Approaches of the USSR and the RSFSR to the Institutionalization of Ethnic Policy on the Example of the Creation of the Goskomnats of the USSR and the Goskomnats of the RSFSR in 1989-1991

Pishchuk Matvey Dmitrievich ORCID: 0000-0002-4248-2090 Postgraduate student, Department of History of State Institutions and Public Organizations, Russian State University for the Humanities 125047, Russia, Moscow, Miusskaya Ploshchad str., 6 pishuk.mat@yandex.ru

Over the past few years , one can notice a growing interest in the study of the national policy of the USSR and the RSFSR in 1985-1991. Researchers are increasingly studying the specifics of measures taken by the leadership of the USSR and the RSFSR to stabilize interethnic relations ^{[1; 2; 3]}, issues of regulating interethnic conflicts ^{[4; 5]}, conceptual problems of national policy of the USSR and the RSFSR ^{[6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11]}. Despite the fact that these studies address the problems of institutionalization of the national policy of the USSR and the RSFSR, the interest of researchers in this topic is still small.

The author of the article would like to explain what the institutionalization of national policy is – it is the process of formation of state institutions of national policy. State institutions are an "expanded version" of state bodies, in which not only their "formal structure" is studied, but also the totality of historical events and political phenomena associated with them. This determines the form of writing this article, in which considerable attention is paid to the general historical processes in 1986-1991, which influenced the institutionalization of national policy.

For the USSR, the "national question" was one of the key ones in its existence due to the fact that the "institutionalization of ethnicity" was carried out in the USSR ^{[12, p. 362]}, as a result of which it acquired political significance. This is important because at the dawn of Soviet statehood, Soviet citizens did not understand well what "nationality" was ^{[13, pp. 193-195]}, and after only a few decades it became one of the factors of destabilization of the USSR.

Nevertheless, some researchers believe that interethnic conflicts were only a form of institutionalization of the collapse of the USSR ^{[14, p. 235]}, i.e. they were not the cause, but the consequence of a systemic crisis. This is partly true, because many interethnic conflicts at the first stage of their existence were socio-economic. However, it cannot be denied that the specific principles of nation-building originally laid down in the foundation of Soviet statehood gave rise to numerous contradictions in the national-state structure of the USSR ^{[6; 15, pp. 199-200]}, which, in the conditions of the weakening of the Union center, caused the "awakening" of destructive processes in the sphere of interethnic relations. The reason for this was that, having institutionalized ethnicity, the leadership of the USSR was unable to integrate it into its ideology, which caused the crisis of Soviet identity ^[16] and the beginning of the search for alternative ideologies in the face of national democracy. At the same time, it should be understood that the emergence of interethnic conflicts in the second half of the 1980s did not happen suddenly, but as a result of the development of sluggish socio-economic, demographic and cultural processes in Soviet society in the 1960s - 1980s ^[17].

For many decades, national policy was in the "hands" of the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This was due to the fact that in the Soviet system of public administration, the real power belonged not to state, but to party structures ^{[18, p. 116]}. At the same time, there was no special department of the Central Committee of the CPSU dealing with national politics until the late 1980s ^[19], which quite clearly showed the attitude of the party nomenclature to this problem. This state of affairs was not surprising, given that L.I. Brezhnev, speaking at the XXVI Congress of the CPSU in the spring of 1981, declared that "... The unity of the Soviet nations is stronger today than ever ..." ^{[20, p. 75]}. Mikhail Gorbachev made an even bolder statement at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in the spring of 1986, stating that "... the national question ... in the Soviet Union has been successfully resolved..." ^{[21, pp. 155-156]}.

Such illusions were quickly dispelled. Since the spring of 1986, the state of interethnic relations in the USSR began to deteriorate rapidly. However, there was no adequate reaction from the leadership of the USSR to the events taking place ^{[22, pp. 119-120; 23, pp. 107-109]}. This was due to the fact that M.S. Gorbachev, despite the emergence of the first interethnic conflicts ^{[23, pp. 109-111]}, did not think about the need to reorganize the existing system of national policy management ^{[24, p. 57]}. The leadership of the USSR continued to act situationally, inconsistently and inertly, refusing to recognize the existence of serious problems in the sphere of interethnic relations ^{[1, p. 124; 15, p. 226; 25, p. 221]}. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev was convinced that the problems that had arisen were not independent, but were either part of the counter-reformatory sentiments of local party elites ("national localism"), or part of general socio-economic problems ^{[26, p. 17]}.

Until the summer of 1988, the leadership of the USSR did not make serious attempts to create state institutions of national policy. The first step on this path was the holding of the XIX All–Union Party Conference of the CPSU in June - July 1988 ^{[12, pp. 373-375]}. It was said about the expediency of creating permanent commissions on interethnic relations under the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (approx. – hereinafter referred to as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) and under the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republics, as well as a special state body for nationalities and interethnic relations ^{[27, p. 158]}. For the first time, it was said that the processes taking place in the USSR in the sphere of interethnic relations require the restructuring of the system of public administration. Nevertheless, the significance of the Conference is estimated by researchers rather modestly, since no real "updating" of conceptual views on the principles of Soviet national policy was carried out ^{[15, pp. 327-328]}.

After the Conference, large-scale work began on the preparation of amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, during which one of the most important topics was the discussion on the status of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces ^{[28, l. 24-32, 79, 122; 29, l. 36, 39.]}. According to the amendments to the Constitution of the USSR made on December 1, 1988, the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces He was to be responsible for the realization of the national interests and needs of the peoples of the USSR, as well as for improving the legislation of the USSR in the field of interethnic relations. On January 12, 1989, the Department for Interethnic Relations was formed in the Secretariat of the USSR Armed Forces, which was to become a "link" in the work of the two chambers of the USSR Armed Forces ^{[30, pp. 30-31.]}.

However, it is worth noting that when implementing the initial measures to institutionalize national policy, the leadership of the USSR faced difficulties that were associated with the activities of the RSFSR. Let us draw attention to the fact that in January 1989, after the escalation of the interethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR (approx. – then the Supreme Council of the RSFSR) adopted a document according to which the RSFSR began developing proposals to strengthen interethnic relations ^{[31, l. 13]}. The document touched upon a wide range of issues related to the implementation of national policy in the RSFSR ^{[31, l. 51-52]}. The content of this document testified that in the RSFSR, observing the failures of the USSR leadership in resolving interethnic conflicts (including in Nagorno-Karabakh), they decided to begin "disengagement" with the union center of areas of responsibility in national policy (i.e. expressed a desire to have powers in this area).

The first evidence of "disengagement" was the April 1989 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at which individual representatives of the RSFSR made a number of claims to the leadership of the USSR, the main part of which was that when making decisions on national policy, the opinion of the RSFSR is not taken into account ^{[32, pp. 65-66, 89-90]}. The second evidence of the "disengagement" was the elections of People's Deputies of the USSR in April – May 1989, during which the political "rehabilitation" of Boris Yeltsin took place ^{[33, pp. 170-207]}, whose popularity grew due to the fact that he sharply criticized the activities of the USSR leadership in the field of national politics ^{[33, pp. 223-224]}.

In connection with these events in early June 1989 at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (approx. – further, the SND of the USSR) M.S. Gorbachev stated that he had fully underestimated the need to update the national policy of the USSR ^{[34, L. 36-40]}. However, M.S. Gorbachev did not propose any plan to remedy the situation, which was the reason for another criticism from B.N. Yeltsin ^{[35, l. 139-149]}, who accused the USSR leadership of ineffective work in the field of interethnic relations, indecision in the settlement of interethnic conflicts and the desire to rely on dogmatism in conducting national policy.

Despite such accusations, a lot of work was done at the Congress to create commissions in the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces. On June 6, 1989, during numerous discussions, three commissions of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces were formed ^{[36, L. 68]}: on national policy and interethnic relations; on social and economic development of the Union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and districts; on the development of culture, language, national and international traditions, protection of historical heritage.

In the RSFSR, the process of institutionalization of state institutions of national policy took place differently. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the RSFSR could not get permission from the leadership of the USSR to adopt amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR (similar to those adopted for the Constitution of the USSR in December 1988). M.S. Gorbachev avoided this issue, because he understood that with amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR, the positions of the RSFSR would strengthen and it will become less manageable ^{[37, p. 206]}. Some researchers believe that Gorbachev's position was based on the fact that he was a "hostage" of the old principles of "Leninist national policy", according to which the RSFSR was assigned the role of a "resource base" for strengthening other union republics in the USSR ^[38].

Because of this, the leadership of the RSFSR had to be content with rather modest opportunities to create separate structures that consider only some issues of national policy. In particular, in August 1989, a Commission on National Policy and Interethnic Relations in the Russian Federation was established under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which was responsible for developing proposals for improving interethnic relations in the RSFSR ^{[39, L. 8, 124-125]}. The creation of this Commission once again emphasized the desire of the RSFSR to pursue an independent national policy.

A very important event for the further process of institutionalization of the national policy of the USSR and the RSFSR was the September Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1989 . Preparations for it lasted a year and a half due to the fact that the main theme of the Plenum, dedicated to national politics, "stalled" within the walls of the party structures responsible for ideology. The main problem was that the party nomenclature did not want to abandon the long-known theses of the general line of "Lenin's national policy" ^{[15, pp. 319-322]} and use new scientific ideas ^{[15, pp. 327-329]}. Because of this, it turned out that at the Plenum M.S. Gorbachev made a report "On the national policy of the party in modern conditions", the theses of which turned out to be outdated. The program document adopted on the basis of this report was frankly weak, since it was more like a plan for the reorganization of individual elements of the public administration system, rather than the concept of the USSR state national policy.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Plenum became a platform for serious clashes between the leadership of the USSR and representatives of the RSFSR. The fact is that in his report M.S. Gorbachev touched upon the issues of improving the state structure of the RSFSR, expanding the rights of its autonomies and creating the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU ^{[40, pp. 28-30]}. The discussion of these issues revealed a whole layer of contradictions, which was a big surprise for Mikhail Gorbachev. Representatives of the RSFSR demanded to create a Communist Party of the RSFSR and expand the powers of the RSFSR, pointing out that the RSFSR is in a discriminated position compared to other union republics, fulfilling the role of a "donor" for the USSR ^{[40, p. 69, 96; 41, p. 141]}. In addition, the discontent of representatives of the RSFSR was associated with the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev that autonomies within the Union republics should be given a new political status, expanding their rights and powers ^{[40, pp. 226-227]}. Given the fact that the RSFSR had the most autonomies, a large-scale change in their status would mean a revision of the status of the RSFSR. And this was a reason for serious concern among representatives of the RSFSR, who feared that the "nationalist fire" from other union republics would "spread" to the RSFSR, using as a pretext the issue of "changing the status of autonomies."

During the September 1989 Plenum, the contradictions between the leadership of the USSR and representatives of the RSFSR, which had been smoldering for a long time, were revealed. And although some researchers believe that the RSFSR was not in a discriminated position ^{[14, p. 216]}, and the Union Republic itself was one of the calmest until Boris Yeltsin came to power ^{[15, p. 299]}, it is impossible not to note the very critical sentiments of the RSFSR representatives at the Plenum, who for the first time expressed them his dissatisfaction with the actions of the USSR leadership ^{[41, p. 141]}.

Despite the problems that arose at the Plenum, Mikhail Gorbachev did not take serious steps to mitigate the conflict, leaving the Platform of the Plenum practically unchanged. Nevertheless, M.S. Gorbachev, realizing the growing discontent in the RSFSR, nevertheless approved amendments to the Constitution of the RSFSR on October 27, 1989. they were accepted. The Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR, by analogy with the union body, became the first state institute of national policy in the RSFSR.

However, a much more important event was the creation on November 29, 1989 of the State Committee of the RSFSR on National Issues (Goskomnats RSFSR). The RSFSR understood that the Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR, responsible for drafting laws in the field of interethnic relations, was not enough to conduct an effective national policy. There was an urgent need to create a state institution that would implement the laws adopted in practice in order to avoid a situation in which there is a law, but there is no one to execute it, as regularly happened at the union level. Moreover, the creation of the State Committee of the RSFSR acquired special significance due to the fact that there was no such body at the union level, which means that the republican committee received a full "carte blanche" for designing its future activities.

After M.S. Gorbachev faced the continuation of the "Russian fronde" at the II SND of the USSR in December 1989 ^{[42, l. 22]}, it became clear that representatives of the RSFSR embarked on the path of open, albeit moderate confrontation with the leadership of the USSR in order to achieve the expansion of their independence, including in the implementation of national policy. At the same time, it is worth noting that the RSFSR took up the "national question" much more actively than in the Union center. The leadership of the RSFSR not only received the Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR "put by them", but independently created the State Committee of the RSFSR, which became a unique structure in the Soviet system of public administration.

In January 1990, events occurred that influenced the further process of institutionalization of the national policy of the USSR and the RSFSR. As a result of another escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, riots occurred in Baku, during which troops were brought into the city to restore order. In connection with these events, on January 26, 1990, N.I. Ryzhkov will appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a proposal to form a Union-Republican State Committee of the USSR ^{[43, l. 3-8]}, which would deal with issues of national policy of an inter-republican nature that require solutions at the union level with the coordination of the activities of ministries and departments of the USSR, union and autonomous republics.

However, N.I. Ryzhkov's proposal was "torpedoed" due to the fact that M.S. Gorbachev began preparing a new political reform, which he would publicly announce at the February 1990 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, expressing a desire to create the post of President of the USSR. M.S. Gorbachev believed that the creation of this position would give him additional powers in in the conditions of growing managerial disintegration of party and state structures ^[44], which will allow him to increase the controllability of processes in the field of interethnic relations. As a result of this political reform, on March 15, 1990, the III SND of the USSR elected Mikhail Gorbachev President of the USSR.

In response to the political reform in the spring of 1990, the RSFSR decided to begin organizational preparations for the "launch" of the State Committee of the RSFSR (it should be understood that since its creation, the State Committee of the RSFSR de facto continued to exist only "on paper"). March 17 , 1990 The chairman of the State Committee of the RSFSR was appointed A.M. Belyakov, whose candidacy was insisted on by the Central Committee of the CPSU. He was a compromise figure: on the one hand, A.M. Belyakov was a conservative, well suited for the role of "guardian of the national question", and on the other, being an acceptable candidate for the leadership of the USSR, he could, without fear of any active opposition, start organizing the activities of the State Committee of the RSFSR. This was confirmed by the fact that almost immediately after his appointment, A.M. Belyakov achieved the approval of the first structure of the State Committee of the RSFSR ^{[45, l. 186-188]}, which indicated that the leadership of the RSFSR was really interested in the soonest "launch" of the State Committee of the RSFSR.

After Gorbachev's political reform was implemented, they remembered N.I. Ryzhkov's proposal. In addition, the "launch" of the State Committee of the RSFSR and the appointment of A.M. Belyakov as its Chairman seriously concerned the leadership of the USSR. In response to this, on March 27, 1990, after three months of difficult discussions ^{[46, l. 79-83]} (it is characteristic that in the RSFSR there were no disputes about the expediency of creating a State Committee of the RSFSR), the USSR State Committee on National Issues (USSR State Committee) was established. The State Committee of the USSR received the status of the Union-Republican State Committee, which was supposed to manage national policy through the relevant state committees of the Union republics. This status meant that the leadership of the USSR tried to de jure subordinate the State Committee of the RSFSR, making it the "grassroots link" of the management of the Union national policy.

The problem was that the State Committee of the RSFSR had the status of a republican committee and therefore was subordinate only to the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR (approx. – further SEE RSFSR). By creating the State Committee of the USSR, the leadership of the USSR hoped to "drive" the State Committee of the RSFSR under double subordination – the State Committee of the USSR and the RSFSR CM. However, this could not be done. Firstly, Mikhail Gorbachev almost immediately after the creation of the USSR State Committee lost interest in him. Secondly, after Boris Yeltsin became the head of the RSFSR Armed Forces in May 1990, he did everything to preserve the autonomy of the RSFSR State Committee. As a result, the leadership of the USSR simply "forgot" about the State Committee of the USSR, leaving it to exist "on paper".

In April 1990, M.S. Gorbachev and A.I. Lukyanov proposed the so-called "plan of autonomization" ^{[47, pp. 167-174]}, which was aimed at a large-scale expansion of the rights and powers of autonomous entities in the USSR ^{[37, p. 199]}. M.S. Gorbachev considered this plan as a stage of preparation for the signing of a new Union Treaty. It was assumed that the autonomous entities, having received expanded rights and powers, would sign a new Union Treaty as full-fledged subjects of the new federation. Thus, the Union leadership spoke directly about equalizing the status of autonomous entities with the Union republics, which led to the extreme confusion of the latter. Some researchers point out that the "plan of autonomization" was directed against the RSFSR, which had the most autonomous entities in its composition ^{[41, pp. 181-183]}. It is worth noting that the "autonomy plan" turned out to be too conflictogenic for the RSFSR and threatening its territorial integrity, which caused concern even among those representatives of the RSFSR who were in no way connected with opposition Russian politicians. As a result, the "plan of autonomization" became a "trigger" for the growth of opposition sentiments in the RSFSR, which resulted in the election of Boris Yeltsin as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on May 29, 1990.

On June 12, 1990, Boris Yeltsin achieved the adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. The Declaration became a way to prevent the implementation of the "autonomy plan", since according to its provisions, the laws adopted by the leadership of the USSR were deprived of their supremacy on the territory of the RSFSR. After the adoption of the Declaration, the next step of the RSFSR leadership was to organize the activities of the Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR Armed Forces. On June 14, 1990, three commissions were created in it ^{[48, L. 31]}: on the national-state structure and interethnic relations; on the social and economic development of autonomous republics, autonomous regions, autonomous districts and small peoples; on the development of cultures, language, national traditions and the protection of historical heritage.

On July 14, 1990, the Law of the RSFSR was adopted, according to which the structure of executive authorities reporting directly to the RSFSR CM (including the RSFSR State Committee) was formalized. Thus, the leadership of the RSFSR emphasized that national policy remains the sphere of Russian interests, despite the fact that the USSR State Committee was created. It is noteworthy that at about the same time, at the July 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated the appointment of the Secretary of the Central Committee, A.N. Girenko, responsible for overseeing issues in the field of interethnic relations, and under him he would create a Permanent Commission on National Policy. This indicated that M.S. Gorbachev, despite the current state of the party (the fact is that after several reorganizations carried out by M.S. Gorbachev in 1987-1990, the political and managerial capabilities of the CPSU were greatly reduced), when solving issues of national policy, he still "in the old-fashioned way" gave preference to party bodies rather than state.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin initiated the so-called "parade of sovereignties", which became one of the reasons for the destabilization of interethnic relations in the RSFSR ^{[49, l. 2-4; 50, l. 1ob]}. With his help, the leadership of the RSFSR was looking for an opportunity to enlist the support of the national republics of the RSFSR in the fight against the leadership of the USSR. In this endeavor, part of the presidential entourage was ready to unconditionally support any nationalist movements ^{[1, p. 193-194]}, as long as they supported the course of Boris Yeltsin. Despite carrying out such a risky policy, it should be recognized that by the autumn of 1990, Boris Yeltsin managed to strengthen his position. This was also facilitated by the fact that the main measures were implemented to strengthen the state authorities of the RSFSR, including those responsible for the implementation of national policy.

At the Union level, the situation with the institutionalization of national policy was much worse. Due to the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev was busy promoting the new Union Treaty, he paid little attention to other issues. Suffice it to say that it was only on August 17, 1990 that the Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee was appointed ^{[51, l. 7]}. He became the People's Deputy of the USSR M.S. Minasbekyan, to whom M.S. Gorbachev offered to become Chairman, but he refused because of his unwillingness to part with the deputy mandate. N.I. Ryzhkov asked him to write a Provision "On the State Committee of the USSR", but due to the fact that M.S. Minasbekyan de facto did not he took office, and the leadership of the USSR did not allocate funds to him for the organization of the activities of the State Committee of the USSR, it was not possible to prepare a document. Such an attitude towards the USSR State Committee looked extremely strange, given the importance of national policy in the current situation. It is worth noting that by the autumn of 1990, the leadership of the USSR as a whole stopped any major measures to improve the system of state institutions of national policy of the USSR. All forces were thrown into the preparation of a new Union Treaty (September – October 1990 ^{[52, L. 341-342]}), within the framework of which it was supposed to solve the main problems of national policy.

The leadership of the RSFSR had no illusions that the new Union Treaty would be able to solve "all problems at once", therefore, active work continued in the RSFSR to develop state institutions of national policy. On November 5, 1990, a Resolution of the RSFSR Council of Ministers was adopted, which concerned the tasks and organizational issues of the RSFSR State Committee. The document emphasized that in order to carry out a unified state national policy in the subjects of the RSFSR, it is recommended to form bodies or structural units that would be responsible for the implementation of national policy on the ground. Thus, the process of forming the vertical of national policy management in the RSFSR began. On November 21, 1990, L.P. Prokopyev was appointed the new Chairman of the State Committee of the RSFSR, who was considered a less conservative politician capable of perceiving the new and more radical course of Boris Yeltsin on national policy (we are talking about its "sovereignizing" component). It is noteworthy that this time the candidacy of the Chairman was no longer coordinated with the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In January 1991, tragic events took place in Vilnius, in connection with which political forces opposing Mikhail Gorbachev began to turn public opinion against the President of the USSR, the CPSU and the USSR as a single state ^{[53, l. 98-101]}. The sharp reaction of the Union republics was due to the fact that they feared the victory of the "conservative wing" of the USSR leadership and a return to authoritarian methods of governance. However, despite the deteriorating situation in the sphere of interethnic relations, the degradation of the state institutions of national policy of the USSR continued ^{[54, L. 1-37]}. In February – March 1991, there was a significant reduction in the staff and powers of the commissions of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces ^{[55, l. 10-11]}. The question was raised about the future fate of the USSR State Committee (whether it is advisable to leave it, even in its current "paper form") ^{[55, l. 13]}. The Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces, R.N. Nishanov, called on M.S. Gorbachev to allocate resources for organizing the activities of the USSR State Committee ^{[56, L. 3]}. However, his call went unheard and the State Committee of the USSR continued its "ghostly" existence in the system of state bodies of the USSR.

Meanwhile, in the RSFSR in February 1991, the discussion of the draft Regulation "On the State Committee of the RSFSR for Nationalities" began, which lasted more than three months ^{[55, l. 20-21; 57, l. 4, 6, 18-26]}. A significant part of the disputes was related to the issue of determining the limits of the powers of the State Committee of the RSFSR in conducting national policy in the national republics of the RSFSR. On May 8, 1991, the Regulation was approved. In accordance with it, the State Committee of the RSFSR was the republican state administration body for nationalities and national relations, which was subordinate to the RSFSR Council of Ministers and was responsible for conducting a unified state policy in the RSFSR in the field of national relations. The powers that were given to the State Committee of the RSFSR in the national republics of the RSFSR can be described as "moderate".

On May 16, 1991, the Supreme Council of the RSFSR adopted a resolution, which formulated the basic principles of the national state structure of the RSFSR. This document reflected the difficult dilemma of the leadership of the RSFSR, which on the one hand gave guarantees of the territorial integrity of the RSFSR, and on the other emphasized the right of peoples to self-determination. Let us draw attention to the fact that in this document the leadership of the RSFSR for the first time thought about the need to develop conceptual documents on national policy. In this regard, in May 1991, an attempt was made to develop the "Fundamentals of the RSFSR legislation on National Policy" (this could not be done due to the resistance of the national republics of the RSFSR) ^{[58, L. 68-70]}.

While in July – August 1991 the State Committee of the RSFSR was actively expanding its activities and improving its structure, the leadership of the USSR tried for the last time to "revive" the State Committee of the USSR. T.G. Ivanova (at that time Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) was proposed for the post of First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR, and P.S. Rudev (at that time Head of the Main Department of Migration and Resettlement of the Ministry of Labor of the USSR) for the post of Deputy Chairman ^{[59, L. 1-11, 18]}. The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR approved both of them in new positions on August 22, 1991. It is not difficult to guess that these appointments no longer made sense, since after the August coup, the hardest processes of destruction of Soviet statehood began, and therefore the fate of the USSR State Committee, which de facto was never formed, worried the leadership of the USSR in the new conditions least of all.

After the August coup, the leadership of the RSFSR actively engaged in "interception" of the main spheres of activity from the leadership of the USSR. In August 1991, the State Committee of the RSFSR raised the issue of transferring "into his hands" the "German question", which previously related to the activities of the USSR leadership ^{[60, l. 2-4, 8-15]}. L.P. Prokopyev proposed to create the Main Directorate for the Problems of Soviet Germans under the State Committee of the RSFSR, emphasizing that the creation of this structure would allow the RSFSR to receive from the FRG financial assistance instead of the USSR (the fact is that the FRG provided financial support to the USSR for the promise of its leadership to contribute to the restoration of the Republic of the Volga Germans). Later, on October 15, 1991 The Council of Ministers of the RSFSR decided to create a Department for the Affairs of Peoples who do not have national-state entities as part of the State Committee of the RSFSR. It is noteworthy that the created Department was supposed to deal not only with German, but also with other peoples, including those living on the territory of other (!) Union republics.

One of the most important activities of Boris Yeltsin after the August coup was the strengthening of the institution of presidential power: for this purpose, in August – September 1991, the Institute of Representatives of the President of the RSFSR and the Institute of Representations of the President of the RSFSR in the national republics of the RSFSR was established. Both institutes will play an important role in promoting the new course of Boris Yeltsin's national policy. On September 7, 1991, in order to strengthen control over the situation in the field of interethnic relations, the Department for the Development of the Federation and National Relations was established in the Administration of the Administration of the President of the RSFSR.

The strengthening of Boris Yeltsin's power was accompanied by the "nationalization" of his positions in national politics, which was expressed in the "revision" of some earlier "sovereignizing" principles. A striking example was the adoption on October 25, 1991 of the RSFSR Law "On the Languages of the Peoples of the RSFSR", according to which Russian was declared the state language (note that the USSR leadership could not achieve the adoption of this formulation) and the language of interethnic communication. Researchers believe that the "Declaration on the Languages of the Peoples of Russia" adopted in accordance with this law was the first step towards creating a "Russian view" of its future language and national policy ^[61]. At the opening of the V Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR (approx. – further, the SND of the RSFSR) On October 28, 1991, Boris Yeltsin made a keynote speech on the new economic course, in which he touched on the problems of national policy: "extremely painful forms" of national revival (i.e., the problem of separatism); the situation of the Russian population outside the RSFSR; the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons. But the most important thing was that Boris Yeltsin said: "... there is a line that we cannot cross under any circumstances. This feature is the territorial integrity of Russia ..." ^[62].

When on November 1, 1991 D.M. Dudaev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic, B.N. Yeltsin came up with the idea of sending troops in order to restore control over the situation. It is known that he failed to do this (due to the opposition of Mikhail Gorbachev and the ambiguous position of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR), however, it is important to note that in this situation Boris Yeltsin acted as a supporter of a hard course aimed at preserving the territorial integrity of the RSFSR. It is noteworthy that Boris Yeltsin's position on the crisis in the Chechen Republic caused a conflict between him and the head of the RSFSR State Committee L.P. Prokopyev, who considered the tightening of positions in national politics in the North Caucasus an ill-considered decision ^{[63, L. 47-48]}. On December 5, 1991, L.P. Prokopyev was removed from office. After that, the State Committee of the RSFSR obeyed the presidential course, which now provided not only for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the RSFSR, but also for increasing manageability in the sphere of interethnic relations ^{[64, l. 15-21]}.

In December 1991, after the conflict with L.P. Prokopyev, B.N. Yeltsin thought about the future of the State Committee of the RSFSR ^{[63, l. 109-112]}. One of the options under consideration even provided for the complete abolition of the State Committee of the RSFSR and the transfer of all issues on national policy to the State Legal Department of the President of the RSFSR, which was established on December 12, 1991 and which included the Department for Interaction with Representative and Executive Authorities and National Policy. Nevertheless, in January 1992, Boris Yeltsin would decide to keep the State Committee of the RSFSR as a counterweight to the growing Council of Nationalities of the RSFSR Armed Forces.

As for the Union state institutions of national policy, since September 1991 they have been paralyzed and de facto ceased to exist, which crossed out all previous stages of the institutionalization of the national policy of the USSR. In the RSFSR, the processes of institutionalization actively continued, but in a different plane. When the registration of the state institutions of national policy in the RSFSR ended, in November – December 1991, the "separation" of approaches to national policy from the President of the RSFSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR began ^{[41, pp. 312-315]}. This process will manifest itself in full force in 1992-1993 within the framework of the worsening political crisis.

Approaching the end of the existence of the USSR in December 1991, it is necessary to summarize the results of the study. It must be said that the process of creation and further development of the State Committee of the USSR and the State Committee of the RSFSR reflects two different approaches to the institutionalization of national policy. The first approach, which was implemented by the leadership of the USSR, was conservative, clumsy and focused on traditional party forms of decision-making. Because of this, from 1986 to 1988, the leadership of the USSR did not attempt to create a working system of state institutions of national policy (all issues continued to be solved "in the old way", within the framework of party structures).

The first state institution responsible for the implementation of national policy was the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Armed Forces, which was established in December 1988. However, its activities were started only in the summer of 1989, i.e. three years after the first interethnic conflicts in the USSR began. The question of the creation of the USSR State Committee was raised in the summer of 1988, but its creation was delayed until March 1990. At the same time, it is important to note that it was created under the pressure of external circumstances, primarily due to the fact that in November 1989 the State Committee of the RSFSR was created. When the State Committee of the USSR was created de jure, then for two years it remained existing only "on paper". From time to time there were attempts to "resuscitate" him, but they all ended unsuccessfully.

Mikhail Gorbachev demonstrated unwillingness to rely on the State Committee of the USSR in the implementation of national policy, preferring either to use party structures (at the beginning), or to expand his own power (later, due to the "decline" of party structures). This was due to the fact that he was sincerely convinced that problems in the sphere of interethnic relations could be solved by signing a new Union Treaty covering the entire spectrum of problems of Soviet statehood. As a result, it turned out that by betting on the preparation of a new Union Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev missed the opportunity to complete the institutionalization of the national policy of the USSR. The Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces of the USSR could not ensure the implementation of a comprehensive national policy in the USSR, since this required a state body that could implement its decisions in the field of interethnic relations.

The second approach to the institutionalization of national policy was implemented by the leadership of the RSFSR. This approach implied active support for the activities of State institutions of national policy. The leadership of the RSFSR achieved the creation of the Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces of the RSFSR in October 1989, and in the summer of 1990 it already began to work (i.e., when interethnic conflicts in the RSFSR had just begun to emerge). At the same time, in November 1989, the State Committee of the RSFSR was created, a special state body responsible for the implementation of national policy in the RSFSR (in March 1990, it had already begun its activities). The creation of the State Committee of the RSFSR pointed to two important facts: firstly, the leadership of the RSFSR was much more aware of the need for a comprehensive institutionalization of national policy (i.e., the creation of all its elements: both legislative and executive); secondly, the leadership of the RSFSR was able to realize the value of the State Committee of the RSFSR as a tool for promoting independent national policy in the face of confrontation with the leadership of the USSR.

The fact that the leadership of the RSFSR considered the State Committee of the RSFSR as a "political tool" was the reason for such significant attention to this state body. It is worth noting that such "politicization" of the activities of the State Committee of the RSFSR was characteristic of the entire period under review in 1989-1991. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the RSFSR conducted a very flexible and risky national policy (especially since the summer of 1990), which was supposed to give "political points" in the fight against the leadership of the USSR. It is important to note that such "politicization" significantly weakened the activities of the State Committee of the RSFSR, which was often forced to adjust its positions in accordance with the current political course of Boris Yeltsin. In September - December 1991, this led to the fact that during the next "change of course", the Chairman of the State Committee of the RSFSR L.P. Prokopyev, unwilling to adjust the activities of the State Committee of the RSFSR again, criticized the new course, because of which he was subsequently removed from office.

And the fact that after that Boris Yeltsin thought about the expediency of further preservation of the State Committee of the RSFSR, once again testified to the "utilitarian attitude" of the leadership of the RSFSR to this state body. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that with all the shortcomings of this approach, the "political relevance" of the State Committee of the RSFSR was the reason that this state body existed and actively worked, unlike the State Committee of the USSR. It turned out that the use of the State Committee of the RSFSR for political purposes made it possible to complete the process of institutionalization of national policy in the RSFSR (i.e., made this process "politically valuable" for the leadership of the RSFSR).