The USSR and the problem of Northern Epirus at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946

Martyukova Elizaveta Aleksandrovna ORCID: 0000-0002-1032-5998 Postgraduate student, the department of Russian History of the XX – XXI centuries, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moskva, Moscow, Lomonosovskii prospekt, 27/4 eamartyukova@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The Paris Peace Conference was held from July 29 to October 15 , 1946 . It considered draft peace treaties on the settlement of disputed issues after the Second World War through negotiations, which were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers (hereinafter CFM). The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is an international body consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, China and France, which also raised issues on the resolution of national–territorial claims of Greece. At the conference, two opposing tendencies of the post-war peace settlement collided: one was most sharply expressed by the diplomacy of the United States and Great Britain, and the other, which was defended by the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc. At the Paris Conference, the debates were public and the attitudes of individual delegations were discussed ^{[5, L. 275]}.

The "Greek" issues were not just one of the many problems of the Parisian theme. The Greek national-territorial problems affected the entire work of the conference, all the decisions it made on other issues, since there was a civil war in Greece, the issue of the new Greek government, as well as the troops of the allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition was not settled ^[2]. The "Greek" crisis had to be solved at the international level, and it was simultaneously considered within the framework of the newly created UN ^[23-25]. In order to settle the post-war world order, the Paris Conference was also convened in 1946, which often turned into a conference on "Greek" national-territorial claims.

In the modern world, rapid and profound changes are taking place, associated with the reformatting of the political and geographical space, the transformation of the functions of borders, primarily state borders. Border regions interact with neighboring countries in economic, cultural, legal and political aspects. Border regions occupy an important place in the national security system of both the Russian Federation and other states, taking into account geopolitical and geo-economic approaches. The relevance of the research problem is explained by the need to ensure the territorial integrity of states, therefore, in modern conditions, there is an increasing interest in the historical experience of states' activities to resolve the problem of territorial changes and create an effective mechanism for resolving and preventing ethnic conflicts, many of which take the forms of armed conflicts of an international nature.

An important aspect of studying the problem of the history of relations between the Soviet state and Greece is the study devoted to "Greek" issues at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946. The debates at the Paris Conference largely showed the main line of Soviet policy that developed in the post-war period. Consideration of the "Greek" national-territorial claims at the conference in Paris allows us to paint a picture of how two opposing political camps in the conditions of the "cold" war considered the future of the Balkans. Based on the analysis of new archival documentary materials, the article comprehensively examines the issue of Greece's national-territorial claims to Northern Epirus in the process of post-war peace settlement.

Soviet-Greek relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 they remain insufficiently researched in Russian historiography. General questions on international relations on the eve and during the Second World War, as well as on the post-war peace settlement were considered in the works of historian L.E. Grishaeva ^[13-19]. The national-territorial claims of Greece, voiced at the Paris Peace Conference in one aspect or another, were touched upon by many authors. Of the recent works that are closest in subject matter to the tasks set, it should be noted the works of A.A. Kalinin ^[20-21], A.P. Salkov ^[33-34], a specialist in the history of Greece T.V. Nikitina ^[26-27], as well as an article by a significant figure among researchers of Albanian history N.D. Smirnova ^[35]. To understand the essence of the work of Soviet diplomacy at the conference, the memoirs of the outstanding Soviet diplomat K.V. Kiselyov ^[22], the head of the delegation of the Belarusian SSR in Paris, should be particularly noted. All these works have made a valuable contribution to the study of the post-war history of international relations and the work of the Paris Peace Conference and reveal the participation of Soviet diplomacy in its activities.

        The scientific novelty of this study consists in the fact that, based on the involvement of new archival documentary materials, an attempt was made to study the question of the status of Northern Epirus in 1946 in the context of the approval of territorial changes after World War II. In the scientific literature, this problem has not been specifically posed in such a perspective until now.

The materials of the Russian State Archive of Modern History, namely the documents of personal origin of Nikos Zahariadis, fund 75a "Zahariadis Nikos (1903-1973), Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece", allow us to consider the position of the KKE on the Greek national claims regarding Northern Epirus. Also of great value are the publications of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the State Archive of the Russian Federation, namely, the archive fund R-4459 "Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (TASS)", which stores inventory No. 27 – "Foreign reference Edition for 1940-1960". The materials on Greece contain information about the work of the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, which contains a detailed chronicle of events and facts that make up the main content of the narrative.

The purpose of the article is to compare the positions of different parties, to show the course of the political struggle around the adoption of final decisions on the status of Northern Epirus. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to trace the development of Soviet diplomacy of its own position on the "Greek" issue, as well as the strategy of the USSR and its activities to protect the territorial integrity of Albania. This allows for a serious analysis of the results of the Paris Peace Conference of 1946. The chronological framework of the study is due to the fact that the work of the Paris Peace Conference began in July 1946 on the basis of draft peace treaties with Germany and the countries of Hitler's "Axis". The upper limit of the study is due to the fact that in October 1946 the conference completed its work, and on October 15, 1946 the final meeting of the Paris Peace Conference took place. Then, following the results of the Paris Conference, in 1947 the Paris Peace Treaties were concluded on the post-war settlement in Europe, including in the Balkans.  

THE POSITION OF THE USSR AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1946

The Paris Conference of 1946 was the first experience of broad cooperation between States in establishing peace after the Second World War. Representatives of great Powers, large and small States met at the conference to consider peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Conference was preceded by a rather lengthy work of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four great Powers. During this preparatory period, the main issues of peace treaties were considered: changes in the borders of States were determined, since there were controversial issues, reparations requirements were considered, although this work was not completed, military restrictions were established for the defeated states. On all these issues, agreed decisions were taken by the four Governments. However, some of the issues remained unresolved at the preparatory stage and transferred to the conference for consideration. The Conference had to express its opinion both on the agreed issues and on all the others ^{[30, p. 4]}.

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean was characterized by the complexity of defining the borders of states and extreme instability associated with the aggravation of post-war contradictions between Greece, which fought against Italian fascists and German Nazis, and the Balkan states that recently joined the Soviet bloc ^[18]. The most important role in resolving the issue of Greek national-territorial claims to Northern Epirus at the Paris Conference was played by the Soviet delegation, whose position coincided with the Albanian one. The main purpose of the USSR's participation in the Paris Conference on Greek claims was the desire to prevent the alienation of the territory bordering with Greece that belonged to Albania. During the negotiations, the issue of Northern Epirus was raised repeatedly, which caused protests from the Soviet delegation, which insisted on recognizing the existing border between Albania and Greece as acceptable.

Greece's relations with its northern neighbors, the countries of the Soviet bloc – Albania and Bulgaria, as well as Yugoslavia – were unstable and unpredictable ^[23-25]. The Soviet delegation refuted historical and ethnic arguments that could have been used and were used by the Greek delegation in order to increase its state and separate the regions from neighboring Balkan countries. Molotov stressed that "the means of pressure on the internal affairs of Greece are not only alien to democracy, but also dangerous." "Isn't it time to stop, isn't it time to put an end to this interference in the internal affairs of Greece, from which the Greek people have a hard time. Isn't it time to stop external interference..." - V.M. Molotov said at the conference ^{[2, p. 22]}. Thus, the Soviet diplomat in this case was really concerned about the fate of Greece, and not more global geopolitical interests.

Soviet diplomacy in Paris found its expression in the energetic positions of V.M. Molotov and A.Ya. Vyshinsky. The head of the Belarusian delegation, K.V. Kiselyov, spoke about the latter as a man of exuberant energy, great culture and extensive knowledge, who participated in many international conferences during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war period and contributed to the practical implementation of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the struggle for peace, friendship and cooperation between all peoples ^[22]. The central element of the Russian position was that the USSR defended itself against threats, explicit or implied not by Greece, but by England ^{[6, l. 184-185]}, supported by the United States. Since 1943, the Soviet leadership has referred Greece to the British sphere of influence. At the conference, the initiative in discussing the Greek issue was taken by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. The French government has only moved away from this issue. Despite the requests of the Soviet delegation not to involve the peace conference in this matter, the proposal to consider the Greek issue was accepted ^{[29, p. 2]}. The British were glad of this turn of affairs, since any mention by Great Britain of Greek problems was immediately followed by Soviet accusations of supporting the reactionary regime in Greece ^{[21, p. 249]}. In the post-war period, Britain's financial capabilities were decreasing, so the United States gradually became involved in all Greek affairs. The British were interested in strengthening the US position in Greece.

Of course, the Soviet delegation arrived at the conference in Paris well prepared to discuss any issues of post-war settlement with the former satellites of Nazi Germany. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Soviet delegation V.M. Molotov, the Paris Peace Conference "must fulfill the task of five peace conferences, which emphasizes the importance and complexity of its work" ^[28].

It was decided to include the Foreign Ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the USSR Ambassador to the USA N.V. Novikov in the USSR delegation at the peace conference in Paris. The delegation of the Belarusian SSR was approved, consisting of K.V. Kiselyov (head of the delegation), A.G. Bondar, P.V. Lyutorovich, A.A. Chizhov, F.P. Shmygov (members of the delegation), B.S. Tarasov, V.N. Yashumov, N.P. Novik and G.G. Novitsky (advisers of the delegation) ^{[32, L. 84]}.

The Greek delegation included three members of the parliamentary opposition. Venizelos is the leader of the Venizelists, Konstantin Rendis is a member of the Sofoulis party, deputy leader of the Venizelos liberals is Politis. Dragoumis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also present at the conference. They were assisted by the Greek ambassadors in London, Paris, Moscow, the plenipotentiary envoy representing Greece in the Allied Mission in Rome, Indaris, the adviser to the Greek King George Pipinelis, and Ventris, a historian and writer. 18 specialists in military and naval affairs and members of the diplomatic staff were also present ^{[5, L. 87]}. Thus, the conference was attended by the most important Soviet and Greek statesmen and politicians. The Greek plans and their national-territorial claims showed the growing contradictions between the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc, on the one hand, and Greece, on the other.

GREEK NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

On June 30, 1946, the members of the Greek delegation flew to Paris. The most controversial and painful issues of Greece were national-territorial and reparational – in terms of the amount and procedure for making payments and transferring lands previously owned by Greece. The main objective of the trip was to obtain economic and financial assistance to facilitate reconstruction in Greece ^{[4, l. 284]}. These issues were, among others, concerning Greece, the first and most important ^{[4, l. 282]}.

According to the Potsdam Agreement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was entrusted with the task of proposing a solution to unresolved territorial issues that arose in connection with the end of the war in Europe ^{[4, L. 37, 38]}. The proposals regarding Greece at the Paris Conference were as follows:

1. Ratification of the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the Dodecanese Islands.

2. The annexation of Northern Epirus to Greece, 80% of whose population were Greeks. The Greek delegation did not know at that time how this claim would be made, given that Albania was not initially invited to the Paris Conference.

3. Fixing the borders with Bulgaria (Rumelia) so that the Bulgarians could no longer attack Greece, which, according to Greece, has occurred three times over the course of 30 years.

4. Reparations from Bulgaria.

5. Financial assistance of the great powers of Greece ^{[5, l. 95]}.

The Greek foreign policy, as well as the Greek national requirements for the Northern Epirus, an area of approximately 1,950 square miles ^{[29, p. 2]}, set out at the conference, were approved by the majority of the population at the elections on March 31, 1946, as well as by all political parties at repeated meetings of the commission of party leaders of the National Assembly, which were We fully stand in solidarity with the Government in implementing this policy. At the same time, the Greek government was attacked for its foreign policy, which was approved only by "adventurers" ^{[5, l. 259]}. The EAM bloc also supported national territorial claims by sending a telegram to the presidium of the peace conference with a statement on the transfer of Northern Epirus and Eastern Thrace to Greece, where the majority of the population before the forced displacement in recent years was Greek ^{[5, l. 118-119]}. In this way, he expressed his desire to unite with the Greeks living on the lands of Albania and Bulgaria, who were torn away from Greece by the will of military circumstances.

The same position was held by the committee representing the Greeks living in all parts of Epirus. He sent a telegram to the leaders of the Allied delegations to Paris for a peace conference, in which he also supported the Greek claims to Northern Epirus ^{[3, l. 342]}.

In 1945, N. Zahariadis said that the issue of Greek national claims was not the main one, since the main problems concerned the internal structure of the country. The KKE was against the forcible occupation of Northern Epirus by Greek troops. However, in order to ensure the democratic unity of Greece, the party, having expressed its motivated opinion, was ready to take the position on the issue of Northern Epirus that the majority of democratic forces would take ^{[31, L. 1]}. Consequently, the KKE adhered to the principles of democratic cooperation on the issue of Northern Epirus, did not express any objections against the policy of the Greek government and did not oppose the attempts of a certain dominant group to annex Albanian territory. Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that all political parties in Greece, including the opposition, supported the claims of the Greek government to Northern Epirus.

Among the young nations, Greece played the largest role in the war against fascism ^{[4, l. 154]}. Some members of the Paris Conference spoke about the need to support the Greek delegation, although it made unfounded claims ^{[6, l. 46]}. Western countries, especially the United States, having studied in detail the Greek territorial claims submitted on April 17, 1946 by the Greek Ambassador in Washington, came to the conclusion that the annexation of areas such as Northern Epirus and the southern border areas of Bulgaria to Greece would undoubtedly cause vigorous confrontation and partisan activity. Thus, peace in the Balkans would be under threat without a decisive strategic benefit ^{[38, p. 196]}. However, geographical maps have long been sold in Athenian stores, on which Southern Albania, part of Yugoslavia and almost half of Bulgaria are included in the Greek territory ^{[2, p. 12]}. Thus, American statements indicated that Greece was endangering peace in the Balkans. This position of the US delegation undoubtedly brought positive results to the work of the entire conference.

There was no unity among the delegates of the conference on the issue of the Greek-Albanian border. Greece advocated the creation of a "Greater Greece", which included the Greek minority on the territory of Albania. Another part, primarily supporters of the Soviet bloc, believed that Northern Epirus was part of Albania.

Greek claims to Albania were based on historical, ethnic, geographical, legal rights, as well as strategic considerations ^{[4, l. 30]}. The province of Northern Epirus was necessary for her, including for the self-defense of the country ^{[5, l. 154-155]}. According to the Greek side, a significant majority of the inhabitants were Greeks, and they constantly protested against their rejection from their native country. The resolution adopted by the American Senate in 1920, advocating the inclusion of Northern Epirus into Greece, was repeated in almost identical terms by the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, which adopted this decision unanimously ^{[4, l. 30]}. According to the Greek side, Albania's actions on the border with Greece were hostile ^{[5, l. 154-155]} and it was necessary to put an end to the state of war that still existed between Greece and Albania ^{[4, l. 37-38]}. This statement for the USSR was unfounded and undignified ^{[29, p. 2]}. Thus, at the Paris Conference, the efforts of the Greek government were focused on resolving the territorial dispute with Albania. The main place was occupied by the solution of the problem of Northern Epirus, which had cultural, economic and defense significance.

DIPLOMACY OF THE PARTIES AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1946

Greek Prime Minister K. Tsaldaris spoke before the Paris Conference as a defender of the demands of the Greek people. Tsaldaris denied that Albania had made any contribution to the Allied war effort. In his opinion, the country was hermetically sealed for external observation ^{[5, l. 287]}. Enver Hoxha's regime was also accused of persecuting Catholics and Greek minorities in Albania ^{[5, l. 265]}. The arguments given by Tsaldaris expounded at length the history of the Albanian question. He carried out the figures of Turkish statistics presented at the conference in Paris in 1919, when 120 thousand Greeks lived in Northern Epirus and there were 360 Greek schools ^{[5, L. 299-300]}, while the head of the Albanian government, Enver Hoxha, estimated the number of the Greek minority in this area at the time of the conference at 35 thousand people.

 Tsaldaris expressed his sincere desire to live peacefully and peacefully in the neighborhood of Albania and expressed his readiness to sign all the provisions of the peace treaty, provided that the issue of the border separating the two countries is settled. He talked about Greece acquiring rights to Northern Epirus several centuries before Albania became a sovereign state. This problem created obstacles to the establishment of friendly relations between Greece and Albania and was, from his point of view, the result of the pernicious game of the imperialists, whose policy was full of intrigues and intrigues ^{[5, l. 297]}. The concern of the Soviet representative was caused by the fact that Tsaldaris, in addition to demands about Southern Albania, made demands about the Rhodope Mountains. Simultaneously with these statements, border incidents on the Albanian-Greek border intensified ^{[5, l. 294]}. Thus, the Greek delegation justified its claims by the fact that Albania was a country at war with Greece. Also, this issue was of paramount importance for Greece, taking into account ethnic, geographical points of view, as well as security and justice.

Tsaldaris asked the members of the Yugoslav delegation not to resist the Greek demands for Northern Epirus and recalled that the territorial claims of Yugoslavia were satisfied (Venice-Giulia) ^{[5, l. 272]}. Also, representatives of Greece stated that the Greek government would not oppose Yugoslavia acquiring the Albanian territory in the north that it would like to have ^{[5, l. 258]}. Consequently, Tsaldaris wanted the Yugoslav side to stop providing support to Albania.

However, the Yugoslav delegation supported the Soviet bloc countries, Albania and Bulgaria. At that time, the "corrections" concerned only the Greek-Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian borders, but, according to the Yugoslav side, the Greek leaders aimed at their territory as well. Consequently, concern for the security of their country played no role in the Greek claims. The Greek government proceeded from the desire to create a "great Greece". This created a danger for the countries neighboring Greece, so the "great Greek" tendencies had to be rejected ^{[29, p. 2]}. The Yugoslav representative M. Piade stated that the Greek delegation adhered to the old political line, which was the guiding line of all the small Balkan monarchies and which would have generated endless wars between these powers and endless suffering of the Balkan small states ^{[5, l. 183]}. Thus, the political preferences of the Yugoslav delegation from the very beginning of the Paris Conference were connected with the USSR.

Albania considered the Greek demands ridiculous and unfair ^{[4, l. 96]}, and the Prime Minister of Albania, Enner Hoxha, rejected them ^{[5, l. 313]}. The Communist Party of Albania, established in November 1941, won the war both with foreign occupiers and with its political opponents inside the country and at the end of 1944 established a dictatorial regime in the country under the slogan of "people's democracy" ^{[39, p. 97]}. The Albanian government of Enver Hoxha was recognized by the USSR, the USA and the UK ^{[4, l. 37-38]}. The Soviet government and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which came to power after the liberation of the country from the Nazi army, supported the government of E. Hoxha ^{[4, pp. 37-38]}. Despite the fact that the USSR did not pay significant attention to Albania, so as not to cause carping from the allies, it was already in the sphere of influence of the Soviet state.

Albania was unable to take full part in the work of the Paris Peace Conference ^{[36, p. 271]}. She was invited to the conference, but not as an enemy state, as Greece saw her, but as a state that helped the allies during the war against Germany ^{[6, L. 47]}. This, of course, was the merit of Soviet diplomacy. The Albanian delegation used the right of advisory vote granted to it to present a thorough argumentation on all issues concerning the interests of Albania ^{[36, l. 271]}.

England's position regarding the Greek demands for Northern Epirus was the partition of Albania. A hypothetical solution based on federal principles could become a model of a peaceful organization in the Balkans ^{[5, l. 253]}. The British newspaper Observer also wrote that Greece's demands for a revision of the border with Albania were met with vigorous opposition, indicating a state of mind that would be called psychopathological in relation to an individual. After Molotov's usual objections in the conference hall, Soviet radio commentators addressed their Balkan listeners in more incendiary terms ^{[6, l. 184-185]}. Such statements were a manifestation of information and propaganda work. The most important issue that Great Britain was seriously engaged in at that moment was the organization of a plebiscite on the return of the king. The policy of Great Britain was to normalize the situation in Greece and the Balkans, so it did not put forward specific programs for the partition of the Albanian state.

According to V.M. Molotov, the "aggressive" claims to the territory of Albania were an unacceptable maneuver of the Greek government, which took the opportunity to put it forward. In his opinion, Greece should have put its questions to neighboring or other states in the usual way: through diplomacy, through negotiations ^{[29, p. 2]}. According to the Soviet side, all the statements of the Greek delegation were invented in order to threaten little Albania and justify the aggressive plans of the Greek rulers. The Soviet delegation considered the only correct friendly attitude to the current democratic Albania, which fought against Germany and fascist Italy and helped the victory over fascism ^{[37, pp. 88-89]}.  Even before the Paris Peace Conference was convened, the Albanian press wrote in response to the Greek memorandum with demands for Northern Epirus that, given the world importance of the USSR and its determination to defend a just and sustainable peace, reactionary forces launched a diplomatic attack to create a common anti-Soviet front ^{[4, L. 96]}. Large forces of the Albanian army were concentrated on the Greek-Albanian border when the "war of nerves" around the Greek-Albanian border reached its climax. Albania declared itself ready to fight for Northern Epirus if the Paris Conference would accept the Greek demand for this territory ^{[7, l. 263]}. Consequently, the Soviet position was explained by the fact that the conference in Paris was not convened to help the Greek government achieve its goals and objectives. Also, the statements of the Greek delegation posed a threat not only to Albania, but also to the entire post-war world order.

Thus, there was no unity among the members of the Paris Conference delegation regarding the ownership of Northern Epirus. On the one hand, Greece understood that its demands regarding Northern Epirus were in no way consistent with the goals of Albania, the USSR, and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The UK offered its own solution to the situation. On the other hand, Greece was afraid of losing public support in its own country, which supported the national-territorial claims of the government. The Greek delegation withdrew its proposal, and in fact this issue no longer existed at the Paris Conference ^{[7, l. 213]}. Thus, the Greek-Albanian conflict demonstrated the existence of serious differences between the interests of countries of different delegations, as well as the desire to settle disputed issues to ensure universal peace.

The very problem of the territorial affiliation of Northern Epirus did not go away with the conclusion of negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and was raised for discussion at the UN after the end of the civil war in Greece in 1949. On October 28, 1949, the Greek delegate in his speech at a meeting of the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly stated that the Athenian government has never refused and does not renounce claims to the Northern Epirus ^{[10, l. 108]}. A.Ya. Vyshinsky on this occasion replied that the borders could be changed, but by mutual consent of the states concerned on the basis of respect for the principle of sovereign equality of the contracting parties ^{[12, l. 182]}. At the same time, the Greek delegates were of the opinion that the two sides Albania and Greece would not be able to live in peace if the disagreement existing between them was not resolved ^{[12, l. 165]}. Opinions were also expressed that the Gordian knot of partisanship was located on the territory of Northern Epirus and the UN had to slowly give Greece a historical commission to re-occupy the inhumanly tortured Northern Epirus ^{[11, l. 185]}. Also, the "Committee of Struggle for the Liberation of Northern Epirus" at the end of 1949 appealed to Christians all over the world with a request to help in the struggle to put an end to the anti-Christian tyranny experienced by the natives of Northern Epirus in 1950 ^{[12, l. 304]}. Archival documents mention the multiplicity of border conflicts between Albania and Greece during the civil War of 1946-1949, which made it impossible to conduct a friendly policy of the two states towards each other. The process of discussing the issue of Northern Epirus at the UN spoke about unresolved differences between the two states and at the same time about the desire to settle the long-standing territorial dispute by peaceful means.

The Albanian newspaper Bashkimi, regarding the removal of the Greek proposal from the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, came out with full houses: "The Peace Conference removed the shameful demands of the Greek fascist government to Albania"; "Defending the rights of the Albanian people, Molotov and Kardelj exposed the maneuvers of the Greek fascists"; "Byrnes once again tried to make the maneuver of the Greek fascists go quietly, but he did not achieve this." The newspaper wrote about the victory of the right cause of the Albanian people and stressed that the policy of the Athenian businessmen had suffered a shameful bankruptcy in the international arena in front of the entire international community. Expressing gratitude to the delegations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the newspaper wrote about the deep gratitude of the Albanian people for the unwavering defense of their cause. The names of Molotov, Vyshinsky, Manuilsky, Cardel, Piade were called as the names of the defenders of the holy and just cause ^{[7, l. 289]}. The Albanian press carried out regular information work. Soviet diplomacy was active in protecting Albanian interests and had a significant impact on the members of the Paris Conference delegations in order to prevent the satisfaction of Greek claims. Thus, the foundations of friendly relations between Albania and the USSR were laid.

The decisions of the Paris Conference caused disappointment and indignation among some segments of the Greek population. Despite the fact that the USSR consistently opposed the territorial claims of the Greek delegation, the discontent caused by the failure of these claims was directed primarily against England and against the Tsaldaris government, since it was not possible to create a "great Greece" ^{[9, l. 224]}. With expressions of discontent, demonstrators took to the streets of Athens, carrying slogans: "Where are the fruits of our sacrifices", "We need Northern Epirus" ^{[8, l. 11]}. These press statements indicate that the actions of the Greek authorities have not found support among certain groups of the country's population. Assessing the results achieved by Soviet diplomacy in matters of belonging to Northern Epirus, it should be noted that it managed to achieve its main goal – to preserve Northern Epirus as part of Albania.

conclusion

The Paris Peace Conference of 1946, which ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaties on February 10, 1947, became the basis for the post-war world order. Despite the prolonged nature of the Second World War and the enormous material and human costs, the influence of the USSR in Europe and in the world increased, which created the basis for making geopolitical decisions and developing peace treaties taking into account its own interests in order to strengthen international security. The Paris Peace Conference of 1946 summed up the results of the Second World War, at which the terms of peace treaties with the defeated former allies of Nazi Germany were openly discussed and approved.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1946 was convened in the context of already formed ideological differences between the USSR and the United States on the peaceful settlement of the Balkan Peninsula and the Mediterranean region. The Conference became the arena of an exceptionally acute and intense diplomatic struggle. The political and diplomatic struggle of the Soviet government at the Paris Conference was active from the very beginning. The methods used by the USSR in its active political and diplomatic struggle against the national-territorial claims of Greece were well-thought-out arguments for discussing any issues of post-war settlement, speeches by V.M. Molotov, A.Ya. Vyshinsky, publications in the Soviet press directed against the Greek monarchist bloc and systematic proposals to reject Greek territorial claims.

The discussions at the Paris Conference became part of a propaganda war that unfolded within the framework of a tough confrontation between the two camps in the conditions of the Cold War. The most important role in the confrontation between the ideological camps belonged to the press, which systematically implemented state policy on the information and psychological front. During the Paris Conference, the Greek monarchist press published malicious anti-Soviet articles that called for an immediate and merciless war against the USSR, and declared the Soviet policy of procrastination in Paris ^{[5, l. 249]}. Also during the work of the Paris Conference, it was reported that the discussion was "turning into a circus", and that measures were being taken to re-refer issues to the foreign ministers of the Big Four ^{[5, L. 341]}. The Daily Herald newspaper gloomily commented on the work of the Paris Conference ^{[5, l. 340]}. The Soviet press also accused the "Greek monarcho-fascist clique" of conducting chauvinistic propaganda and attempts to intimidate their northern neighbors in order to conquer foreign lands ^{[21, p. 302]}. Thus, the mass media of different states pursued the goal of maintaining their influence in the ideological confrontation.

On May 22, 1947, former Greek Foreign Minister I. Sofianopoulos, according to information published in the newspaper Eleftheria, speaking at a meeting of diplomats at the Institute for Foreign Policy, said that the Greek territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference were exceptionally moderate. Northern Epirus, in his opinion, has always been Greek. In conclusion, Sofianopoulos stated that the hostile position of the Soviet delegation towards Greece taken at the Paris Conference was "a consequence of the ridiculous and stupid policy of the Greek authorities," which more than once in statements made publicly and officially fell out hostile and provocative against the USSR ^{[1, l. 46]}. Thus, Sofianopoulos supported the Greek national-territorial claims that Northern Epirus was to become part of Greece. At the same time, he acknowledged that the attitude of the Greek authorities towards the USSR and communist ideology was hostile.

The Soviet position in the region was to support the countries of the Soviet bloc, despite the fact that during the Second World War they were called aggressors. The debates at the Paris Peace Conference testify to the clash of Soviet and American interests in this region and the emergence of a new threat to the security of the southern regions of the Soviet Union. The general line of Soviet foreign policy was to defend the principles of honest cooperation between peoples, the struggle for lasting peace and security. During the Second World War, the Red Army defeated Hitler's Germany, which was of world-historical significance. However, according to the Soviet delegation, the former allies sought to use the Paris Peace Conference in the interests of a certain dominant group in Greece, which was an active supporter of territorial claims to Albania.

However, with the participation of the USSR, the Greek national-territorial claims regarding Northern Epirus were not realized. The disputed issue was settled in favor of the territorial interests of Albania, which was in the sphere of influence of the USSR, which was a significant achievement of Soviet diplomacy. Greece's existing border with Albania was seen as the basis for stability in the Balkan region.

The Greek delegation led by Tsaldaris presented several national-territorial claims against other states at once, which did not find support at the conference and predetermined the disappointments and protests of the Greek public. Despite this, the Western powers supported the interests of Greece.

The subsequent conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 played a major role in the post-war peace settlement in Europe. The treaties preserved the independent existence of the defeated States and created an opportunity for their peaceful democratic development.