The enlightenment committee Hamburg-Bremen and covert Propaganda of Weimar Germany abroad, 1923-1932

Nurislamov Ruslan Rifovich Postgraduate Student of the Department of World History, Archaeology and Methodology of Historical Science, Moscow State Regional University 141014, Russia, Moscow region, Mytishchi, Vera Voloshina str., 24 ruslan.nurislamov89@mail.ru

Taking into account the development of communication technologies in the XXI century, information support of foreign policy is of particular importance, which is an auxiliary tool for achieving the tasks of the state on the world stage. The information struggle unfolding during the current international conflicts serves as a confirmation of this. Studying and understanding the methods of conducting foreign policy propaganda in a historical context can become a support for creating a more viable model of such activities in modern conditions, as well as for organizing countermeasures aimed at preventing manipulation of public consciousness from the outside. 

In this regard, it seems relevant to refer to the experience of Weimar Germany, in which the use of foreign policy propaganda tools played an important role due to restrictions on the use of armed forces established in relation to the country under the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919. It was in the 1920s that solid foundations were laid for those areas of propaganda activity that subsequently contributed to the achievement of the destructive aspirations of the Nazi leaders, the outbreak of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War.

If the propaganda activity of Hitler's Germany outside has attracted significant research interest up to the present time ^[1-9], then much less work has been devoted to the study of German foreign policy propaganda in the Weimar period. Of the published publications that affect the designated activities in the period 1919-1932, the research of V.A. Kosmach^[10] and H.Y. Muller^[11] should be mentioned first of all. The work of the first examines the foreign cultural policy, scientific, technical and cultural ties of Weimar Germany with abroad. V.A. Kosmach identifies "cultural propaganda" as one of the types of foreign cultural policy and argues that after the First World War there was a "turn from "cultural propaganda" to the liberal-democratic model of the German state and foreign cultural policy" ^{[10, p. 5]}. The author's wording indicated in the introduction is not entirely accurate, that in Weimar Germany "there was a decisive rejection of "cultural propaganda"" ^{[10, p. 5]}. In this time interval, we should rather talk about the implementation of propaganda actions by the German government in a more cautious and hidden form, but not about a complete refusal. However, later in the text of his research, V.A. Kosmach clarifies the position and also comes to this conclusion ^{[10, p. 84]}. The work of H.Y. Muller, in turn, is devoted to foreign policy propaganda in the field of the press in 1923-1925. The German historian in his research focuses on the analysis of the propaganda activity of the Stresemann government, the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions abroad, and other structures aimed at forming a benevolent foreign public opinion towards Germany and shows how foreign policy propaganda has become one of the factors contributing to Germany's return to the circle of European powers as an equivalent partner. 

The activities of the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information (sokr. BEI, German) remained outside of the detailed analysis in both of these works. Aufkl?rungs-Ausschuss Hamburg-Bremen), which, being a non-state actor, during the Weimar Republic acted jointly with official government departments in the framework of promoting both the interests of the economic circles of Hamburg and Bremen and national interests. Subsequently, already in Nazi Germany, as indicated in the "Review of the structure and activities of the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information and related independent departments as of August 1939", transferred by the leadership of the BEI together with other documents for storage in the Imperial Archive in Potsdam, at the end of the 1930s. the organization had at its disposal about 350 secret agents around the world, who contributed to the publication of more than 2,000 articles in 27 languages annually and sent 120-140 information reports to the center on the political and economic situation of various foreign states (RGVA. F. 1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. l. 4). The purpose of the article is to determine how the Hamburg structure managed to deploy such a large-scale activity, which acquired national significance, what prerequisites existed for this in Weimar Germany.

The weak development of the BEI in German historiography is due to the presence of a large number of documents related to its functioning in the Russian State Military Archive (sokr. RGVA) ^{[12, S. 15]}. This article is an attempt to fill this research gap and consider the activities of the Hamburg-based organization in Weimar Germany in 1923-1932. The sources for the work were materials stored as part of the trophy funds of the RGVA, as well as documents of the Federal Archive of Germany (German Bundesarchiv, sokr. BArch).

The results of the First World War were disappointing for Germany, its image in the world was seriously damaged. The country was defeated and took a controlled place in the post-war system of international relations. The overwhelming majority of political forces in the Weimar Republic formed after the war had a negative attitude to the "Versailles dictate". However, the means for a possible revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty were limited due to the extensive regulations established by the victorious countries in relation to the German armed forces and economy. One of the reasons for the defeat in the war was the failure of their own and the success of enemy propaganda, which, as it was believed in conservative and nationalist circles in Germany, was able to prepare a "stab in the back" of the army (German Dolchsto?legende) ^{[11, S. 9-10]}. Considering the above, the first post-war years, as shown by H.Y. Muller, became a time of intensive theoretical understanding of the issue of propaganda support for foreign policy ^{[11, S. 9-10, 23, 25-26]} and the expansion of practical activities in this area ^{[11, S. 9-10]}.

The refusal of the Germans to pay reparations caused the occupation of the Ruhr region, the center of the German mining industry, by French and Belgian troops in early 1923. The German government's counteraction capabilities were narrowed, and the officially proclaimed policy of "passive resistance" did not lead to a positive result. The Ruhr crisis became the starting point for a comprehensive propaganda campaign aimed at driving a wedge between France and other powers and convincing the world community of the need to make concessions on the reparations issue. Philipp Stein, an employee of the press department of the German Foreign Ministry, wrote in this regard in June 1923: "... we must try to strengthen the conflict of interests among our opponents in the press at home and abroad" (BArch. R 43-I/228. Bl. 267). Foreign policy propaganda has become one of the components of a successful resolution of the crisis situation for Germany: the United States has put pressure on France, linking the latter's participation in the inter-allied expert commission to resolve the reparations issue with the settlement of the problem of inter-allied debts.

One of the regions that actively joined the propaganda campaign during the Ruhr crisis was Hamburg. Trade and transportation occupied the most important place in the economic structure of the city, therefore, merchants and shipowners of Hamburg reacted especially sensitively to the aggravation of the foreign policy situation. Back in March 1918, the commercial elite of the city took initiatives to the government to update the service abroad to counter the efforts of enemy propaganda to discredit the image of Germany in the world ^{[10, p. 62]}. After the beginning of the Ruhr crisis, the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, which united the economic circles of the city, created a special structure — the Bureau of Economic Information, the main activity of which was to be export propaganda abroad (RGVA. F.1257k. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 3). Due to direct ties with the government and the presence of stable business contacts in foreign countries, the BEI had a significant potential to continue its activities even after the resolution of the Ruhr crisis. One of the founders of the organization was Chancellor V. Kuno, who was closely connected with the economic circles of Hamburg and in 1919-1922 served as director of the Hamburg shipping company "HAPAG" (German "HAPAG", sokr. from Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft), B. Blomberg, the head of GAPAG, became the chairman of the BEI, and G. Johannsen, a former school teacher and then an employee of the information department of the Hamburg trading firm Schlubach, Thiemer & Co., was appointed director. Prior to his appointment as director of the BEI, Johannsen was engaged, among other things, in seeking financial support for the "German Fichte Society" (sokr. HOF, German. Deutscher Fichte-Bund) ^{[6, S. 44]}. The GOF, founded in early 1914 in Hamburg, was a nationalist-oriented organization that carried out propaganda abroad by publishing and distributing pamphlets and leaflets. Initially specializing in the topic of culture, this structure often touched on political topics in its materials: reparations, Germany's guilt for unleashing the First World War, disarmament, the threat of Marxism. The GOF can be considered as a prototype of the BEI, adjusted for the fact that the activity of the latter was initially focused on economic issues, and not on culture, although both of these directions for influencing the public opinion of foreign countries, as will be shown later, often intersected.

The central office of the BEI was located in the building of the Hamburg Stock Exchange. There was a press service, a photo service and a correspondence department. Under Johannsen's supervision, the necessary materials were created in Hamburg and communication with foreign structures was carried out. In order to accelerate coordination with government agencies and German economic associations, a representative office was founded in Berlin, headed by V. Grosse. Also, a number of publishing houses controlled by the BEI operated in Germany.

The very fact of bringing together various Hamburg entrepreneurs, who were soon joined by the economic circles of Bremen to conduct coordinated export propaganda, can say a lot. The German foreign trade sector was extremely competitive, and it was difficult for various firms to find points of intersection for joint actions. However, world trade was becoming even more competitive. Compared with the XIX century, sales markets were constantly narrowing, protectionism was characteristic of many countries after the First World War ^{[13, S. 96]}. Stimulating the export of goods was extremely important for Germany, given its dependence on foreign raw materials, food and the need to pay reparations. Only the joint efforts of the country's exporters, which were primarily concentrated in Hamburg and Bremen, could contribute to the promotion of German goods abroad. In this regard, the German economist Erwin Wiskemann wrote in his article: "The times when individual trading houses freely expanded their influence in free competition with each other in vast foreign territories by using the advantages of their own knowledge and different methods of promotion are long gone" ^{[14, S. 171]}. Firms continued to engage in their own advertising, and export propaganda became a common idea for the merchants of Hamburg, Bremen and all of Germany. It was aimed at encouraging the export of German goods and deepening Germany's economic ties with foreign countries. According to Wiskemann, the idea of the quality of goods and guaranteed success of the transaction could be promoted both in a utilitarian and abstract form, for example, by depicting Germany as a country demonstrating outstanding achievements in various fields: science, invention, entrepreneurship, art, etc. ^{[14, S. 178]}. The relationship between economic and cultural policy was also emphasized by other scientists and politicians of Weimar Germany ^{[10, pp. 131, 195]}.

If we talk about the external propaganda of Germany in the Weimar period as a whole, it is worth noting the absence of a central government agency that would coordinate all actions in this direction. Significant activity was carried out by the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while focusing on traditional channels of influence: news agencies, foreign correspondents and publications on international topics in the German media ^{[11, S. 39-40]}. The influence of official structures on the foreign press should have been considered as a restrained tool due to the negative consequences for German foreign policy that it could cause if it was discovered. Carrying out these actions with the help of private organizations could reduce such risks. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided assistance to the BEI and allocated a special budget for the implementation of not only economic, but also political and cultural propaganda. In addition, the Hamburg-based organization presented its materials and closely interacted with other state and non-state structures, in particular, with the Imperial Union of German Industry (German Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie), the Association of German Industry and Trade (German Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag), the organizers of the Leipzig Fair and many others. As archival documents show, the BEI budget was replenished from three sources: infusions of the economic circles of Hamburg and Bremen, state appropriations, as well as funds from industrialists and bankers throughout Germany (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 18).

The methods of conducting the activities of the BEI differed from most of the propaganda structures of Germany at that time. During the years of the Weimar Republic, it was the largest organization engaged in covert propaganda for the formation of public opinion friendly to Germany abroad. As the head of the Berlin representative office of the BEI, V. Gross, pointed out in the "Memorandum on the hidden influence on the public opinion of foreign countries as currently the most important and financially acceptable method of systematic German foreign policy and counter-propaganda", forwarded to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education and Propaganda and the Reich Chancellery in 1933 and summarizing the functioning of the organization in the Weimar period, secrecy It was the main principle of BEI activity (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 13). It has never performed under its real name. The rationale for conducting covert propaganda was that, according to Gross, undisguised methods of influence are less effective abroad. The lack of direct propaganda was seen in the evidence of the origin of the material and its purpose (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 10). This could reduce the propaganda effect and facilitate the implementation of countermeasures by opponents. The existing official materials of foreign propaganda were also criticized for their uniformity, lack of attention to the specifics of a particular country and region, poor translation of texts. Low-quality materials, as Gross pointed out in the memo, could cause a backlash, irritation towards Germany from foreign countries (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 11).

The practical implementation of export propaganda was carried out by BEI in several directions. Considerable activity has been undertaken in publishing books, brochures, leaflets and other printed materials abroad. Contacts with publishers and authors interested in publishing materials about Germany were expanded. Instead of low-quality periodicals for individual countries under the leadership of the BEI, since 1931, the Revista Alemana magazine (Spanish: Revista Alemana) has been published every two months in Spanish. The circulation of the magazine was 10,000 copies, it was distributed free of charge in Latin America and Spain. This edition included publications about German culture, as well as well-illustrated advertisements of German goods. The magazine was positively received both among various German organizations and in the Spanish-language press. For example, the Association of German Industry and Trade wrote: "Thanks to the publication of this magazine, the long-felt need to create a good-quality propaganda press body aimed at improving economic relations with the countries of Central and South America has been satisfied" (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 160). The public opinion of Latin American countries interested Germany not only in terms of export opportunities, but also in view of their participation in voting on various issues in the League of Nations (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. l. 31).

Very quickly it became obvious that propaganda in the foreign press surpasses the influence of the publication of printed products, so the BEI began to pay significant attention to this area. The press materials covered a wide range of the population and by regularly mentioning similar topics, it was possible to achieve a deeper penetration of the desired moods into the minds of readers. On March 6, 1923, the German Ambassador in London, Friedrich Stamer, in his message to Berlin, noted that a thoughtful policy in the foreign press could change public sentiment and lead to "liberation from military psychosis" (Akten zur deutschen Ausw?rtigen Politik: 1918-1945. Series A: 1918-1925. Bd. VII. 1. Januar bis 31. Mai 1923. G?ttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989. S. 306). At the same time, he mentioned certain important aspects of such activities that were relevant not only from the point of view of German-British relations, but also for German foreign policy propaganda in general: the need for well-written articles that do not give the impression of propaganda; the lack of sufficient resources at the embassy to work on such materials; the need to take into account the mentality of the people, to which these texts are directed (Akten zur deutschen Ausw?rtigen Politik: 1918-1945. Series A: 1918-1925. Bd. VII. 1. Januar bis 31. Mai 1923. G?ttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989. S. 305). In fact, these points were taken into account in the activities of the BEI.

Over the centuries of successful foreign trade, the entrepreneurs of Hamburg and Bremen have formed extensive ties abroad. Using them, the BEI sought to create stable strongholds of influence in various countries and regions of the world. A network of "trusted persons" (German: Vertrauensleute) was formed, who played the role of intermediaries in promoting publications in various countries. They often became Germans who settled abroad, who had a certain weight in society and connections in the local press. One can agree with the position expressed by V.A. Kosmach in his work that "the resumption and construction on a new basis of closer contacts with Germans abroad" was a core element of German foreign policy in the 1920s - early 1930s ^{[10, pp. 69-70]}.

The mechanism of the BEI's attempted penetration into the foreign press with the help of "trusted persons" was as follows. On the territory of Germany, outwardly neutral articles were created on various topics related to the political and economic situation of the country, German culture and way of life. However, in addition to expanding knowledge about Germany and deepening the understanding of the country among foreign readers, the idea was to implicitly state the German position on various political issues. For example, in order to convince foreigners that the security police (German Schutzpolizei) of Germany is not a secret army, the peaceful activities of police officers to protect law and order on the roads were described and, incidentally, it was mentioned that sports activities in their professional training supplant training with weapons, which are becoming less necessary (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 16).

The texts created in Germany were translated into various languages, edited taking into account the specifics and current socio-political situation of a particular foreign country. In their writings, the authors of the BEI did not seek to touch on current topics, so there was no need for urgent publication. The publication of articles could be extended for a long period up to 12 months. This could also be influenced by the remoteness of the territories.  The distribution of articles was carried out through foreign chambers of commerce or representative offices of German firms. A selection of materials was presented to "trusted persons" who, not having the right to change anything in the content, published them at the first successful opportunity under their own name. Foreign readers should have formed the opinion that the article was written by their compatriot, and not created abroad. This increased the credibility of the information contained in it. Thus, the source of the article and the true intent underlying its content was hidden from the reader. Various "proxies", which could be several in one country, did not know about each other's existence. The BEI sought to strengthen the authority of its agents in various ways. It was assumed that over time, due to the depth of knowledge about Germany inherent in the articles of "proxies", their influence in the host country would grow (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 16). Subsequently, this could be used to promote them in the political sphere as pro-German-minded figures.

The penetration into the foreign press by the BEI was really large-scale. As the secret brochure "Relations of the Hamburg-Bremen Bureau of Economic Information with the World Press" shows, the network of "trusted persons" covered almost all states of the world (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 78-81). Special activity of pro-German propaganda in the foreign press was deployed in the following countries: Spain, Finland, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, USA, Canada, India, China, Indonesia, South African Union. By the end of the existence of Weimar Germany, according to the data given in Gross's memo, BEI articles were published in approximately 800 newspapers around the world (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. l. 17). Every month, about 80 articles (RGVA. F.1235k. Op. 2. d. 18. L. 17) of economic, political and cultural content were published through "proxies", the purpose of which was to provide a friendly climate abroad in relation to Germany in an unobtrusive form, to increase readiness to purchase German goods.

In order to better understand the political and economic state of foreign countries, a secret information service was created within the framework of the BEI. "Trusted persons" created reports analyzing the current situation abroad. The information received was taken into account to adjust and emphasize their own propaganda activities. The BEI also used reports received from "trusted persons" as material for publication in German, mainly regional newspapers, friendly articles about foreign countries and figures in order to show that Germany respects foreign culture and wants to strengthen mutual ties. This was done, among other things, to facilitate pro-German publications abroad. In 1930, German Admiral Paul Behnke published a study in which he came to the conclusion that the German press did not pay enough attention to countries outside Europe. In his message to Chancellor Breuning, he noted that the activities of the BEI, which systematically provided the German society with the necessary information from abroad, deserved support from the state (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 12).

Additional financial assistance became urgent for the BEI due to the impact of the world crisis of 1929-1933 on the economic circles of Hamburg and Bremen. The volume of German foreign trade in 1931 decreased by 28% compared to 1929, and the trade turnover through the port of Hamburg decreased by approximately the same amount ^{[13, S. 127]}. Trading, shipping and shipbuilding enterprises suffered huge losses, some of them went bankrupt. Thus, the profits of the merged "GAPAG" and the Bremen "North German Lloyd" (German: Norddeutscher Lloyd) fell by 63% in 1931 ^{[13, S. 131]}, and the firm "Schlubach, Timer und Co." in June of the same year was forced to declare bankruptcy ^{[13, S. 127]}. Against this background, the BEI's funding was significantly cut, the number of articles sent out decreased by a third, and due to budget shortages, the threat of curtailing some areas of activity loomed. The leadership of the Hamburg-based organization turned to the state for help, placing special emphasis in their requests on the need to support political propaganda in their work (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 86, 88, 90-91, 110, 127-129). Lists of articles published in the foreign press related to the revision of the Versailles system, reparations, disarmament, etc. were sent to the Reich Chancellery (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 88, 107, 114). As a result, the government provided the BEI with additional funds, and the ministries provided materials for publications in the foreign press (BArch. R 43-I/2529. Bl. 117, 122, 142).

Thus, already in Weimar Germany, the BEI carried out large-scale propaganda work abroad. The key area of his activity was covert penetration into the foreign press. The reasons for such activity lay in the interest of the economic circles of the region in improving the image of the country for the normalization of foreign trade relations and the availability of the necessary connections for propaganda in foreign countries. The activities of the BEI were supported by the government, which was interested in carrying out propaganda actions through private structures. Over the years, the Hamburg-based organization increasingly began to fall under the influence of the state, eventually after the collapse of Weimar Germany and Hitler's rise to power, becoming in 1933 directly controlled by the Ministry of Education and Propaganda of J. Goebbels.