To the question of modernity and corresponding representations of subjectivity: “dividual” and social organizations

Belonogov Ivan Nikolaevich PhD in Philosophy Scientific Associate, the sector of Cross-Disciplinary Problems of Scientific and Technical Progress, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12, str. 1 ligneofflyight@gmail.com Other publications by this author

The article presented below is written as part of a study of the value orientations of Russian specialists in the field of digital technologies. Representatives of the IT community are most closely involved in the main processes of modernization of society related to digitalization and innovation, and the values they share are formed as a result of the adaptation of carriers to these processes. Consequently, the community in question can act as a "donor" of values conducive to modernization and development. But in order to determine which values can be considered as related to "modernization", it is necessary to derive the criterion of "modernization". It, in turn, depends on how "modernity" and "progress" can be defined. This article is devoted to the derivation of this criterion.

But before we proceed to the designated topic, we will briefly reproduce the conclusions obtained earlier. In the previous work ^[9] it was shown that the main characteristic of the modern cultural situation is multiplicity. The multiplicity of value attractors, subjectivities, points of view and, as a result, theories and names of modernity itself. The source of this situation was designated "postmodern philosophy" or "French Theory" — works and concepts, or rather, methodology and optics developed by French philosophers (Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze are widely known to Russian readers). It was their works, as well as the work of writers, artists, and post-Soviet philosophers inspired by these works (Vladimir Sorokin, Viktor Pelevin, Pavel Pepperstein, but also Valery Podoroga, Fyodor Girenok, Alexander Dugin and many others) that were most popular among the mass reader in Russia.

As a method that is simultaneously applied and developed for the analysis of modernity, the method of virological epistemology ^[10] is the consideration of knowledge and language systems as functioning like viruses: knowledge can both be preserved in the form of records, and mutate and spread infecting carriers; thereby, theories, views, ideologies, practices and methods can be considered as strains of viruses that, being transmitted to an increasing number of carriers, form infectious networks; such networks, by virtue of scale, cause changes in society, sometimes so global, both in their content and in scale, that they mark a paradigm shift or episteme.  This criterion is the prevalence and popularity, and allows us to refer to the content of the Jacques Derrida project as a viral program that has been widely distributed in society (in particular, in Russia) and retains its influence to this day. In turn, the way Derrida formulated this program has heuristic value, since it allows you to cover a wide field of various trends in modern philosophy and politics.

Analysis of Jacques Derrida's philosophy of the early period of creativity (works that were translated into Russian in those two decades) made it possible to discover, behind a variety of topics, the general program of his philosophy — the overthrow of "phallo-logo-theo-teleo-anthropo-onto-phonocentrism" as a task of "deconstruction". The very structure of this word-centaur already allows you to explicate both the problem and the solution method:

Firstly, this word highlights the cultural situation, because each of the "centrisms" is a presumption that circulated and was transmitted in the culture of European civilization and endowed certain categories included in the opposition with greater meaning than their opposites: "fallo" referred to the opposition "male/female"; "logo": "reason/unreason", but also "word/experience"; "theo": "divine/profane"; "teleo": "goal/process"; "anthropo": "man/non-man (animal, machine, nature)"; "onto": "being/being"; "phono": "voiced/written"; and everywhere the first term of the opposition received a positive coloring, while the second one was endowed with negative features. A similar situation has taken place in ethics, aesthetics, politics, economics and other spheres of culture. And the task of deconstruction is to change this relationship, to reverse it, to question it.

Secondly, the word "centrism" itself pointed to the structural features of the system of such preferences: "Centralization is a way of identifying and self—identifying anything, in which a selected fragment of a thing is considered as its concentration, and everything is pulled together to it, as to the core, the basis" ^{[26, p. 15-16]}: one term was not only meant as preferred, but occupied a central position, being defined as the only possible one, as opposed to marginalities, which were either read as deviations from the "norm" that needed to be "corrected" by likening to a "standard", or simply avoided silence. Thus, the set of oppositions is complemented by a variety of ways to reduce to One, to the Identity, to the Center. This is how the problematic field of deconstruction as poststructuralism is set — the question of creating a method, optics or philosophy that does not put one thing at the center, to the detriment of everything else.

Thirdly, the presence of many roots of this concept (to which Derrida added new ones as philosophical texts were deconstructed) indicates Derrida's method itself — these concepts cannot be replaced by one word, their multiplicity is irreducible, and at the same time, they are interconnected in various ways, by "family similarity", i.e. so that each of the individual centrisms does not presuppose all the others at all, but only refers to some of them. "Phallo-logo-theo-teleo-anthropo-onto-phonocentrism" is a set of concepts separated and connected (after all, only the separated can be connected) with each other by means of a "hyphen" ["—"], which can be used in any combination. "Plurality" as a weapon against "centrisms" is the solution proposed within the framework of the deconstructivist project.

But Derrida viewed deconstruction as a dynamic method that had no completion — because then deconstruction itself would become one thing. As he himself said, "not a single word, no concept, no important thesis claims to be summed up and organized based on the theological presence of the center" ^{[26, p. 23]}; "Dispersion <...> is capable of producing a finite number of semantic effects, does not lend itself to any kind of presence of monosyllabic origin <...> not to a certain eschatological presence" ^{[26, pp. 54-55]}. And this dispersion continued after Derrida's death — individual roots of the word became guiding stars for social, political and philosophical movements (feminism, environmentalism, animal rights protection, secularization, neo-nationalism, etc.), and those, in turn, also continued to diverge in different directions, resulting in subspecies, giving rise to all new concepts, research and policy programs, points of view.

This analysis made it possible to identify and present in the form of a limited set of concepts, the main vectors of the development of thought that formed the landscape of modernity and conclude that "modernity, in many ways, represents the practical implementation of theoretical constructions created in the "postmodern era"" ^[9]. Based on the above, "progress" turns out to be associated with the development of a method that does not involve reducing multiplicity to a single denominator. The method of virological epistemology corresponds to the derived criterion, since it allows us to imagine modernity as a situation in which a variety of points of view can coexist with each other, fighting for their own distribution.

However, it is also necessary to point out the risks associated with such a vector of development. The development of Artificial Intelligence and digital communication tools can lead to the loss of individual autonomy, when instead of the will of an individual, decisions will be made for him by a network, whether it is a neural network or a network of social interactions ^[12]. In addition to the ability to perceive multiplicity, the individual must be able to maintain his own autonomy. Otherwise, although "modernization" will take place, its consequences will be catastrophic.

Thus, the question of the method turns into the question of the carrier of this method: how, within the framework of the optics of multiplicity, is self-identification of oneself as an integral and autonomous agent of actions possible? The answer to this question contains an opportunity to move forward, but in the direction of a possible future that does not end in a dead end of the death of our species or a global catastrophe. That is, towards modernization, not towards the end.

The Art of Self-management in the era of the Anthropocene

Let's start again with the conclusion made in the previous article, based on the analysis of existing concepts of subjectivity and modernity: "the individual <...> has changed, ceasing to perceive himself as a certain subject and becoming the one who can choose subjectivity" ^[9]. Such is the individual in the aspect of his multiplicity — it is given to him in the form of a multitude of possible identifications, from which he can choose the appropriate one, depending on the situation. But how can he preserve his unity, without it leading to the fixation of identity? How could he preserve both his autonomy, which implies a distinction between "himself" and everything else, and his multiplicity, due to which the idea of "himself" is not permanent?

The question of autonomy is the question of how an individual can control himself, acting as the cause of his own actions in this process. This is a question about a method of managing one's subjectivity based on a deeper sense of one's own integrity than self-identification. There are at least two components related to each other: management technology and the foundations of thinking. They can be presented in the form of two questions: "What is the technology of multiplicity management?" and "what kind of integrity takes place before subjectification?".

I

For an answer to the first question, let's turn to the science that immediately indicates its field of application by its name — cybernetics, or the science of management. "The term "cybernetics" is derived from the Greek Kubernetes, that is, "helmsman, helmsman"; the word guvernor ("governor, ruler") ultimately comes from the same Greek word," explains the creator of this science, Norbert Wiener ^{[16, p. 16]}. He also set the basic bundle of fundamental concepts of cybernetics: communication and management. Wiener builds his science on the indistinguishability of communication as sending and receiving messages, and management as control involving the exchange of messages — imperative commands sent and reactions received. On the other plane, perpendicular to the axis of communication, he establishes the opposition of order and chaos, or entropy as a measure of disorganization and information as a measure of organization. The problem field of cybernetics is located between the constant destruction or change of messages as they are transmitted, and an attempt to transmit the necessary information with their help. Wiener points out Leibniz, Fermat and Huygens as the forerunner of cybernetics, since "each of these scientists was characterized by an interest in physics, the focus of which was not mechanics, but optics, that is, communication of visible images" ^{[16, p. 19]}. Describing the current situation, he unites J. Willard Gibbs, who, together with Ludwig Boltzmann, introduces statistics into physics, thereby giving it a new beginning, but already as a non-classical science, and Sigmund Freud, the creator of psychoanalysis, since both there and there we are talking about the introduction of randomness and irrationality into the field where determinism and logic, respectively, prevailed before. These remarks, pointing to the influence of predecessors, are important because they report on the invisible connections on the surface between various thinkers and the revolutions generated by them.

However, Wiener's work was first published in 1948, and cybernetics at that time was an expression of the formation of a new, non-classical, paradigm of rationality. The next step taken by Heinz von Foerster in 1974 was the foundation of second-order cybernetics, the so-called "cybernetics of cybernetics" ^[7], i.e., due to the application of cybernetics to itself, a new field of research opened up, in which the emphasis was placed not on the observed, but on the observer. And regarding this event, it is worth remembering Jacques Lacan, a follower of Freud and the founder of his own psychoanalytic school and teaching, which arose through the use of psychoanalysis on the situation of psychoanalytic practice itself, i.e., consideration of communication between the analyst and the patient and the introduction of the problematic of "the analyst's desire". Lacan, in his first seminars, openly uses the achievements of cybernetics, pointing out that, like Freud's discovery of the unconscious, "cybernetics also began from the moment when people were amazed to find that language functions almost independently, giving the impression that we are in his power" ^{[27, p. 170]}, game theory ^{[27, pp. 247-290]}, along with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss ^{[27, pp. 42-58]}, who himself was influenced by Wiener, Shannon and von Neumann ^{[29, pp. 343-348]}. Thus, just as Wiener sees the intersections between Freud and non-classical physics, it is not difficult to see the reverse effects of cybernetics on psychoanalysis and isomorphism of the moves undertaken by Lacan and von Foerster. It is interesting to note that in this, the second measure, psychoanalysis overtakes cybernetics.

The third tact is connected with the "third-order cybernetics" or cybernetics of "semi-subjective reflexive-active environments" currently being developed by V. E. Lepsky. He also sees the main problem of project management in Russia and innovation activity in the fact that "after the collapse of the USSR, the subjectivity of Russian development was destroyed and, as a consequence, the subjectivity of project management" ^{[32, p. 20]}. In a broader sense, Lepsky diagnoses modernity, arguing that ""Subjectivity" is the main disease of humanity" ^[31] and, as a countermeasure, introduces the concept of a "strategic subject of development", i.e. a subject teleologically oriented towards the future, setting a goal and independently creating the necessary prerequisites, the main of which is he himself, to actualize the goal. It is also worth noting that Lepsky does not limit the use of the concept of "subject" by individual individuals, but speaks of a variety of "types of subjects (personality, group, organization, ethnicity, state, etc.)" ^[31].

More important for solving the problem posed here is the categorization of innovative development models introduced by Lepsky, and based on the distinction of three types of scientific rationality introduced by V. S. Stepin: classical, non-classical and post-non-classical ^[30]. But this ternary structure is also used by him to isolate third- order cybernetics:

1) Wiener's first-order cybernetics was focused on the study of communication with a controlled object, just as classical Newtonian physics viewed the world as given directly, while an observer scientist was presented as some kind of abstract eye, or, more broadly, a perceiving mechanism. Here it is worth remembering Freud, who concentrated on the analysis of his patients and the question of the object of desire, in connection with which, "what Freud did not recognize (although his introduction to the case of a hysterical woman shows that at some other level he perceived danger), what he did not realize and what remained not recorded in the in his texts (at least in the form of theses addressed to the reader), it means that everything the hysterical woman does in the analysis boils down to the proposal of an alternative project. That is, the hysterical woman hinted how she should be treated, how she should be listened to, what conclusions should be drawn from her words" ^[1] — by riveting all attention to the object, Freud missed the subject itself — in this case, female and hysterical — which was different from him, and had other desires and ideas, which In the end, they were ignored by Freud.

2) Von Fester's second-order cybernetics transfers the observer to the center, and "everything that is reported is reported to the observer" as "von Fester's consequence number one" says ^[7]. In turn, in non-classical physics, similar shifts occur, which found expression in the Copenhagen interpretation: the subject began to be taken into account, and acts as a reference point, relative to which the world is defined as "the totality of our sensations, perceptions, memories" ^{[43, p. 7]}; the object is no longer perceived as given directly, but as a theoretical construction, depending on the chosen method; the method and measuring instruments come to the fore. And again, a similar move was made in psychoanalysis, where Jacques Lacan, bringing the structuralist method to the fore, and applying it to the situation taking place in the analytical office, introduces the concept of "the analyst's desires" and puts the question of the subject at the forefront.

3)      Finally, third-order cybernetics is already expanding optics to a multisubject environment in which many different subjects interact with each other, but there are also non-reflecting agents who are actors, but, in the absence of reflection, do not become subjects, obeying this environment. In post-non-classical physics, this shift took place when physicists realized themselves to be part of a society in which various values circulate and there are various subjects who can use discoveries to the detriment of others, i.e., an environment was also introduced into which a scientist with his method is always immersed, and on which it depends, including, and his fate. Interestingly, such a post-non-classical approach resembles the schizoanalysis developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: from his early works, Deleuze raises the question not about the givenness of the subject, but about how it develops from an initially subjectless state of experiencing life, which is not always accompanied by reflection; the world ceases to be defined as what is given to consciousness, but it acts as a field into which everyone who lives is always already immersed and from which he himself is formed, and of which he is always a part; in later works, the medium will be the non—subjective streams of desire, which are active in themselves, acting as the substance of the world, and the subject is a local limitation of these flows, produced by their organization in the mechanism that fixes identity; the very installation of social transformations, in contrast to the directly opposite function of Freudian psychoanalysis of embedding the patient into the existing society; schizoanalysis is a program calling for psychoanalysis to be taken outside the office and, in addition to transformations, also to reflect on the very place of psychoanalysis as an institutionalized practice that arose in a certain historical and socio-political cultural situations.

Perhaps it is also worth noting interesting coincidences between the views of Lepsky and two French philosophers: firstly, Deleuze and Guattari also speak of a "group-subject" ^{[23, p. 549]}, however, they distinguish between such "group-subjects" and "enslaved groups", which are closed, disciplined and embedded in the social hierarchy, which is very similar to Lepsky's description of a strategic subject: "We will call a strategic subject a subject included in a metasubject (family, group, organization, country, etc.), identifying itself with this metasubject and regulating its activity (activity, communicative, reflexive), taking into account its influence on metasubject" ^{[31, p. 175]}; secondly, Deleuze and Guattari also postulate subjectivity, but in a positive way, unlike Lepsky. And yet, it is worth noting that in their later work there will be a remark that "the organism — it should be preserved so that it is reformed at every dawn <...> and small doses of subjectivity — they should be preserved sufficiently to be able to respond to the prevailing reality" ^{[21, p. 267]}. Taking into account this clarification, it becomes easy to see that we are talking here about a similar, post—non-classical model, with the difference that Lepsky and Deleuze and Guattari have opposite starting and ending points - the first goes from the subjectless to the restoration of the integral subject; the latter, on the contrary, call for leaving the subjects and opening the subjectless field of desire flows. But in the end, their paths converge on the issues of assembling the subject, in Lepsky, and assembling instead of a predetermined and fixed subject, in Deleuze and Guattari. To clarify this discrepancy, it is worth taking into account, in addition to the difference in the cultural and political context (Russia and France), the fact that third-order cybernetics is also lagging behind the development of psychoanalysis: Deleuze and Guattari, developing a project of schizoanalysis, were looking for ways to free themselves from the repressive pressure of disciplinary society, while Lepsky writes in the situation, which, among other things, is a consequence, perhaps, of an unnecessarily radical (not) understanding, of the appeal of French philosophers. Therefore, in modern times, in order to stabilize, it becomes necessary to re-develop technologies for the production of integrity and subjectivity.

II

In turn, the line of thinking research also turns out to be related to the trinity of authors under discussion. You can start it by pointing out to Leibniz that Wiener was declared the forerunner of cybernetics, and who was one of the first, together with Pascal, who asked about the creation of a thinking machine — a kind of calculating apparatus of thought. And he also appears as one of the important personalities in Deleuze's philosophy — starting with his work "Difference and Repetition" ^[19], through a course of lectures on Leibniz ^[17], Deleuze writes one of the last lifetime books about Leibniz ^[20]. But in order to understand what place Leibnizian philosophy occupies in Deleuze's own thinking, it is worth turning to the project of another, no less bright thinker, whom Deleuze designated as his opponent — Immanuel Kant. Kant is known primarily for his project on explication of the foundations of thinking, which was the subject of three of his critics. Deleuze, starting with a work dedicated to Hume (the philosopher whose book was lying on Kant's desk when he wrote The Critique of Pure Reason) ^[22], begins his project of "transcendental empiricism", the purpose of which is to find the conditions of real, not abstract, experience and thinking. Thus, Deleuze can be considered both a critic of Kant, since Kant's decision does not suit him, and a follower of his cause ^[4]. In the work devoted to the method of intuition by Henri Bergson, one can see the conceptualization of the space of experience and perception — what Kant misses by declaring passive, and immediately turning to the question of the subject's thinking and his Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

Deleuze's psychoanalytic work on perverse subjectivities, sadist and masochist, represented by two authors whose surnames became these names, the Marquis de Sade and Leopold von Sacher—Masoch, fits into this line, which may not be obvious ^[18]. The necessity of this, which seems to be a departure from the stated project, is revealed in the subsequent work "Difference and Repetition", where it is shown that the concept of Cogito as a model of the subject, introduced by Rene Descartes, was supplemented by Kant, who pointed out that in the formula "I think, therefore I exist", "existence" turns out to be unclear and devoid of content. Kant corrects this omission by pointing out that there is a thinking subject as a form of time. Deleuze also points out that Kant does not close the circle — for a full circle of self-justification of the subject, it is necessary to show how thought is derived from the form of time, and therefore demonstrate the genesis of thought from perception and experience ^[11]. If we also take into account that "the Cartesian subject almost inevitably becomes an obsessive—type subject - that is, potentially, an obsessive neurotic" ^{[38, p. 179]}, which is characterized by identification with exclusively intellectual activity, with almost complete denial of its bodily existence, then it becomes clear that based on such, neurotic optics, it is impossible to conceptualize perception and experience. Perverts, in turn, turn out to be those who are not afraid of reality — the sadist, being the one who is not afraid to speak on behalf of the Super-Ego, produces a double, forced movement of thought that allows him to think of hyperhaos as the foundation of any law (the absence of laws and orders as what should act as the foundation for them) a masochist, purging himself of the need to follow the law, at the expense of punishment committed before the offense, finds himself in the position of a child who can simply passively contemplate and experience the world, suspends his thinking, depriving him of any task or goal, responsibility and the need to solve, opens hyperhaos as an active and productive basis, super-completeness ^[3]. Thus, there is a recognition of the reality of bodies, and overcoming alienation from one's own experiences. This is how the perverse structure of the psyche differs from the neurotic one, which is characterized by its initial limitation of social rules and the need to follow them, in fear of receiving punishment for disobedience (from its Super-Ego — i.e., the instances of law and censorship in consciousness) in the form of guilt, are disconnected from the perception of reality. A good description of such a neurotic structure is the example given by Wiener, who describes the mechanism of a music box with figures dancing on its lid: "figures do not communicate with the outside world in any way, except for the designated one-way communication with a pre-configured mechanism of the music box. They are blind, deaf and dumb and cannot break the conditioned structure by their behavior" ^{[16, p. 23]}. Similarly, the structure of the psyche of an obsessive neurotic is so absorbed in communication with his Super-Ego, always being in fear of punishment, and dreaming of getting narcissistic pleasure from feeling his own importance in society, which he is also afraid of, that he turns out to be "blind, deaf and dumb." Seeing the reality of bodies and actions, at the same time he does not fully perceive it, displacing most of the perception, ready to trust the "authoritative" opinion or the cry "fire!" rather than the eyes or the sight of smoke. This closeness from perception is accompanied by the fear of ceasing to exist, because the obsessive neurotic is extremely concerned about his own autonomy, the assertion of his "free will" and the maintenance of the integrity of his personality and inner monologue ^[42]. In this description, it is not difficult to see the widespread image of a "free personality" that is popular in Western culture and Russia. Obsessive neurosis is more common in men than women, and due to patriarchal cultural attitudes, it is brought to the fore as an image of the "norm".

Such a structure turns out to be connected with what Deleuze describes as a "dogmatic way of thinking" ^{[19, pp. 163-208]}, which, as an image of "correct" thinking, runs through the entire history of philosophy, starting from Plato and Aristotle, through Descartes and Kant. This image is based on the recognition of the object as a representative of the concept ("any chair is still the same chair") while abstracting from all the features of this particular object. Deleuze contrasts this way of thinking with the synthesis of differences and divergences of lines, when instead of recognizing an object, by the presence of qualities connecting it with the reference image, the possibilities of the object are perceived based on its real qualities. The same is true for personality — personality is always the past, which is fixed and preserved. While the experience of one's own presence and the consideration of an object as unique and capable of change presupposes a look and calculation into the future, based on the present.

In the same chapter, Deleuze will note that "It is not about contrasting a dogmatic way of thinking with another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia. But rather a reminder that schizophrenia is not only a human fact: it is also the possibility of thinking, which manifests itself as such only in the abolition of the image" ^{[19, p. 185]} — thinking is possible outside of self—identification and reflection, moreover, it turns out to be even more free and open, not being limited by moral prohibitions and the need to follow the reference image. And this remark, made in early works, allows us to integrate the works written together with Felix Guattari into the line of the project on the disclosure of the foundations of thinking. One of the theses on which the "Anti-Oedipus" is based is that the Oedipus complex is not fixed in schizoids, and they are not fixed in their identity. The second important thesis here is an indication that a psychiatric institution, whether it is state psychiatry or psychoanalysis, does not allow schizoid personalities to remain plastic, setting themselves the task of imposing an identity on them and fixing them in one, and only one, role of social subjects. As long as this fails, they make a clinical unit out of a schizophrenic, stigmatizing him and placing him in isolation from society. Thus, removing them from their creative and mental potencies.

If we now turn to Lep's categorization of innovative development models, it is easy to find correspondences between models and subjects: 1) Linear models of innovative development. Linearity presupposes a pre-set goal, and only one, to which all forces are thrown. As Lepsky notes, "this model will always be in demand in strategic projects with the participation of the state. Its principal drawback is limited communication and underutilization of the activity of participants in innovation processes, the lack of quality solutions to the problem of convergence of technologies." Such a model turns out to be a social embodiment of a dogmatic way of thinking, where the task is set by an external authority (the state), a reference idea of the result is established, departure from which is punishable by fines, and creative opportunities are limited by disciplinary fixation on solving the task. This is the case in hierarchically organized structures, be it government research or large corporations of the old type. Hierarchical organization is characterized by its rigidity: the fixation of roles and functions, as well as positions relative to the center, generates a neurotic subject who always feels ambivalent, because there is always someone above him, and someone below. Deleuze describes this as an orientation towards "heights" (idols, ideals), generating manic-depressive cycles.

2) Nonlinear models of innovative development. In such models, "more attention is paid to the forms and intensity of interaction between the main elements (or actors) of the NIS. The model of multiple sources of innovation is focused on the mechanism of development with maximum consideration of the diversity of these elements through the creation of conditions for their creative interaction. Nonlinear models are adequate to non—classical scientific rationality: the "subject-subject" paradigm, the subject-activity approach, the consideration of communicative activity, the network approach and communicative ethics for the assembly of subjects of innovative development" ^{[31, p. 174]}. Here we are talking about a network structure that is more flexible and plastic. Roles and functions are not supposed to be fixed here, and they can be interchangeable, and individuals can change places depending on skills. There is no longer a shortage generated by the gap between the ideal and the real result, because the network itself turns out to be what keeps individuals together. Such suspension presupposes a perverse subject who enjoys being involved in the network and its capabilities. Also, due to the non-fixed roles and functions, the symbolic status that neurotics value so much is in the background, while the properties and capabilities of individuals themselves come to the fore. After all, it is based on them that it is determined which role an individual will take on, depending on the task being solved, which, moreover, may be several, which allows an individual to change roles quite often. Such communication involves direct communication between subjects, unlike hierarchy, where any communication is mediated by the organization itself, its rules and principles, on which the distribution of positions and roles depends. The neurotic subject does not speak directly to another individual, but refers to the role, to the object. And yet, Lepsky comes to the same conclusion as Deleuze — despite the opportunities opened by such an organization, it still turns out to be dependent on the market and the state; Deleuze also departs from the perverse structure in his later works, since the pervert, getting what he wants on the spot, does not stream anywhere, continuing to circulate endlessly on the web, in search of new combinations of role-playing interactions.

3) Self-developing innovative environments. Here we are no longer talking about any particular organization, but about an environment that is always in change, maneuvering between chaos and order. In the theory of systems, such "structures" are designated as "market", and do not presuppose a given organization in advance — the main actors are the individuals themselves, who, in turn, are always in communication and co-evolution with the environment. Such a rhizomatic environment is characterized by "a sharp decrease in the influence of normative components on the actions of subjects" ^{[31, p. 174]}. Describing this model, Lepsky's rhetoric turns out to be indistinguishable from the rhetoric of modern vitalists and posthumanists: "Such an approach presupposes an irreducible diversity, pluralism of different positions, points of view, value and cultural systems that enter into a dialogue relationship with each other and change as a result of interaction" ^{[31, p. 175]}. And the very structure of the environment suggests the answer to the question of unity and multiplicity: if unity prevails in the hierarchy, and all elements are tied to a central node, so that even horizontal communication takes place with an eye to the presence of a towering instance of the law, then in the network, despite the nonlinearity, greater flexibility of the structure and freedom of elements relative to each other, the network remains unified due to the connections that remain binary, and the element that broke away from it ceases to exist for it. Unlike these two cases, the environment does not necessarily imply the presence of any organization. All individuals can travel in space without being tied to each other in any way. There is no unity of organization here, but there is an environment that itself is the result of the resonance of the elements inhabiting it, which are in constant co-evolutionary development. Transferring this conclusion to the question of the modern, multimodern situation, one can answer that it is not characterized by any structure, by certain fixed characteristics, but represents a resonance between multiple entities that co-evolve, unite into large entities (groups-subjects) or vice versa, compete with each other by entering in local battles. 

In such a chaosmotic environment, and Deleuze, Guattari and Lepsky again agree on this, we are no longer talking about the individual, but about the individual or ACTOR: "In the processes of interaction of the subject with the environment, there are always at least two subjects: the actualized subjective position (virtual subject) and the actualized ACTOR (virtual ACTOR) of the environment, i.e. e. certain types of reflexive structures are actualized" ^{[32, p. 106]}. In terms of Deleuze, we can talk about the machine level and the level of the Body without Organs, corresponding to the division into types of connections — the organization of discrete connections and the holographic resonance of the medium ^[11]. Such a division seems a little more convenient than the idea of two subjectivities, since for some time one or another MSW may not reflect itself, and therefore does not become a subject with a fixed identity ^[3]. Thus, we are talking here about taking into account two levels of the individual, which makes him a "dividend": the level of his presence as a living, feeling, thinking, and the level of his possible subjectivations, depending on the social organizations in which he can be included. "Subjectivity" can then be represented as the result of the coordination of external social relations that establish his rights and duties, and the internal environment populated by desires and habits. "Subjectivity" is a surface, an interface that allows you to navigate in society. And the freedom of the dividend depends on who and how it is established. If the choice of subjectivity is made by an external dividend system, then he finds himself in a subordinate position. This position can be fixed if the division is completely identified with its role, which will lead to fixation and limitation of its becoming as a Body without Organs. If the division has an idea of itself as a Body without Organs and a method of producing its own subjectivity as its organization, this will allow it to maintain autonomy, even in the case of external imposition of identity. 

It is here that the main need is revealed — to move further, and not to talk about how to be one or another subject, but to develop a technology for the production of subject machines by selecting virus programs that populate the environment. On the one hand, it is necessary to move from a single identification, even if it is an identification that implies a constant change in formation, to the interface of their production itself, which includes, and thereby necessarily confirms, a multitude of possible identifications. On the other hand, it is necessary to realize one's own integrity, oneself as a Body without Organs or an environment that remains linked even in the absence of reflection. This is how the completion of the project begun by Leibniz, continued by Kant and practically completed by Deleuze is possible: Enlightenment as the acquisition of the autonomy of the mind, perhaps not when a certain subject is chosen, but when individuals can perceive themselves as a multiple integrity, the habitat of viral programs and habits that need to be learned to select, establish, delete, while maintaining all the time a sense of one's own integrity, no longer dependent on one or another subjectivation. Both regarding the deconstructivist project and the Enlightenment project, the concept of "diva", which includes the idea of a Body without Organs as an integrity of a chaosmotic internal environment and an interface for the production of subjectivity by organizing this environment according to the external requirements of structured social formations, acts as the most progressive model for social actors, combining openness, plasticity and autonomy. 

Conclusion

This article is one of the final works in the cycle devoted to the study of the IT community as a possible donor of innovative values and practices that can accelerate the modernization of Russian society. Therefore, having deduced criteria that allow determining values adapted to innovation and contributing to modernization, they must be correlated with other results obtained in the framework of the study. The main criterion is the conclusion that when analyzing the value orientation of the Russian IT community, it is necessary to pay attention to how their working environment is structured. The values developed in hierarchical organizations remain the values of the past and present, since they imply the fixation of identity and linear development. The values of communities organized according to network principles belong to the transitional type, and can be used to ensure the transition from linear thinking to multiple thinking. The values of communities built according to the rhizomatic type seem to be the most progressive, since they take into account both the autonomy of the individual and the possibility of free choice of their subjectivity.

In the first work, the main factor hindering the modernization of Russian society was identified, which consists in the spread and consolidation of resentment, as a situation in domestic culture, expressed in the substitution of external signs for functional meanings, and fruitless copying of Western institutions, which, due to the desire to resemble the foreign "ideal of modernity", remain completely not adapted to the realities of our country, and therefore do not bring any result, except purely symbolic ^[36]. In turn, the carriers of such practices, according to the conclusions drawn here, are neurotically structured subjects who, due to their isolation on a discrete symbolic order, are subjects per se, blocking their creative abilities for the sake of compliance with imposed norms and ideals. 

Moreover, in the current situation of multiplicity and acceleration of progress, a neurotic individual simply does not survive, as happened with an IBM technician who committed suicide in the parking lot and left a letter in which he blames the company for his death ^[2]. In connection with this story, Nicole Ober speaks about the "hypermodern" situation, describing it as an increasingly accelerating and intensifying race for profit, leading to high workload of corporate employees and their moral exhaustion. It defines the subject of modernity as suffering from bipolar syndrome, with an increasingly increasing contrast between each of the poles: manic work is replaced by depression, obesity is adjacent to anorexia, etc. Its description corresponds to neurotic subjectivity (or "hyperneurotic" ^[39]) produced in hierarchically organized workspaces. Consequently, such a trend is entirely negative, since it not only blocks the innovative potential of the IT community, but also generates subjects that are not viable in the current situation.

At the same time, as a result of a survey of Russian IT specialists, such characteristics as "universalism" (a quality that foreign representatives of the it community notice, but managers and managers deny), "high level of professional training", "craving for solving non-standard tasks" were revealed ^[35]. The latter characteristic is often singled out as one of the cultural characteristics of the inhabitants of Russia, which can play a positive role in the modernization of the economy ^[8]. And, as it was shown in this paper, it can play a positive role only in organizations structured according to network or rhizomatic principles, where there is no high degree of standardization and fixation of roles and functions. And how explicit this relationship will be for representatives of the Russian IT community depends on the success of applying the skills they have acquired, which in themselves have sufficient potential for innovation.

The study of the attitude of representatives of the Russian it community to the formation of a control society allowed us to establish that "Russian IT specialists inherit the low generalized trust of Russians and their negative attitude to control by the state in the network, but they are somewhat better at offline control" ^[34]. This suggests "the potential for the development of "complex" technologies, the use of the innovative potential of an individual, the priority of the individual in the context of technology development, which is the basis for socio-cultural modernization in the direction of "technological humanism"" ^[34]. Thus, in this matter, the values of the it community also correspond to the criteria derived here, since they imply awareness of the risks of losing their own autonomy. 

The lack of understanding of the relationship between the environment and subjectivity may be one of the factors constraining the modernization potential of representatives of the Russian IT community. This is also indicated by the fact that the international IT community is one of the hotbeds of spreading the values of the rhizomatic organization of interactions between software creators. The Free Software movement has many actualizations in European countries and has the support of UNESCO ^[41]. The global IT community has been and remains the vanguard of the production of progressive values, and, therefore, the question is not how to make it even more progressive, but what prevents the full disclosure of the potential of its Russian representatives. And the main conclusion of this work is that the existing potential of the Russian IT community to be an agent of modernization is neutralized, first of all, by hierarchically structured work environments. The values generated by such environments not only hinder modernization, but also support the situation of cultural resentment. Their identification and control is the next necessary step in the movement towards the modernization of society.