The Benghazi Treaty is the unfulfilled foundation of modern Italian-Libyan relations

Высочина Екатерина ORCID: 0000-0003-1395-8149 Assistant, department of modern East and Africa, Russian state university for the humanities 125047 Rossiya, Moskva, Miusskaya ploshchad', d. 6, Russia, Moskva oblast', g. Moscow, ul. Miusskaya Pl., 6 vysochinaekaterina@gmail.com

The 20th century was the time of another colonial redistribution of the world. So, in 1911, Italy invaded Libya. The Libyan territories acquired by Italy were the least desirable of all the colonies, having few resources and sources of raw materials necessary for the development of an industrial state ^{[1, p. 222]}. The Italian government felt a lot of resistance from local groups, which led to the war in 1911-1912 ^{[2, p. 48]}. Italy thoroughly prepared the ground for the seizure of the country, using military, diplomatic and humanitarian methods of influence, as well as slogans about liberation from the "barbaric domination" of Turkey. The strong superiority of the Italians over the Turks, especially in the field of the navy, however, did not allow the war to pass like lightning, prevented the powerful national-tribal movement of the Libyans. The guerrilla war of the underestimated Libyans with the Italians continued even after the signing of the peace agreement between Italy and Turkey ^{[3, p.138]}. The outbreak of the First World War somewhat distracted the attention of Italians from Libya, but the struggle against the imperialists in this North African country was also weakened by the hostility between the Tripolitans and the tribes of Cyrenaica. Against this background, England begins to behave more and more actively, which subsequently wins back influence in the region ^{[4, p. 76]}. But since the 1980s, scientists have already called Italy one of the main "counterparties" of Libya in oil exports, which accounted for 21.5% of total exports and about 20% of oil imports to Italy ^{[5, p. 412]}. However, economic cooperation is by no means the only mutual interest of states in each other: the countries actively interact in the political, social, migration, and cultural spheres.

On March 2, 2009, Prime Minister Berlusconi exchanged instruments of ratification with the leader of Libya, which marked the signing of the Benghazi Treaty, which was considered a very promising and ambitious project for the development of relations between the two countries, but would later be suspended unilaterally by Italy when NATO troops entered Libya in 2011. ^[6] Nevertheless, in order to consolidate relations between the two countries and promote mutual interests, the agreement reflected financial, economic, political and socio-cultural aspects ^[7].

The leaders of other countries and the public perceived the signing of the Benghazi Treaty in different ways: some fully supported this initiative as an opportunity to reduce disagreements between the countries, while others looked for flaws in the provisions of the treaty. However, it cannot be denied that the signing of the treaty was indeed aimed at improving Italian-Libyan relations. Recall that relations between the two countries have been developing tensely for many decades, since 1912, when Libya fell into the colonial dependence of Italy ^{[8, p. 86]}. The last significant event preceding the signing of the treaty was the lifting of the trade and arms embargo against Libya on October 11, 2004, thanks to which Euro–Libyan relations began to develop very rapidly both in terms of mutual contacts at higher levels and in terms of accelerating the process of institutionalization of relations. At the same time, in our opinion, Libya has progressed much further in relations with Italy than with the rest of the EU over the same period, since the Benghazi Treaty was signed in 2008, and negotiations were just underway with the EU on concluding a Framework agreement.

The Benghazi Treaty reflects the history of relations between Libya and Italy, and its purpose was to end all historical claims between the two countries. Indeed, during the ceremony of concluding the Friendship Treaty, Berlusconi expressed regret about the colonial period ^{[9, p. 12]}. The Benghazi Agreement also shows that 26 bilateral agreements or arrangements have been concluded between the parties since 1952, among which ^{[10, p. 10]}:

• Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Rome, 1974 (Agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, Rome (1974);
• Oral agreement on the issue of Libyan citizens deported to Italy, Tripoli, 1988 (Proc?s verbal relative to the question of Arab-Libyan citizens deported to Italy, Tripoli (1988);
• Oral agreement concerning the investigation of the fate of Libyan citizens captured and deported by Italy in the period 1923-1943, Rome, 1988 (Proc?s verbal relative to the Libyan request to receive documentation concerning the Libyans deported to Italy from 1923 to 1943, Rome (1988) and a number of others.

The Benghazi Treaty consists of a preamble and 23 articles, which can be conditionally divided into 4 groups:

1. general principles (articles 1-7);
2. provisions reflecting the conclusion of historical disputes (articles 8-13);
3. provisions concerning the establishment of an equal and new partnership (articles 14-22);
4. final rules (article 23).

As part of the study of the Benghazi Treaty, a content analysis of its content was carried out. Based on the results of the analysis, tables 1, 2 and 3 were formed.

Table 1 shows data on the frequency and percentage of marker words included in the preamble. Table 2 shows data on the frequency and percentage of marker words in the entire contract. Table 3 includes a content analysis of words that occur rarely in the Benghazi Treaty.

Table 1. Analysis of the content of the Benghazi Treaty: preamble.

*compiled by the author of the study

According to table 1, the most frequently used word in the preamble is the word "cooperation" - 13.15% of the total frequencies. Bilateral cooperation was supposed to include three separate areas, and therefore its frequency reflects political, economic and cultural aspects. Although words such as peace (2.63%), security (2.63%), stability (2.63%), dignity (2.63%) and mutual respect (2.63%) represent political cooperation, it is obvious that growth (2.63%) and integration (2.63%) reflect economic cooperation, and the total heritage (2.63%) represents a cultural dimension. As a result, the words reflecting the fact of cooperation between the countries is 35.2%, which is more than 1/3 of the preamble. This ratio indicates the desire and special attention to building cooperation between Italy and Libya in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Further, the presence of the word "integration" characterizes the intention to establish trade relations. At the time of the conclusion of the Benghazi Treaty, the main export directions were industrial goods from Italy and gas, oil from Libya. The Italian-Libyan trade turnover in 2007 amounted to 15.643 billion. euro with a negative of 12.365 billion . for Italy, the trade balance, which is explained by large volumes of hydrocarbon imports (98% of all supplies) from Libya. The main export items of Italian goods to Libya are oil refining products (44% of exports) and mechanical engineering (13%) ^{[11, p.71]}. At the same time, Italy is the main trading partner for Libya, while Libya is "one of" its partners for Italy.

In addition to the trade direction, the agreement also provides for cooperation in the field of environmental maintenance: "environmental protection" - 2.63%. The importance of the regional dimension in their bilateral relations is also emphasized, since Libya and Italy are key members of the African Union (2.63%) and the European Union (2.63%), respectively.

As already mentioned, the Benghazi Treaty has become a stepping stone to new directions in the development of relations between the countries, which, according to content analysis, confirms the presence of such words as "partnership" (7.90%), "friendship" (5.26%), "readiness" (5.26%) and "last file" (2.63%). And also a way to end the "painful drama of the past" (the word "readiness" has a frequency of 5.26%), which was reflected in the consolidation of apologies (2.63%) for the suffering that Italian colonization caused to the Libyan people (2.63%). And, despite the fact that the "apology" is mentioned only once in the treaty, it is impossible to overestimate the significance of even this one mention, because this is the first time in history when a former colonial power apologized for its historical actions. And this could be taken as an example by other former colonial powers, for example, France or Great Britain.

Next, let's focus on the results of Table 2.

Table 2. Analysis of the content of the Benghazi Treaty: frequency and percentage.

The data in Table 2, as well as Table 1, emphasize the desire of the two countries for cooperation: "cooperation" - (10.92%), as well as the first ten words that reflect this case exceed 44% of the total percentage of frequency. In addition, the following figures confirm the hope for partnership in political, economic and cultural aspects: "Joint Committee" - (3.82%), "Partnership Committee" - (3.27%), "Monitoring Committee" - (1.10%), "political dialogues" - (1.10%), "Italian companies" - (7.10%), "enterprises" - (4.91%) and "social fund" - (3.82%).

Additionally, we will clarify that the agreement in priority ratio reflects the provisions regarding economic cooperation among other areas - (15.29%). According to the signed agreement, Italy was to pay compensation to Libya in the amount of $ 5 billion in order to restore basic infrastructure ($ 250 million per year for 20 years). Of course, the perception of this amount by Italy and Libya is different, nevertheless, this provision still has its own symbolic meaning for the development of Italian-Libyan relations.

Nevertheless, in addition to the economic direction, the agreement was aimed at developing partnerships in the fields of culture, science, industry and energy. Also, a very important direction of Libya's development was its desire to give the Mediterranean the status of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Also, referring to such principles contained in the treaty as the principle of self-defense (according to the UN Charter), the principle of non-use of force and threat of force, the principle of state responsibility, the principle of respect for human rights, the principle of sovereign equality, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the principle of non-use of territories of both sides for any possible military actions or aggression against to each other, the prevention of illegal immigration, we can talk about the desired commitment of both countries to international law and norms.

We will focus separately on the provision on illegal immigration. For Libya, illegal immigration at that time was, among other things, an effective way to influence the foreign policy of EU countries, in particular Italy. Italy, realizing that due to the problems of illegal immigration and the growing competition between countries interested in Libya's resources (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), which, in turn, put Italy's interests at risk, offered the already mentioned compensation not only for the formation of basic infrastructure, but also to protect its borders from illegal immigration, supporting its own competing position on a par with major Western powers and ensuring uninterrupted oil and gas supplies ^{[12, p. 273]}.

Illegal immigration is one of the most frequently quoted phrases according to Table 2 (its percentage reaches 2.73%). Therefore, we have every reason to believe that the issue of illegal immigration is one of the most controversial and acute political issues at the time of signing the agreement. In addition, the existing problem of illegal immigration could be called a reflection of the phenomenon of the North-South conflict in the new millennium. Despite the fact that both Italy and Libya adhered to traditional human rights protection instruments, but since Libya was not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it was not obliged to treat illegal immigrants as refugees.

At the same time, we recall that Libya was a party to many human rights agreements (for example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981, which contains provisions on relations with foreigners), which undoubtedly significantly influenced its migration policy. Therefore, Italy, referring to Article 14 of the Declaration of Human Rights, reflected in Article 6 of the Benghazi Treaty, as well as the UN Charter, had every reason to put forward conditions for respecting the provisions of the 1951 Declaration, even though Libya was not a party to it.

The intention of the countries to combat illegal immigration was reflected in article 19 of the Benghazi Treaty, which also refers to the obligations to implement previous agreements: the Agreement on Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Illegal Immigration (Rome, December 13, 2000), the Protocol on Cooperation between both Sides to Effectively Solve the Problem of Illegal Immigration (Rome, December 29, 2007).

At the same time, the right to develop a system of control over the Libyan borders passed to Italian companies with 50/50 financing of this project from Italy and the EU. This agreement was fixed in the second paragraph of the agreement.

To coordinate the fight against illegal immigration, as well as the implementation of other agreements within the framework of the Benghazi Agreement, the following governing bodies will be created:

- The Partnership Committee (2.18%), which will meet annually in Italy and Libya, respectively. This committee has the highest position and includes the most senior persons;

- Monitoring Committee (1.10%) at the level of Foreign Ministers of both countries. Its purpose is to solve periodically arising controversial situations arising in the process of executing the Benghazi Treaty;

- A regular meeting that creates a mechanism for coordination and consultations between the two sides.

The listed management bodies were also identified during the analysis: "Joint Committee" (3.82%), "Partnership Committee" (2.18%) and "Control Committee" (1.1%), reach 7% of the total number of frequencies. All this indicates the political orientation of the treaty. In addition, political partnership extends to various areas of common interests, such as: political dialogue (1.1%), international legitimacy (1.64%), the UN (1.64%), sovereignty (1.64%), political independence (1.1%), non-use of force (1.1%), non-interference (1.1%) and non-aggression (1.1%).

Table 2 shows that some words reflect Italy's concerns, such as debts (1.10%) and entry visas (1.10%), while others reflect Libya's interests, such as social fund (3.82%), infrastructure (2.18%), mines (1.64%) and scholarships (1.10%). There are also words reflecting mutual interests: WMD nonproliferation (1.63%), investments (1.63%), joint company (1.10%) and joint counteraction to the threat of terrorism (1.10%), organized crime (1.10%) and illicit drugs (1.10%).

Another dilemma of the two countries is antiquities (2.18%) and treasures (1.63%). Article 10/4 of the Benghazi Treaty stipulates that all treasures and antiques must be returned to Libya, and in this regard, the General Committee will determine what exactly needs to be returned from Italy. To demonstrate his free will, Berlusconi brought with him a statue of Venus of Cyrene, which was taken from Libya during the colonial period along with other historical treasures.

There are some words in the contract that do not appear more than once each, but the total sum of the percentage values of their frequency reaches more than one fifth of the total number of frequencies (21.31%). Table 3 shows that the frequency of these words does not exceed once.

Table 3. Content analysis of the Benghazi Treaty

Let's analyze the meaning of individual words for the two countries from the point of view of their inclusion in the treaty:

- "Friendship Day": it was decided to celebrate the day of the conclusion of the contract annually. The date of the celebration is set for August 30. The parties hope that this event will contribute to the cooperation of the two countries; 

- Every country has the right to choose a suitable political system. Therefore, there is no need to duplicate each other;

- Both countries' compliance with the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights also reflects the intention to build new ties;

- Italy and Libya have a common culture and heritage, the strengthening of which can be used in common interests;

- Dialogue is the best way to minimize existing and potential disagreements.

As already mentioned in the coverage of the data in table 1, one of the tasks that the countries were going to solve together was the protection of the environment. The data in table 2 also confirm this. The countries' concern about environmental issues is quite understandable, given the main focus of trade supplies between the countries. It is assumed that thanks to the Benghazi Treaty, within the framework of new cooperation, Libya would be able to benefit from Italy's experience in industrial production in order to reduce the gap between them. It was also planned to cooperate in the creation of defense enterprises. All these new areas of partnership have been developed with the hope of a promising future for the two countries.

Stating, the content analysis showed that the second part of the Benghazi Treaty was undoubtedly burdensome for Italy. Firstly, Italy had to bear annual expenses in the amount of $250 million over 20 years for the restoration of Libya's basic infrastructure, which were increased by increasing IRES (Imposta sul reddito delle societa), the income tax of companies working in the field of research and development of hydrocarbons with headquarters in Italy and with with a capitalization of more than 20 billion euros, mainly ENI ^{[10, p. 125-129]}. Secondly, since the work was to be carried out by Italian companies in a non-EU member state, funds had to be raised directly from Italy ^{[13, p.70]}. Thirdly, Italy also assumed responsibility for providing "special initiatives" for the benefit of the Libyan people, for example, the costs of rehabilitation of victims of explosions, scholarships, the return of archaeological artifacts, etc. Fourth, Italy was forced to pay compensation to Italians expelled from Libya in 1970 (after Gaddafi came to power) in the amount of 150 million euros. This issue was not settled in any way in the Benghazi Treaty, and Italy did not speak out on this in any way. The result was the already mentioned compensation payment. At the same time, the indicated amount of compensation of 150 million euros is slightly higher than the amount agreed in Law 1066/1971, but still insufficient, according to the expelled Italians.

Libya, now, according to the norms of the Benghazi Treaty (Article 11), was obliged to provide such Italians with visas for tourism, work and other purposes, although they had previously been banned from entering the country by the Libyan authorities. This obligation also applied to Italian citizens who voluntarily left the country before the extradition decision was made.

Summing up, we can draw the following conclusions. The Benghazi Agreement was of a project, programmatic nature. That is, he set promising directions for development, cooperation and provided for several costly parts for Italy. The main directions of establishing partnership were economic, socio-cultural, scientific, industrial, defense aspects, as well as issues of disarmament and combating terrorism and illegal immigration. Another significant goal of the treaty was the transformation of the Mediterranean Sea into a zone free of mass weapons of destruction, of course, subject to the requirements of all international agreements on this issue. However, it is unlikely that this provision could be considered as an obligation in favor of nuclear-free zones.

Provisions concerning the fight against illegal immigration are particularly controversial. The articles of the agreement require the fulfillment of obligations in two directions. Firstly, the fulfillment of tasks under previously concluded contracts and agreements, including those that were concluded in 2007: the boats provided by Italy were required to patrol 2,000 km of the Libyan coast, forming mixed brigades. After that, six Italian patrol boats were supposed to join the Libyan armed forces on May 15, 2009 . Already taking into account the new partnerships, Libya's land borders had to be monitored using a satellite detection system. It should be noted that this commitment did not involve the involvement of Italian police forces to the borders of Libya.

As a result, the issues of combating immigrants also affect human rights issues. Italy and Libya are parties to the UN Organized Crime Protocol of 2000 on Combating Trafficking in Persons by Land, Sea and Air ^[14].However, Libya, as mentioned earlier, is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, even though it has ratified regional and universal instruments guaranteeing human rights ^[15].

The need to conclude such an agreement was due to a number of factors and reasons that had been accumulating for a long time. First of all, undoubtedly, the initially established colonial relations of the countries played a huge influence throughout the entire period of the development of relations. However, in addition to factors within the framework of exclusively bilateral Italian-Libyan relations, it is important to take into account other factors. For example, the colonial past of Italy, connected with other countries ^[16]. For this reason, Italy refused to divide Libya with Great Britain and France. In addition, Italy could not act absolutely freely with regard to Libya due to a number of internal and external reasons, among which the most significant are: public opinion, political instability, external pressure from the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, energy dependence and the bipolar context.

The conclusion of the Benghazi Treaty was perceived by the political majority of both countries as a "hope for a bright future" of Italian-Libyan relations, but Italy's historical place in the ranks of the EU adjusted this promising vector towards supporting the interests of Western powers in revolutionary Libya. The Benghazi Treaty, the main purpose of which was the removal of post-colonial tensions, is not without contradiction due to the fact that, despite the obligations not to use its territories for hostile actions against each other, Italy retained the right to act against Libya in the event of its going beyond the framework of international law. This contradiction was reflected in Italy's behavior after the start of NATO military operations in Libya in 2011 ^{[17, p. 68.]} It is worth noting that after the unilateral suspension of the treaty, attacks by NATO troops from Italian military bases in Libya and the assassination of Gaddafi, Italy did not change its position too noticeably regarding the acquisition of benefits from contacts with Libya. The unconditional importance of Italy's cooperation with Libya was expressed, first of all, in how quickly the Italian side began to establish a dialogue with the new government of Libya after the end of the main stage of the military conflict with international intervention.

At the present stage of the development of relations between the two countries, there is not only a desire to control illegal immigration from Africa to Europe and oil trade, but also attempts to unite in the face of terrorism, which has actively begun to strengthen its position in Libya in the process of smoldering civil war conflicts. Well aware of the impending danger, Italy took an active part in the process of signing the Skhirat peace agreement in 2015, which was aimed at stabilizing the positions of the new Government of Libya. At the current stage of development of Italian-Libyan relations, the problem of global terrorism is coming to the fore, and the fragility of the new government in Libya does not allow us to accurately predict how relations between Tripoli and Rome will be built further.

The article was carried out with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research within the framework of scientific project No. 19-31-27001.

This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project № 19-31-27001.