Military-political Relations Between Russia and Turkey in the Context of the Kazakhstan Crisis of Winter 2021-2022

Kasyanenko Aleksandr Vladimirovich Postgraduate student, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Junior Research Fellow, Center for Oriental Studies, International Relations and Public Diplomacy; Chief Specialist, JSC "National Aviation-Service Company" 119021, Russia, Moscow, Ostozhenka str., 53/2, office 1 kassa93@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey are currently experiencing a flourishing period, which is characterized by the expansion of channels of interstate cooperation in various directions. Nevertheless, along with the notable successes of the two states' cooperation in the military and political spheres, it is impossible to ignore the fact that their foreign policy actions in certain regions may carry certain risks for relations between Russia and Turkey. The Central Asian region can be considered as a typical example of a potential clash of the foreign policy ambitions of the two states. For the Russian Federation, the republics of the former Soviet Union located in the Central Asian region are significant trade and political partners, interaction with which is carried out, including in the format of military and political integration (CSTO, EAEU). For Turkey, the Central Asian region is a significant vector for the development of the state's foreign policy, since mainly Turkic-speaking ethnic groups live in it, which allows Turkey to make significant efforts to unite them in the format of the Turkic integration process. Thus, Central Asia is a space of potential conflict of interests between Russia and Turkey, which actualizes the need to consider significant political events that can influence the foreign policy of the states in question. Among such events, through the prism of which it is possible to consider the military-political relations between Russia and Turkey, it is necessary to include the political crisis in Kazakhstan in January 2022.

Despite the fact that this crisis was resolved relatively quickly, and was soon pushed into the background by the events related to the beginning of the Russian Federation's special military operation (hereinafter referred to as SVO) on the territory of Ukraine, its importance for the positioning of Russia and Turkey in the Central Asian region cannot be underestimated. The catalyst for the crisis was economic reasons.

The military-political relations of Russia, Turkey, with the countries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in particular, are considered in this study based on a broad methodological base, which includes general scientific methods (induction and deduction), the method of comparative analysis. In addition, the methods of analysis of political processes used in the course of this study are of particular importance, it was they that made it possible to identify the priorities of multi-vector relations between Russia, Turkey in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Separately, it is necessary to note the importance of such historiographical methods as the method of description, which was used to analyze the relations between Russia and Turkey with the Republic of Kazakhstan and situational studies, which were used to analyze the key events of cooperation between Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan.

Causes of the political crisis in Kazakhstan and steps to resolve itFor most of the last decade, the rhetoric of the leadership of Kazakhstan, including its desire to become one of the 30 largest developed countries in the world, did not correspond to the perception of reality by most of the country's population.

On the contrary, although in the 2000s there was a continuous increase in the standard of living in Kazakhstan, today the growth rate of the well-being of the population, as M. Ermirzoev points out, leaves much to be desired ^{[1, pp. 525-527]}.

The increase in natural gas prices led to popular demonstrations that began on January 2, 2022 in western Kazakhstan, which grew rapidly both in scale and direction. Already on January 2, spontaneous protests began in one of the western regions of the republic, the Mangystau region, which by January 4 resulted in mass and well-organized rallies not only in the capital of the region Aktau, but also in many other major cities of Kazakhstan ^{[2, p. 57]}.

The next day, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev asked for help from the Russian–led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which promptly sent forces to protect key facilities and institutions. By refusing to raise prices and promising to deal with serious economic inequality in Kazakhstan, the government recognized the legitimate nature of the discontent behind the protests that swept the country. The prompt resolution of the crisis contributed to the rapid establishment of internal political peace in Kazakhstan, however, it is impossible not to take into account the fact that the protests and riots occurred at a time of unprecedented tension in regional affairs. The political crisis in Kazakhstan followed the events related to the rather chaotic withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, and preceded the beginning of the SVO on the territory of Ukraine. In this regard, the active participation of the Russian Federation in the resolution of this conflict is not accidental, since the destabilization of the military-political situation in Central Asia clearly does not correspond to the interests of the country. Although the events related to the SVO quickly overshadowed the consequences of internal protests and armed unrest in Kazakhstan, a number of experts, in particular T. Umarov, did not miss the opportunity to link their occurrence with the further actions of the Russian Federation to conduct SVO on the territory of Ukraine ^[3].

As you know, President K.Zh. Tokayev came to power as a result of a process of managed succession. He was chosen in part because he did not have a large pyramid of patronage under his own control. At that time, it was assumed that President Nursultan Nazarbayev and closely related interests considered this important, since they assumed that Tokayev would not be able and would not want to challenge their informal positions of power. Tokayev was supposed to have some power, while Nazarbayev would retain the right of veto. The transit of power that started in March 2019 and the choice of K.-Zh. Tokayev as a successor, even if temporary, led to the rise of the latter and the promotion of his positions within the hierarchy of power ^{[4, p. 103]}.

President Tokayev took a difficult position in explaining the events that took place in Kazakhstan. Judging by his public statements, his position consists of three parts. First, President Tokayev recognizes the spontaneous and legitimate nature of peaceful protests against the increase in prices for liquefied natural gas, as well as against inequality in the country. Secondly, he accuses some high-ranking officials of a combination of dereliction of duty and deliberate attempts to overthrow him. Finally, he also accused "international terrorists" of being behind the violence ^[5]. The second and third parts of this position do not necessarily contradict each other. But the Government has yet to provide any detailed evidence of an international terrorist conspiracy, much less establish what the origin of these terrorists were or what ideology they adhered to. Undoubtedly, pro-Turkish sympathies allow the ruling elites of Kazakhstan to fend off the threat from radical Islamism, which is alien to the traditional tribal structure of the Kazakhs ^{[6, p. 50]}.

The Turkish factor in the settlement of the Kazakhstan crisisAt the same time, Russia's active actions to resolve the political crisis in Kazakhstan were combined with Turkey's rather weak involvement in the process of overcoming this conflict.

Turkey's political leadership has limited itself to verbal interventions expressing concern about the ongoing events and striving for a constructive settlement of the crisis. Considering that the basis of the CSTO military grouping involved in the operation in Kazakhstan are the units and military units of the Russian Airborne Troops, we should talk about the predominant role of Russian participation in overcoming the conflict.

There seem to be several reasons for this circumstance. Despite the strengthening of Turkey's foreign policy presence in Central Asia, the main formats of the country's interaction with the states of the region are of an economic and humanitarian nature. Turkey is actively developing cultural and diplomatic ties with Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan. There is an expansion of the presence of Turkish investors in economic projects in the region. The three countries of the Caspian region – Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan – are mainly inhabited by the Turkic-speaking population ^{[7, p. 213]}.

However, over the years of intensification of the process of Turkic integration, the Republic of Turkey has not been able to form a platform for the military-political integration of the Central Asian states that would allow it to take part in forceful counteraction to internal unrest in Kazakhstan. In part, this can be explained by Turkey's unwillingness to openly enter into conflict with Russia's interests, since the creation of military-political alliances in the Central Asian region would be guaranteed to cause a negative reaction from Moscow. An additional factor complicating any military involvement of Turkey in resolving the Kazakhstan crisis is the country's membership in NATO. There is no doubt that any presence of NATO troops in Kazakhstan would cause a sharp foreign policy protest from Moscow.

The Republic of Turkey, while remaining the most influential foreign policy player in the Central Asian region, avoids, unlike Russia, direct military and political involvement in potential internal conflicts. The example of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict in 2020 and 2022 testifies to the dominance of diplomatic forms of Turkey's participation in peacekeeping processes. This fully reflects the consideration of Russian interests on the part of Turkey, which does not want to provoke a military escalation of conflicts in the region. The modern leadership of Turkey, represented by the ruling Islamic Conservative Justice and Development Party ^{[8, p. 79]}, sees the country's position in the world as a political force promoting peace as one of the poles of the new emerging world order. Multipolarity, in which Turkey becomes one of the regional centers of power with a bid for supra-regional leadership, dictates a new model of behavior in the international arena and indicates the need to create opportunities to preserve itself in the central coordinate system, and not on the periphery ^{[9, p. 293]}.

One of the factors explaining the low level of the country's involvement in the resolution of the Kazakh political crisis is Turkey's desire to use the multi-vector nature of its foreign policy as a strategic advantage, allowing the country to build constructive relations with both Russia and the Central Asian states. In other words, there is no reason for the Turkish political leadership to actively intervene in conflicts like the Kazakh political crisis, in conditions when its overcoming is possible thanks to the military and peacekeeping efforts of Russia, with which the country seeks to build constructive relations. Currently, Turkey considers Central Asia as one of the zones where it could strengthen its influence. From an economic point of view, no state in the region, including Turkey, is so unreasonable as to ignore the growth of the "Eurasian" potential, which also provides strategic balance and economic opportunities ^{[10, p. 35]}.

In addition to defense, Turkey and Kazakhstan are strengthening economic cooperation by developing bilateral relations in such areas as information technology, culture, agriculture and education. At the same time, Ankara and Astana are even developing transport links along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which passes through China, Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and further to Europe. Although it seems obvious that Turkey no longer considers the leaders of Central Asia as junior partners, the deinstitutionalization of the decision-making process in Turkey's foreign policy as part of the further autocratization of the regime and the shortage of specialists in Central Asia in President Erdogan's inner circle complicate Turkey's stable and strategic long-term commitment to expanding its influence in the region ^{[11, p. 105]}.

Despite the fact that analysts express the possibility of Kazakhstan seeking help from Turkey in the future when situations typologically similar to the political crisis of the winter of 2021-2022 arise ^[12], it cannot be assumed that the Turkish leadership will allow itself to ignore Russia's interests in Central Asia. Turkey's direct involvement in conflicts like the protests in Kazakhstan is poorly consistent with the country's foreign policy doctrine. Turkey's foreign policy was aimed at turning the country into a regional power, which, having restored its lost power and former prestige, is able to extend its influence to the territories that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire ^{[13, p. 15]}. A policy based on the application of the alleged influence of the Ottoman past and "primacy" among the Turkic states, initially based on a comprehensive approach full of good intentions and the use of soft power resources as a priority, eventually faced the stubborn reality of geopolitics. The problem with the implementation of this policy, which has actually had some success, is that it exacerbates tensions with both Turkey's Western partners and regional rivals, encouraging the formation and consolidation of associations whose goals contradict its interests, which leads to diplomatic isolation ^{[14, p. 12]}.

Although mutual understanding with Russia initially strengthened after the foiled coup d'etat in July 2016, various goals at the strategic level eventually revealed the limits of this cooperation. An example of constructive military-political cooperation between Russia and Turkey was the acquisition of the latest modern Russian-made S-400 anti-aircraft system. This step turned out to be extremely counterproductive for the balance of relations with the United States. Turkey became the first NATO member to be sanctioned by the United States and excluded from the 5th generation F-35 fighter program, an acquisition that is necessary to upgrade its air force and maintain air superiority over its rivals in the region ^{[15, p. 422]}.

The role and place of Russia in the settlement of the Kazakhstan crisis The Russian Federation, unlike Turkey, on the contrary, is actively developing channels of military and political interaction with the states of the region, and the CSTO operation in Kazakhstan has become a constructive example of a peacekeeping mission organized to assist the Kazakh side in maintaining law and order.

For Russia, the crisis in Kazakhstan has acquired special significance also because it was possible to discern signs of the use of political technologies of the so-called "color revolutions" that shook states in the post-Soviet space until recently. One of the latest examples of attempts to organize a color revolution was the protests in Belarus in 2020-2021. Russia's negative attitude to such attempts to overthrow the legitimate government is known. In this regard, Moscow's prompt reaction to the events in Kazakhstan fits into the general logic of countering color revolutions in the post-Soviet space. It is also noteworthy in this context that Russia is also credited with an active role in overcoming the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016, which can be considered as a factor of mutual understanding between Russia and Turkey on this issue.

From Moscow's point of view, a successful coup could exacerbate the unrest in Kazakhstan, in the worst case, lead to a potentially revolutionary scenario or civil conflict. In other words, the conspirators could provoke further unrest and the fall of the regime itself. President Tokayev, on the other hand, personified the continuity of the regime. In addition, the CSTO's participation in the process of resolving the situation in Kazakhstan was a significant step for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who sought to present it as an organization capable of helping regional leaders to resist both internal and external threats to their power. In conditions when the protests inside the country quickly transformed into an internal armed conflict, the President of Kazakhstan, President Zh.-T. Tokayev, found it necessary to turn to the CSTO for help to stabilize the situation. The only probable reason for this decision is that he was not sure of the loyalty of the leadership of security structures and law enforcement agencies at the most critical moments ^[16].

The crisis in Kazakhstan underscores the importance of Russia's diplomatic and economic security presence in Central Asia. Surrounded by great and regional Powers, the Central Asian States seek to establish regional cooperation in order not to become the object of regional policies and tactics of "divide and rule", in which they are played against each other by larger powers. In this context, middle Powers such as Turkey, Iran and Israel are also updating their policies towards the region. The study of Turkey's relations with the Central Asian states is especially relevant, given the "Eurasian shift" in Turkey's foreign policy, Turkey's key role in the second Karabakh war in 2020 and the resumption of efforts to strengthen pan-Turkist initiatives in the region. To a large extent, for example, the rhetoric of the President of the country regarding the problems of religious terrorism, which was previously not so clearly put on the agenda, has become tougher ^{[17, p. 155]}.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that Russia has been following Ankara's Eurasian shift with some concern, taking into account its own interests in the region. Relations between Russia and Turkey have been tested in recent years, but the presence of many points of foreign policy contact has allowed them to be successfully overcome. The culmination of the complications in the relations between the two countries is the destruction by Turkey of the Russian Su-24 in Syria. However, after President Erdogan's public apology for the downing of the Russian Su-24 bomber, Turkey managed to restore the deteriorated relations with Russia, which was the first step towards changing the orientation of its foreign policy, which, due to the more active involvement of military power, was aimed at solving security problems.

The role of Russia in the settlement of the internal armed conflict in Kazakhstan can be understood by taking into account the general rejection by the Russian state of the concept of the violent overthrow of legitimate political power in the state as a result of the color revolution. A similar example of the actions of the Russian state was the events of the foiled coup in Turkey in July 2016, while the attitude of various governments to the attempt to overthrow President Erdogan played an important role at that time. Some countries have not expressed support for R. Erdogan's regime, so one of the principles of the new foreign policy has become "reciprocity" (political recognition of each other) ^{[18, p. 189]}. While Western partners and allies reacted slowly, Moscow's reaction was immediate and unequivocal, offering Erdogan not only unconditional political support to suppress the uprising, but also, as later reported in the press, military assistance. These events were little appreciated in the West, but the support provided by President Vladimir Putin at that difficult time was one of the most turning points in Turkey's foreign relations. It was clear that, despite the huge differences between their respective strategic views, it was important for Turkey to reach an understanding with Russia ^{[19, p. 96]}.

Conclusions on the articleDespite the fact that Turkish-Russian relations have been defined by a common strategic rapprochement, the geopolitical aspirations of the two countries remain partially incompatible, and the level of trust among political elites is low.

Currently, Moscow seems ready to calmly consider Turkey's influence in Central Asia as long as it remains limited. A special influence on the formation of ideologies in Russia's foreign policy has recently been exerted by the Turkic factor, consisting of several elements. Thus, according to V.A. Avatkov, these elements are represented by the internal component of the Turkic-speaking regions, as well as the policy of external actors, which consists in spreading their influence and creating the so-called "Turkic world" ^{[20, p. 45]}.

The willingness to develop ties with each other in various spheres can be interpreted as one of the manifestations of a preference for a diversified foreign policy, which both Turkey and the Central Asian states seek. Turkey's role in facilitating the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 also seems to be forcing Armenia to strive more and more to normalize relations with Turkey, even if it is trying to get enhanced security guarantees from Russia. In this regard, the signing of a trilateral ceasefire agreement in November 2020, where Russia, not Turkey, acted as the main guarantor of the truce, hurt Ankara's ambitions, which made great efforts for a different outcome ^{[21, p. 85]}.

At the same time, the Kazakhstan political crisis of 2021-2022 will not be an obstacle to the further development of Turkey's foreign policy presence in the Central Asian region. Cooperation between Turkey and the Central Asian states is strengthening, but there are factors that hinder this process. Firstly, although Turkey and Russia are strengthening their cooperation, Russia continues to consider Central Asia as a sphere of its interests, and still takes into account Turkey's membership in NATO. In this regard, the expansion of cooperation formats between Turkey and the Central Asian states could potentially pose a threat to Russia's interests. However, it is also possible that Moscow is not embarrassed by Turkey's membership in NATO as such, given Ankara's tendency to create problems within the Alliance. Russia's resistance to Turkey's expansion into the Central Asian arms market may actually be dictated by economic competition rather than security considerations. The governments of the Central Asian countries, for their part, may deliberately demonstrate Turkey's proposals in order to conclude more profitable deals with Russia ^{[22, p. 88]}.

The limits of Turkey's influence in the security sphere are also visible in the intensification by the Central Asian states of security cooperation with both Russia and China in response to the seizure of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan. This indicates that Kazakhstan and other states in the region prefer security partners during an acute regional conflict, despite the ongoing purchases of Turkish weapons. Although Turkey has offered itself as a subject capable and willing to mediate between the Taliban and the West, at the moment, according to O.N. Novikova, the country has not achieved greater success in its international mediation efforts ^{[23, p. 175]}. Moreover, during the Kazakhstan crisis in early January 2022, the CSTO deployed an operational "peacekeeping mission" at the request of the President of Kazakhstan Tokayev, while the participation of Turkey and the Organization of Turkic States was limited to an indefinite expression of solidarity. This indicates that Turkey's interests in Kazakhstan and Central Asia are to a greater extent part of its foreign policy ambitions to create a so-called Turkic world. Turkey expects to expand its economic and humanitarian influence on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, in particular in Kazakhstan ^{[24, p. 34]}.

Kazakhstan may take actions to increase its military budget in the light of events related to the aggravation of regional tensions, as well as its own on the territory of Ukraine. In this context, the news about the introduction of a temporary embargo for a period of one year on the supply of arms and ammunition logically fits into the policy of Kazakhstan, aimed at strengthening the country's defense capability.

Indeed, the return of great Power rivalry, although significantly different from the Cold War period, once again gives Turkey a value similar to that it had as a country bordering the Soviet Union. It is obvious that, ignoring the possibility of military participation in the settlement of the Kazakh political crisis, Turkey seeks to emphasize its peaceful nature without provoking influential players in the Central Asian region, in particular Russia, to express a sharply negative reaction to such forms of foreign policy. At the same time, along with Russia and China, Turkey retains the status of a significant partner for the Central Asian states, which allows it to play the role of a diplomatic mediator in the settlement of regional conflicts. Turning your back on Russia at the same time is not a viable option, and it should be expected that Turkey will do everything possible to keep its mediation potential intact. Pragmatism and ideology influence Turkey's policy towards regional integration in the Eurasian space ^{[25, p. 123]}.

It can be concluded that the Kazakhstan political crisis of the winter of 2021-2022 became a practical example of the differentiation of the foreign policy role of Russia and Turkey as influential players in the Central Asian region. Russia, actively developing military and economic forms of interstate integration of post-Soviet states in Central Asia, reacted quite quickly to the events inside Kazakhstan, taking direct military participation in overcoming this crisis. Turkey, realizing the limits of its interference in this process and not wanting to provoke a negative reaction from Moscow, actually withdrew from its mediating role in this conflict. Turkey's desire for greater strategic autonomy and the preferences of the Central Asian States, given to a multi-vector foreign policy, are the single most important long-term factor bringing Turkey and the States of the region closer to closer cooperation. On the one hand, this is due to the limited economic opportunities of Turkey, the overload of foreign policy and limited experience in modern Central Asia in the inner circle of President R.T. Erdogan. On the other hand, the parties involved are likely to hesitate to strengthen relations if they encounter strong opposition from Russia. Despite the noticeable desire to strengthen Turkey's presence in the Central Asian region and its growing political influence, Russia is ready to calmly treat this trend, taking into account the preservation of the predominant share in the structure of economic and political interaction with Kazakhstan.