"The scenario of confederation is unlikely": the consequences of the August 1991 crisis in the USSR in secret CIA reviews (on the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union)

Yakupova Dar'ya Viktorovna PhD in History Associate Professor, Section of Russian History and Methodology for Teaching History, Department of History and Philology, Penza State University 440026, Russia, Penzenskaya oblast', g. Penza, ul. Lermontova, 37 bubnova90@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Yakupov Roman Aleksandrovich PhD in History Scientific Project Executor 440026, Russia, Penzenskaya oblast', g. Penza, ul. Lermontova, 37 penza.pr58@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The problem of timely assessment of the role of the collapse of the USSR in the context of global politics has become a rubicon of reliability testing for the US intelligence community. National intelligence overseas was criticized for the lack of qualitative forecasts, and the inconsistency in the description of the financial and economic capabilities of the USSR, which, as it turned out, were greatly overestimated. Critics argued that the CIA underestimated the strength of Republican independence movements and exaggerated the military threat, thereby forcing the United States into what some pragmatists called an "unnecessary arms buildup." Stansfield Turner, head of the CIA from 1977 to 1981, noted at the end of 1991 that "we should not gloss over the monstrous inability [of the CIA] to predict the scale of the Soviet crisis ..." ^[1].

Despite the relevance of the topic, the coverage of intelligence assessments of the USSR in the run-up to and after the crisis of 1991 is quite rare. It is even rarer to find publications that used documents from foreign archives in their arsenal. Turning to this issue, the researchers emphasized that the August 1991 crisis and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union turned out to be an unpredictable political process, which did not allow the West to take concrete measures to better control the further development of the post-Soviet space ^[2]. Looking forward to high-quality academic research on this topic in 2021 as part of the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR, we regret to state that in the leading domestic journals covering the issues of the modern history of Russia, there was no place for generalizing the intergenerational experience of publications interpreting this tragic event on a new basis. The topic faded into the background, hiding behind the hackneyed topics of explaining the need for a systematic approach to assessing the causes and prerequisites of disintegration processes in the Soviet Union.

The main question that we have set ourselves in this work is: for what purposes was the US intelligence assessment of the political crisis in the USSR in 1991 carried out. The answer to it did not lie on the surface. Thus, examining many CIA documents, it became obvious that the intelligence tasks did not aim to assess in detail the internal problems of the Soviet republics, although many internal factors were important determinants of the long-term course of Russia's political and economic development.  It was only after deeply analyzing the targets of intelligence analysis and comparing them with the directives previously adopted in relation to the USSR that we formulated the conclusion that the key direction of such work on the part of the Langley expert community was the search for vulnerabilities that the United States and other Western countries could use to influence the development of the territories of the former USSR, as well as in order to reducing the risks of nuclear arsenal proliferation on the territory of the post-Soviet republics. This is actually and documented by the documents described by us in this article.

It was also important for us to understand which options in the future would fully meet the interests of the United States, and which ones would not. In the course of studying the document "Republics of the former USSR: prospects for the next year", we found that the American administration was satisfied with either the scenario of creating a "confederation" or the scenario when the former Soviet republics would conclude an agreement of "free associations" among themselves. "The governments of Russia and most other republics will be very receptive to advice and technical assistance from the West on internal and external reforms in exchange for economic assistance. The influence of the West would be most effective in these republics, especially in Russia, in striving for democratization and transition to the market," the CIA report emphasized ^[3]. Identification of the causal relationship between the above processes was also one of the tasks of the published work.

Indeed, the failed coup of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991 created the most favorable opportunities for political democratization and market economy in the history of the former USSR. The main organizational obstacles to fundamental changes in the system were seriously weakened, and the prerequisites for self-determination of the republics were finally formed. At the same time, an unsuccessful coup accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Republican governments tried to assert supreme authority in their territories, but their political legitimacy and ability to fill the power vacuum left by the weakened center differed greatly. Political instability in the center and within individual republics has led to the unlikely achievement of a lasting consensus in politics and economics. This was clearly shown by the August coup, during which the signing of an essentially ready-made new Union Treaty was actually disrupted ^[4].

The US intelligence community emphasized that "if the situation goes according to the scenario of "disintegration", Western opportunities to influence the direction of changes in the post-Soviet space will significantly decrease" ^[5]. This conclusion was based on the fact that only Russia and Ukraine would assume the immediate democratization of their political regimes, while other republics would establish an authoritarian regime to maintain order, in which Western efforts in the field of human rights were severely limited. But in fact, the preservation of authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space caused concern to the American government only in one issue: the high probability of maintaining the deployed tactical means of nuclear potential under its control. In the event of the collapse of the USSR, cooperation between the republics, according to the CIA, should have been interrupted at all levels, including in the field of coordination of nuclear weapons. "Nationalism had to manifest itself more and more vividly, and economic conditions – more and more chaotic. As nationalist sentiments intensified, anti-Western sentiments would become more pronounced. The disposal of nuclear weapons would be controversial, since some republics would seek to establish operational control over nuclear weapons on their territory. There will be an increased risk of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and even their use within the borders of the former USSR. The West will probably not be able to implement and verify arms control agreements. The republics will try to involve the West in inter–republican disputes, while the demands for help from the West will continue," this is how the CIA described the risks of an uncontrolled collapse of the USSR.

After the failure of the State Emergency Committee on August 22, 1991, work on a new Union Treaty was continued within the framework of the Union of Sovereign States as a confederation. The CIA believed that "an agreement on the creation of a confederate political union would allow the central government to continue to exist and cooperate with foreign governments, but the center would not dominate the republics" ^[5]. But Langley simultaneously predicted that "the scenario of a "confederation" is unlikely"due to the unwillingness of many republics to cede part of their political sovereignty and power to the government of the confederation" ^[5]. In this part, the intelligence community consciously believed that "if Ukraine chooses the path of independence without participating in the confederation, the viability of the confederation with other republics will significantly decrease. This will increase the risk of conflict between the Ukrainian population and the Russian minority in the republic, as well as ongoing disputes with Russia over the border and control over the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine" ^[5].

It should be noted that Boris Yeltsin himself did not see the prospects of a confederation without the presence of Ukraine in the Union. "If Ukraine is not in the Union, it will be a rather weak Union. I told Gorbachev today and said yesterday in a newspaper interview that if Ukraine does not join the Union, then this is a problem for Russia. Gorbachev always tells me that he will meet with Ukrainian leaders and they will sign an agreement. But if the referendum shows that the majority of the people of Ukraine are in favor of independence, it means that Ukrainians will not sign the treaty now in preparation for the Union of Sovereign States. This would dramatically change the balance in the Union between the Slavic and Islamic peoples. We cannot allow a situation where Russia and Belarus have two votes as Slavic states against five Islamic nations. I told Gorbachev that I could not imagine the Union without Ukraine," Boris Yeltsin noted in a telephone conversation with George Bush on November 30, 1991 ^[6].

The classical version of the confederation was preferable for Western countries also because a strong central government would historically have been impossible under it. It was this goal that was put at the forefront when developing further options for action in diplomatic cooperation between Russia and the United States. As a thesis, information was brought to the participants of interstate meetings that "the confederation is the preferred outcome of Gorbachev and Yeltsin." "There will be a weak central government, but close cooperation between the republics in the political, economic and military spheres. Russia and Ukraine would at least lay the foundation for a democratic regime and a market economy. Nuclear weapons will be promptly controlled by the center. The lines of authority will be relatively clear," the intelligence reports emphasized ^[7]. With such an outcome, foreign Governments could facilitate decision-making on various policy issues. This scenario would give the West the advantage of greater predictability, increase confidence that nuclear weapons will remain under centralized control, arms control will remain at the proper level, economic assistance to the republics will become more effective, and the process of democratization will move forward. 

After the actual elimination of the scenario of the Union Treaty, against the background of the political position adopted by Ukraine on withdrawal from the USSR, there was a potential possibility of creating another option – the so-called "free association", which would also ensure the independence and participation of each post-Soviet republic in a free common market and would suit the West quite well. "Under this option, Ukraine and other non-Russian republics would probably agree to the removal or elimination of strategic nuclear weapons from their territory. In this case, all key republics, according to the US plan, should have pursued a pro–Western foreign policy, and the armed forces should have been significantly reduced. Further arms control negotiations for even deeper reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons would continue, although perhaps more slowly than in the case of the Confederation," the US intelligence report predicted. It is quite logical that the United States realized that after the collapse of the USSR, it would inevitably have to deal with the spread of Russia's foreign policy. That is why the confederation was the last chance to preserve a single political space with the leadership of Russia. Back in November 1991, at a meeting of the State Council of the USSR, the question was raised: a union confederate state or a confederation of union states ^[8]. But Boris Yeltsin quite logically waited for the results of the referendum in Ukraine, putting aside the start of signing a new treaty.

The confederate nature of the new interstate agreement included quite a few points, the key of which was the issue of security and ensuring control over tactical means of nuclear weapons. We emphasize in particular that the issue of disarmament was supported by the American administration in almost every personal conversation with J. Bush and Boris Yeltsin. Of course, the leading role in this part was assigned to Ukraine, a country that at that time possessed a nuclear potential in excess of the entire European arsenal. "As we move towards recognition, I want to be sure that the emerging agreements provide for: collective, centralized control over nuclear weapons; non-nuclear Ukraine, which signed the NPT; respect for human rights with equal rights for minorities; implementation of existing treaties (START, CFE Treaty)" ^[9]. These theses perfectly demonstrate the goals and objectives of the American government in analyzing the political crisis in the USSR on the eve of its collapse and supporting the activities of Boris Yeltsin to conclude a confederate agreement.

According to researchers, at the time of the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements, "the Soviet nuclear arsenal of about 30 thousand nuclear weapons was located mainly on the territory of four new states: Russia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine" ^[10]. "I ask you not to worry about nuclear weapons. We discussed all issues with Defense Minister Shaposhnikov. With the accession of Kazakhstan to the commonwealth, we will have all four republics with nuclear republics in one commonwealth. And that is why we will have a unified strategic military command," Boris Yeltsin noted, parrying George Bush's question about "what decisions were made regarding the Soviet armed forces" during a telephone conversation held on December 13, 1991 ^[11].

An early solution to the "nuclear issue" was necessary for Boris Yeltsin in order to receive reciprocal food aid from the West to maintain internal political stability against the background of free prices and liberalization introduced since January 1992 ^[12]. In connection with the inevitable collapse of the USSR and the achievement of the goals of creating a confederation, Boris Yeltsin concluded agreements with the remaining ex-Soviet republics. In this regard, the Alma-Ata Declaration was signed, which stated that "in order to ensure international strategic stability and security, the joint command of strategic military forces and unified control over nuclear weapons will be maintained; the parties will respect each other's desire to achieve the status of a nuclear-free and (or) neutral state" ^[13].

"It was decided that only the Russian president would control the nuclear "button" after consultations with three others. The President of Russia will make a nuclear decision through the Supreme Commander. The President of the Union will transfer his duties in this area to the President of Russia and resign on December 25. He will do it in the presence of Shaposhnikov," Boris Yeltsin told George Bush on December 23 ^[14]. "Ukraine and Belarus undertake to be non-nuclear states. They agree to eliminate all strategic weapons on their territory and all tactical nuclear weapons by July 1, 1992. A certain number of strategic weapons will be stored in Kazakhstan. Other weapons will be delivered to Russia for destruction. The START Treaty will be submitted for ratification to the parliaments of the four nuclear-weapon States on the same day, and it will be ratified in accordance with international standards. I believe that this is one of the most important aspects at the international level – nuclear weapons will be controlled only in one place," concluded Boris Yeltsin ^[14].

Thus, it can be concluded that the US intelligence community, in assessing the collapse of the USSR, mainly focused its attention on the search for political forms of interstate interaction in the post-Soviet space that would allow controlling the issue of preserving the agreements reached under the USSR on the non-proliferation of tactical forms of nuclear weapons. That is why the signed Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States fully satisfied the United States as the declared outcome of the end of the Cold War. "The member states of the Commonwealth will cooperate in ensuring international peace and security, implementing effective measures to reduce armaments and military spending. They strive for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament under strict international control," article 6 of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States states. Despite the failure to conclude a new union treaty, Boris Yeltsin managed to carry out work to ensure the negotiation process regarding the nuclear disarmament of three states (the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine) and the settlement of the creation of a single nuclear weapons control center on the territory of Russia within the CIS.

Despite the fact that American analysts did not guess the forecast – the collapse of the USSR took place, and independent states and the CIS appeared in its place, it is worth emphasizing that the declared goals of controlling this political process were successful for the US intelligence community. Whether to consider the CIS a confederation in its purest form or to accept this form as a "free association of states" is a question the answer to which does not affect the objectives of this study. But we note that it was these options that completely satisfied the United States, as they allowed to minimize the risks of controlling the nuclear legacy of the USSR.