Analysis of possible physical conditions of using firearms by the employees of temporary holding facilities and guarding units of the police service

The relevance of research.

The relevance of studying the probable physical conditions of the use of firearms by employees of temporary detention facilities and security and convoy units of the police is due to:

        -implementation of the exclusive powers of employees of this category in the field of application of measures of state coercion;

- the need to maintain the constant readiness of employees to repel a possible attack by a special agent;

- formation of the necessary competencies of employees related to the lawful use of firearms.

In addition, the results of such studies determine the requirements for the fire preparedness of employees of internal affairs bodies and, as a result, the content and methodology of administrative, legal and fire training ^[1].

The purpose of the study is based on the results of the analysis of the probable physical conditions of the use of firearms, to consider the possibility of studying and designing appropriate pedagogical conditions, including working out techniques and methods of using firearms, by means of modeling service and professional situations in fire training classes.

         Research objectives:

1.                Conduct a survey of employees of the IVS and ACS departments.

2.                To analyze the most probable conditions for the use of firearms by employees of the IVS and ACS.

3. To consider possible approaches in the professional training of employees of IVS and ACS, based on the results obtained and the specifics of the activities of these units.

Analysis of the study of the problem. 

An important condition preceding the formation of the readiness of employees of the internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation to perform official tasks related to the possible use of firearms is to obtain ideas about the specifics of the practice of using weapons by police officers, including the conditions and circumstances of its use. On the basis of these data, directions for improving the organization and methods of professional training of employees of internal affairs bodies should be developed. Analysis of the information available in open sources shows that such analytical studies have not been carried out enough in recent years. The necessary information for conducting qualitative research on this topic, namely, the materials of official inspections on the facts of the use of firearms by employees during their service, are inaccessible to general use and have an appropriate mark, which marks such materials with limited access. In addition, information about the facts of the use of physical force, special means and firearms by police officers, which is accumulated in higher bodies and organizations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, often does not reflect a full picture that would allow for a comprehensive study based on modern factual material.

In this regard, the authors of the study did not set tasks to find the facts of the use of firearms by police officers in recent years. One of the tasks of the work was to analyze the possible conditions and circumstances accompanying the situation of the use of firearms by employees, so that, based on the data obtained, to consider the possibility of creating a complex of service and professional situations in the process of fire training of police officers. The simulated situations of the use of firearms should be close to the conditions of the real office environment and reflect its specifics. As an example of units that serve in conditions of limited or confined space, it should be noted the activities of temporary detention facilities and security and convoy service units. Employees of these units carry out daily escort of the special contingent along pre-approved and agreed routes that reduce the possible risks associated with escape or attack on the convoy. In addition, the routes of movement should be short and safe, excluding meetings with random citizens or relatives of escorted persons.

So, in 2021, a group survey was conducted among the employees of the IVS, security and escort units who underwent professional training in basic and additional programs on the basis of the Tyumen Institute for Advanced Training of Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, aimed at improving the quality of fire preparedness of employees. A total of 93 listeners took part in the questionnaire survey. The questionnaire form included a block of 15 questions, 14 of which were general questions: about the types of weapons and special equipment assigned to the employee; about the frequency of firing in the unit; about the presence of objective reasons that did not allow the employee to attend the shooting during the calendar year; about the presence of full-time fire training instructors in the unit; about carrying out exercises with weapons before entering the service; about the facts of the use of weapons during service. The final question reflected the opinion of the survey participants about the most likely conditions and circumstances of the use of firearms by employees during their service. This question included a number of judgments, to which respondents were asked to express their degree of agreement on an evaluation scale from 0 to 5, where 0 corresponded to the answer "Unlikely", and 5 corresponded to the answer "With a high degree of probability".

When conducting the study, the length of service in the internal affairs bodies was taken into account. To do this, the respondents were divided into 4 categories:

- 1 category: employees with service experience up to 1 year;

- Category 2: employees with service experience from 1 to 3 years;

- Category 3: employees with service experience from 3 to 5 years;

- Category 4: employees with service experience of 5 years or more.

In the process of studying the issue of weapons assigned to the employees of the IVS and ACS, we noted that those employees whose service experience in the Department of Internal Affairs is no more than 1 year, enter the service of guarding and escorting a special agent only with a Makarov pistol, because

Fig. 1 Diagrams of firearms assigned to employees of the IVS and ACS, depending on the length of service in the Department of Internal Affairs, in %

other types of weapons are not assigned to them. For employees who have experience

service in the Department of Internal Affairs is 2 years or more, additionally fixed a submachine gun (11% of employees) or a submachine gun (30% of employees) (Fig. 1).

In accordance with the Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia dated May 05, 2018 No. 275 "On approval of the Procedure for organizing personnel training for positions in the Internal Affairs bodies of the Russian Federation" in the bodies, organizations, divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, pistol practice is organized and conducted – at least once every two weeks (with police officers). Accordingly, during the year, a police officer may be involved in pistol practice shooting at least 24 times, except in cases when it is impossible to perform pistol practice exercises for a number of valid reasons: being on duty, on vacation, on sick leave, etc.).

To clarify the issue of the frequency of involvement in shooting, employees had to indicate in their questionnaires the approximate number of shootings they attended during the calendar year, as part of professional service and physical training classes. As a result, the results were obtained, which turned out to be significantly lower than expected (Fig. 2).

         Fig. 2 The approximate number of shootings in which IVS and ACS employees took part during the calendar year, in %

         The graph below shows that about 70% of the interviewed employees (regardless of the length of service in the Department of Internal Affairs), during the calendar year, attended fire training classes no more than 5 times. It is obvious that, in order to maintain and even more so improve the necessary professional skills of working with weapons, as well as the successful completion of tasks related to its possible use, the specified number of firings is not enough.

Fig. 3 Objective reasons that did not allow to attend the training shooting, in %

In addition, 23% of the surveyed employees noted that during the year they had never attended fire training classes and had not performed pistol practice exercises. Those employees whose service experience in the Department of Internal Affairs is 5 years or more were more often involved in pistol shooting than employees with little service experience. The reason for this may be: the formation of a high professional culture of an employee and the upbringing of personal responsibility for the state and improvement of their level of professional readiness; the presence of a certain degree of motivation expressed in the possibility of awarding or confirming a qualification title

The majority of respondents, as the main reason why they were unable to attend fire training classes, pointed to their regular involvement in service. About 81% of employees chose this answer option (Fig. 3).

To determine the conditions that increase the readiness of IVS and ACS employees to serve with weapons, we proposed 3 possible answers. About 76% of respondents indicated a high need for shooting with l/s. In total, about 62% of respondents indicated the high importance of carrying out training with weapons before entering the service and practical development of situational tasks (Fig. 4).

Thus, a significant part of the interviewed employees believe that the acquisition of stable skills of working with weapons, the ability to quickly extract and bring it into combat readiness in life-threatening and health-threatening conditions is as important as physical and psychological readiness for the right actions from a legal point of view.

Fig. 4 Conditions that increase the readiness of IVS and ACS employees to serve with weapons, in particular %

To do this, according to the staff, it is necessary to fully immerse yourself in conditions close to the real situation, which simulates real situations that arise during the protection and escort of a special contingent, during practical training on fire training.

Fig. 5 The most probable legal grounds for the use of weapons by IVS and ACS employees, in %

Setting conditions, the possibility of independent decision-making in limited time intervals and a detailed analysis of incorrect (illegal) actions of employees will allow timely suppression of illegal actions of the special agent. Comparing the real situation with the previously worked out and simulated in training sessions will add confidence to employees in their actions when serving with weapons.

According to the employees who took part in this study, the most likely legal grounds for the use of weapons against a special agent are: an attempt to escape a special agent when loading into or unloading from a special vehicle; an attack or an attempt to escape a special agent when moving a special vehicle; a reflection of an attack by a special agent on police officers in the convoy room of the court (Fig. 5).

Of the above options for the emergence of legal grounds for the use of weapons, employees with short service experience in the Department of Internal Affairs (the first 3 categories of employees) ranked these risks according to the degree of probability of their actual occurrence, as follows: 79% of employees indicated a high probability of their use of weapons when repelling an attack by a special agent in the convoy room of the court; 44% of employees they indicated a high probability of using weapons when trying to escape at the time of loading and unloading of a special agent; 31% of employees associate the possibility of using weapons during an attack or escape attempt during the movement of a special vehicle.

Employees with service experience of 5 years or more equally appreciated the likelihood of using weapons in all cases indicated in the questionnaire. At the same time, according to the personal conviction of the author of the study, the probability of an escape or an attack by a special agent on a convoy will indeed be approximately equally high if this is preceded by a number of violations of the rules and order of service by the employees themselves. Regulatory legal documents regulating the activities of the IVS and the ACS, in case of their unquestioning compliance, practically exclude the possibility of escape by persons in custody. Most of the known cases of illegal actions of a special agent are associated with such a concomitant factor as non-performance or improper performance by an official of his duties to protect and escort a special agent, which is qualified in criminal law as negligence ^[2].

The experience of the author of the study on this issue indicates that when escorting a special agent, employees of the IVS and ACS units periodically commit violations that could potentially contribute to the escape or attack on the convoy. Therefore, the heads of departments need to exercise constant control over the organization and service of their subordinates. Use modern technical means of control over the organization and performance of service. During the briefing, inform the personnel of the requirements for preventing violations of the rules for the protection and escort of the special contingent, inform about the possibility of disciplinary or criminal liability, depending on the severity of the consequences that have occurred.

Fig. 6 The most probable distance of the use of weapons by IVS and ACS employees, in %

Returning to the analysis of the survey results, it should be noted that only employees with service experience of 5 years or more have ever used weapons or put them on alert during their service. Thus, 28% of employees from this category indicated that during their service they used weapons against a special agent, and 9% of employees put him on alert without firing a shot.

         Accordingly, the longer the employee's service experience, the more likely it is that during his professional activity in the Department of Internal Affairs, he will find himself in a situation where there will be a need to bring weapons to readiness and use them.        

In the final part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer the question about the distance from which, in their opinion, the use of weapons is most likely (Fig. 6). The first category of employees preferred a distance of 10 meters or more.

The responses of employees with short service experience indicate that attempts to attack by a special agent or taking possession of a service weapon may lead to the fact that the employee will be confused and will not be able to resist the attacker, since he will not expect any illegal actions from him from short or ultra-short distances, or will simply not be ready to repel the attack due to insufficient technical and tactical preparedness for such actions. From this it follows that when conducting fire training classes with personnel, it is necessary to pay special attention to the increased likelihood of a sudden attack on the convoy from close range.

         Employees with 5 years or more of service in the Department of Internal Affairs prefer short (up to 5 meters) and ultrashort distances (up to 3 meters). This can be explained by the formed understanding of experienced employees of the likely ways to counteract from the special agent. And this is not only the provision of physical resistance, but also an attempt to take possession of a weapon causing serious harm to health.

         In addition, it is necessary to understand that such an extreme measure as an attempt to escape with the possession of weapons is most likely to be carried out by persons sentenced by a court to imprisonment for committing serious or especially serious crimes ^[3]. When escorting this category of persons, the outfit must serve with special vigilance and caution. The composition of the outfit should include the most experienced employees. Information about the escorted citizens and the possibility of their resistance must necessarily be brought to the staff at a general briefing, or by the head of the convoy – immediately before the convoy.

         Main conclusions:

1.                The analysis indicates the presence of shortcomings in the units for the protection and escort of the special contingent, associated with insufficient involvement of employees in fire training classes. The reason for this, as a rule, is a high service load. Poor fire preparedness of employees increases the likelihood of harm to their life and health from the criminal. In addition, the employees' lack of readiness and the necessary skills to prevent illegal actions using fixed weapons casts doubt on the reliability of the tasks they perform to protect and escort the special contingent.

As alternative ways to maintain and improve some elements of the fire readiness of personnel, it is possible to consider the possibility of carrying out simulations with weapons before entering the service, or practical development of situational tasks directly in the unit.

2.                When performing the tasks of guarding and escorting the special contingent, employees with short service experience indicated a low probability of an emergency situation associated with the possibility of escape of persons in custody while traveling in a special vehicle or at the time of loading (unloading) from it. While more experienced employees, on the contrary, indicated a high probability of their using weapons in these circumstances, if there are legal grounds for that.

This fact indicates the most vulnerable moments of service by young employees, during which they may show a decrease in vigilance and caution when working with the category of suspects, accused and convicted citizens.

3.                With an increase in service experience in the IVS and ACS units, the respondents' opinion was proportionally formed and increased that their use of weapons (if there are legal grounds for it) is most likely from short and ultrashort distances.

Based on the nature and specifics of the tasks performed by employees of temporary detention facilities and security and escort units of the police, such an approach is possible in the professional training of this category of employees, in which the following training issues will be considered during their training:

- the use of firearms, special means and physical force by police officers when repelling an attack by suspects and accused on police officers while boarding or disembarking from an AZ-type car;

- the use of firearms, special means and physical force by police officers when attempting to escape suspects and accused persons while boarding or disembarking from an AZ-type vehicle;

- the use of firearms, special means and physical force by police officers when repelling an armed attack on a vehicle for transporting suspects and accused of the "AZ" type;

- the use of firearms, special means and physical force by police officers when repelling an attack by suspects and accused on police officers in the convoy room of the court.

Thus, the subject matter of the proposed educational issues implies the interdisciplinary nature of training. In addition, these training questions reflect the specifics of the activities of IVS and ACS employees, which allows for the possibility of fire contact or other opposition from escorted persons in the cabin of a special vehicle or in the convoy room of the court, i.e. in conditions of limited space and with a minimum distance between the employee and the escorted person up to 5-7 meters.