The Russian Army on the Eve of the Crimean War: Between Myth and Reality

Ilyichev Anton Vladimirovich Junior researcher, Museum of the Heroic Defense and Liberation of Sevastopol 299020, Russia, Sevastopol, General Ostryakov Ave., 250-V, sq. 11 ilichev-toni@mail.ru Other publications by this author

            The Crimean War is a complex page in the domestic and foreign historical discourse. On the one hand, the events of 1853-1856 demonstrated the courage, heroism, fortitude and bravery of the Russian people, shown during the Battle of Sinop, the defense of Sevastopol (1854-1855), the fighting in the Caucasus. The reverse side of the medal is the tragic outcome of the "Russian Iliad", which ended with the difficult conditions of the Paris Peace Treaty. Traditionally, the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian Empire in the war include the technical lag of Russian troops from foreign armies ^{[6],[19],[21, c. 90],[2]}. Focusing on this issue is not only erroneous, but also leads the discourse away from discussing the shortcomings of the military organization of the empire, which led to such a tragic outcome.

            Before proceeding to the consideration of the problems of the military system of the Russian Empire in the middle of the XIX century, it is worth paying a few words to the issues of armament. The myth of the serious technical backwardness of the Russian troops and the factor of "rifled weapons" has been thoroughly dispelled by modern researchers. At the beginning of the Crimean campaign, only 75 percent of the British army was armed with new Minier rifles, while the French were armed only with Zouaves and Guards. The Russian troops also had rifled weapons. Although not in such a large number ^{[4, p. 98],[71, p. 15-24]}.

            Russian Russian army's main reasons for the defeat in the Crimean War lay in the fundamental foundations of the organization of the Russian war system of that period. Many of these shortcomings were not corrected by the XX century, which played a significant role in the defeat of the empire in the Russian-Japanese and the First World War.

            Soviet historian L.G. Beskrovny wrote that the genesis of destructive principles in the Russian military system was laid during the reign of Emperor Paul I ^{[5, p. 10]}. Similar views were held by other authors, noting the emperor's thoughtless copying of the Prussian military machine ^{[37, p. 228, 239-240],[74, p. 15-18]}. Such a critical view of the reforms of Paul I is well-established in Russian historiography. Military historian A. Kersnovsky rightly noted on this occasion: "Emperor Pavel Petrovich is the most maligned monarch of Russian history. His contemporaries did not appreciate him, posterity did not understand, looking at events through the eyes of contemporaries. He was seen only as a tyrant who exiled the Horse Guards directly from the watch parade to Siberia for poor alignment, a despot who banned the word "citizen", the wearing of tailcoats and round hats "as they are typical of godless French regisides" — and who made all the barriers and guardhouses of the Empire match the color of his favorite's gloves. They did not see, did not want to see either his highly chivalrous soul, nor the kind and sympathetic heart of the hot-tempered but outgoing Emperor, nor, most importantly, the time spent by the Tsarevich sadly and abnormally away from the throne, almost in exile" ^[34]

            In recent years, modern researchers, based on a broad source base, have begun to revise the established views on the reforms of Paul I. The Russian emperor's military reform was based on the goal of ridding the empire's military system of the shortcomings that were rapidly developed during his mother's period. To restore order in drill and military regulations, to rid the armed forces of embezzlement, abuse, to establish discipline in the troops and material support for soldiers and officers.

            The first blow was dealt to the "privileges of the officer class". The nobility, according to Peter I's plan, was to become the basis and the most select part of the officer corps. However, since the era of the palace revolution, a gradual process begins to expand their class freedoms. The peak of these processes is reached during the reign of Catherine II. The service of nobles in the army turns from duties into a formality.

            The XVIII century. in many ways and indicators is the peak of the glory of the Russian imperial weapons. However, behind the facade of the geniuses of Suvorov A.V. and Rumyantsev P.A., unsightly problems in the military industry were hidden, which required significant reformation. This is especially typical for the end of the XVIII century, when power in the empire is concentrated in the hands of Catherine II's favorites. At this time, the military sphere is actively suffering from: corruption, abuse (including in the system of rank production, when promotions were received mainly for personal connections and origin, and not for abilities), a significant drop in discipline in guards units ^{[65, pp. 278-314],[70, p. 39, 148],[1, pp. 141-146],[32, pp. 7-17],[51, p. 6],[52, p. 134],[34]}

Paul I began to fight all these destructive processes decisively and radically. First of all, in 1796 the "Military Charter on field Infantry Service" was adopted, which significantly contributed to overcoming abuses against lower ranks ^{[56, p. 247]}. During the 4 years of the reign of Emperor Paul I, more military regulations were adopted than in all the previous years of the empire's existence ^[72]. Most of the provisions of these documents continued to operate in the XIX century

The next step was the revision of the officer staff, during which all officers formally registered in the troops were excluded ^{[74, p. 131],[34]}.

During the reign of Paul I, the clothing supply in the troops was significantly improved. Here is how the authors of the XX century write about this: "In view of the shortage of cloth in the markets, its high cost and poor quality, Emperor Paul I ordered that cloth for generals and officers be harvested through the commissariat, and he completed this difficult task with success... The uniforms and equipment of the troops were apparently in good condition. The clothing vacations established at that time should be recognized as generally sufficient. Under Paul I, the troops were only dissatisfied with the cut of the clothes" ^{[69, p. 123]}.

The life of soldiers under Paul I was significantly improved due to the construction of barracks and quartering of personnel in them, an increase in salaries, improvement of medical services, a ban on voluntary work, the introduction of awards for enlisted personnel (the insignia of the Order of St. Anna) ^{[35, p. 88],[34]}. 

            The uniform changes carried out by Paul I were also heavily criticized by contemporaries. The transformation was based on the Prussian uniform of the time of Frederick II and part of the uniform of the sample of 1763 (this concerned pants). Unlike the Prussian, the Russian infantry uniform did not have such an ornate and rich finish, and also did not have serious differences between officer and ordinary models. The Pavlovian uniforms were examined in detail by E.I. Yurkevich in the article "Uniforms of the Russian army during the reign of Emperor Paul I (1796-1801): Analysis and evaluation". In the work, the author highlights the following positive features of the reform: the unification of uniforms, the introduction of "dark green" as the main color in almost all branches of the armed forces, the appearance of a sheepskin vest and overcoat for winter time ^{[75, p. 181, 185]}. Among the advantages of Paul I's reforms in this area, Yurkevich E.I. highlights the improvement of clothing supplies and the reduction in the cost of guards uniforms from 120 rubles to 22 ^{[75, p. 183]}. In his work, the author comes to the conclusion that the form of Paul I was quite convenient and practical and suited the linear tactics of combat. A number of elements with minor changes reached the XX century . At the same time, Yurkevich E.I. notes that the uniform of Alexander I and Nicholas I was more inconvenient and impractical for soldiers ^{[75, p. 183, 184, 186]}. This point of view is confirmed by other uniformologists. K.V. Tatarnikov writes the following on this occasion: "... As for the functional properties, it is still a big question how much the shako with a lot of jewelry introduced under Emperor Alexander was more convenient than a triangular hat, a short–cut uniform with a stiff standing collar and tightly buttoned to all buttons in any weather - a caftan with a doublet, and wide criss-crossed ammunition belts, sometimes squeezing the shoulders and chest to numbness, and a satchel worn on the back – the former ammunition… In fact, "the Pavlovsky uniform had only one, but very serious, from the point of view of the people who wore it, drawback – it was unfashionable" ^{[64, pp. 37-38]}. The reconstructor and uniformologist Egorov V.I. described his impressions of the Alexander suit as follows: "The overcoat is an excellent, most comfortable thing ... however, having turned into a roll and taken its rightful place in the system of ammunition belts, it loses a lot of its useful qualities. The notorious straps are entirely shoulder straps… First, a cleaver sling is put on (with a cleaver); then, crosswise, a handbag (with a cartridge bag). This is followed by a roll, rolled as thinly as possible. And finally, everything is "sealed" on top with a satchel on two shoulder straps with one transverse. It is impossible to equip yourself correctly – you need the help of comrades ... The result resembled a cocoon. All objects are absolutely motionless and largely non-functional. You can't get anything out of the satchel... The manerka tied to it is tied tightly: there is water, there is no water – you still can't take a sip… After a couple of hours of being in a routine "package" ... the arms and shoulders began to go numb, the chest languished in discomfort" ^{[20, p. 48]}.

            Negative assessments of the Alexander form are also found in the pre-revolutionary period ^[29].

            The Pavlovian reforms in their scope require a comprehensive review in a separate study. As part of this work, we can only note that they laid the foundations and set the subsequent vector for the development of military affairs in Russia in the XIX – early XX century. Professor Fischer A. wrote about the Pavlovian reforms: "Paul's military reforms were reduced to a clearer organization, rapid mobilization and greater maneuverability of the army, ... were also aimed at the unification of training and the elimination of corruption" ^{[18, p. 368]}.

By the beginning of the Crimean War, the armed forces of the Russian Empire were organized according to the Prussian/French model. The field army consisted of 4 corps, three infantry, one cavalry and artillery division each. The division was formed from two brigades, two regiments each. The regiment could include from three to six battalions. At the time of the Crimean campaign, the Russian Empire could field an army of almost a million people ^{[77, p. 13]}. At first glance, this figure may impress. However, upon closer examination, it can be noted that this number was by no means commensurate with the quality of the troops. This can be directly linked to the current system of recruiting troops and the training system.

            In the middle of the XIX century, Russian troops were replenished by "recruiting". Representatives of the taxable population of the Russian Empire were called up for 20-25 years of military service. Considering that the majority of this category of citizens were peasants, the main burden of recruiting the armed forces fell on them. Despite one of the highest population growth rates in Europe, the Russian army regularly experienced a shortage of personnel ^{[5, p. 6]}. This was directly related to the economic system of the Russian Empire, the basis of which was the serfdom system. Landlords regularly sabotaged the expansion of recruitment, as they were interested in preserving their workforce. In addition, the recruit who returned after military service was released from serfdom.

A significant stratum of the Russian population (nobles, merchants, clergy) was completely exempted from military service, and this is from 5 to 6 million people.

The peasants were mostly illiterate or completely illiterate, which from a military point of view caused significant harm to the quality of training of troops. British historians J. Sweetman and P. Mercer added to this another thesis that peasants forcibly conscripted into the Russian army markedly contrasted in matters of moral and motivational qualities with European armies recruited at the expense of volunteers ^{[62, p. 203]}. A similar point of view was held by the most prominent Soviet military historian, a follower of the school of X. Delbryuk, Svechin. A.A. Here's what he writes: "In the Nikolaev army there was neither that restraining principle that the high cost of recruitment brings to the enlisted armies, nor that thrifty attitude to the soldier, which is a natural consequence of the general, extending to all classes of military service; as a result, "here a person is protected, as in the Turkish a shootout that will be given empty ones by force" ^{[57, p. 17]}.

The recruitment system and the long term of military service caused significant damage to such an important element as the military (mobilization) reserve. This led to the fact that the Russian army consisted of two completely different units in terms of the qualities of the troops: a well-trained active army and an almost completely incapacitated reserve ^{[22, p. 409]}. In the Prussian army, a recruit could retire after 8 years of service, while in the Russian it was possible to do so, with the most favorable outcome, only after 13-15 years ^{[57, p. 16],[5, p. 77]}. In combination with supply problems and insufficient level of development of the medical unit, most of the 212 thousand reservists could not serve due to health problems ^{[57, p. 16],[33, p. 277],[22, p. 410],[24, p. 19]}. Russian Russian Colonel S.V. Gavrilov also writes about serious problems in the supply of provisions to the Russian army in his study "Features of quartermaster supply in the Russian Army in the first half of the XIX century." Here is an example from his research that directly concerns the Crimean War. Small food stores were responsible for supplying the garrisons defending the coast of the Crimean Peninsula ^{[10, p. 62]}. Their assortment was replenished due to supplies from the mainland by horse-drawn transport. The overall quality of roads in the Tauride province, even before the war, left much to be desired, as we know from the memories of people who visited the region ^{[73, p. 19]}. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Crimea, the general condition of land transport routes has deteriorated significantly. Already in September 1854, the assortment of the mentioned stores ends, which is why all the issues of food supply fall on the Simferopol Food Commission. This leads to a direct threat of starvation of the armed forces in the Crimea, which, thanks to a number of measures, was subsequently avoided ^{[10, p. 62]}. Baron Colmar von der Goltz (Prussian general, author of the reforms of the Ottoman army in the 1880s, which allowed the Turks to win the war with Greece in 1897) wrote about the direct relationship of the armed forces of the state with the economic and logistics system in his work "Armed People/An essay on the structure of the army and the way of waging war in our time":

"The modern army is somehow a monster, needs constant nutrition and, like Antey (approx. Antaeus – in ancient Greek mythology, a giant, the son of Poseidon and Gaia, who drew his strength from contact with the earth), retains his strength only as long as she is able to draw it from mother earth, i.e. the fatherland" ^{[14, p. 427]}

About the problems of supplies in the Crimean War and the besieged Sevastopol, P.I. Gradov, an orderly, Lieutenant General S.A. Khruleva, writes.:

"It is painful to see that all the works of Gorchakov and Zatler are spoiled by dishonest performers. Some company commander of a mobile store makes from a thousand to two thousand rubles a month; the cattle are starved and there is no kit in any company. In Bakhchisarai, hay stocks were burned to avoid inspection....The caretakers stole even more; not to mention the firewood that was almost sold for its weight in gold; the wards were heated by the breathing of patients. Hay and straw were changed in the mattress very rarely, because 2 rubles were released for pud and others were shamelessly put on typhoid mattresses and vaccinated with typhus. Linen was also rarely washed, although money was released for laundresses – but weak ones were used for this, and the expenditure was carried out regularly and the reporting on paper was perfect" ^{[61, p. 43, 50]}.  

            Similar problems are reported by another participant in the Crimean War and the defense of Sevastopol, N.S. Milosevic.:

"After the Battle of Inkerman, the Crimean army could not put 30,000 bayonets into operation, and diseases and hospitals reduced it daily. The state of the hospitals was terrible; there was an extreme shortage of doctors, and there were no medicines and hospital supplies at all. But the prevailing obstacle to military operations was the lack of food: there was no quartermaster unit in the army, the country was devastated, the roads were impassable and it was impossible to even think about collecting 7 days' worth of food for 30-40 tons of people in Sevastopol" ^{[39, p. 31]}.

Staff Captain E. Arbuzov wrote the following in his memoirs:

"In general, the sanitary unit at the troops at that time left a lot to be desired. In bandages and lint (approx. Linen or cotton rags divided into threads, used as a dressing material) felt a terrible shortage, and meanwhile, the storerooms of the Simferopol post office were overflowing with them, due to their enormous shipment from all over Russia. Lint and bandages were only with the infirmary trucks and were used as a jewel; the soldiers did not have them with them.…Before going to winter quarters, the food of people and horses was very miserable. Often it was necessary to have neither hay nor oats for three days; crackers and cereals were given out by people carelessly, and they had not seen vodka for more than two months. The items of food that were used by the markintants of the troops were sold at a fabulously high price..." ^{[3, p. 393, 407]}

A number of authors, on the basis of the "high mobilization potential" of the Russian Empire and a huge number of military personnel, put forward the thesis that "the failure of the Nikolaev military machine is a myth" ^{[36, c. 57-59, 79-82, 182],[78, c. 243]}. It is difficult to dispute the fact that the Russian army on the eve of the Crimean War was one of the most numerous armies on the continent, as well as the fact that during the war years it was possible to mobilize a huge number of recruits. However, the "solvency/insolvency" of any military machine does not depend on the number of armed forces. Military science has known for a long time that wars are won not by quantity, but by skill. It was also known in pre-revolutionary Russia:

"All European armies compete with each other in improving the technical advantages of rifles and in a common desire to improve infantry fire. A lot of effort is spent on inventions and the choice of the best weapons, millions are spent by the state on its acquisition. But in order for the strength of the army to increase in proportion to the costs made, it is necessary that the art of shooting should be on a par with the dignity of the weapon. Bullets fired from a gun aimed by an inexperienced hand will burrow into the ground or fly over the enemy's heads, regardless of the dignity of the weapon" ^{[7, p. 256]}

The lack of a reserve base of the Mykolaiv system led to the fact that the government was forced to en masse recruit without any training and training ^{[40],[24, p. 18]}. Naturally, such formations could not equally resist the professional armies of England and France. Thus, the army of the Russian Empire in the XIX century had an extremely large personnel for peacetime, but absolutely insufficient in the case of war.

The problems of maintenance concerned not only the rank and file, but also the junior officers. The salaries of chief officers were rarely enough even to satisfy ordinary needs ^{[50, p. 288]}. In this regard, officers who had no other sources of income were forced to turn to benefactors or moneylenders. Financial problems also concerned pensions. It was possible to receive a full pension salary in case of reaching the staff officer rank and a total length of service of 35 years. In the German army, a pension for the military was paid only in case of inability to continue further service (due to age or health). In addition, they were employed by the state in the corps of zemstvo gendarmes and the civil service.  The half-pension (of a lieutenant colonel), in case of an earlier retirement than under the conditions indicated above, was ^{[43, p. 378-380]}: 215 rubles. It was almost impossible for a person, especially a family one, to live exclusively on this amount ^{[44, p. 178]}. The problem of disability pension provision is touched upon in the article "On the appointment of pensions from disabled capital" in the Military Collection of January 1894. The author questions the theses voiced by historian Solovyov in his monograph "Pensions to military officers and their families in Russia, Germany, Austria and France":

"1) to assign pensions from the disabled capital to the wounded of all three classes, but not by rank, but by classes of wounds, and to establish only three pension sizes: one for the wounded of the 1st class, the other for the 2nd class and the third for the wounded of the 3rd class. 2) to assign pensions to the wounded only upon retirement" ^{[46, p. 153]}.

According to the author of the article, such a decision is impractical because higher ranks have a much wider range of responsibilities, as well as needs, which undoubtedly entails the need for higher pension payments ^{[46, p. 153-155]}:

"Ranks, as well as official position in general, expand the range and size of needs, for example: a general needs an apartment more extensive and more decent than an officer..." ^{[46, p. 155]}

 Financial difficulties affected not only non-commissioned officers, but also chief officers. In the article of the Military Collection from 1870 , considering officer auxiliary capitals , the author writes the following: "A large number of those who wanted to get a loan from the officers' capital were, in turn, due to the insufficiency of the officers' funds, both due to the increasing cost of living for all vital needs from year to year, and therefore excessive cheapening of money, and due to unaccustomed to thrift and, at the same time, various undertakings incongruous with the limited means of the officer.... In the regimental officer's sum, the owners of net capital, unencumbered by debts, were, for the most part, only officers who were fully provided with any private means: income from the estate, who had it, interest on the capital inherited, or some kind of monetary allowance from sufficient parents…Of the poor people, who had neither patrimony nor capital, only old-serving officers, who at the same time had great means, great experience and great ability to live, belonged to the lucky owners of "pure" officer capital. The rest of the officers were, as they say, in debt" ^{[45, p. 306]}.    

It is worth noting that the problems with the maintenance of the officer corps were typical not only for the Russian Empire, but also for other powers of that time, in particular Great Britain ^[38],[68]. A. I. Denikin also wrote about the unfavorable financial situation of the officer corps in his work "The Way of the Russian Officer" ^[16].

A serious problem of the Russian army of the Nicholas era was the quality of the command staff. The officer corps at that time was completed at the expense of: graduates of the academy who voluntarily entered the service (mostly nobles) and by recruitment. The first category was small and basically entered the service of the Guard. Regarding the second category, it was she who represented the basis for the replenishment of the officer corps. Having passed a simple exam for a cadet, the nobles entered the service where they could receive an officer rank in a few years. Non-commissioned officers, for the same purpose (obtaining an officer's rank), had to serve 10-18 years as a non-commissioned officer, pass a difficult exam and pass a probationary period of one year ^[23].

The famous Soviet historian P.A. Zaionchkovsky wrote about the low quality of officer training in the pre-reform period ^{[24, p. 29]}. This problem concerned not only the second, but also the first category. Zaionchkovsky P.A. writes about this: "The amount of knowledge of general education subjects received in cadet corps was very low, and the quality of teaching was at an extremely low level, which was explained by the general state of education in the pre-reform era and its certain orientation" ^{[24, p. 30]}. The volume, directly, of military knowledge in specialized institutions was extremely small, and the emphasis was on drill. This leads to the fact that most of the officer stratum after graduation was not aware of the specifics of the service. It is worth noting that even with such significant problems, the traditions of Suvorov and Kutuzov continued to be preserved in the armed forces. As P.A. Zaionchkovsky himself rightly notes: "not only the "heroes" of the inspections and parade grounds came out of educational institutions, but also genuine heroes – heroes of Sevastopol ^{[24, p. 31]}."

A relatively complete system of chinoproduction in Russia was introduced with the establishment of the consription during the reformation of Milutin D.A. Before that, the imperial army used the principle laid down by Peter I. Naturally, with the development of the state and military science, it was significantly expanded and supplemented with new provisions and paragraphs. In Prussia, a strict and efficient system of chinoproduction was formed in 1808 (and has not changed much since that period). In France, similar transformations took place in 1838. And in Austria only in 1866.

The principle of personal merit was the basis of Peter I's rank production, which allowed many talented and capable officers to break through, regardless of their origin ^{[66, p. 35]}. Already from the period of the "Palace Coups", Peter I's reforms in this area are beginning to be supplemented. By the middle of the XIX century, this leads to excessive bureaucratization and the accumulation of the entire system of chinoproduction. Many provisions were literally mutually exclusive ^{[31, p. 267]}. Empresses Anna Ioannovna and Catherine II introduced a factor into this system that negatively affected the quality of all officers in the future – the principle of promotion by "seniority and dignity" ^[54]. It has led to a significant increase in corruption in the chinoproduction system. In fact, it was almost impossible to get further promotion without someone's patronage or connections. This situation led to serious dissatisfaction with the stratum of officers who did not belong to noble houses and did not have patrons ^{[9, p. 73]}.

Problems in the system of chinoproduction were not a feature of the Russian Imperial military machine, but were characteristic to one degree or another for all European armies of the XIX – early XX century. In France, an officer could receive a staff officer rank only after 40 years ^{[63, p. 98]}. In the German Army, an ober-officer had to serve for 14-16 years to get the rank of captain or captain, and 20-25 years to get a staff officer ^{[42, p. 183]}. In Great Britain, there was a vicious practice of buying officer ranks until the end of the XIX century, which led to a complete washout of professional military personnel in the officer corps.

The American historian R. Riiz in his work "The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856-1917" put forward the thesis about the absence in Russia, on the eve of the Crimean War, of the officer corps as a professional military organization. The author begins the argumentation of his point of view by saying that the officers of the Russian Imperial Army defined their personal and corporate interests not as a military structure, but as a social class ^{[76, p. 28]}. As an evidence base, R. Riiz cites the research data of John Kiip and P. Zayonchkovsky on this issue. John Kiip writes that the social climate in Russia did not contribute to the formation of horizontal ties among officers ^{[79, p. 232]}. In addition, he notes that the very idea of the absence of such a phenomenon as an officer corps in pre-revolutionary Russia is not new. It originates in the XIX century and is associated with the observations of Shedo-Ferroti who wrote about the absence of Russian officers of what the French call "esprit de corps".

R. Riiz writes about the high level of conflict in the officer environment of the Russian imperial army: the conflict between hereditary nobles and personal nobles, rich and poor, nobles and non-nobles ^{[76, p. 30]}. From the evidence, he also cites an excerpt from the "Sevastopol Stories" by L.N. Tolstoy:

"For Captain Obzhogov, staff Captain Mikhailov is an aristocrat, because he has a clean overcoat and gloves, and he can't stand him for it, although he respects him a little; for staff Captain Mikhailov, adjutant Kalugin is an aristocrat, because he is an adjutant and on "you" with another adjutant, and for this he is not quite he is well disposed towards him, although he is afraid of him. For Kalugin's adjutant, Count Nordov is an aristocrat, and he always scolds him and despises him in his soul for being an adjutant wing. The terrible word aristocrat. Why does Sub-lieutenant Zobov laugh so forcibly, although there is nothing funny, passing by his comrade who is sitting with a staff officer? To prove by this that, although he is not an aristocrat, he is still no worse than them. Why does the staff officer speak in such a weak, lazy-sad, not his own voice? To prove to his interlocutor that he is an aristocrat and very gracious when talking to a sub-lieutenant. Why is the Junker waving his arms and winking like that, going after a lady whom he sees for the first time and whom he would never dare to approach? To show all the officers that, despite the fact that he takes off his hat to them, he is still an aristocrat and he has a lot of fun. Why did the artillery captain treat the good-natured orderly so rudely? To prove to everyone that he never ingratiates himself and does not need aristocrats, etc., etc., etc." ^[67].

At first glance, the opinion of the American historian can be presented as an attempt to belittle and belittle the officer corps in Russia, which fits perfectly within the framework of modern Russophobic discourse in the world. However, with a more detailed consideration of the issue, it acquires a slightly different facet. The high conflict described by R. Riiz in the officer environment of the Russian imperial army in the middle of the XIX century clearly correlates with the general patterns and problems of the socio-economic development of the empire. Confirmation of this is also found in the works of the Russian historian P.A. Zayonchovsky ^{[24],[25],[26],[27]}.

Here are some examples demonstrating conflicts in the officer environment from the memoirs of participants in the Crimean War:

"Unfortunately, the secret spring in their beliefs was selfishness. A successful battle from the city eliminated them from the glory that would have gone to the Sevastopol chiefs, and that's why Vrevsky came to make himself the glory of a combat general; he didn't have enough reputation as an intelligent and useful cabinet administrator" ^{[60, p. 43]}.

 "I cannot keep silent how amazed I was when I personally saw the lifestyle of quartermaster officials who gathered in circles, began to carouse and gamble, so that large piles of gold were formed on the green table in front of each subject, which often passed from one subject to another; at the same time, various misunderstandings and screams, but it didn't come to a fight" ^{[55, p.50-51]}.

"From the letter where I described Menshikov to you, it is clear that I was telling the truth: he is not fit to be a commander, a miser, – it's true, the whole family is like that, proof of Sousa, –a dry sarcastic, a notorious egoist–is this a commander? How he launched the administration, all the messages, the entire medical part. This is terrible! And in return, what did you do strategically? Absolutely nothing. He made plans, but did not know how to watch their execution, because he lacked the ability to do it; he did not know either soldiers or military leaders; surrounded himself with insignificant people, did not consult anyone; – nothing came of it" ^{[53, p. 115]}

"And indeed, if the lower ranks never violated the honor and subordination, then the commanders of the units often evaded the exact execution of orders, and the higher they were in the ranks, the more they considered themselves entitled to self-will in the name of higher considerations. Prince Meshshikov, not without reason, said that he had generals in the Crimea who could command units, but there was not one who could obey" ^{[8, p. 213]}.

R. Riiz notes that such a problem was typical not only for Russia, but also for Great Britain and Prussia. After the Crimean War, D.A. Milyutin, as part of the military reform, tried to solve this problem by: 1) an increase in the number of military educational institutions 2) an increase in the complexity of exams 3) an expansion of the social stratum of officers by increasing the number of representatives of the working class in it.

The problem of military education, when most of the officers were poorly informed about military affairs and practically had no combat experience, was clearly manifested during the Crimean War. At the same time, another painful points related to the officer corps were revealed – the passivity of the generals and the ambiguity in the wording of orders.

Nicholas I paid special attention to the development of military education ^{[11, p. 90],[13, p. 1],[12, p. 11]}. During his reign, in fact, there was a complete formation of the system of military education in the Russian Empire in a foreign (modern) manner. However, as Major General of the General Staff N.P. Glinoetsky notes, the first 20 years of this process are characterized by significant difficulties and constant quadrille transformations of curricula ^{[13, pp. 38-39]}. Among the disadvantages of this period, the author also attributes excessive enthusiasm for drill training ^{[13, pp. 46-47]}. The process of creating a centralized, modern system is complex and lengthy, which is why the good beginnings of Nicholas I were completed only in the era of "Great Reforms".

In the issue of the Military Collection of 1896, the article "The real value of independence in the command system in the war" was published ^[17]. Within its framework, the author analyzed the Battle of Werth, which took place during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). For the Prussian army, this battle almost turned from a great victory into a catastrophic defeat. As the author notes, the reason for this was the passivity of the army commander and the ambiguity of the orders given by the general Staff ^{[17, p. 66]}. Exactly the same problems plagued the Russian army in Crimea throughout the Crimean War.

In the Battle of Alma, the commander-in-chief of the military land and naval forces in the Crimea, Adjutant General A.S. Menshikov chose the initially correct and correct position. S.V. Chennyk in his work rightly notes that in this battle A.S. Menshikov anticipated the "Flank position" described by General Helmut von Moltke ^{[71, p. 34]}. The position of the Russian troops did not allow the enemy fleet to support its forces due to the remoteness of the coast. And the enemy's ground units were forced to attack the enemy head-on, under heavy artillery fire, or to make long roundabout maneuvers. Most likely, according to the plan of A.S. Menshikov, the Russian army was supposed to hold the defense, stop the enemy's offensive and take advantage of the success achieved to launch a counterattack. However, the original plan failed miserably, and the Russian army failed to hold the position for more than 4 hours. The reason for this was several:

1)      Passivity of both the commander-in-chief and his subordinates. The Russian officers were completely tied to their own positions and refused to take advantage of maneuvering. The commander-in-chief himself did not bother with the problems of supply and organization of the rear part, which is why many soldiers were left without ammunition in the thick of the battle.

2)       Ambiguity in the wording of orders and tasks for officers. The cavalry did not participate in the battle at all, although it could be used to delay part of the enemy forces.

3) "Tactical illiteracy" of the command staff. The lack of competent interaction between infantry and artillery (the exception is the events at the Great Redoubt), the emphasis on frontal bayonet attacks, ignoring soldiers armed with union rifles, the use of outdated linear tactics of combat.

All these problems plagued the Russian army in the Inkerman and Chernorechensk battles. Let us dwell in detail on the last sore point of the Nikolaev military system – the tactics of the troops.

Linear tactics were developed by Prussian military figures of the late XVIII – early XIX centuries . It was a tactical configuration of troops in closed formations in several (or one) lines. Within the framework of linear tactics, soldiers and officers were required to automatically execute commands and completely exclude the initiative as such. Thus, the troops mechanically achieved the cohesion of the army's battle formations.

In the first half of the XIX century, the concept of "deep tactics" was actively developed. France was an apologist in this direction. The formation of "deep tactics" began in the revolutionary French army. It acquired its final form thanks to the reforms of Napoleon I ^{[5, p. 102]}. The effectiveness of the new tactics, combined with changes in the principles of recruitment, organization and training of the army, was vividly demonstrated during the Napoleonic Wars.

In the Russian Empire, P. Rumyantsev, A. Suvorov, M. Kutuzov were engaged in the development of "deep tactics" in the troops. Here is how P.A. Zaionchkovsky described it:

The "deep" tactics provided for such a battle order in which each military unit was echeloned in depth, as a result of which it was provided with its own reserve. In addition, a special mobile reserve was created, which was also located in the depths. Different types of combat corresponded to different formations: firing — loose formation, attack — column…… If in the conditions of linear tactics only automatic execution of the command was required, then in the "deep" it was replaced by an order requiring reasonable execution" ^{[24, p. 32]}.

The developments of the great Russian commanders anticipated the reforms of the Prussian Landwehr, which allowed them to defeat the French military machine. However, these ideas did not receive proper development in the pre-reform army. Instead, the drafters of the military regulations of the 20-50s tried to combine the provisions of linear and deep tactics. The attempt to combine these mutually exclusive systems was initially doomed to failure. As a result, the military department developed five main battle formations, in case of the main typical situations that could arise in battle. This leads to a natural result – the destruction of the officers' initiative as such, because instead of analyzing the current situation, they relied solely on published orders.

The emphasis on "linear teaching" can be explained by the "Gatchina traditions" prevailing in the Russian imperial army, thanks to representatives of the Holstein-Gotorp dynasty (Paul I, Alexander I, Nicholas I and Alexander II) ^{[57, p. 27]}. Russian Russian emperors of the first half of the XIX century actively tried to transfer the main achievements and advantages of the Prussian military system to the Russian army. On the one hand, the adaptation of advanced developments that have proven themselves positively in other armies carries only a "positive aspect". However, the blind copying that was undertaken by Paul I introduces only a serious destructive beginning to the entire armed system. Unfortunately, as a result of the military reform of Alexander I and Nicholas I, only the most negative aspect of the Prussian military system – the "Prussian drill" - was consolidated. It aimed to prepare soldiers not for combat conditions, but to give the troops a beautiful external effect during parades and shows ^{[24, p. 33],[5, p. 106]}.

Shooting was given catastrophically little attention. Historian A. Kersnovsky writes that only 6 rounds per person were allocated for shooting per year ^{[33, p. 282]}. P.A. Zayonchkovsky also writes about the insignificant number of cartridges allocated for shooting training ^{[24, p. 33]}. People involved in the army of that period write about the problems with the fire training of troops in their memoirs. So in Davydov 's memoirs there is the following epichod:

"After several lessons with a non-commissioned officer, Samarin and I were curious whether the teacher himself could shoot, and to our surprise, we learned that he, who knows all the art of throwing to the smallest detail, had never fired a gun, and did not have to try, because they did not give out charges for training to shoot..." ^{[15, p. 46]}

The author also writes about the problems mentioned above, and "From the notes of a Sevastopol resident":

"The soldiers only cared about what was required of him – cleanliness, bearing, pace, but something that was really necessary for the war, like "target shooting", seemed to him like a whim of the authorities, since many people got away with the lack of shooting skills at the shows... for him it represented a kind of punishment because she was given hours intended for rest and looked at everything through her fingers ..." ^{[28, p. 1585]}

Instead of shooting, for which time was allocated for rest, soldiers were trained for parades. In order to achieve the effect when the bayonet remains monolithic (does not waver when moving), and the gun itself rings when demonstrating training techniques, many commanders went to deliberately damage equipment (loosening the screws of the rifle) ^{[33, p. 282]}.

Pre-revolutionary authors wrote about the need for practical training and shooting with live ammunition. Here is an excerpt from a Military collection from 1911 .:

"In order to raise this training department, it is necessary first of all to transfer tactics, i.e. combat techniques, to shooting ranges and turn them from large shooting ranges for target shooting to shooting areas for solving tactical tasks with live ammunition. Of course, this is not an easy task and requires a lot of money, but in this case the goal justifies the means to achieve it… Our soldier is harder to teach a lot than a German, a Frenchman, and maybe even a Japanese. But he undoubtedly has the ability to understand the requirements directly in practice, if possible, without distractions" ^{[41, p. 3-4]}.

It is fair to note that the top leadership was aware of the low level of fire training in the infantry, on the eve of the Crimean War. In 1852, an inspection was carried out, according to the results of which the sovereign-emperor was provided with a report of the inspector of rifle battalions, Lieutenant General Ramzai, with the following contents ^{[5, p. 110-111]}:

Two more problems of the Mykolaiv military system are closely related to the issues of personnel training – these are uniforms and military production.

The Soviet historian Zaionchkovsky P.A. in one of his works wrote about the craving of representatives of the Romanovs (with the exception of Alexander III) for changes in the uniform of military personnel ^[25]. Basically, they were largely negative in nature, complicating the life of both the military in practical terms, and creating an additional burden for the textile industry.  

The uniform of the Nikolaev army was intended exclusively for a spectacular appearance during inspections. Single-breasted dark green uniforms were longer than the previous double-breasted ones. High boots were introduced in the infantry. The shako with the sultan was replaced with a Prussian-style helmet. This piece of clothing lasted 30 years. The helmet looked beautiful, but was not comfortable when hiking. In addition, the military department did not adopt a helmet cover, which caused the skin to shrink from the high temperature ^{[33, p. 277]}.

Military production suffered from the economic backwardness of the empire and the exploitation of outdated technological tools (serf labor). All production of firearms and edged weapons was carried out by three main factories: Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsky. All these enterprises were equipped with first-class equipment for that period, and provided with first-class weapons specialists. However, the main problem lies in the exploitation of serf labor, which led to low productivity of factories and a high percentage of defects. Here are some figures.

Tula Gun factory was the most productive enterprise. In 1855, by order of the emperor, he managed to produce 106 thousand copies of rifled weapons ^{[47, p. 136]}. According to the plans of the military department, weapons factories were supposed to produce around 100 thousand rifles per year. The Tula plant accounted for the manufacture of 63 thousand of them ^{[47, p. 133]}. According to the reports of the military administration, it was possible to achieve only a figure of almost 90 thousand rifles and pistols per year ^[30].

The Sestroretsk Arms Factory was supposed to produce from 30 to 40 thousand copies of small arms per year. Instead, the productivity of the enterprise ranged from 1 to 6 thousand rifles ^{[48, p. 366]}. And only by 1859 it was possible to achieve a figure of 12 thousand rifles ^{[48, p. 366]}. At the same time, the production itself was extremely expensive, since the costs of infrastructure and staff were intended for the production of 30-40 thousand guns ^{[48, p. 376]}.

The situation was somewhat better at the Izhevsk plant. At the time of 1858, the company was supposed to produce 27 thousand guns, of which 18 thousand were actually made ^{[48, p. 381]}. The cost of one rifle was around 17 rubles ^{[48, p. 382]}, which was cheaper than at the Sestroretsk plant (26-27 rubles per rifle) ^{[47, p. 376]}.

 Military production suffered from a high percentage of defects due to the exploitation of serf labor. In the manufacture of ammunition, the percentage of defective shells reached the terrible mark of 60-80 percent ^{[59, p. 128]}. The high percentage of defects in military production was known even before the Crimean War. In 1847, Lieutenant General N.O. Sukhozanet and a member of the Committee on the Improvement of Fittings and Guns, Colonel B.G. Glinka, conducted an inspection at the Tula Arms Factory ^{[58, p. 229]}. According to its results, conclusions were drawn about a significant marriage in the production of guns and the need to switch from manual labor to mechanical. For this purpose, they offered to purchase the appropriate equipment from the French Chatellerault arsenal ^{[58, pp. 229-230]}. The revolution of 1848 and the deterioration of Russian-French relations with the coming to power of Napoleon III led to the temporary suspension of negotiations with the Chatellerault arsenal.

The situation was not the best with the production of artillery guns. The government of the Russian Empire, before the outbreak of the Crimean War, paid insufficient attention to artillery factories. In 1848, instead of the planned 572 guns, only 61 were produced ^{[24, p. 23]}. Artillery armament had to be manufactured at arsenals in St. Petersburg, Bryansk and Kiev. But their condition did not meet modern standards of armament production. Many guns were of poor quality and often burst when firing ^{[24, p. 23]}.

In the Nikolaev military system, there are two main exceptions to the problems described above – the Artillery and Engineering Service, as well as the Caucasian Corps. The famous foreign researcher of military history of the XIX century A. Si'ton in his work "Russian army of Crimea", with a general negative assessment of the training and effectiveness of Russian troops in the Eastern War, notes the high, advanced level of development of engineering and artillery service:

 "Artillery has been taking an honorable place in the Russian military heritage for many years. Its officers, as well as engineers, as a rule, had better education and more competent generals than in other branches of the armed forces.... » ^{[77, c. 19-20]}.

The Crimean War became an armed conflict that revealed many serious shortcomings of the Russian military organization of the first half of the XIX century. The fighting (field battles) in the Crimea demonstrated the significant lag of the Russian Empire both in socio-economic development and in terms of military thought. The use of outdated tactics of combat, the lack of interaction between generals (including due to the high conflict in the officer corps), poor training of the chief officers and staff officers, weak organization of the supply system - all these are the reasons for the defeats of the Russian army in the Crimea. Russian Russian's courage, heroism, steadfastness combined with the genius of individual representatives of the military industry (Liprandi P.P., Nakhimov P.S., Kornilov V.A. Totlebin E.I., etc.) did not lead to the complete defeat of the Russian army expected by the allies in the Crimean War. It is fair to note that the Allied armies suffered from equally serious problems related to the logistical support of troops, the general and private management of combat forces, and the poor quality of training of enlisted personnel for battles with European armies. After the Crimean War, fundamental changes began in both the economic and military system of the Russian Empire. The reforms of the Minister of War D.A. Milyutin (1861-1881) managed to correct many shortcomings of the military system of the Nicholas era, modernizing the Russian army to the standards of advanced European armies, while combining the spirit of the Suvorov-Rumentsev school.

  Summarizing the whole range of problems related to the Nikolaev army, it is appropriate to quote the already mentioned, within the framework of the work of P.I. Stepanov.:

"I took out a sad impression from the Crimea. How much courage, self-sacrifice died from indecision, half measures, mistakes! How many people died for nothing from abuse, theft, riots! How much money is wasted, without benefit. Thank God it's over yet! And what could remain in the memory of this war – except condolences about our strong, mighty Russian kingdom without a purpose, without good reasons, having wasted its strength? What will history say, of course, based not on relationships? It is not the Russian people, it is not the soldiers who are being blamed. The Russian man was all poured out in this war; he went to battle, not understanding what he would fight for, but he walked on an unlimited high sense of submission to the Sovereign and honestly fulfilled his duty, fought bravely and bravely, died in cold blood! Of course, the accusation will not fall on the troops; it is also unfair that one army training, lagging behind the changes and improvements in the French troops, was the cause of our failures in the Crimea; the fittings and the deployed front gave the enemy the upper hand only in the Battle of Alma; in other matters, the tightness on the battlefields balanced the action of the shooters.... Where to look for the causes of military failures, setting aside politics? In our indecision, in self–confidence, in the ambiguity of assumptions, in half-measures, in the shortcomings of capable military commanders and, most importantly, in unforgivable selfishness, strife and personalities among themselves" ^{[61, pp. 50-51]}