The modern practice of applying unilateral restrictive measures by subjects of international law (for the purposes of this article, the concepts of "sanctions" and restrictive measures are proposed to be considered equivalent) confirms that their targets traditionally become sovereign states (for example, the Russian Federation) or private legal entities – individuals or organizations that meet certain criteria (for example, persons operating in oil and gas sector of the Russian Federation). At the same time, a special place among the subjects of international law applying restrictive measures is occupied by the European Union (hereinafter also referred to as the "EU" or "Union"), which is the only regional international organization applying unilateral restrictive measures against third States and their residents. Currently, there are over 40 sanctions regimes in the Union, 25 of which were put into effect autonomously, that is, in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution (hereinafter referred to as the "UN Security Council")^{[4, c. 142-143]}.

After the announcement on February 24, 2022 by the President of the Russian Federation of the beginning of a special military operation against Russia, its individuals and legal entities, restrictive measures (sanctions) from the European Union followed. The new sanctions simultaneously provided for both the expansion of prohibitions in force since 2014 and fundamentally new, previously unused, restrictions.

It seems necessary to note that the problems of restrictive measures (sanctions) of the EU have received a relative scientific study in the domestic legal literature. The most complete description of the restrictive measures of the EU is contained in M. G. Doraev's monograph^[5]. However, it cannot be said that this work is a comprehensive scientific study of this phenomenon – due to the general nature of the monograph, relatively little attention has been paid to the restrictive measures of the EU, which does not provide an exhaustive scientific study. Moreover, the monograph in question was published in 2016 and has not been updated subsequently, so it does not take into account the significant changes in the legal regulation of EU restrictive measures that occurred after February 24, 2022.

It should also be noted the works of S. V. Glandin, in which certain issues of restrictive measures of the EU are investigated, however, the scope of research of these works seems limited mainly to the introduction of sanctions against certain private legal entities and the challenge by these entities of the sanctions imposed in the Court of the European Union (hereinafter - the "EU Court"). In this regard, S. V. Glandin pays considerable attention to the study of the judicial practice of the EU Court in cases of challenging restrictive measures by sanctioned persons^[21], and also analyzes the application by the EU Court of Justice for these purposes of the provisions of the Charter of the European Union on Fundamental Rights^[25]. At the same time, the author's attention is focused on studying the case law of the EU Court and its application when considering claims of Russian applicants such as Arkady Rotenberg^[22], Almaz-Antey Concern and Rosneft oil company^[23][24]. At the same time, the specifics and features of the practical application of certain types of EU restrictive measures are not given in these works.

In addition, the work of A. A. Klishas should be highlighted, in which a political and legal analysis of the restrictive measures of the EU was carried out^[6]. The subject of the analysis of this work was the restrictive measures imposed on the Russian Federation at the time of publication – that is, the specifics of the new restrictive measures introduced after February 24, 2022 are not taken into account. In addition, as part of his work, the author did not set out to conduct a doctrinal study of the restrictive measures of the EU, his work reflects the specifics of sanctions of a wide range of subjects of international law, which, in addition to the EU, includes the United States, Switzerland and Australia.

Some issues of restrictive EU measures in force against Russia were considered in the work of V. V. Voynikov^[7], however, this work can be considered as a general regulatory characteristic of individual restrictions imposed by the EU on Russia until February 24, 2022. The article pays considerable attention to the review of applicable EU regulations, which did not allow taking into account the results of the study of the phenomenon of restrictive EU measures reflected in the works of domestic and foreign authors.

Despite the presence in the domestic legal literature of publications concerning the restrictive measures of the EU listed above, it seems premature to say that this phenomenon has received a full and exhaustive doctrinal study, the works published to date affect only certain aspects of this phenomenon or consider it in general terms. At the same time, taking into account the prolonged (since 2014) application of EU restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, Russian legal entities and individuals, a thorough doctrinal study of EU restrictive measures seems not only necessary from both a scientific and practical point of view. In practice, this will allow taking into account the specifics of restrictive measures when doing business with European jurisdiction, in scientific terms, doctrinal study will provide a basis for further applied research and legislative developments in terms of countering the negative consequences of restrictive EU measures.

Within the framework of this article, it is not intended to establish and resolve existing doctrinal contradictions regarding how restrictive measures should be defined. It should be noted that this issue, despite the relative elaboration of sanctions issues, both in domestic and foreign literature, still does not have a unified approach among researchers ^{[3, p. 5]}. Thus, some authors believe that sanctions are legal instruments designed to restrict trade or financial relations with foreign states, governments, legal entities or individuals^{[2, p. 334]}. A significant disadvantage of this definition is that it does not take into account the purpose of the application of sanctions. Other authors, which seems appropriate, define sanctions depending on their purpose as a punishment imposed through any means and processes with the intended purpose of changing the behavior of the target State of sanctions ^{[1, p. 3-5]}. This definition does not reflect the possible types of sanctions and is limited only to sanctions against States, while modern practice has long allowed the use of sanctions against private law entities.

Thus, although both of these definitions are correct, they separately appear to be somewhat incomplete. Despite the fact that the formation of the concept of restrictive measures is not the purpose of this work, for the purposes of the study, it is proposed to include trade or financial restrictions imposed by States or international organizations through legal mechanisms against States, organizations and individuals in order to "punish" behavior that does not correspond to the political guidelines of the initiators of sanctions, and for coercion to change this behavior.

The purpose of this article is to establish the reasons and prerequisites for the use of restrictive measures against private law entities, to define and classify the tools of restrictive EU measures used against private law entities. In order to achieve the stated goal, the EU restrictive measures applicable to the Russian Federation and its residents have been chosen as the subject of study of this article, since at present they involve the use of the widest range of possible restrictions that apply only to the Russian Federation. The methodological basis of the study was the dialectical method of cognition of legal phenomena, in addition to which the following logical and systematic methods were used – this approach allowed us to consider the problem under study from the point of view of the basic laws of dialectics, with the help of formal logic, as a whole as a system and separately as components of this system. In the process of studying EU regulations, a technical and legal method was also used. To a lesser extent, in particular, when studying the prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against private law entities, the historical and legal method was used.

1. Prerequisites for the application of restrictive measures against private law entities (smart sanctions concept)Despite the fact that restrictive measures have been applied regularly throughout the history of the state and law, their targets most often became public law entities – sovereign states^[8].

The use of restrictive measures against private law entities is a fairly new phenomenon and therefore little studied. The emergence of this practice is usually attributed to the XX century, to the period of world wars, when the United Kingdom, together with the United States, first turned to the practice of controlling business participants – with the help of intelligence services, they tracked individuals and legal entities of neutral states trading with Germany. Such persons were subject to inclusion in the so-called "black lists". British subjects were forbidden to conduct trade relations with the persons involved in these lists, and neutral states were forbidden to provide them with goods produced by Great Britain ^{[9, p. 147-148]}.

At the same time, after the end of the Second World War, the practice of applying restrictive measures against private law sanctions faded into the background until the 2000s. Foreign legal literature provides estimates that the main prerequisite for the development of this practice was the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. It is noted that these events have become a catalyst for the international community, contributing to the increased use of restrictive measures against private legal entities (terrorists) both on the part of the UN, and on the part of the EU and other subjects of international law ^{[11, p. 91]}.

These restrictive measures were applied both in a multilateral format on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, and in an individual format by individual subjects of international law. Foreign researchers note that the extraordinary scale of the application of EU "anti-terrorist" sanctions indicates that they are becoming not only an important component of the EU sanctions policy, but also a cornerstone of the common foreign policy and security of the Union ^{[12, p. 288]}. It should be noted that the changed approach was based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions – if before September 11, 2001, the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions providing for sanctions related to terrorism, then after that date and until 2010 – 13 resolutions. The increased activity of the UN Security Council in this direction indicates the existence of a consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on the need to use sanctions against private law entities to counter terrorism. The criticism of the effectiveness of the UN Security Council sanctions in the situation of conflict between its permanent members expressed in the domestic literature can be a confirmation of this. For example, M. G. Doraev determines the small number of UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions during the Cold War by the situation of permanent conflict between permanent members of the UN Security Council, which led to the de facto blocking of the UN Security Council and depriving it of the opportunity to effectively use international sanctions to force delinquents to comply with international law^{[5, p. 17]}.

It would be logical to assume that restrictive measures against private legal entities have proved to be an effective tool in the fight against terrorism – this is due to their extrapolation to international legal relations between States. An additional factor contributing to this process is probably the imperative principles of international law enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter and obliging States to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force, as well as to resolve their international disputes by peaceful means. Perhaps some States have begun to consider economic sanctions as a "peaceful" tool for resolving their international disputes.

There is a point of view in foreign literature according to which the active application of restrictive measures against private law entities is due to the EU's desire to reduce the negative humanitarian impact of such measures on the civilian population of the State that became their target. For this reason, restrictive measures against individuals are proposed to be considered "smart" or "targeted" ^{[13, p. 63]}.

A similar approach can also be traced in the documents of the EU Council responsible for the application of EU restrictive measures. In particular, the Basic Principles on the Application of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), approved by him on June 7, 2004, indicate that restrictive measures should be applied in such a way as to have the maximum impact on those whose behavior they are aimed at changing. At the same time, targeted restrictive measures should, to the maximum extent possible, reduce any adverse humanitarian or unforeseen consequences for persons who are not targets of sanctions (relevant instructions are contained, for example, in the Basic Principles for the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), which were published on June 7, 2004). Although such documents are not legally binding for the EU and its member States, they are adopted by the EU Council with the intention of further use when introducing restrictive measures^{[13, p. 63]}.

In the domestic literature devoted to the issue of restrictive measures, this approach is seriously criticized. In particular, I. N. Timofeev points out that the introduction of targeted sanctions against companies strategically important for the country may entail severe negative consequences for the citizens of this country ^{[14, p. 74]}. Similar judgments can be found in the relevant foreign literature, in particular, Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, notes that targeted sanctions, which were supposed to reduce negative consequences compared to comprehensive sanctions, in practice cause humanitarian damage to the population of the countries concerned^[20]. Recently, these conclusions were confirmed in connection with the US sanctions against individual members of the Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation), who became part of the new Government of Afghanistan. This situation significantly complicated the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and put the country on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe.

2. EU restrictive measures against third States and their persons. The example of Russia

2.1. Regulatory framework for the application of EU restrictive measures against RussiaThe European Commission, the executive body of the Union, classifies restrictive measures of a nature as instruments of a common foreign and security policy (See, for example, European Commission, Restrictive measures, Spring 2008).

Decisions within the framework of the Common Foreign and security policy are taken unanimously by all EU Member States in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Treaty on the European Union (signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, effective from December 1, 2009 with amendments and additions as amended on December 13, 2007). The meaning of the common Foreign and Security policy is to consolidate the principles and objectives of the EU's foreign policy activities, based on the political solidarity of the member States of the European Union.

By applying restrictive measures, the European Union pursues a number of goals:

— Protection of fundamental values and interests in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;

— Ensuring the security of the European Union;

— Protection of international peace and security in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe;

— development of international cooperation;

— development and strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The legal basis for the introduction of restrictive measures of an economic nature and financial sanctions of the EU is article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, effective from December 1, 2009, as amended on December 13, 2007). Decisions on the introduction of restrictive EU measures are taken by the EU Council, in which all EU member states are represented^[19]. Since this decision relates to the common foreign and security policy, it must be unanimously approved by all EU Member States. The decision adopted by the Council of the EU comes into force from the moment of publication in the official press of the EU – the Official Journal of the EU.

In accordance with this procedure, the EU Council adopted the following regulatory legal acts establishing restrictive measures against the Russian Federation:

— EU Council Decision No. 2014/512/CFSP of July 31, 2014 and corresponding EU Council Regulation No. 833/2014 of July 31, 2014 "On restrictive measures in connection with Russia's actions to destabilize the situation in Ukraine" (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation 833/2014"). These regulatory legal acts provide for a set of sectoral restrictive measures (i.e. restrictions on Russia and Russian persons not related to the blocking of assets);

— EU Council Decision No. 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014 and corresponding EU Council Regulation No. 269/2014 of March 17, 2014 "On restrictive measures in connection with actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine" (hereinafter referred to as "Regulation 269/2014"). These regulatory legal acts provide for blocking restrictive measures against certain Russian individuals and organizations.

It should be noted that, in addition to the regulatory legal acts listed above, the EU has established a special regime of restrictive measures against the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. The basis for these restrictive measures is the Decision of the Council of the EU No. 2014/386/CFSP of June 23, 2014 and the corresponding Regulation of the Council of the EU No. 692/2014 of June 23, 2014 "On restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol". A detailed review of these regulatory legal acts, however, is not the purpose of this article, since they have already been repeatedly studied in the domestic literature and have not been changed since 2014.

Initially, all the acts listed above were adopted to create additional costs for the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to it, as well as to persuade the Russian Federation to change its policy towards Ukraine. In particular, the preamble to Regulation 269/2014 states that "the heads of EU member States stressed that a solution to the crisis should be found through negotiations between the Governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, including through potential multilateral mechanisms, and that in the absence of results, the EU will decide on additional measures, such as visa restrictions, blocking assets...". The preamble to the later adopted Regulation 833/2014 indicates that "... it was deemed expedient to introduce additional restrictive measures in order to increase the costs of Russia's actions to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis ...".

2.2 Scope and classification of EU restrictive measuresThe effect of EU sanctions is limited to persons who have a connection with EU jurisdiction.

They are mandatory for all persons on the territory of the EU (including on board aircraft or vessels flying the flag of an EU Member State), as well as for any persons in part of activities that are fully or partially carried out on the territory of the EU (hereinafter collectively referred to as "EU persons").

In addition, EU restrictive measures, regardless of the location and region of activity, must be observed by individuals who are citizens of EU member States and organizations registered in accordance with EU legislation.

Thus, if a person's personal law is not the law of an EU member State, while such a person is not located on the territory of the EU and does not conduct activities on the territory of the EU, he is not obliged to comply with EU restrictive measures.

The restrictive measures of the EU , depending on the consequences provided for by them , can be divided into three categories:

1. blocking – providing for the blocking of the property of a sub-sanctioned person;

2. non–blocking - providing for restrictions not related to the blocking of assets; and

3. visa – restricting the access of a sanctioned person to the territory of the EU.

In turn, non-blocking sanctions can be further classified into trade and financial (including investment).

Depending on whether the adoption of national regulation by an EU Member State is required for the entry into force of EU restrictive measures, one can distinguish:

1. blocking restrictive measures and the vast majority of non-blocking restrictive measures (except restrictions on the supply of weapons);

2. restrictive measures requiring the adoption of additional national regulation (visa restrictive measures and restrictions on the supply of weapons).

Blocking restrictive measures of the EU are imposed on individuals and organizations on the basis of decisions and regulations of the Council of the EU, which operate directly throughout the EU. Funds and economic resources owned or controlled by such sub-sanctioned persons are subject to blocking, in addition, it is prohibited to provide funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to sub-sanctioned persons or for their benefit. This type of restrictions applies to individuals and organizations listed in the annex to the relevant "sanctions" regulation of the Council of the EU.

For the purposes of blocking restrictive measures of the EU, broad definitions of what refers to "funds" and "economic resources" are provided. In particular, "funds" include financial assets and any kind of benefits, including, but not limited to (i) money, checks and other payment instruments; (ii) deposits in financial institutions or other organizations, account balances, debts and debentures; (iii) publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments, including stocks, bonds, derivative contracts; (iv) interest, dividends or other types of profits or values derived from or created by assets; (v) loans, rights of set-off, guarantees, contractual guarantees or other financial obligations; (vi) letters of credit, bills of lading, certificates of transfer of ownership; (vii) documents providing evidence of shares in funds or financial resources ^{[5, pp. 115-116]}.

In turn, "economic resources" are assets of any kind (tangible or intangible, movable or immovable) that do not relate to funds, but can be used to obtain funds, goods or services ^{[5, pp. 115-116]}.

The traditional companion of blocking restrictive measures are visa restrictive measures – they apply to sanctioned individuals whose assets are subject to blocking. However, unlike blocking restrictive measures, the regulatory legal acts of the EU Council on sanctions do not have direct effect in terms of visa restrictions. EU member States are obliged to additionally implement visa restrictive measures in their national legal order. In particular, the EU Council Decision No. 2014/145/CFSP of March 17, 2014, which provides for blocking sanctions against Russian individuals, additionally obliges EU Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent access to their territory or transit through it of individuals under sanctions.

Visa restrictive measures are not applied to citizens of EU Member States, as well as in a situation where this would contradict certain international legal obligations of an EU member State (for example, if it would prevent such an individual from accessing an international conference held under the auspices of the UN on the territory of the relevant EU Member State). In addition, an EU Member State may, at its own discretion, make an exception to this prohibition if the trip is justified by urgent humanitarian needs or the need to attend an intergovernmental meeting, or such a trip is supported or organized by the EU ^{[5, p. 117]}.

The greatest difficulties in practice seem to be related to non-blocking sanctions. This is due to an extremely wide range of tools provided for by this category of restrictive measures. Traditionally, this set includes a ban on the supply of weapons or military or dual-use goods, as well as the provision of related services and related financing to any persons located in the target State of restrictive measures, or to any persons for use in that State. In addition, EU regulatory legal acts on sanctions may provide for additional restrictive measures. For example, the EU Council Decision No. 2017/2074/CFSP of November 13, 2017 "On restrictive measures in connection with the situation in Venezuela" prohibits, among other things, the supply to Venezuela or for use in Venezuela: 

— goods that can be used for internal repression; and

— equipment and software that can be used to track and intercept communications in the interests of the ruling regime.

At the same time, traditionally trade restrictive measures prohibiting the supply of certain categories of goods also include a ban on the provision of technical and financial assistance, brokerage services and the provision of financing in connection with such "prohibited" supplies.

2.3. EU restrictive measures in force against RussiaThe set of restrictive EU measures that applied to the Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of Crimea provided for blocking and visa restrictive measures, as well as non-blocking restrictive measures.

After the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, these restrictive measures were significantly expanded – blocking restrictive measures were introduced against a multiple of a larger number of Russian persons, and non-blocking restrictive measures were supplemented with new prohibitions that were previously absent in EU practice.

In order to apply blocking restrictive measures against a Russian person (and visa measures, if it is an individual), it must comply with any of the following criteria provided for in Article 3 of Regulation 269/2014:

— be a natural person who is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies that undermine or pose a threat to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine, or that hinder the activities of international organizations in Ukraine;

— is a legal entity providing material or financial support to actions that undermine or pose threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine;

— is a legal entity in Crimea or Sevastopol, the ownership of which was transferred in violation of the legislation of Ukraine, or a legal entity that benefited from such transfer of ownership;

— is a person who provides material or financial support to Russian persons responsible for making decisions on the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine;

— is a person who performs operations with separatist groups in the Donbas.

After February 24, 2022, EU restrictive measures may be additionally imposed on persons receiving material or financial benefits from the Russian Government, as well as large Russian entrepreneurs and organizations that operate in sectors of the economy that bring significant income to the Russian Government.

The whole variety of non-blocking restrictive measures can be divided into three groups: trade, financial and others. Each of these groups, in turn, is divided into separate types of restrictions.

Trade restrictive measures usually include prohibitions on the sale, supply, transportation or export of certain categories of goods to Russia, as well as opposite prohibitions on the import, purchase or transportation of certain categories of goods from Russia. Since 2014, it has been prohibited to supply military goods to Russia or for use in Russia and from Russia, to supply certain categories of dual-use goods to Russia or for use in Russia, as well as some goods to be used in the oil and gas sector for oil production and exploration projects at a depth of more than 150 meters, north of arctic circle or for projects with shale oil production potential.

After February 22, 2022, trade restrictive measures were significantly expanded and, as of the date of this article, it is additionally prohibited to supply to Russia or for use in Russia any dual-use goods (any categories); goods that can contribute to the development of its military and industrial potential; an extremely wide list of oil and gas industry goods (including those necessary for gas liquefaction); goods intended for the aerospace industry and aviation fuel; high-tech products and quantum computers; marine navigation installations; and luxury goods.

In addition, it was prohibited to import a number of goods into the EU if they are of Russian origin or imported from Russia. This ban applies to steel products, coal and other solid fossil fuels, crude oil and petroleum products, as well as goods whose exports bring substantial revenues to the Russian Federation.

In addition to direct trade bans (i.e., the prohibition of direct import or export of goods), the EU sanctions regulation prohibits the provision of technological or financial assistance, brokerage services or financing in connection with prohibited supplies.

Financial restrictions in force since 2014 provided for a ban on providing medium- and long-term financing to the largest state-owned banks and state-owned companies in Russia (in particular, VTB, Sberbank and Rosneft), as well as their subsidiaries outside the EU and persons acting on their behalf or at their disposal. Thus, it was prohibited to purchase traded securities and money market instruments issued by these organizations (i) from August 1, 2014 to September 12, 2014 with a maturity of more than 90 days, (ii) from September 12, 2014 to April 12, 2022 with a maturity of 30 days. It was also prohibited to provide investment services in connection with the issuance of these securities and to participate in loan or loan agreements for a period of more than 30 days for any organization subject to these restrictions.

After February 22, 2022, it was additionally prohibited to make transactions and operations in respect of traded securities and money market instruments issued by organizations for which this ban applies, after April 12, 2022 with any maturity. In addition, the list of Russian legal entities to which this restriction applies has been significantly expanded.

The EU de facto blocked the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation under its jurisdiction, since EU persons were prohibited from performing any operations related to the asset management of the Bank of Russia.

It is also prohibited to invest in the energy sector of the Russian Federation, as well as any Russian persons are prohibited from opening deposits in European financial institutions in the amount of more than 100,000 euros and storing assets worth more than 10,000 euros on European cryptocurrency platforms. EU persons were also prohibited from providing financial services related to the transportation of Russian oil and petroleum products.

Other restrictive measures include:

— suspension of broadcasting in the EU of a number of Russian state-owned media (in particular, Russia Today); 

— a ban on providing access to ports and docks on the territory of the EU for ships under the Russian flag;

— prohibition of Russian motor transport companies to transport goods on EU roads;

— prohibition of Russian persons to participate in European public procurement;

— prohibition of providing state aid to companies with public participation over 50%;

— ban on the supply of banknotes denominated in the currency of EU member states to Russia;

— prohibition of providing registered addresses and services for the creation and management of trusts, foundations and other similar entities if their founder or beneficiary is a Russian person;

— prohibition of the provision of credit rating, auditing, accounting services, tax and management consulting services, as well as public relations consulting.

At the same time, it should be noted that, as a rule, any restrictive measures discussed above provide for a number of exceptions when they are not subject to application or when the competent sanctions regulator of the EU state has the right to issue permits for a prohibited transaction or operation. However, consideration of these exceptions within the framework of this article seems impossible due to their voluminous nature, as well as due to their inconsistency with the purposes of this article.

3. ConclusionIn the course of the study, it was found that restrictive measures against private law entities began to be actively applied only since 2001 in the framework of the international fight against terrorism.

The instrument, which has demonstrated its effectiveness in the process of using the UN Security Council, was adopted by individual subjects of international law, including the European Union, and the experience gained in the fight against terrorism was extrapolated by it to apply restrictive measures against sovereign states and their residents.

The EU regulatory legal acts on restrictive measures studied in the framework of this article indicate that the most active restrictive measures of the EU are applied to the Russian Federation and its residents. Thus, Regulations 269/2014 and Regulation 833/2014 contain an exhaustive set of restrictive measures used by the Union. The study of the EU restrictive measures in force against the Russian Federation made it possible to classify them into blocking ones, which, if applied to individuals, always follow together with visa ones, as well as non-blocking ones. Among the latter, within the framework of this study, trade, financial and other restrictive measures were identified.

At the same time, this sanctions regime is constantly and dynamically developing, which necessitates further doctrinal study of its foundations, features and practical consequences. It can be stated that in 2022 there was a significant expansion of the mechanisms of restrictive measures used by the EU – in addition to restricting the export of goods to the Russian Federation, the import of a significant number of goods of Russian origin was restricted. In turn, export restrictions were extended not only to a significantly larger number of goods, but also to some European services – they are prohibited for Russian persons. In terms of financial restrictions, in addition to the previously used restrictions on the access of Russian state-owned banks and companies to medium- and long-term European financing, an indiscriminate ban was established for Russian individuals to place deposits in excess of 100,000 euros in EU financial institutions. In addition, a mechanism was used to de facto block the assets of the Bank of Russia located in the jurisdiction of the EU.

The EU's restrictive measures against Russia are used to a much lesser extent by the EU against other states (in particular, against Belarus, Venezuela, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar and others). The results of this study will also be valid for the restrictive measures of the EU applicable to states other than Russia, since such restrictive measures partially provide for mechanisms that are similar in relation to those established by Regulation 269/2014 and Regulation 833/2014.

Additionally, it can be stated that the hypotheses expressed in foreign legal doctrine regarding the application of restrictive measures do not find their practical confirmation. In particular, the assumption that the use of restrictive measures against private law entities will reduce negative social and humanitarian costs compared with the use of restrictive measures against the whole state. Despite the official statements of the EU authorities on the application of "smart" and "targeted" sanctions, this work shows that in practice such restrictive measures are accompanied by indiscriminate comprehensive restrictions that apply not only to sanctioned persons, but also, in principle, to any persons of the relevant target State of sanctions.

In this context, it can hardly be called "smart" to ban the import into the EU of certain categories of products produced by any Russian persons, as well as the ban on the export from the EU of certain categories of goods for any Russian persons.  In addition, statements about the use of "smart" sanctions to reduce the negative humanitarian impact do not stand up to scrutiny when considering the actual blocking of the assets of the Bank of Russia by the EU, which partially paralyzes its achievement of the goals of protecting and ensuring the stability of the ruble, ensuring the stability and development of the national payment system and the financial market. Thus, these restrictive measures are theoretically capable of causing significant negative humanitarian consequences (such as, for example, hyperinflation). Thus, it can be concluded that, from a practical point of view, the restrictive measures of the EU provide for a set of hybrid restrictions combining simultaneously comprehensive sanctions against the relevant State and targeted sanctions against individual private law entities.