Foreign policy activities of the Visegrad Group in the period 2004-2014

Peshkin Vitalii Mikhailovich Educator, Department of International Journalism, Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University 603155, Russia, Niegorodskaya oblast', g. Nizhnii Novgorod, ul. Minina, 31a vitaly1209@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Speaking about the role of the Visegrad Group in the external actions of the EU, it should be emphasized that within the framework of a single Europe, V4 was significantly limited in terms of promoting its own initiatives. This was due to internal principles involving the coordination of actions of EU member states and discussions with Brussels on proposed plans and projects, little experience of post-socialist states' participation in large-scale integration projects^[1] and the emerging informal division of Europe into "old" and "new"^[2]. In fact, the only initiative developed mostly within the framework of the Quartet countries was the Eastern Partnership.

The relevance of this study is due to the fact that it is the Eastern Partnership that will become one of the indirect causes of the Ukrainian crisis, which has become the most serious and large-scale challenge for the current system of international relations. After Kiev's announcement of its intention to "take a pause" in negotiations on signing the Association Agreement scheduled for November 2013 at the Vilnius summit, protests began in the Ukrainian capital, which will lead to an armed struggle of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass and the beginning of a special Russian military operation in Ukraine in February 2022.

The purpose of the study is to study the process of designing and implementing the Eastern Partnership program as the only significant initiative of the Visegrad Quartet in EU foreign policy.  The stated goal will be achieved by performing the following tasks:

- formulation of the critical attitude of other EU countries to the Eastern Partnership project;

- to study the development tools used by the Visegrad Group for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership project, due to the limited resource base of the Quartet countries.

The novelty of the scientific research in the framework of this article is expressed in the analysis of the "energy crises" and changes in the EU's approaches to the post-Soviet space in the late 2000s, which became the basis for the development of the Eastern Partnership program. The competition between Poland and the Czech Republic for leadership in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership program, which has not been studied before, will also be presented.  

The methodological basis for writing the article was following the principle of historicism, applying a system-structural approach to the study of political, economic, and other factors that led to the design and implementation of the Eastern Partnership program. In the course of the work, analysis and synthesis were applied from general scientific methods, which helped to isolate the political and economic measures of individual Western countries, and then recreate a holistic view of the general activity of the West to unite Eastern European states under its patronage.

The sources used in writing this work can be divided into two groups – 1) information materials of the European Economic Community and the European Union, as well as documents of the Visegrad Group itself. 2) Scientific research published by various foreign scientific institutes; articles by Russian (Shishelina L.N.) and foreign scientists (K. Kotulevich-Vishinska, and Artemyev), as well as publications in the Ukrainian media.

The most well-known and implemented initiative of the Visegrad Group is the Eastern Partnership project, which aimed to develop relations between the EU and six "partner countries" representing the post-Soviet space (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). The increased interest of V4 in the Western and Transcaucasian republics of the former USSR is explained by two factors:

- a common border with some of the participants of the Eastern Partnership, which, on the one hand, facilitated communication and interaction, and on the other, made it possible to more objectively assess all the benefits and costs of the potential expansion of EU cooperation with eastern neighbors;^[3]

- An attempt by the Visegrad Group to raise its status by putting forward its own regional initiative within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy implemented by the EU^[4].

It should also be pointed out that the problem of energy security, which became relevant for the Visegrad Group in the mid-2000s, when the "gas wars" between Russia and Ukraine began, served as a material basis for developing ideas about the need for a more active EU policy in the post-Soviet space. 

The countries of the "quartet" depended on the supply of Russian energy resources, Hungary and Slovakia were in the most difficult situation^[5]. Within the framework of the Visegrad Group, the topic of weakening energy dependence on Russia by diversifying suppliers has been repeatedly raised, and individual representatives of V4 have also come up with energy initiatives within the EU and NATO. Poland was the most active at that time.

In 2005, Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, at the NATO summit in Riga, took the initiative to create an "energy defense union" ("energy NATO") in order to ensure the security of the Visegrad Group countries and, more broadly, the entire former socialist bloc^[6]. In some interpretations of this proposal, it was proposed to include some post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) into the potential bloc^[7]. The initiative received support from the USA, the Baltic States and Norway^[8]. At the same time, the Polish project did not imply the creation of some new structure combining the features of an energy organization and a military-political union, but the expansion of NATO's powers and capabilities in the field of ensuring the energy security of its members and potential allies of the alliance^[9]. However, this initiative did not receive practical implementation and after an active discussion in 2006-2007, it was actually removed from the agenda.

It is also worth noting that the end of the first decade of the XXI century was marked by significant changes in the perception of the post-Soviet space in Europe. If until 2008 Brussels did not make serious efforts to promote its integration project in the republics of the former USSR, then after the events of the August "Five-Day" war, it revised its approach to the region^[10]. According to a number of researchers, the main goal of the EU was to turn part of the post-Soviet space into a buffer territory separating Europe from the "unpredictable" Russia^[11]. One of the instruments of "binding" the republics of the former USSR to the EU was the Eastern Partnership program, which actually turned the "integration dilemma" (the choice between European and Eurasian integration projects) into an "integration dilemma" (the need to take into account the interests of third countries when choosing an integration path, which may consider it as a threat to their security)^[12].

Traditionally, it is believed that the initiator of the creation and promotion of the Eastern Partnership initiative is Poland, which developed it with the support of Sweden. However, rather, it is worth talking about the parallel preparation of two similar projects simultaneously in Warsaw and Prague. The Polish version, as a result, received practical implementation, and this happened during the Czech presidency of the EU Council.

The success of the Polish-Swedish version of the Eastern Partnership was facilitated, in particular, by Warsaw's experience in developing regional cooperation projects. In the period 2002-2004 . Poland took the initiative to create the so-called "Eastern Dimension" within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU Common Foreign & Security Policy)^[13]. Thus, Warsaw (at that time not being a member of the EU) actually presented itself as a potential link between a united Europe and the western part of the post-Soviet space. At the same time, in addition to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, the initiative in the future also covered Transcaucasia and a number of western regions of Russia^[14].

For the first time, the Eastern Partnership project was officially presented in May 2008 by Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski^[15]. At that time, there was still no clear certainty that Brussels and the EU leaders would support the new initiative, since the project had a serious competitor in the face of the "Union for the Mediterranean" promoted by France^[16]. Looking ahead, it should be emphasized that, despite the final success of the Polish-Swedish project, there was no consensus in the European Union regarding the Eastern Partnership, and the project itself was perceived skeptically and repeatedly criticized. Moreover, among the critics of the project were not only the countries of "old" Europe (including Germany and France), but also Poland's former partners in the socialist bloc Bulgaria and Romania, which promoted the initiative to develop integration processes in the Black Sea region ^[17].

In December 2008, the European Commission issued a special Message in which it characterized the Eastern Partnership as "a long-term political signal of EU solidarity, reinforced by additional significant support for reforms by partner countries aimed at developing democracy and market relations, strengthening their statehood and territorial integrity"^[18]. At the same time, there was no common understanding among the EU member states of what prospects the new project could offer to the "partner countries". On the one hand, Brussels could not directly promise EU membership to the project participants. On the other hand, in the case of minor effects on the implementation of the program, there was a risk that the "partner countries" might become disillusioned with the EU policy and reorient themselves to cooperation with Russia.

The date of the official launch of the Eastern Partnership is May 7, 2009. On this day, the founding summit of the program was held in Prague, and a Joint Declaration was adopted defining the main areas of cooperation between the EU and the "partner countries":

- "democracy, responsible governance and stability" (in fact, the promotion of European ideas and values in the post-Soviet space, as well as EU support for democratic reforms and public administration reforms in the former Soviet republics);

- "economic integration";

- "energy security" (an area relevant for the EU, since Russian energy resources are transited through the territory of Belarus and Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, in the future, could become an alternative supplier of hydrocarbons);

- "contacts between people"^[19].

The spheres, mechanisms and methods of interaction between the EU and the "partner countries" were described in more detail in the documents preceding the Joint Declaration (memorandum and press release) published by the European Commission on the eve of the Prague summit. In particular, the so-called "flagship initiatives" within the framework of the Eastern Partnership were put forward, revealing the specifics and directions of cooperation between the European Union and six post-Soviet republics^[20].

In addition, the Joint Declaration announced that the implementation of the Eastern Partnership project will be implemented simultaneously at several levels:

 - Firstly, it was assumed that the partner countries would interact with the EU both in a consolidated and individual manner. Each partner country interested in rapprochement with Brussels had to implement a set of reforms in various spheres of domestic activity in order to achieve the ultimate goal of signing an association agreement with the European Union;

- Secondly, the participating countries of the Eastern Partnership had to actively interact with each other (including through institutionalization of relations) in order to more effectively develop and implement internal reforms and develop a model of cooperation with the EU. The prospect of forming a new macro-region on the basis of the project, combining various parts of the post-Soviet space (the European part, the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region and the Black Sea region, the Caspian Sea) was also considered;

- Thirdly, the Eastern Partnership was to become one of the elements in the system of regional and international initiatives and projects implemented in Europe. In particular, close cooperation with the Black Sea Synergy program was assumed^[21].

It is characteristic that the first Eastern Partnership summit has already demonstrated certain differences between the EU member states over the launch of a new project. Thus, many leaders of the states of "old" Europe were absent from the meeting (with the exception of German Chancellor Angela Merkel), which emphasized the ambiguous perception in the EU of the Visegrad Group initiative. The position of V4 on the relevance of the project was actually expressed by Acting Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolanek, during the final press conference, calling on the EU "not to pretend that there is nothing to the east of na" and that for partner countries with "European ambitions", the Eastern Partnership should become "not formal, and pragmatic cooperation"^[22].

The partner countries assessed the launch of the project differently. While the leaders of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine reacted positively to the Eastern Partnership, calling it "another step on the way to the EU," in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus, the attitude towards the new regional initiative was restrained, and in the case of Minsk, rather indifferent. In addition, Armenia and Belarus worked closely with Russia, which significantly influenced their perception of the new initiative. Azerbaijan, in turn, focused on Turkey in its foreign policy, and did not see any practical benefits for itself in the Eastern Partnership (with the exception of certain segments)^[23].

For the Visegrad Group, the promotion of the Eastern Partnership initiative and its subsequent implementation in practice was an important event that emphasized the importance of the Quartet (and the whole "new" Europe as a whole) for the EU's domestic and foreign policy. A few years after joining the European Union, V4 has identified itself as an active actor capable of both developing and proposing large-scale projects, and acting as an intermediary between the countries of the post-Soviet space and the EU, as well as actually overseeing the implementation of the goals and objectives of the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, the Visegrad Group and its individual participants considered the project as an integral part of their own foreign policy courses^[24]. As one of the Polish researchers stated, the strategic goal of the existence of the program is "to have the West in the East"^[25], which, in principle, met the interests not only of Warsaw, but also of other V4 participants.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that, despite the high degree of interest of the Visegrad Group in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership project and its active development, the economic and resource capabilities of the Quartet seem limited for full participation in the practical implementation of all the stated goals and objectives. Therefore, the V4 countries tried to use the opportunities and tools available to them to develop relations in the most promising areas. In particular, relying on the experience and potential of the International Visegrad Foundation, the Quartet promoted various reforms in the "partner countries", promoted the ideas of democracy and civil society, and strengthened social communications^[26].

The Visegrad International Foundation also implemented a large number of different programs in the field of culture and education (the Visegrad Four Eastern Partnership program), offering participants a wide range of grants, scholarships and academic internships. In 2011, an additional program for the Eastern Partnership was also launched^[27], aimed at supporting democratic transformations and the formation of civil society in the Eastern Partnership countries. As K. notes : Kotulevich-Vishynska, "the Fund's actions fit into the EU's overall strategy towards partner countries and corresponded to its general approach of "more for more". As you know, the principle of this approach is that those countries that will be committed to deep democratic reforms can expect more from participating in the European program"^[28].

Among the achievements of the first years of cooperation between the International Visegrad Foundation and the Eastern Partnership, it is worth mentioning the involvement of "partner countries" to participate in new projects or joint implementation of previously existing programs:

- "Flagship Projects" – support for long-term projects aimed at the development of political and economic interactions between the EU and the Eastern Partnership, democratic transformations and the building of civil society;^[29]

- Extended Standard Grants – support for medium–term projects to study the V4 experience in the areas of democratization, European and regional integration in order to use the results obtained in the development of relations between the Eastern Partnership and the EU;^[30]

- grants intended for conducting scientific research (University Studies Grants) – support of projects for the creation and launch of educational and scientific courses, programs and disciplines;^[31]

- Visegrad Scholarship Program (Visegrad Scholarship Program) – support for academic exchange between V4 and the Eastern Partnership^[32].

In addition, in 2011, with the active assistance of the Visegrad Group, a special Transport group was created within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program to intensify cooperation on the exchange of experience and information with the EU. The purpose of the program is to identify priority strategic projects for the development of transport systems of the "partner countries" and their further integration with the transport systems of the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe^[33].

Despite the results achieved, the Eastern Partnership program faced difficulties already in the first years of its existence. The opinions of researchers and experts on the reasons differ. In Russia, criticism of the program is based on the politicization of the program, the inconsistency of its strategic goals with resource and financial content, the disunity of the "partner countries", internal disagreements of the EU, Brussels' misunderstanding of the peculiarities of the development of the post-Soviet region and the specifics of individual countries, the dependence of the republics of the former USSR on relations with Russia^[34]. In turn, European researchers and experts, as well as their colleagues from the Eastern Partnership countries, find difficulties in the implementation and full functioning of the program in opposition from Russia, heterogeneity of participants, difficulties in overcoming the legacy of the Soviet period, the secondary importance of the program for the foreign policy of the European Union, insufficient resources and financing^[35].

Difficulties in putting the goals of the Eastern Partnership into practice arose already at the first summit in Prague in 2009, when the launch of the new program was accompanied by skepticism from many EU countries. In 2011, during the Warsaw summit "partner countries", these trends again affected the representativeness of the participants of the EU delegation (of the leaders, only A. Merkel was present again). Also, the Eastern Partnership countries have already faced internal contradictions, having failed, for example, to adopt a resolution criticizing Belarus for human rights violations. Also, the parties were unable to hold a full-fledged meeting of EURONEST (an association of parliamentarians from the EU and "partner countries")^[36].

A certain incentive to the activation of the Eastern Partnership was the changes in the foundations of the European Neighborhood Policy in May 2011, which shifted the focus to the need for democratic transformations and reforms in the "partner countries". This step was positively received in some countries of the Eastern Partnership (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) and influenced the intensification of activities to prepare for the signing of association agreements with the European Union.

Subsequently, the Eastern Partnership will become one of the indirect causes of the Ukrainian crisis, which has become the most serious and large-scale challenge for the current system of international relations. After Kiev announced its intention to "take a pause" in negotiations on signing the Association Agreement, scheduled for November 2013 at the Vilnius summit, protests began in the Ukrainian capital, which will lead to large-scale upheavals, a change of the ruling regime and a number of other consequences^[37].

Speaking about the perception of the Eastern Partnership by the Visegrad Group countries and the role of this project for each of the four countries, several key points can be highlighted:

- Firstly, the main political beneficiary in the interaction of V4 and the "partner countries" is Poland, the initiator of the project, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic. Hungary and Slovakia were less involved in the implementation of the project and acted, rather, as a "support group" for Warsaw and Prague, demonstrating a kind of "Visegrad solidarity";^[38]

- Secondly, the economic effect of cooperation between the V4 countries and the Eastern Partnership countries seems insignificant. According to official statistics, "the share of partner countries in the total imports of each of the V4 countries from the time of their accession to the EU and before the crisis in Ukraine fluctuated between 1-2%," and in the case of Transcaucasian countries, this figure barely reached 0.01%"^[39]. The Czech Republic can be considered a certain exception, since it managed to establish relatively strong ties with Azerbaijan and agree on regular supplies of energy resources. For the "partner countries", the Visegrad market was of the greatest importance only for the border countries of Belarus and Ukraine^[40]. The situation is somewhat better with exports from V4 to "partner countries" (from 1 to 2.5%), and the main beneficiary is Poland (3.5-4.5%), which has a stable market for its products in Ukraine;^[41]

- Thirdly, the Visegrad Group countries are actually divided on the issue of financing multilateral projects with the Eastern Partnership. While Poland and the Czech Republic actively invested in this area, Hungary and Slovakia chose a more cautious tactic that does not involve large-scale financing on their part;

- Fourthly, until 2014, when, against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, there will be an increase in attention to the Eastern Partnership, both from the EU and separately from the Visegrad Group, the project, with all its achievements, can be considered rather more iconic and symbolic for Poland and the Visegrad Group as a whole than an effective component of the European Neighborhood Policy.

Summing up the interim results of the Visegrad Group's foreign policy of 2004-2014, it can be stated that in the first decade of its membership in the EU, the most important initiative of the Visegrad Group was the Eastern Partnership, in which the Quartet countries (primarily Poland) played the role of curators and at the same time acted as a link between the EU and the post-Soviet space. The implementation of the project in practice allowed V4 to significantly improve its image and gain political weight within the European Union. When developing relations with the "partner countries", the Visegrad Group tried to make maximum use of all available mechanisms and tools (for example, the potential and experience of implementing joint projects within the framework of the International Visegrad Foundation). At the same time, our own capabilities and resources (coupled with the ambiguous perception of the Eastern Partnership in the EU) did not allow us to fully implement all the stated strategic goals, which seriously affected the effectiveness of the project and the results obtained.