The presidential campaign of 1965 in France: features of the conduct and motives of the voters' vote

Atakishieva Dzhamilya Gunduz Kyzy Postgraduate student, the department of Modern and Contemporary History of Europe and America, M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Leninskie Gory, 1 atakishiewa.jamilya@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

After the adoption of the constitutional amendment in a referendum on October 28, 1962, the presidential elections in France acquired the status of universal popular vote. In the first edition of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the President was elected by an expanded electoral college (about 80 thousand people), consisting not only of members of both houses of Parliament, as it was during the Fourth Republic, but also of representatives of local governments, general councils and assemblies of overseas territories. Now every French citizen who reached the age of 21 received the right to choose the head of state ^{[1, p. 2-3]}. The idea of introducing general presidential elections came from the founder and first president of the Fifth Republic , Sh . de Gaulle, who in August 1958, during a meeting of the Constitutional Advisory Committee, expressed a desire to "give the elections of the president of the republic a national and federal character" ^[2].

In 1962, they really gained a nationwide character. The head of state became a "direct representative of the nation", who received a broader legitimacy of his power, because unlike the deputies of the National Assembly, he was elected by the whole country, whereas only citizens of one electoral district from which he was nominated voted for each deputy. The well-known French researcher R. Remon estimated the significance of the adoption of the constitutional amendment by the French people in 1962: the popular election of the president "marked the final approval by the French of the regime of the Fifth Republic" ^{[3, p. 645]} because for the first time citizens could independently elect the head of state, thereby determining the fate of the country for the next seven years. It is not surprising that the 1965 elections saw the lowest percentage of absenteeism during the entire existence of the Fifth Republic. According to the prominent French sociologist F. Gogel, the number of those who did not come to vote reached only 14.9%, which was two times less than in the parliamentary snap elections of 1962 (31.3%) ^{[4, p. 227]}.

The first national presidential elections were held in two rounds – on December 5 and 19 , 1965 . It was expected that the majority of French people would vote for the incumbent President de Gaulle in the first round, whom the pro-government press called "the savior of the state" ^[5] and to whom voters had previously expressed unconditional support, demonstrated at various referendums. In 1958, the Constitution was adopted by popular vote, laying the foundations of the Fifth Republic (82.6% of the votes in favor); in 1961, the French supported Algeria's self-determination (75% of the votes in favor); the April 1962 referendum approved the Evian Agreements that granted independence to Algeria (90.8% of the votes in favor), and the October the same year - the right of the French to vote for the future president in national elections (62% of the votes in favor). But this time his victory was not so unconditional: only 11 million people (44.65%) voted for the president in the first round, and the second round had to be held, which brought him a little more than 13 million (55.2%) votes ^[6].

Later, in June 1968, during a television interview with journalist M. Droit de Gaulle admits that after December 5, 1965, he even thought of leaving the presidency: "... a wave of sadness almost drowned me then," but the general understood that if he left, "the existence of the republic would be threatened" ^[7]. Did the general's failure in the first round mean that the political mood of the French underwent a transformation? And if so, why did this happen? These issues are supposed to be analyzed in this article. 

The analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) during the election campaign of 1965 allows us to solve this task ^[8]. They enable the researcher to rank and study the responses of voters according to a number of criteria, such as their gender, age, social status or professional affiliation. During the 11 weeks prior to the election, the IFOP staff, commissioned by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, organized six public surveys, which were often conducted on the eve or after the candidates' speeches on radio and television.

Radio and television addresses of candidates to voters are also an important source for identifying the features of the 1965 election campaign. The data of audiovisual materials posted on the website of the French National Audiovisual Institute are of particular interest ^[9]. Already in 1965, television became an integral part of the life of the French population and, according to researchers R. Remon and K. Neuschwander, acquired the status of a "political weapon" ^{[10, p. 326]}. By the 60s, televisions appeared in the homes of most French people: in the fall of 1962, there were approximately 12-14 million in France. Television receivers ^{[10, p. 331]}, which, along with radio, have become an important source of rapid dissemination of information accessible to a wide mass of people. Thus, in 1965, the French were much more involved in political election battles than before.

There is no denying that the presidential campaign of 1965 was already the subject of research in the works of Western scientists who appeared in the first few years after the elections ^{[4, 11-13]}, it is also described in general works on the Degoll presidency ^[14-26]. At the same time, the influence of the peculiarities of the 1965 election campaign on the choice of voters did not become a separate topic of study; there are no special works on the 1965 presidential campaign in Russian historiography at all.

* * *

In total, six candidates participated in the presidential race, among which the political figures of de Gaulle, Francois Mitterrand, the leader of the center-left anti-Gollist opposition, and Jean Lecanue, the head of the center-right Republican People's Movement (MPP), stood out.  The other candidates - right-wing lawyer Jean-Louis Tixier–Vignancourt, who declared himself a candidate from the anti-communist "national opposition", Pierre Marcillasi, a centrist senator from the Charente department and leader of the European Liberal Party, and Marcel Barby, a non-partisan independent candidate - could not count on winning ^{[14, 27-29]}. During the first round, none of the six candidates managed to get an absolute majority of votes, which meant that it was necessary to organize a second round in which de Gaulle had to meet with the candidate from the left forces F.Mitterrand, who received 32.2% of the votes in the first round ^[30].

The reasons why de Gaulle failed to win immediately should be sought in the peculiarities of the political preferences of French voters and the conduct of the presidential campaign. During the seven years of the existence of the Fifth Republic, the attitude of the majority of the French towards the Gaullist government has not changed dramatically. According to opinion polls, de Gaulle still enjoyed great authority and respect. IFOP regularly analyzed and published his popularity ratings, which always exceeded 50%. The exception was the eight months of 1963 that followed the general strike of miners, but since November there has been a steady increase again, and in September 1965, three months before the presidential election, the curve of the president's popularity reached 67% ^{[8, p. 202]}. Therefore, such low results of voting for de Gaulle in the first round turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the incumbent president, who found it difficult to believe that the sympathy of the population for him could change so dramatically.

But, as the study of public sentiment on the eve of the elections shows, not all of de Gaulle's initiatives found unconditional support from the population. Discontent with the Gaullist regime was manifested primarily in the field of socio-economic policy, as evidenced by the frequent strikes in 1963, in which there were over 80 thousand people and which were a response to the decision of the Government of Zh. Pompidou to reduce coal production in France. In the 1960s, the demand for coal in Europe was falling, but it continued to be produced, and this led to an overabundance of coal in coal storage facilities. The state preferred to invest in more in-demand oil production, reducing investments in the coal industry, which irritated miners ^{[31, p. 240]}: since 1959, their wages directly depended on government orders, reducing coal production also reduced their wages.

On November 9 and 11, 1965, before the presidential election campaign, which opened on November 19, the 33rd Congress of the French Democratic Confederation of Labor was held - the left-wing professional center of France, created in 1964 on the basis of the French Confederation of Christian Workers. The FDKT declared its task to fight for the democratization of society and declared its independence in relation to the state, parties, and the church. Its participants reproached the executive branch for the fact that neither the President nor the Prime Minister Zh. Pompidou "did not take into account the opinion of the trade unions." The workers also reproached the authorities for "not informing them about the development of new reforms" in the economic sphere ^{[32, p. 608]}. In addition, workers were not satisfied with the low wages at state-owned enterprises in comparison with the private sector. As a result, the resolution adopted at the Congress called on workers to vote against de Gaulle: "it is necessary to understand the serious economic consequences that may arise after the renewal of the Gaullist regime... by voting for a candidate who opposes the current policy, you will choose an alternative that will lead the country along the path of fundamental reforms focused on social progress, democracy and peace" ^{[31, p. 243]}. A similar "alternative" for the workers was the candidacy of F.Mitterrand, who insisted that the general makes decisions ignoring the opinion of trade union organizations: "de Gaulle's policy in the economic sphere is never discussed [with them – D.A.]" ^[33]. It is not surprising that in the 1965 elections there was a common candidate from the left parties (meaning the Socialist Party, the Party of Radicals and the United Socialist Party, which merged into the "Union of the Left" (Federation of Democratic and Socialist Left Forces), founded on September 10, 1965, and the French Communist Party, which supported the candidacy of F. Mitterrand in November 1965 G.) was supported by 55% of workers ^[30].

De Gaulle's policy in another area of the economy, agriculture, also caused a mixed reaction. On September 12 , 1963 , the Government of Zh . Pompidou adopted a "Stabilization plan", which assumed "stopping the growth of prices or reducing them" for services, industrial goods and food ^[34]. Prices for certain consumer goods were set by the Council of Ministers, whose members virtually ignored the opinion of agricultural trade unions and their representatives in the National Assembly. Thus, the Council of Ministers in 1964 fixed the price of grain, which, according to producers, was lower than the price of 1963. Such a policy of the authorities provoked the discontent of peasants who organized a series of demonstrations in 1963 and 1964.

Agricultural trade unions claimed that the general hindered the solution of agrarian problems and – contrary to the traditional support of de Gaulle – in 1965 "turned away" from him. On October 21, the National Organization of Agricultural Trade Unions issued a resolution calling for voting against the candidacy of the incumbent president. Agrarians were also dissatisfied with the fact that the executive did not take into account their interests when adopting economic development plans ^[35]. The resolution of agricultural trade unions in the form of leaflets was widely distributed throughout the country, which contributed to the decline in de Gaulle's popularity: it was in this socio-professional group that he lost the largest percentage of voters who previously supported him (from 68% in October 1965 to 38% in early December) ^[30].

De Gaulle's European policy also caused discontent, primarily among numerous supporters of the unification of Europe on a supranational basis. The General was a fierce defender of the concept of "Europe of the Fatherlands", which implied the creation of a political interstate organization while fully preserving the national sovereignty of the member states. In 1965, the Gaullist authorities criticized the plans of the EEC leadership to transfer funds from customs duties to the Community to finance the common agrarian policy, "because it was going to form the EU's own budget" ^[36]. It was assumed that France, interested in establishing a common market for agricultural products, would take such a step, which would expand the powers of supranational European bodies (the European Parliament and the European Commission), to which control over the pan-European budgetary sphere was gradually transferred ^[37-39].  In addition, "the CES sought to replace the decision-making procedure in the [interstate - D.A.] Council of [Ministers - D.A.] with a simple majority instead of unanimity" ^{[36, p.71]}. In June 1965, the French Government refused to participate in the meetings of the Community bodies until the powers of the Commission were reduced. Thus, the general actually slowed down the process of formation of the Common Market, which the supporters of accelerating the European integration of France counted on ^{[40, pp. 120-121]}.

At the end of November 1965, the national level of confidence in de Gaulle fell and reached 46% ^{[8, pp. 219-220]}. In parallel, the ranks of voters who were going to vote for J. Lecanue grew: from 3% (October 5) to 14.5% (December 1-2). According to the analysis of polls conducted by the French sociologist, contemporary of the events and founder of the scientific journal of sociology "Revue Francaise de Sociolog" J. Stetzel, even many "doubting" Gaulists who supported the president at the beginning of October, then "from October 15 to November 15 refrained from answering, but at the end [months – D.A.] made their choice in favor of Lecanue" ^{[13, p. 149]}, who managed to take advantage of the growing public sentiment in opposition to the Gaullist regime.

45-year-old politician J. Lecanue in his TV broadcasts did not so much talk about the election program, as he talked about the "need for progress" for the Fifth Republic and the intention to build "modern France within a strong Europe" ^[41], and his election slogan "Forward, France!" called for the modernization of all public life. According to Lecanue, the implementation of reforms, especially in the socio-economic sphere, guaranteed "progress" in the country. The candidate criticized de Gaulle's European policy. To the general's statements about the need to preserve national interests in a united Europe, Lecanue replied: "The Elysee Palace should not embody the house of loneliness, pride and Machiavellianism" ^[42].  The center-right candidate often touched upon issues that really worried citizens, suggesting, for example, "simplify exams for admission to universities and provide new jobs for young graduates," increase funding for the social sphere by reducing the "unjustified military expenditures" of the Gaullist government, and begin to pursue a more open European policy ^[42].

Lecanue's election campaign bore fruit: if only 17% of the French knew about him before November 1965, then before the first round he became known to everyone who followed the development of the election race ^[43]. The positive results of the center-right candidate's campaigning activities were also associated with the formation of a political image opposite to de Gaulle: Lecanue created the impression of an open person, he always smiled, freely let reporters into his home and allowed newspapers to publish his portrait surrounded by his family. The French publicist of the newspaper "Monde" J. Ko was ironic about building the "right image" of Lecanue, giving him the nickname "white teeth, fresh breath" ^[44]. Despite ridicule from journalists, opinion polls showed that the politician's television broadcasts attracted the highest number of viewers (36%), and his speeches found the greatest response among citizens (51%) ^[43]. According to the results of the first round, Lecanue won 15.85% of the votes, becoming, according to R. Remon, "the main culprit of de Gaulle's failure", since he attracted part of the traditional Gaullist electorate to his side ^{[3, p. 655]}. So the candidate from the center-right camp "related" to the Gaulists turned into a very inconvenient rival for the founder of the Fifth Republic.

Another serious competitor of the president, 49–year-old F. Mitterrand, ran for election as a single candidate from the left parties. His political career began with participation in the French Resistance movement in 1944, he was one of the founders of the Democratic and Socialist Union of Resistance (UDSR), and during the Fourth Republic he held the posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Justice. In 1958, Mitterrand voted against de Gaulle's coming to power and sharply criticized his policies throughout the general's presidency. In November 1965, Mitterrand's candidacy was supported by all major center-left and left-wing political parties, including the PCF. Just like Lecanue, Mitterrand created his political image of a popular candidate, calling the speeches he organized "a dialogue with citizens." His program of "replacing personal power with a republic of citizens" found a response among the French, who were eager for change. During the election campaign, Mitterrand brought to the forefront of his criticism the socio-economic problems unresolved by de Gaulle, the most serious among which he considered the high unemployment rate, "especially among the young population" ^[45].

The candidate from the left also drew the attention of voters to the fact that the general hindered the development of the Common Market in a way beneficial to France. With this F. Mitterrand did not go into details about what exactly the economic benefits for the country would be, limiting himself to the words: "... we need to create a common budget, a common cash register, which, most likely, should be controlled by the European Parliament" ^[33]. In a televised speech on November 27, he recalled the resolution of the trade union of French agrarians, saying that "now those who have always supported de Gaulle are asking not to vote for him in the elections" ^[33]. Mitterrand demanded to redistribute public spending: "increase the financing of the social sphere and reduce military spending," thus improving the living conditions of ordinary citizens. The candidate also actively criticized the Gaullist increase in spending on nuclear weapons: "If I am elected president, I will solve all issues related to atomic and nuclear weapons…If France actively develops nuclear weapons, one day someone may start a war... 20 bombs would be enough to level France to the ground in 12 minutes" ^[33]. As a result of Mitterrand's election campaign, his popularity among voters increased from 15% in November 1965 to 20% in December, in the first round he won 32.2% of the vote.

The president practically did not participate in the election race before the first round, he began to prepare late for the elections, declaring his candidacy only in early November 1965. Such actions of de Gaulle can be explained by his confidence in an early and unconditional victory. According to the French researcher M. Vinok, "he [de Gaulle – D.A.] sought to be above his rivals: his past, his activities, his popularity spoke for him" ^[46]. De Gaulle very rarely appeared on television (only three times during the entire election campaign), using only 25% of the airtime allotted to the candidate, while his rivals appeared on TV screens five or even six times, speaking for an average of half an hour. Not wanting to compete and prove the rightness of his case on an equal basis with other candidates, de Gaulle made a serious tactical mistake, because he gave his opponents the opportunity to freely criticize the Gaullist political course and determine the choice of voters through the media, without receiving proper rebuff, and at the same time did not fully engage in the "struggle of parties" despised by him for power, in this case - in the competition of candidates' software installations.

Polls conducted by the IFOP showed that as the election campaign progressed, the attitude of citizens towards one or another candidate changed, and not in favor of the president ^{[13, p. 148]}. J. Stetzel was one of the French scientists who raised the problem of the relationship between the preferences of respondents and the speeches of politicians on television. According to him, after each TV broadcast, more and more Frenchmen intended to vote for de Gaulle's two main rivals - Mitterrand or Lecanue – excellent polemicists and convincing politicians. But a similar pattern appeared just before the first round, when the majority of viewers spoke for or against the candidate, regardless of the political party to which they belonged. Before the second round, on the contrary, "the French supported their [party-D.A.] candidate and criticized his opponent" ^{[13, p. 154]}.

The results of the first round seriously worried de Gaulle; he realized that it was important for the French not only and perhaps not so much to preserve order, stability in the country and the "greatness of France", but to solve specific problems that ensured a decent life and the well-being of their families. De Gaulle, of course, was upset that he had failed to defeat his political rivals already in the first round; he considered this state of affairs a personal loss, since he had to participate in the "struggle for a place" familiar to the French, but hated by the general, characteristic of the political electoral traditions of the parliamentary republic in France. In addition, the second round meant that de Gaulle had a real political rival, capable and ready to fight with the famous general for the title of "leader of the nation". According to the French historian and biographer of de Gaulle E. Roussel, no one expected such a result of the first round, even despite the "sharp drop in the popularity curve of de Gaulle" ^{[47, p. 197]} during the election campaign.                                  

The French vote in the first round also violated the "traditional" geographical expression of will according to the political sympathies of voters. In the north of France, the influence of right–wing politicians prevailed for many decades, and in the south - the left. A prominent French sociologist A. Siegfried was the first to notice such a pattern and explained it by the fact that in the north the land is unpaved, there are large farms of the landed aristocracy, which were more often adherents of traditional right-wing views. In the southern zone with limestone soil, people's living was more dense, independent farms of equal small owners prevailed there, the influence of the church remained insignificant, and therefore the majority of the population voted for left-wing politicians ^[48]. The candidacy and ideas of General de Gaulle were usually supported by residents of the northern and central departments ^{[4, p. 222]}. But in 1965, during the first round, the situation changed: part of the north-western departments actively voted not for de Gaulle, but for Lecanue, because his program turned out to be closer to the inhabitants of this region, and the agrarian policy of the state ceased to satisfy many peasants ^{[4, p. 236]}.

However, having defeated his political counterpart from the right camp in the first round, de Gaulle could now count on his votes in the second round, in which the president's main rival was a representative of the left, and the law of political bipolarity was supposed to demonstrate not so much the personal popularity of the right or left candidate, as the predominance of left or right sentiments in French society.

After the failure on December 5, de Gaulle decided to fight in the second round for the voter, communicating with him. After analyzing the situation, he realized that his fame is not eternal, and people quickly forget past successes, because the future is important to them. Having listened to the advice of J.The president decided to actively join the campaign before the second round, take advantage of all the opportunities of pre-election propaganda and change the image of an arrogant and even arrogant politician of the old school, removed from the party struggle. It's as if the days of the first Gaullist party Union of the French People (1947-1955) have returned, when de Gaulle traveled a lot around the country, spoke, addressed representatives of various socio-professional groups and age categories ^[49]. According to the Russian researcher N.N. Molchanov, de Gaulle "used his invariable weapon: the word. From the tactics of cold-blooded threats, he begins to move to persuasion" ^{[50, p. 345]}. The general actively spoke on radio and television, for the first time gave a large television interview to M. Drua, in which he appeared before the audience unexpectedly close to her, calm and reasonable head of state. The President emphasized in every possible way his interest in the well-being of not only France, but also all the French: "It is the French who make up France. And in order to create a strong France, it is necessary that the level of well-being of the French be as high as possible" ^[51]. At the same time, de Gaulle for the first time responded in detail to the criticism of his rivals of state economic policy: "Our fifth economic plan [1966-1970 – D.A.] provides for an increase in incomes of all social categories, and most of all incomes will increase for farmers. We have done more for agriculture than anyone before." According to the President, he understands the need to improve the living conditions not only of peasants, but also of workers "who cannot live as they lived yesterday" ^[51].

In his pre-election speeches, de Gaulle emphasized loyalty to political traditions and the need to "preserve what has been achieved": "Since most of the citizens encourage me to remain as President of France, the future of the Republic is guaranteed. Otherwise, and no one can doubt it, it will immediately collapse" ^[52]. On the eve of the second round, the general did not have a clearly developed electoral platform, he often resorted to old and well-known methods of persuading and intimidating voters: if he left, the country would be plunged into "chaos"; law and order would disappear. De Gaulle's arguments resonated with older people who remembered the events of the Second World War and de Gaulle's role in them. They saw in the general a man who liberated the country from the invaders and achieved France's place in the victorious camp, carried out progressive socio-economic and political reforms in 1945-46, fought "for the honor of France" in the 1950s with the weak parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic and was able to establish internal order and stability of state institutions in the new one. Sociologists noticed a certain pattern: the older the voter was, the more often he voted for de Gaulle. In the 1965 elections, he received a significant majority of votes from citizens over 65 (2/3 of all votes of this group) and women (61%), to whom the general, who spoke a lot about family values and the role of a mother in the family and society, granted the right to vote in 1945. Therefore, it is not surprising that French women also wanted to preserve de Gaulle has the power ^[30]. Both of these groups of voters were afraid of abrupt changes and political perturbations, they were quite satisfied with the Gaullist policy that had already become traditional, which was aimed at ensuring order and tranquility of citizens in the country, which managed to put an end to the seemingly endless Algerian war and the same endless government crises of the Fourth Republic.

The majority of young Frenchmen (20-34 years old) preferred to vote for Mitterrand's candidacy (51%). The main candidate from the left with 44.8% of the votes in the second round actually approached the status of a national politician, comparable in influence and authority with the "standing above political storms" figure of "de Gaulle himself.

Slogans about the importance of preserving order and traditions in France did not attract the young population too much, which demanded transformation and liberalization of society, as well as deeper social reforms. After the signing of the Evian Agreements of 1962 and the beginning of the detente of international tension, France was no longer threatened by the terrorist activities of the ultra-colonialists, nor the destabilization of the internal situation, nor the threat of a new war, so de Gaulle as a guarantor of state stability was of little interest to the young population. In addition, the 1960s became the time of the rise of the French economy: the rates of industrial growth, the volume of foreign trade and agricultural production increased rapidly, the standard of living also increased, French society at the height of the "glorious thirtieth anniversary" turned into a "consumer society" ^{[29, pp. 249-253],[53]}.

In such an environment, young people were waiting for the arrival of a reformer ruler, "she wanted changes" ^{[53, p. 266]}. According to E. Roussel, "he [de Gaulle - D.A.] understood better than anyone that the young were beginning to abandon the [Gaullist – D.A.] regime" ^{[47, p. 199]}. However, the results of the second round of the 1965 presidential election showed that the youth had not yet completely renounced de Gaulle, "giving 49% [of their votes - D.A.] in his favor" ^[30].

In the second round, the French faced a very responsible choice - an old, but with a clear logic of their actions, a president, a hero of the nation, an independent politician or a political figure of a leftist figure in the prime of his powers with bold slogans close in spirit to many voters, but it is unknown whether he is able to put them into practice. The results of the vote showed that the supporters of de Gaulle were industrialists and merchants (67%), senior managers (63%) and representatives of the liberal professions, i.e. doctors, lawyers, self-employed (63%), in other words, those persons who sought to preserve their property and social status and opposed, perhaps, radical changes in the life of the country in the event of Mitterrand's victory. Working-class voters, among whom sentiments more critical of the government prevailed, nevertheless divided into two relatively equal groups: 45% of them preferred to support de Gaulle ^[30]. It is noteworthy that opinion polls before the second round showed a lower percentage of workers' votes in favor of the president – 36% with 20% abstaining ^[30], which indicated the unwillingness of workers to openly support de Gaulle.  

The results of the 1965 elections testified that in a country that had ended the bloody Algerian war and adopted the process of decolonization, whose international prestige had increased due to an independent foreign policy, it was the socio-economic motives of voting that began to come to the fore and determined the results of the vote. The two main rivals of President F. Mitterrand and J. Lecanue correctly sensed the public mood, focusing the attention of voters on the problems in the social and economic sphere. Politicians of the traditional type, who often participated in the parliamentary game, they had extensive experience in party discussions, were excellent speakers who were able to beat the failures of the Gaullist government in a favorable light for themselves. De Gaulle's unwillingness to actively campaign before the first round led to the fact that his expectations for an easy victory were not met. And the president's slogans to preserve the stability and security of France in the conditions of the beginning of detente and favorable domestic political conjuncture no longer seemed relevant to the majority of the French. In a society experiencing an economic upswing and an increase in the welfare of the population, issues of improving working conditions, a decent standard of living and the organization of interesting leisure gradually came to the fore. Such sentiments meant the beginning of the transformation of the mentality and socio-cultural priorities of the French.

Nevertheless, thanks to a change in the previous insufficiently flexible tactics characteristic of his behavior before the first round, de Gaulle managed to attract "wavering" voters to his side, get a majority of French votes and be re-elected president. The policy of the ruling circles still found a response among the population, de Gaulle for many Frenchmen continued to be a symbol of stability, traditional values and genuine independence of France. But the support for the ideas of Gaulism was no longer "crushing", as when de Gaulle came to power in 1958. As a result, although the first president of the Fifth Republic lost some of his voters, he still managed to win the elections as a unifier of the nation and an exponent of ideas shared by the majority of French citizens. According to the British biographer de Gaulle C. Williams, "the general won, but it was not the victory he had hoped for" ^[54].

The change in the motives of the French vote was connected not only with the new economic situation, with a new generation of young voters - children of the war era and the occupation of France, but also with the widespread use of modern propaganda methods, primarily television. Citizens actively followed the TV appearances of politicians, because television allowed them to see the candidate, "look into his eyes", be closer to him. De Gaulle was "blackballed" in the first round largely due to the fact that he initially refused to use the possibilities of new ways of propaganda, did not at all create a more attractive, understandable image to voters, believing that his previous merits would be enough to win.

De Gaulle changed his electoral tactics after the failure of the first round, when he had to adopt new rules of the political game and appear before the citizens at the same time as the head of state and as an ordinary person.  De Gaulle's main voters have traditionally been people over 65, women, and senior executives. He was able to attract other socio-professional and age groups – workers, youth, representatives of the small and middle bourgeoisie - largely due to the fact that before the second round he decided to actively use television as a "political weapon". As a result, voters saw in de Gaulle not only a guarantor of security and domestic political stability, ready to carry out socio-economic reforms and protect the national interests of the Fifth Republic, but also a politician capable of engaging in dialogue with society.