of their tactical priorities gradually evolved from the creation of the market to its further development. This meant that in its medium-term programs, the Government considered the transformation period to be basically over.