Man and Being as factors of Culture dynamics in the concept of permanent Modernity

Maltsev Yaroslav Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0002-1725-2859 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor of the Department of History and World Politics of Tyumen State University 625003, Russia, Tyumenskaya oblast', g. Tyumen', ul. Volodarskogo, 6 maltsevyaroslav@gmail.com Other publications by this author

IntroductionThe end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI centuries were marked by a number of regular philosophical turns, partly related to a return to traditional themes, after attempts to bury these themes: to the subject, to metaphysics, to the rejection of postmodernism.

After all the psychoanalytic and structuralist announcements about the death and crossing out of the subject, S. Zizek called on the supporters of the Cartesian subject not only to speak loudly about the existence of subjectivity again, but also to create a "manifesto of Cartesian subjectivity itself" ^{[19, p. 24]}. In parallel, A. Badiou speaks in favor of the existence of the subject, although with his own conceptual reservations ^[1]. In this regard, the work of P. Kokelman ^[48] is interesting, not only devoted to the subject, but also considering it in the context of ontology (in this case, the ontology of objects). Such an approach connects the actualization of thinking about the subject with the ongoing so-called "ontological turn" ^{[53, 17]}, aimed at finding and satisfying the newly arisen need for ontology and updating theories about being ^{[52, 72]}. As a result, there is an increase in the number of theories (ontologization versus deontologization) about the structure of reality: the unique concepts of Deleuze and Guattari ^[15] are developed in the actor-network theory of B. Latour ^[20], speculative realism of K. Meyasu ^{[23, 40]}, object-oriented ontology of G. Harman ^[34], new materialism/theory assemblage ^[16], assembly theories ^[3], agent realism ^[42], critical realism ^[46], etc. Physicists also express their view on the structure of the universe ^{[17, 30, 35, 36, 49]}.

All this takes place against the backdrop of a changing cultural situation, when with the light hand of L. Hutcheon ^[45] there is a real explosion of theories associated with an attempt to comprehend the changes taking place with culture, after the postmodern period, post—postmodern theories: the ultra-modernity of M. Auger ^[24], the hypermodernity of J. Lipovetsky ^{[21, 22]}, the fluid modernity of Z. Bauman ^[4], the second modernity of W. Beck ^[5], the late modernity of E. Giddens ^[13], the time after the end of the history of E. Cioran ^[37], N. Burrio's altermodernism ^[8], K. Moraru's cosmodernism ^[50], A. Kirby's digimodernism ^[47], metamodernism ^[9], neomodernism ^[28] and others, most fully covered in the monograph of Alexander Vladimirovich Pavlov ^[27]. Of the concepts of modernity that have arisen on this basis, related to the characteristics of the historical section of space-time, the theory of permanent modernity, which arose on the basis of the ideas of Alexander Valentinovich Pavlov ^{[25, 26]}, which were actively discussed on the pages of the journal "Society and Power, seems to be the most universal." ^{[6, 18, 31, 38]}. In this concept, modernity is proposed to think not historically (as was first done by Cassiodorus), but existentially: as Hegelian ("To comprehend one's own time in thought") the connection of man with time, with being, a deep, individual connection based on a dialogue between man and being, man and man, man and time/culture; a connection where culture itself, man himself arise as a result of self-development and self-knowledge of being; where culture is created as a second being, being (according to Hegel) present, phenomenal, semantic, manifest, named, constructed by man for his own cognition and cognition of being in general. At the same time, being itself carries out self-knowledge through man and culture. As a result, the concept of permanent modernity, it seems, allows the most successful way to link the three above-mentioned areas of current philosophical thinking today: the problem of the subject, the problem of being, the problem of culture. Taking into account these three registers (corresponding to the famous Lacanian triad of the Imaginary, Real, Symbolic) within the boundaries of one theory allows us to most fully imagine the subject-subject paradigm of the dialog model of the universe, where the relations of co-being, co-creativity, co-knowledge unfold between man and being.

MethodologyAs a result, the purpose of the work offered to the reader's attention is:

 to take a fresh look at the dynamics of culture unfolding in the dialogue of the subject-subject relations of man and being as equal partners, where human activity and the existence of culture are part of self—awareness of being itself. Methodologically, the article uses: phenomenological optics of E. Husserl, analytical concepts of J. Lacan, Cartesian paradigm, dasein analysis and A.V. Pavlov's ideas about modernity as Self-subjectivity. The author also relied on the philosophical heritage of Hegel and Heidegger. The novelty of the research lies in the consideration of culture, man and being in their dialogical integrity, where the existence of partnership relations is recognized between being and man, and culture acts as a result of the development of this ontological connection; and is also associated with the special status of the subject as the creator and bearer of culture, which creates a unique situation of permanent modernity.

The main partThe dialogue of self—consciousness is one of the most important layers of the dynamics of culture.

Culture is a dialogue of a thing and consciousness, where consciousness is turned inward and outward. In some respects, culture itself, as a fruit of consciousness, goes the way of isolation and transformation into self-consciousness. Culture becomes autonomous from the subjects of culture, acquires its own lines and fractures of development, and subjects become actors and agents of culture: they act, being themselves mediated by culture, but also mediating culture. The complexity of this dynamic turns out to be that the subject is a crack of culture through which it speaks to itself: the subject is the one who acquires the integrity of himself and understands the mechanisms that affect his subjectivity, knows how to select them independently, defining his own goals, but at the same time the subject is the one who is in dialogue with culture itself as with the spirit, i.e. with culture as it developed at the moment of its being here and now. The subject is not just in dialogue with culture, as it has been formed here and now, not just assimilates, translates and creates, but creates forms of culture that define the situation of the new modern. The subject is always trying to hear that true sound, that call to truth, a call to another possibility, which are behind the current form. Strictly speaking, the Hegelian spirit, as an absolute substance, as the equality of I with We and We with I ^[12] — this is culture, as it reveals itself to the subject.

Being is movement. Culture is movement. Movement is determined by the desire of consciousness to comprehend the true being of social and material things, as well as itself, while simultaneously being unable to do so. At the same time, consciousness exists as a part of the whole. It exists in the dialogue of consciousnesses. As a result, culture is a movement of self-consciousness: "Each of them sees that the other does what it does; each does what it demands from the other, and therefore does what it does, also only insofar as the other does the same; unilateral action would be futile, because what should happen can only be accomplished by both" ^{[12, p. 100]}. The parable of the Master and the Slave reflects the dialectic of modernity and postmodernity in the dynamics of culture.

Traditionally, Hegel's parable of the Master and the Slave is interpreted through its affiliation with political or psychoanalytic dimensions. However, it seems that Hegel himself meant by this parable just the designation of the interaction of cultural actors and the variability of culture as such. Both Master and Slave have a difference of self-consciousness in their interaction with each other. But not the self-consciousness of subjects equal to each other, but the self-consciousness of the difference of cultures. The difficulty in understanding this fragment in Hegel ^{[12, pp. 99-106]}, as well as Hegel himself, seems to be that his thought in this case is somewhat blurred: he speaks of self-consciousness as a single subject (let's designate it as self-consciousness of the first level) and of self-consciousness as a form of culture (self-consciousness of the second level). Why is culture self-awareness? Because it is organized as consciousness: culture is constructed by thought as a simple basic element and represents a chain of relationships, some kind of assembly (thoughts, space, time, people as information carriers), deployed in the conditional infinity of human (individual and generic) being (and, perhaps, more global, if you believe that information is preserved even when passing through a black hole: perhaps the universe is constituted by information codes with which humanity only interacts in a certain way, not fully realizing its role in this interaction). Of course, the second level removes the first one in a Hegelian way, but at the same time remains in dialogue with it, as it was written above: the subject-in-culture is constantly defined and defines (using Hegelian terminology), is constantly involved in the process of cultural movement, in its variability. It is through which culture thinks and addresses itself as being for itself, functioning as a set of independent information units (memes). At the same time, the subject is a complex unit with its own self—consciousness and will, therefore, its influence on culture is always a dialogue of the selves: the refraction of culture through the prism of the Ego and always the impact of the Ego on the cultural whole.

However, in this bundle of Self and culture, another bundle is also visible: cultural levels with each other, designated as modern (established form) and postmodern (moving form). Regarding the Hegelian parable, postmodernism is the self-consciousness of a Slave. Modern and postmodern, Master and Slave, is a dual relationship of culture in which the struggle unfolds and the forms of culture find their formation. Hegel writes that the Master is domination over the Slave, formed as a result of the struggle and victory of the Master and "only as a kind of negative" ^{[12, p. 103]}. That is, modernity denies, seeks to deny the presence in itself and the values of the postmodern itself. At the same time, as a living dimension of culture, it is the postmodern that finds itself between the Master (modern) and the thing: it is in the postmodern that the search for truth, the search for a way to interpret a thing, is expressed, while the modern dies in its stabilization. Modernity in its stabilization gradually loses the truth and the desire to search for it, unwittingly transferring these functions to the postmodern: "The truth of independent consciousness is slave consciousness," Hegel noted ^{[12, p. 104]}. It is through such an interpretation of the parable that we can look at the history of culture of the XIX and XX centuries, when G. Courbet opens the "Pavilion of Realism" in the depths of modernity; when the 1968 counterculture is suddenly born in the depths of a prosperous consumer society and the welfare state; when new forms of this language are constantly being born against the background of the dominant language, often appropriated by the authorities as a call for liberation: from national languages created in modern times in the form of intellectuals' dreams of a new political community where everyone will be able to participate in political action on the square, where everyone will understand the language of this participation ^[43], to constantly emerging languages of subcultures, as attempts to create their own independent community, their own culture, own rules of interaction with the truth of the Real, own rules of residence. Gradually, the dynamics of this interaction between Master and Slave, modern and postmodern, leads to a reversal of the situation and roles. And for the sake of this reversal, the postmodern has to do a difficult/laborious job. A slave has to work.

Strictly speaking, the permanent rift and dialogue between modernity and postmodernity, unfolding within the field of culture, can be defined in Hegelian terms as consciousness stitched together by contradiction. Culture as "a form that for itself is a double consciousness of itself" ^{[12, p. 112]}. Culture as a single whole, constituted by a duality fault, where each fault breaks up into smaller and smaller agonal (what S. Muff designates as a confrontation in cooperation ^[51]) actors — carriers of individual micro-projects for macroculture.

Actors (subjects of permanent modernity) act. Hegel wrote that the individual consciousness of the actor desires, acts and consumes culture, thereby dissolving the reality of culture in itself. Thus, the extreme of reality is removed by the extreme of activity. But this becomes possible only insofar as the reality of culture itself contains an active principle ^{[12, pp. 118-119]}.

So, according to Hegel, the dynamics of culture is provided by the relation of a thing and consciousness, while the latter can act as a thing of itself, and the former imposes itself in some way for cognition. The operation of cognition is carried out through the primary formation of consciousness: it needs to turn to itself and into itself, in some way temporarily abandoning the world, reality, in order to then turn to it fully. The consciousness of the subject, as it were, absorbs reality and "opens the world as its own": "Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is the whole reality," and further: "Self—consciousness is the whole reality not only for itself, but also in itself only because it becomes this reality or, better to say, manifests itself as such" ^{[12, p. 125]}. The mind includes the thing, symbolizing it, and thus builds the reality in which it has to live. The reality of culture. Real, divided into categories.

The natural inclination of the mind is the desire for knowledge. The desire for knowledge is conditioned by the mind's awareness of the fact that the thing it includes in itself (in its picture of the world, map of reality, its categories and representations) is not given to it as true. A thing is given to the mind as a concept. Speaking in the language of postmodernity: the cognizing mind deals with certainty (by the way, Hegel says exactly that: Hegel is a postmodernist! ^{[12, p. 129]}), and not with the truth. This intersects with the thought of R. Brassier: "Thinking is not guaranteed access to being; being is not something inherently conceivable. Cognition has no other access to reality except the concept" ^{[7, p. 228]}. But the desire of reason is for truth; it is in the desire to know "the essence of things as things" ^{[12, p. 130]}. Cognizing, the mind transforms things into concepts, i.e. into its own being (the being of the Self, the being of the subject), since concepts are inseparable from the consciousness that defines them. As a result, the being of things that the mind deals with is the mental being of the mind, where the thing is represented as a concept ^{[12, p. 131]}, and the totality of concepts outlines the cultural matrix. Culture is a person's life within a "variously defined world" ^{[12, p. 109]}. Otherwise, what Hegel designates as a system of consciousness formations is formed, representing the life of the spirit ^{[12, p. 159]} — a culture that arises at the junction of the individual (I, sensory consciousness, subject) and the universal, rational universal, i.e. included in the general conceptual grid ^{[12, p. 134-137]}. Culture is the result of the realization of the law of the transition of the inner (how the subject defines the world for himself, categorizes his world) into the outer (what form the world takes as a result in interaction with an active subject having will and power) ^{[12, p. 142]}. In a global sense, this process is defined as world history. World history is the unfolding of the horizon of culture, which itself is an expression by an individual of "his activity in the world" ^{[12, p. 169]} and "absolute dialectical restlessness" ^{[12, p. 111]}. World history is the actualization of being.

So, according to Hegel (and in accordance with the concept advocated in this work), the individual is an active element of culture. It cannot be said that he is the primary element, because such a Thing acts as a phenomenon that is included in culture. But an individual is a consciousness that creates the fabric of culture (although at the same time he also acts as a Thing for himself) through comprehension of a Thing, through forced interaction with it and its inclusion in his conceptual chain of interactions. Hegel successfully formulates the emerging situation in the following sentence: "The individual is not silent about his external action, performing it, because at the same time he is both reflected into himself and outwardly manifests this reflection into himself; this theoretical action or the individual's conversation about it with himself reaches the ears of others, because this conversation itself there is only an external manifestation" ^{[12, p. 169]}. Simplifying, we can say that the Hegelian understanding of the relationship between the individual and culture consists in expanding the space of the individual into an interindividual space, i.e. the internal reflection of the subject and the creation of his Self become part of his external interaction with other subjects, part of an intersubjective dialogue about what it is I after all (how I define myself and how I am defined others) and what is still the world in which this Self has to act (I think that this world is a brotherhood of loving beings or a Hobbesian situation of a wolf pack). "Consciousness, which establishes the law of its heart, thus experiences the resistance of others, because it contradicts the equally singular laws of their heart, and these others act in their resistance only by establishing their law and forcing them to reckon with it" ^{[12, pp. 201-203]}. It is from this dialogue that a culture is formed, traceable as history. Culture develops from internal reflection into external reflection, goes from individual to general, remaining internal in its external manifestation ^{[12, p. 169]}. Culture is reflection.

Is it not from here that the concepts of inner culture (a cultured person, a person of culture) and culture as a general phenomenon come into contact? A person expresses the level of his inner development, his experiences, requests and needs in activities that transform the environment around him. But being not alone, he comes into contact with others, and together they build a compromise environment, simultaneously reflecting together on what this environment should be. At the same time, the process of general reflection always returns to the reflection of the subject, and then goes out of the subject again. And this process continues constantly, like the tides. Or like a football match: a thought like a ball rushes from the common field to the inner halls of the mind and returns back, where it is attacked by football players, i.e. other subjects, other thoughts. Some accepted thoughts, which have suffered a lot, materialize in the form of a football field, railings, chairs, a stadium dome and a scoreboard. Thought materializes through action, because the true being of a person is action ^{[12, p. 172]}. Through action, an individual brings certainty into the world, defines the world ^{[12, p. 344]}, performing the Adam operation. The subject performs the action, realizing the parallel existence of two realities: the present one and the one that he would like to create ^{[12, p. 342]}. Culture turns out to be a constantly updated adaptation, fueled by utopia ^{[39, p. 302]}. That is, culture arises as a result of the action of the subject by definition (concepts) and idealization (desire to create) of the surrounding materiality (including itself as a Thing). At the same time, these actions occur in the process of existential dialogue, since the action being performed (definitions and/or idealization) must be recognized by others ^{[12, p. 346]}. Strictly speaking, due to this state of affairs, such an individual's involvement in the world, the world itself, reality itself, exists as an intersubjectivity, as something that exists only in the process and thanks to the communication of people with each other. According to Hegel, the morality of the universe is based on this intersubjectivity of culture. This morality is based on duty. But this duty is not Kantian, it has nothing to do with deontology, with the law. Rather, this debt is equivalent to emptiness. Duty is nothing. He is an empty signifier. All the commandments are conditional ^{[12, p. 336]} and are removed by their multiplicity and something higher. This is something that a person owes to communication. For Hegel, the only duty of man is the duty of being—for-another. It is as a result of the fulfillment of this duty that specific forms of ethical are determined, a specific understanding of duty is formed. As A. Badiou wrote: ethics are plural ^[2]. As a result, the subject unconsciously and consciously does the overall work of creating the whole through language and communication. As a result, culture arises as a reality, having the form of universal self-consciousness ^{[12, p. 352]}.

As Hegel poetically writes about such a situation: "The individual fulfills the law of his heart," which turns into a "general order" becoming "a common power for which "this" heart is indifferent, so that the individual, establishing his own order, thereby no longer considers it his own" ^{[12, p. 198]}. That is, the subject realizes his culture through bringing it into the general cultural cauldron, where it is melted down, removed, turning the subject himself into his subject, part of the cultural code. "By implementing his law into reality, he does not thereby create his own law, but (...) creates only that he is involved in the actual order, and moreover is involved in it as in some not only alien to him, but also hostile superior power. — By his action, he includes himself in the general element (...) and his very action should, in its meaning, have the meaning of some general order" ^{[12, p. 198]}. — It's hard to say exactly.

Culture is the reflection of a free individual regarding himself and his being in the world, expressed in action: "Man is free (...) the original being is only the makings, i.e. the original being of the spirit can equally be called such a being that does not exist as being. (...) An individual can be something else than he is internally initially, and even more so as a bone" ^{[12, 181]}. This Hegelian, which is now commonly called existential, dimension of culture illustrates Hegel's real attitude to freedom: as a fundamental principle of the formation of man and culture. Freedom is the truth of culture, which is lost under the weight of social practices and formalization. But remaining as a given and existing in the form of an appeal: the hidden truth of individual aspiration and development, as well as social space, breaking through texts and revolutions in the form of a call for equality and self-realization. This truth of freedom is actually the Real, around which all the Symbolic of the social revolves, often diligently displacing this Real: the individual renounces freedom because it is easier to renounce responsibility (as Fromm shows, as Eichmann is), public institutions level freedom because it is easier to rule and rule. But freedom is the initial conditions for the formation of the individual and society. An individual arises in conditions of freedom to be anything, and he either realizes this inner potency of freedom or displaces it in the culture around him (internal into external). Individuality wants to become a law and, imagining it, violates the established order ^{[12, p. 203]}.

The action of an individual in the space of culture, from Hegel's point of view, logically belongs to the space of culture itself (the space of the universal), but meaningfully carries his own individuality, which, however, has the significance of the universal ^{[12, pp. 198-199]}. Culture is a fusion of individual utopias and attempts to implement them, a struggle for the realization of one's own pleasure. Its dynamics is ensured by the struggle of individual projects with each other with general stabilization: "Existing laws are protected from the law of one individual, because they are not an unconscious empty and dead necessity, but a spiritual universality and substance, where those in whom this substance has its reality live as individuals and are aware of themselves" ^{[12, p. 201]}. It is in this quality that culture acquires the quality of a "universally animated essence", and individuality becomes its form ^{[12, p. 201]}.

It must be said that Hegel's concept of culture anticipates Lacan's understanding of the relationship between the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary. From Hegel's point of view, culture, as a universal language, is also embodied in a concrete consciousness, which at the same time is the creator of culture. This creativity occurs due to the deployment of the universe as a speech operating with abstractions, "none of which stands still, but gets lost in others and generates them" ^{[12, p. 352]}. At the same time, according to Hegel (and here we are fully confronted with psychoanalysis, in particular, with the famous example of Freud, associated with a dream where the deceased son, whose body is in the next room, comes to his father and reproaches him: "Father, don't you see that I'm burning?"), the very creation of these abstractions, the very deployment of this speech (culture) it is connected with a person's lack of strength to withstand being. So, the dynamics of culture is an attempt to cover the essence of being with an aesthetic.

Culture, according to Hegel, "is the law of all hearts, in that all individuals directly constitute this universal" ^{[12, p. 201]}, but the universal of culture itself, by result, by quality, by form of organization and internal dynamics, by structure, is the universal resistance and struggle of all against each other, "in which everyone forces to reckon with their own singularity, but at the same time does not achieve this, because this singularity experiences the same resistance and is mutually dissolved by others" ^{[12, p. 202]}. Hegel, therefore, thinks of culture as a constant dynamic ("the general course of things" ^{[12, p. 202]}) of individual enmity, as the confrontation of individual utopias. We already know that in the field of the Imaginary, in the field of the possible culture, there is a confrontation between the subjects whom sociologists designate as group leaders: their role is reduced to processing the incoming message (in the context of work, this message comes from being) and adjusting it/translating it to the needs and expectations of a group (set) ready for perception.

In other words, according to Hegel, culture arises through the removal of the individuality that appropriated culture to itself. Culture is constituted through the opposition of the individual will and the established form (universal will). It is constituted by the constant perversion of its foundations and the struggle to redefine these foundations. It unfolds between subjects and between the subject and the social; between the essence of the subject and the essence of the social (or other subject). The dynamics of culture is a struggle between entities. The dynamics of culture — the action of subjects (defining themselves and their own) as the formation of culture as a superconsciousness.

Hegel defines culture (superconsciousness, self-consciousness, spirit, spiritual essence) as pure consciousness, which we have the right to understand as a noosphere, a sphere of thought, a sphere of circulation of thoughts, a chain of interactions of ideas. In this sphere of pure thought, the originally determined (i.e., the unity of the original, natural, qualities of the individual and his self-determination as an object-for-himself) nature of the subject is removed, elevating him to the universal cultural matrix. Or: for culture, the subject remains the subject even in the event of the death of his physical body. Speaking in the language of Freud: the figure of the dead father continues to configure the space. As a result, culture is formed as a kind of supra-individual thing (a thing in Hegel's understanding, as it was indicated above), the content of which is actions, thinking, and multitudes of individuals ^{[12, p. 224]}. Individuals in such optics are cultural atoms who are not given anything at all in their truth: neither they themselves, nor the material world around them, nor the social space they build and live in — all this is known by individuals as objects (noumenons according to Kant). And the whole culture is recognized by individuals as a phenomenon, but culture itself is, as it were, isolated from individuals: it unfolds according to its own logic, its own chains of relationships, development models, dialogues. Individuals provide this unfolding of culture. Conducting a dialogue within themselves and among themselves, they only conduct a dialogue with culture as such, throwing their ideas (the essence of themselves) into its common melting pot.

As a result, culture (spirit) is reasonable ^[12]: it is composed of categories created by reason and given to reason as its world, as the reality in which it exists. Culture is the correlation of the phenomena of the mind. This is how Hegel's thesis about the reasonableness of reality, which caused so much indignation, should be read. Hegel did not speak about the acceptability or unacceptability of a State specifically existing at that time. He pointed out that any state, as a form of culture, as the fruit of the activity of the mind (a set of individual volitional consciousnesses), is reasonable and only therefore effective (really). And he wrote not only and not so much about the state, as critics loved and like to understand this thesis, but about culture as a whole: culture is rational. And its concrete spatio-temporal form (and its forms, including the state) turns out to be what individuals living here and now, who are at a certain stage of the development of their minds, want to see it.

Culture, according to Hegel, is the unchangeable basis (the individual receives development through its assimilation) and the ultimate goal (the individual participates in its creation by his actions) of the actions of people "as a mental" in himself of "all self—consciousness", as a result of which culture becomes a universal work (a set of individual works, because according to Hegel, the subject reveals himself in the form of a work as being-for-another) and represents a living and active entity ^{[12, p. 234]}. Hegel points out that since culture is a common project created equally by all, it is possible to speak of the ultimate equality of all, i.e., refers to the truth of the ultimate equality of human beings with each other. According to Hegel, culture is moral — it is a "living moral world" ^{[12, p. 237]}, as a project of human community. Culture as a real substance is a people, as a real consciousness is a citizen of the people ^{[12, p. 237]}. Culture exists (is valid) and exists as a mind, as the fruit of the activity of individual consciousnesses that create a grid of concepts and categories.

As a result, for a hypothetical view from above (the view of God from Hitchcock's films), culture is seen as a self-conscious reality, acting and thinking thanks to its individual neurons, and perceived by them (from below) as a law, mores — established patterns of relations between everything and everything (culture as a global assembly, in Deleuze's language). Culture in this optics is the removal of concrete individual being in universal being, as a result of which individual being actually remains, even after its disappearance. In any case, this should be the case in a rationally arranged culture, where each individual is rational, i.e. the subject, as the subject is defined in the context of this work (and it is defined classically, what is its parallelism with Hegel's understanding of the rational individual; the individual at the heart of the ideal society, the Hegelian moral kingdom). Culture is a kind of superconsciousness, a spiritual essence, which is opposed by the essence as reality, as things in their pure being. The symbolization of this Thing by human consciousness (the Imaginary as an act of imagining/comprehending a thing) and its remainder of the Real constitute the dynamics of culture.

From Hegel's point of view, spirit (culture) exists as absolute freedom, as the essence of all spiritual masses (hence the understanding of culture as spirit — as a common spirit, as a common form of mental life: as the highest form of culture, whose rationality is directed both outward and inward ^{[12, p. 12-13]}), which includes all spiritual reality (phenomenality, materiality-for-us) and manifests itself as a common will with self-consciousness ^{[12, p. 315]}. Self—awareness of culture means its organization around thought (thought as a practical, as a structural element) and the ability to self-development: any cultural phenomenon develops due to the actions of individuals - carriers of this culture, a certain cultural community, subculture. Absolute freedom means the ability of culture to be any: like a specific individual, culture is always a potency, always an opportunity, always a project, always a developing dialogue, in which the turning points are an Event. This is the dialectical relationship of micro- and macroculture, individual and social culture. Spirit is the union of multiple individual consciousnesses into one.In Hegel's categories, modernity and postmodernity can be designated as objective and subjective spirits ^{[11, pp. 51-54]}.

By objectivity, Hegel means rational forms, ritualized forms, ordered knowledge, abstraction, forms that are necessarily simplified (like objects in a naturalist's office), reduced to categories that are understandable. In other words, modernity as an objective culture is a symbolic grid of coordinates that compels us to culture: the individual assimilates it in the process of socialization, this is his starting point, the launching pad of culture, the shoulders of giants being substituted for him. This is the whole mass of knowledge accumulated by mankind and the proposed ready-made patterns of behavior. This is the part of the culture that a person learns from childhood, which is available to him through the library or Google. The subjective spirit is the personal dimension of culture. This is the experience of direct experience, the living of the moment itself with intuitive reactions to the problematic nature of this living. The subjective spirit, or postmodern as an individual cultural project, is the reaction of a person standing in time to the challenges of this time. This is a search for an answer to existential experiences (existential living) when the patterns of modernity do not suit: they are either inadequate to the situation, or do not suit the individual, or do not correspond to the time — in any case, they do not solve the problem, the personal problem of a particular individual. That is, the subjective spirit is a person's stay in the flow of being simultaneously with the perception of this flow and an attempt to give him his own answer. For Hegel, the individual is an absolute form, i.e., the immediate certainty of himself, an unconditional being ^{[12, p. 13]}, but pure "being opposes him as some other reality than his reality" ^{[12, p. 192]}. Postmodernity as a form of culture is a set of reactions of "living human individuals" (K. Marx) to the problematic nature of their own being (modernity), which develops into a kind of alternative cultural project that has yet to prove its right to exist, it will still have to go a long way of becoming and some kind of deadening, normalization, transformation into modernity. Culture itself is a form of civilization as a matrix of human community, as a hypostasis of being accepted by it at a certain stage of development. Therefore, culture is in perpetual dynamics and seething: as Hegel noted, in becoming: "Becoming is an unstable anxiety that settles, turning into some calm result" ^{[10, p. 110]}. The further we are from civilization to the subject, the more powerfully the unstable anxiety of becoming manifests itself.

So, self-awareness of culture means its organization around thought. Thought is connected with language. Language — with the simplest concepts. From Hegel's point of view, a new culture is first formed as a whole simple concept created on the basis of the totality of previous knowledge, and from this simple concept, new forms of culture unfold in the future, finding themselves in a new environment and gaining new meanings ^{[12, p. 6]}. The first phenomenon of a new culture occurs as simple concepts, which at the initial stage are still pushed aside by the wealth of the previous culture (the opposition of modernity-postmodern!), but, maturing, are gradually able to gain their own strength. Strictly speaking, the individual himself, as an actor of culture, as its spiritual origin, is the fruit of language. In a way, Hegel anticipates Heidegger, de Saussure, and Foucault. He writes: "Language is the existence of a pure self as a self; in it, for itself, the essential uniqueness of self-consciousness as such comes into existence in the sense that it exists for others. “I” as this pure “I" in cash otherwise is not. (...) Language (...) contains the "I" in its purity, it alone expresses the "I", its self" ^{[12, pp. 272-273]}. In other words, the Ego exists as a language, as its product, and as such is included in the general linguistic and semiotic fabric of culture. Ultimately, for Hegel, culture is not so much a spirit as a text, but a text as a living spirit: a text that writes itself.

According to Hegel, language is the existence of culture ^{[12, p. 350]}. Language exists for another and forms of language (and all cultural objects, as phenomena, are forms of language) exist for others. The language is universal. It covers the entire integrity of cultural objects. And it is language that is both being-for-others and being-for-itself, since it is a sign system of self-consciousness, a sign system of consciousness, it is what makes sense of the external relative to language, and reflection of language itself. Language is the universal code of culture. Language is the being of culture. Culture is framed through language and in language. Actually, here we come to Heidegger's "language is the house of being". And language is a mechanism for determining the world, acting thanks to the individual. Language is spirit. And even the morality of the universe is realized in language.

In this regard, Hegel critically examines mathematics, which, in his opinion, pays attention to space and unity, which in themselves are dead if the concept is not introduced into them. It is the concept of "decomposes space into its dimensions and determines the connections between them and in them" ^{[12, p. 23]}. Interpreting Hegel through Deleuze: the concept is a war machine that segments, delineates flat space. The concept for Hegel is the basic and basic element of culture.

Here we again come up against Hegel's formula "Everything that is real is reasonable, everything that is reasonable is real." But in his preface to the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel gives complete keys to the interpretation of this: "The real, self-positing and living within itself, existing being in its concept. This is a process that creates its own moments for itself" ^{[12, p. 24]}. That is, the real, equally culture, is a self—developing and self—given entity - spirit.

Culture, according to Hegel, is something that exists. This is what he calls cash being. Existence in existence is the smallest unit of culture: it's a thought. Thought is nus (Anaxagoras). A thought is an Idea (Plato). Thought is a fundamental element of culture insofar as it is simple, definite, mobile, durable, identical to itself, rational, universal. In other words, thought is a quality ^{[12, p. 30]}. It is quality that has the right to be at the foundation of culture. It could be added to Hegel's calculations that thought is also free, uncontrolled, fluid and permanent and reflects the true equality between human beings.

Thought (nus) is the substance of culture ^{[12, p. 30]}. Thought is a simple concept that is in motion and becoming. As an independently moving and developing substance, thought is at the foundation of reasonableness and reasonableness ^{[12, p. 30]}. Hence the reality of the rational (thought as real, as acting, as existing generates the rational, i.e. a certain relationship of thoughts, some lined space) and the reasonableness of the real — at the heart of this formula is thought — an act of reason. Ultimately, the mistake of the "negative" interpreters of this Hegelian expression was that they took it locally: in relation to the political structure of a particular country, while Hegel himself speaks of the universality of the reasonable and the real ^{[12, p. 34]}. I.e. his speech is more about culture in general than about its specific forms. At the same time, specific forms of culture are the essence of "shaping consciousness" ^{[12, p. 50]}.So, the essence of the world is thought.

The very external manifestation of culture — matter — is the definition of thought in external existence ^{[10, p. 201]}. The subject is a thought freed from the shackles of corporeality, a thought reduced to a text. Yu. M. Fedorov in his concept developed the idea that the entire universe is a sign, the cipher of which is in the hands of a subject — a person making efforts to understand this sign, to understand and decipher the Cosmos ^[32]. From his point of view, at a certain absolute moment, Man and the Cosmos would have to merge into a kind of unity. Strictly speaking, in a similar way, one can understand the subject — it is a thought detached from corporeality: not a body without organs, but a thought without a body, because the subject's thought has its own development, often unrelated to the subject: once launched, it unwinds and unfolds independently, only broadcasting through a person, and after the disappearance of a person spreading without its original carrier: passing into texts, passing to other people, i.e. assuming the character of what R. Dawkins designated by the term meme ^[44].

ConclusionsSo, the subject is a thought that expresses itself.

Everyone who is engaged in creativity is able to understand what has been said, because this is a state of overflowing human intuition, when the hand transmits something pouring out of nowhere, which can only be controlled, but which, in fact, cannot be rationally controlled, is familiar to him. Hence the creative crises and moments of despair for those who are engaged in creativity — the thought, this alien inside us, is silent, and the person feels abandoned. Because, probably, some come into the world to build, and some — just to talk. To speak, grasping culture.

Grasping culture by the subject means the situation of modernity. The subject exists in time. The subject exists with time. The unconscious voice that the subject feels and translates is the result of his efforts to decipher the time with which and in which he has to exist; the temporality into which he is thrown. He hears the voice of being given to him in the temporality of being, transcendent (Cosmos, God) or material (as a cumulative intellectual product of humanity; as a kind of source information code/field), which he passes through himself and expresses in his own way. This, in its own way, forms modern— new time: a new culture offered by the subject to the world. The subject himself is a postmodern buffoon, a game subversion, an element of the Real: at the same time a carrier of another cultural project, an alternative to the existing one, and an actor whose voice—invasion is able to change everything.

The subject exists with time, comprehending time as thought, holistically, folding and unfolding it: reflecting on the past and trying to create the future; or, in the language of Hegel, comprehends and dissolves the objective within itself in order to develop it out of itself. The subject-thought is in dialogue with other thought-subjects. These thoughts are scattered in time. But they all conduct their conversation in the only present of the only subject. All subjects-thoughts are co-temporal with each other; they are co-temporal. The subject himself, reduced to thought, having lost his physical body, becomes a subject-thought, turns into a meme and is translated as a text, and continues his dialogue with other subjects-thoughts (as text in texts) and other subjects. That is, the subject-thought becomes a portrait in the "gallery of heroes of the thinking mind" (Hegel). This is how modernity acquires its permanent character: being transmitted from subject to subject as a thought. Modernity is becoming permanent and truly fluid. Fluid not according to Z. Bauman, but fluid in the Hegelian way: thought separates from the Self (loses its fixity, is removed in some way) and goes on a journey through the elements of pure thinking, turning into concepts that, according to Hegel, are self-movement (= meme), circles, simple units of a new culture ^{[12, pp. 6-18]}.

It is in this transfer of thought from subject to subject that one can see the action of the spirit as the embodiment of a self-developing form of culture, once generated by man and constantly fueled by him, but already living in man and thanks to man, but at the same time largely autonomous from him and aggressive towards him. Permanent modernity is an implicitly inherent transcendental structure of a particular subject's mind, which is in constant dialogue with subjects-thoughts. Permanent modernity exists only for a particular subject as living now and as a world-perceiving Self (existing by itself, for a particular Self, the world exists only as long as this Self exists and in a form in which I am able to perceive it), but at the same time as a baton connecting subjects into a single continuum of culture, a continuum human thought. The self always exists with time and "speaks" with it, while simultaneously being in dialogue with those others who were before the Self - this is both modernity and permanence.

Thus, the concept of permanent modernity is based on the Cartesian and Kantian traditions regarding the essence, role and meaning of the Self: recognizing the possibility of rational and conscious subjectivation for a person, as well as his right to integrity. Permanent modernity implies the Self as the point at which the world actually exists. There is no flush in the world if there is no person in the world. (The world as meaning and coherence exists only insofar as there is someone to perceive it.). Moreover, not just a person, but a specific Self, who is reading these words now, which gain meaning only in his mind and only thanks to his knowledge of the symbols of the Russian language. The world exists as a language. The world exists as a symbol, with the tools to decipher which the Ego is endowed with. I deciphers the world, paints the world as a text of culture and prescribes myself as the hero of this text, constituting myself as another text. I am engaged in the creation of texts and thanks to this it is rooted in the language. Hence the key role of language for the subject. Strictly speaking, it is the person who has mastered the language, who has understood its power over himself, who has come out from under this power (false needs according to Marcuse; ideology, slogans, appeals and other forms of linguistic domination) and has tamed it for use, for his own speaking, his own announcement, for the creation of his own modernity - this person becomes a subject.

In other words, modernity can be thought of in a Hegelian way. If Zizek urges us to use Lacan to get closer to Hegel, then it seems better to use modernity, the very existence of man in the problematic nature of his life time and the continuing time of humanity, in order to fully penetrate Hegel's thought. Modernity is a Hegelian spirit that "breathes where it wants" (John 3:8) and turns out to be the dialectic of the development and "journey" of culture: "The human spirit is one at all times and differs only in the originality of the conditions of its development" ^{[14, p. 11]}. The individual subject is removed by the Hegelian dialectic. The whole Hegelian philosophy (if you read it as Hegel himself recommended: in response to his student's criticism of the well—known thesis: "What is reasonable is really, and what is really reasonable" ^[11], Hegel once smiled and added: "It should", i.e. the whole Hegelian philosophy should be perceived through this smile, this hidden understatement of a person who is forced to simultaneously fight for existence, "escape from reality into the realm of inner spiritual life" ^{[14, p. 133]}, and say what he thinks) — this is the philosophy of a truly free subject. Hegel throughout his life admired the French Revolution, considered it "a magnificent sunrise" ^{[14, p. 16]}, urged to strive for this sun ("Strive for the sun, friends, so that the salvation of the human race will ripen sooner! What of the fact that branches and leaves interfere with us, make your way to the sun!" ^{[11, p. 233]}), celebrated June 14 during his life and understood world history as a deterministic progress in the consciousness of freedom. Hegel's thought is based on man, the individual and the ancient democratic discourse ^{[14, pp. 20-21]}. Hegel will preserve these cornerstones of his philosophy throughout his life. This will be seen, in particular, in his attitude to the Burschenschaft circle, when in the conditions of political repression Hegel, being a caustic opponent of the movement, supported the victims as much as possible, "overcoming, on the one hand, his antipathies to "demagogues", and on the other — fear of the authorities" ^{[14, p. 124]}. It seems that such an incident is the essence of Hegel's philosophy: it must be understood on the basis of the approach developed by himself — dialectically. A common mistake that is made in relation to Hegel is to interrupt the unfolding of his thoughts on himself, on the state, on the Church, on his epoch. It seems that the person who developed the most complex dialectical thinking, used it in practice and wrote (presumably) intentionally difficult (because he could write crystal clear) was not as naive as they try to attribute to him. Hegel's stops, for which he has been scolded for more than one hundred years, inevitably had to be removed by the development of man and his acquisition of subjectivity. Hegel absorbed (the Spirit develops in stages and on the basis of previous experience) the philosophical thought of antiquity, Kant and Schelling in order to express himself about freedom in his own way, on the one hand, anticipating Marx's 11th thesis ("Since the sun is in the sky and the planets revolve around it, it has not been seen that man became on the his head, i.e. he relied on his thoughts and built reality according to them. Anaxagoras first said that the mind controls the world, but only now has man recognized that thought must control spiritual reality" ^{[12, pp. 413-414]}), on the other hand, to be the forerunner of critical Frankfurt thought directed against the consumer society. No wonder P. Singer believes that: "None of the philosophers of the XIX or XX century influenced the course of history more than Hegel" ^{[29, p. 3]}.

Hegel's thought about being and man-in-being is developed by Heidegger. Heidegger wrote about presence: man, as one of the objects of being, is present in the world and, by being present, implements one or another way of being. A person being present, here Heidegger converges with Hegel ^{[12, p. 215]}, realizes (or misses) his opportunity to be ^{[33, p. 42]}. And, exercising his ability to be, a person creates an explicit idea of the world in general, which is thus conceptually developed, and his image is a constitutive of presence ^{[33, p. 52]}. The world-culture is created as a conceptual and categorical fixation of existence ^{[33, p. 63]}. The world as a named signified being, as a network of cultural concepts thrown over nameless and unknowable objects in their entirety, is a possibility realized together with the realization of a person's self-possibility. Hence the bundle of subject + time = modernity.

What is designated as modernity in the context of this work is meant by Heidegger (who similarly puts time as the basis of being) as concern ^{[33, pp. 68-76]}. He divides being "in itself" — things as they are and as they are not given to other things, and phenomenal being as cognizable. Cognition of being is possible only as a result of its highlighting and opening. But within the boundaries of being itself, there is an interaction of objects. Being is revealed and constituted by movement: some objects of being make themselves visible to others, impose themselves and may even be intrusive. The objects of being, which manifest themselves in the openness of preoccupation, offer to know themselves through the use of themselves. Being is revealed through the verb of use. Heidegger gives a well-known example with a hammer: a hammer becomes a hammer, only being used for scoring, being used by scoring, thus being appropriated by scoring and in some respects being established by scoring. In this way, preoccupation constitutes an object as defined in order to, thereby finding it a certain place in the structure of being. Genesis performs the same procedures with other objects: doors, windows, stones, rocks, the laws of physics. Preoccupation as a form of dialogue with the world practically finds application (discretion) to the objects of being, using their phenomenal facets and only after comprehending theoretically. Being is carried out as a verb, finding ways to use itself, its own objects, establishing dependencies. In the force field of dependencies, being acquires the integrity of itself. The function of the living, the function of the human being is the maximum actualization of preoccupation, the maximum knowledge of the possibilities of use and the grid of dependencies. Man reveals the connectedness of being and links it. Objects of being find/they discover themselves through preoccupation, and culture is constituted as a result of preoccupation: there is a hammer, granite steps, cars made of steel (ores), turn signals at the car and endless other things. The whole culture is a search for ways to use some objects by others in response to challenges and as a creative activity of the Mind.

At the same time, being a hammer is not the ontological essence of a hammer — it is always a possible being. As in the case of man as a possibility, the whole culture is an opportunity, the whole culture is a possible being. A possible being that initially arises from adaptation, from use, and then takes the form of a sign. The sign inherits use and is the result of the creation of thinking forms by being. The result of reflection by being oneself through one's own thinking forms. The interaction of being with its own thinking forms in order to include the objects of being in the movement of being and its self-disclosure, the disclosure of ways to be, is an immanent property of being, revealed in the procedures of the search for truth, within the boundaries of which culture arises.