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Reference:
Yanxia Y.
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Great Power Course
// International relations.
2022. ¹ 4.
P. 24-35.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2022.4.39023 EDN: GTBGOW URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=39023
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Great Power Course
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2022.4.39023EDN: GTBGOWReceived: 24-10-2022Published: 30-12-2022Abstract: The study of this article focuses on the policy of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) to establish the State as a great power. The subject of the study is selected aspects of this policy: rightconservatism, educational reforms, amendments to the constitution of Japan, military reforms, diplomatic activity in relation to the US, the UN and the Asia Pacific. The author pays special attention to the emergence of the political conjuncture that prompted Prime Minister Koizumi to carry out a series of reforms, and focuses on the transition from Japan’s economic weight to the political one during the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi. The study is based on the theory of political realism, namely, the expression of the national interests of the State in the international arena, such as national security, the interests of the national economy or the maintenance of world order. Similar political processes can be observed in Japan during the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi. In the process of research analytical method, problem-chronological and institutional are widely used. This choice is primarily due to the object and subject of the study. The author describes the course of Junichiro Koizumi: the whole set of measures and reforms is fairly comprehensive and at the same time radical. The author points out that Koizumi’s reforms have not been completed and have served as guidelines for subsequent prime ministers. The relevance of this study is conditioned by the increased political weight of Japan in both APAC and world politics; moreover, the attitude to Junichiro Koizumi’s course is polar: as P.V. Kulneva points out "On the one hand, the great-power policy of Junichiro Koizumi has become a reason for fear of a possible revival of Japanese militarism and nationalism; on the other hand, Japan’s policy of gaining political weight consistent with its economic power, is fully justified and is highly positive". Keywords: Junichiro Koizumi, Japan, Great Power course, Yasukuni, rightconservatism, Yoshida Doctrine, APAC, UN, USA, ODAThis article is automatically translated. The historical background of the formation of the idea of Japan's transition from the rank of economic powers to the rank of politicalAfter World War II, Japan adopted the Yoshida doctrine of "contempt for military affairs and emphasis on the economy" [2] and by the end of the 1960s surpassed the countries of Western Europe in economic power, became the second largest economy in the capitalist world and maintained rapid economic growth until the 1990s [3]. With the strengthening of its economic weight, the idea of moving away from the Yoshida doctrine was only gaining popularity. In 1983, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone put forward the slogan "summing up the results of post-war politics", the so-called strategy of a political power. The main provisions of this strategy are twofold: firstly, Japan had to get rid of the shackles of the post-war system and turn from a purely economic power into a political one with military power; secondly, Japan had to use all the power of economic, military and political factors to play an important role in international affairs and become the leading pole of international of the order of [4]. By the 1990s, the structure of the world had changed dramatically: the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unstable situation in some regions, the rapid rise of the European Union and Japan, the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, represented by China and ASEAN, continues to develop. The most important change since the early 1990s was the formation of a unipolar world order led by the United States. The economic turmoil of the 1990s led to economic stagnation, political and social upheaval within Japan. But it was during this period that the alliance between Japan and the United States was revised and strengthened. In the face of all the difficulties in order to overcome them, especially under the government of Junichiro Koizumi at the beginning of the XXI century, Japan clearly defined the direction of its national strategic development: gaining political weight corresponding to economic. Thus, in the face of a changing world order, the establishment of a unipolar world and its own internal upheavals, Japan is beginning to implement a course of reforms.
Domestic political reforms of Prime Minister Junichiro KoizumiJunichiro Koizumi's course of domestic political reforms can be briefly described as right-wing conservative. In 2001 Koizumi becomes the Prime Minister of Japan and begins to reform the central government, the powers of the cabinet secretariat were gradually expanded to have the right to carry out policy planning and formulate bills, thus the Prime Minister literally had his hands free [5]. On September 11, 2005, the "postal elections" rigged by the Koizumi cabinet dealt a serious blow on the "forces of resistance" to reforms. Some experts believe that there was some metamorphosis: before the elections - "Koizumi from the Liberal Democratic Party", and after the elections - "Koizumi's Liberal Democratic Party" [6]. Koizumi streamlined the decision-making mechanism of the Prime Minister through political reforms, literally untied his hands in making political decisions and provided institutional support for the implementation of the strategic transformation of political and military forces. Koiduzmi was twice elected Prime Minister. The reason for such resounding victories was the changes in the attitude of public education: Koizumi continued to strengthen the national spirit, paying homage to the Yasukuni Shrine and revising Japan's past, set out in textbooks, to ensure the smooth progress of his reforms. During Koizumi's reign, he ignored the opposition of Asian countries and the rulings of the Fukuoka and Osaka High Courts of Japan that his actions were contrary to the country's Constitution, since by that time he had already gained broad public support in Japan [7]. In April 2001, a high school textbook was included in the list of textbooks of 2002 approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan, distorting the history of Japan's policy conducted before and during World War II. The then Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Chen Jian, pointed out four main problems of the new textbook: first, the textbook deliberately obscures the nature of the aggressive war unleashed by Japan against the peoples of Asia, embellishes the act of aggression and there is not a hint of reflection on the serious disaster that this war brought to the peoples of all Asian countries. Secondly, the textbook distorts the historical context of the Second World War: in relation to the brutal rule and plundering of resources carried out by Japan during the occupation of Northeast China. The textbook says that this area developed thanks to Japan's investment policy and that it clearly adorns Japan's colonial rule. Thirdly, slander against the struggle of the Chinese people against the aggression and colonial rule of Japan: such actions of the local population fighting for their existence are called "excessive actions" in the textbook. Fourth, regarding the Nanking massacre of 1937, the textbook states that "there are many doubts, and there are still disputes," which is essentially an attempt to deny the barbaric atrocities of the Japanese invaders. After World War II, there was an opinion in the circle of Japanese right-wing groups that the new historical education, condemnation of Japan's actions during World War II led to the thinking of "apology" among the Japanese people, and Japan should free its people from this historical slavery through a new popular education [8]. Junichiro Koizumi's election as Prime Minister of Japan in 2001 marked the beginning of a significant stage in the development of the Japanese constitutional amendment movement. From the very beginning of his tenure, Koizumi clearly stated that "article 9 of the Constitution should be revised in the future." September 13, 2003 Koizumi stated that the Liberal Democratic Party planned to propose amendments to the Constitution on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the party in 2005. After that, Koizumi's concept was written into the program of the Liberal Democratic Party, which also proposed to make an "amendment to the Law of Parliament" and "The Law on National Voting on the amendment to the Constitution." January 14, 2004 Koizumi also proposed to Parliament to amend the Constitution in 2009, speaking openly about it for the first time. Koizumi has repeatedly proposed amendments to Article 9 of the Constitution to allow Japan to legally have the rights to military and collective self-defense, as well as legally get rid of the "post-war system" and confirm its status as a "normal country" [9]. At the same time, Koizumi made every effort to promote the idea of reforming the army. During Koizumi's premiership, Japan implemented an "elite army" strategy. Although military spending was reduced, Japan's defense forces were actually strengthened through measures such as the reorganization of the self-defense forces, the introduction and development of the latest weapons, as well as the creation and improvement of missile systems, etc. Data obtained by Chinese scientists in 2003 indicate that Japan was second only to the United States and Russia in military potential at that time, however, in terms of the development of military technologies, it even surpassed the United States and the Russian Federation, had the ability to produce atomic bombs [10]. Despite the fact that military spending declined during Koizumi's tenure as prime Minister (2001 - 2006), it still amounted to an impressive 25.16 trillion yen. Military spending ranked first in Asia and was among the highest in the world [11]. Japanese great-power policy requires getting rid of the post-war system and moving from a purely economic power to a political one with military power. Since 2001, by repeated, often demonstrative, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where the warriors who "fell for Japan and the emperor" are revered, some of whom were essentially war criminals during World War II, the government of Junichiro Koizumi not only further strengthened the national spirit, turned to internal nationalist sentiments, enlisted the support of the right and strengthened its political positions, thereby providing a political and social basis and a guarantee for the implementation of reforms, but also demonstrated its firm attitude to the issue of history, trying to rethink it, thereby helping Japan get rid of the post-war policy of "apology". Moreover, the efforts of the Junichiro Koizumi government to amend the Japanese constitution and reform the army speak in favor of developing Japan's own military power. Junichiro Koizumi's Foreign Policy ReformsThe main goal of Koiduzmi's foreign policy reforms was the acquisition by Japan of a key role in international relations, its establishment as a leading pole of the international order through the synergy of economic, political and military power. The basis of Koiduzmi's foreign policy reforms is the implementation of the strategy of the "Japan-USA main axis", the dispatch of troops abroad within the framework of the US-Japan alliance and the breakthrough of the restrictions of the "pacifist" Constitution; the use of the UN as a diplomatic arena to become a permanent member of the Security Council; responding to the rise of China and the desire for dominance in Asia. In 2002, the Working group on Foreign Relations presented a political report "The Basic strategy of Japanese Diplomacy in the XXI century". The report indicated that in the foreseeable future, the means of maintaining Japan's security will be nothing more than the Japanese-American security system and that the United States is "the highest carrier of security in Asia and in the world" [12]. Based on this, Koizumi formulated the diplomatic strategy of the "main Japan-USA axis" and used it to implement his country's foreign policy. At the end of June 2001 Koizumi visited the United States and held a meeting with President George W. Bush. The two countries expressed the need to strengthen consultations and cooperation on strategic issues and exchange views on Northeast Asian issues, including the situation on the Korean peninsula. The Japan-US summit contributed to the further development of relations between the two states. After that, the National Security Council, which is directly subordinate to the US President, regularly began to raise the issue of political and military cooperation with Japan. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, Japan fully supported the global anti-terrorist operations of the United States, the Japanese government donated $ 10 million to New York, declaring its full support for the anti-terrorist activities of the United States [13]. And after 2004, Japan began to invest heavily in the reconstruction of Iraq, thus supporting the US-initiated program for the reconstruction of the state. In addition, the Koizumi government also took advantage of the general security concerns to pass a number of bills on sending troops abroad, and strengthen the cooperation of the Japan-US alliance on a global scale. In 2001 Japan has adopted the so-called "Seven Policies to help the United States" [14] and three bills on combating terrorism, namely the "Law on Special Measures to Combat Terrorism", "Amendment to the Law on Self-Defense Forces" and "Amendment to the Law on the Coast Guard" [15]. These measures have expanded the possibilities for the self-Defense Forces to send troops abroad. The Koizumi government sent Self-Defense Forces to Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries to support U.S. military operations, which became nonsense after World War II. In June 2003, Japan adopted the "Law on Measures in the Situation of Armed Attack", "Law on the Revision of the Law on Self-Defense Forces" and "Amendments to the Law on the Establishment of the National Security Council" [16], which basically solved the legal problems of emergency mobilization of Japan in the face of war. In 2004, the Japanese Parliament passed seven bills related to emergency situations, including the "National Protection Law" [17], as a result of which Japan basically improved the legal system of wartime and lifted legal restrictions for sending Japanese troops abroad. This series of operations allowed Japan to send troops abroad during the war, and the Self-Defense Forces could legally participate in regional and global security affairs. Thus, Japan has strengthened military cooperation with the United States, but violated constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the "right to collective self-defense." Moreover, Koizumi's foreign policy reforms clearly show the strengthening of closer cooperation with the UN: the Koizumi government actively cooperated with UN operations and expanded Japan's "Official Development Assistance (ODA)" to the world, etc. in order for Japan to achieve a permanent member of the UN Security Council and enhance Japan's international status. Japan has actively participated in UN peacekeeping missions. During Koizumi's premiership, transport planes of the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces headed to Pakistan to transport cargo to assist Afghan refugees and Navy ships went to the Indian Ocean to support US military operations to combat terrorism [18]. The new "Defense Plan" of Japan in 2004 clearly promoted participation in "international peace cooperation" from the initial "auxiliary task" to the "main task" of the Self-Defense Forces [19]. Japan considers ODA to be an important component of the international contribution. From 1990 to 2004, Japan's total total ODA accounted for 20% of all ODA in the world, making it the largest supplier of ODA in the world [20]. Such a policy of Japan was considered by the country's leadership as a "pass" to world recognition. In addition, Japan, having one of the strongest economies in the world, assumed a significant part of the membership fees to the UN. When Koizumi put forward his request to "become a permanent member of the UN Security Council" in 2005, Japan's membership fees to the UN amounted to 19.5% of total contributions, second only to the United States. This is also one of the reasons why Japan has requested the relevant status in the UN. At a press conference held at the UN headquarters in July 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Matimura said: "If the Japanese action to "become a permanent member of the UN Security Council" is rejected, the Japanese government will face internal pressure to reduce membership fees to the UN" [21]. In 2005, Japan formed an "Alliance of Four Countries" with Germany, India and Brazil and launched an "onslaught" to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but was defeated. After that, Japan was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for a long time. From the point of view of diplomacy in Asia, the Koizumi government continued to strive for dominance in Asia, but chose a very elegant move for this: preventing the rise of China. During Koizumi's premiership, Japan tried to strengthen its dominance in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region, strengthening relations between Japan and ASEAN. The main manifestation of this is Koizumi's proposal to build an East Asian Community with ASEAN [22]. In the process of promoting the East Asian Community, Japan first planned to create an East Asian Free Trade Zone, and then actively promoted political and security cooperation between the countries of the region to increase the international competitiveness and political status of East Asia [23]. In addition, Japan perceived Asia as a rear for economic development. It promoted the internationalization of the yen and its dominance in Asia, used the Asian Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank as tools to promote its interests, created a free trade zone with ASEAN and used its financial power and advanced technology as a means to dominate the economic development of East Asia, which was Japan's long-term economic development strategy. Then Japan planned to strengthen its influence and control over East Asia and even the whole of Asia, implementing the policy of a "great power" [24]. Sino-Japanese relations are complicated by Japanese aggression against China in World War II and are aggravated by territorial disputes between the two countries. These unresolved issues, along with China's rapid economic development and the rise of its status in Asia, are a serious obstacle to Japan's "great power policy" aimed at freeing itself from the shackles of history, developing military power and becoming an important international pole, and may even make China a potential enemy in the implementation of Japan's "great power policy".. Under Junichiro Koizumi, Japan began to block the development of China. In the "Basic Strategy of Japanese Diplomacy in the 21st Century" [25], the "White Paper of National Defense" [26] and the new "Defense Plan Plan" [27] of 2004, it is clearly stated that China's military and economic development may pose a threat to Japan and it is proposed to prevent and balance China. Takayuki Ogasawara, professor of international Relations at Yamanashi Gakuin University in Japan, also noted that Japan's diplomacy in Asia in the first half of the 2000s was mainly embodied in its struggle with China to establish a regional order in East Asia [28]. As for concrete actions, in December 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi lobbied the EU not to lift the arms embargo on China [29]. Speaking about the East Asian Community proposed by the Koizumi administration, Japan actively promoted the ASEAN+3 model (Japan, China and South Korea), but at the same time offered to join Australia, New Zealand and India, who shared the common values of democracy and freedom. It is also a manifestation of China's containment and protection of Japan's initiative in Asia. In 2005, with the opening of the East Asian Summit (EAC), Prime Minister Koizumi's proposal was implemented. ASEAN countries, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India also participated in the East Asian Summit.
Conclusion Junichiro Koizumi's reform course, aimed at gaining Japan political weight corresponding to the economic one, can be characterized as comprehensive (reforms in domestic policy, foreign policy, the army) and radical. In domestic politics, the Koizumi government has seriously turned "to the right." Through a series of political reforms, the centralization of power was strengthened, as well as the power of the Prime Minister was strengthened. Reviewing textbooks, visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, etc. Koizumi strengthened national education, tried to get rid of the "shackles of history", laying a social foundation for the implementation of reforms. Koiduzmi developed an "elite army" policy to strengthen Japan's military might. In foreign policy during the Junichiro Koizumi period, Japan focused close attention on the American-Japanese alliance. Actively cooperated with the United States, played the role of an ally and used it to break through restrictions on the deployment of Japanese troops abroad and formulate a number of relevant bills, thereby significantly violating the provisions of the Pacifist Constitution; on the basis of the American-Japanese alliance, Japan actively sought to participate in UN-related matters to improve its status in the organization; and In order to pursue and strengthen its leading position in Asia, it actively cooperated with ASEAN and other important Asian countries, and began to restrain the rapidly developing China in the region. References
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