Energy security issues in US and EU foreign policy: comparative analysis

Introduction

The generally accepted definition of the global energy landscape is its significant transformation, and political and economic events in the international energy sector justify such an assessment. The civil war in Syria, the crisis in Ukraine, the international agreement on a joint comprehensive plan of action on Iran's nuclear program and the growing concern about the vulnerability of the global energy transportation system associated with maritime "narrow" passages are just some of the issues that define energy geopolitics today. At the same time, the energy market is undergoing significant – if not structural - changes on the supply and demand side, and stocks in the oil and natural gas markets have lost stability. The "shale revolution" is transforming energy markets, an increase in the share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in gas trade is globalizing regional gas markets, and the epicenter of energy demand is moving from the developed West to the emerging markets of the East.

The purpose of this work is to study the role of the energy factor in the foreign policy of the European Union and the United States. These subjects have important common features and a number of key differences. Thus, the EU and the USA have a great need for energy, ranking third and second in the world in terms of energy consumption after China. Satisfaction of such a need is a necessary condition for maintaining living standards. At the same time, the USA is the largest producer of hydrocarbons in the world, which is able to become a net exporter of energy resources, primarily due to its shale deposits, and the EU is the world's largest importer of energy resources with declining domestic production of hydrocarbons. This significant difference expands the research method, allowing us to compare the role of energy in shaping the foreign policy of two players with completely different potential for energy production and export.

Accordingly, the research objectives of this paper are, firstly, to consider the perception of the energy factor underlying different political courses and resulting from different ideas about what drives international energy policy. Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the dual approach to energy as a subject area of foreign policy, where energy carriers are defined, firstly, as an ordinary commodity and, secondly, as a public good. On this conceptual basis, we explore the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU and the United States through the prism of cognitive structures used by actors to understand the landscape of global energy. Thirdly, we believe it is necessary to compare how the relationship between energy and foreign policy has developed in the EU and the USA, to what extent energy is considered a useful tool of foreign policy, and vice versa, to what extent the goals of energy policy are taken into account when forming foreign policy.

Using the institutional approach as a methodology, the authors should emphasize that in addition to the dissimilarity of the energy profile, there is another significant difference between the two entities related to the nature of their institutions. Unlike the USA, the organization of EU institutions is specific and unique. It is not comparable with international organizations or federal States. In this study, the authors focused on the role of specific institutions of the European Union: the EU Council, the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It should be noted a priori that the energy and foreign policy of the EU is not a reflection of the totality of the interests of European states, it is a separate phenomenon with its own essence. With this approach, we do not discount the multilevel nature of the EU and the influence of divergent national interests on its policy, but take them into account properly.

The analysis is based on secondary literature on the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU and the USA. As an empirical basis, we examine a number of primary sources: (a) official documents, including EU and US legislation, advisory documents, Congress minutes, documents of the European Commission and the Council of Europe; (b) inaugural addresses and economic reports of US presidents after the 1973 oil crisis; (c) reports prepared by advisory committees or private companies for governments or influence groups and (d) influence group documents related to the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States.

In this context, the EU and the US are striving for leadership in global energy management. The analysis of the scientific development of the topic indicates that Western research literature recognizes that the actors in question play (or should play) a special role in international energy affairs, although these subjects are often viewed through the prism of stereotypes. The United States is traditionally considered a tough player, prone to fighting for control over energy resources, militarization of energy policy and the use of "coercive" strategies to achieve energy security. The European Union, on the contrary, is "focused" on "soft power", "nonviolent" strategies, multilateral cooperation and the globalization of markets ^[1]. The works of domestic authors such as A. Etkind ^[2], V. Inozemtsev ^[3], A. Movchan ^[4] focus on the so-called "resource curse" of hydrocarbons and give them the importance of factors pulling the global economy down 

Evolution of the Energy agenda in shaping US foreign policy

In its report on the problems and opportunities of energy geopolitics, the Advisory Council on International Security of the United States notes that after forty years, when energy was considered a "source of vulnerability" for the States, the paradigm is changing ^[5]. Even if its shift has not yet been completed, the United States is actually entering an era of relative energy abundance. The United States has become the largest producer of oil and natural gas in the world thanks to the "shale revolution". In terms of production, they have overtaken Saudi Arabia and Russia. At the same time, the country is a leader in oil and gas consumption ^[6].

In the case of the EU, we see the opposite picture. In 2014, the EU recorded a sharp drop in gas production and a serious decline in oil production. Gas consumption has decreased significantly and oil consumption has decreased slightly. Nevertheless, the EU remains the second consumer of oil in the world and ranks third in gas consumption after the United States and Russia. Due to the impressive difference between production and consumption, the EU is heavily dependent on imports, being the largest importer of energy resources in the world ^[7].

The figures above reflect two completely different situations. The first is an abundance of energy, the second is its deficit. If ten years ago the energy deficit was a common problem for the EU and the USA, today it remains a problem only for the EU. Therefore, we cannot ignore the "constant dissimilarity of priorities in the energy security policy of the two regions." In fact, it can be argued that this difference is not new and did not appear as a result of the shale revolution, although the latter played a role. This dissimilarity is deeper and is related to the general perception of the energy factor in EU and US policy.

An impressive increase in oil and gas production in the United States has occurred recently and the country has a long tradition of large consumption of energy resources. Access to enough of them has been an important task for U.S. energy and foreign policy, at least since the 1973 oil crisis. From that moment on, the perception of the energy issue revolved around two poles - independence and interdependence, somehow reflecting the isolationist/interventionist debate in US foreign policy.

From an isolationist point of view, the interests of the United States are narrowly defined and limited by national borders, and the country's energy independence is considered an achievable goal that should be pursued, serving the interests of its industry and consumers. From an interventionist point of view, US interests are intertwined with the creation and preservation of an international liberal order. Consequently, energy interdependence is considered a common situation, the preservation of which reinforces American intervention outside.

Recognizing the risk of over-generalization, it can be argued that energy independence is mainly supported by the US manufacturing industry (for example, manufacturers of chemicals, steel and aluminum), and energy interdependence is mainly advocated by the oil and gas industry. But since the issue of energy independence/interdependence is related to the general orientation of US foreign policy, it would be a mistake to limit it to the narrow limits of these groups of influence. In fact, the ideas of energy independence and interdependence are part of the position of all administrations regarding the role of the country in world affairs. It is also true that the idea of energy independence is widely present in the rhetoric of any president, but its meaning and context are different in each case.

The most vivid understanding of energy independence was reflected in President Nixon's address to the nation in 1973, concerning national energy policy after the Arab oil embargo. President Nixon's Independence Project was designed to protect the United States from energy crises once and for all. Moreover, the goal was not only to reduce energy consumption by increasing energy efficiency, although some measures (for example, speed limits on roads) were taken in this direction. On the contrary, the main goal was to provide "abundant energy reserves" for consumption. As mentioned in the Nixon economic report, "increasing the supply of energy is the best way to cope with its shortage."

It is noteworthy that President Ford has abandoned excessive emphasis on the supply of energy resources, focusing on their efficient use. The first step of his energy program was to create a strategic oil reserve to protect the United States from supply disruptions caused by external factors such as OPEC's price decisions. Ford criticized government intervention in market pricing, in which the price of oil and natural gas produced domestically was below the level of the world market, which led to inefficient use of energy. Moreover, President Ford not only emphasized the importance of energy efficiency, he linked energy and the environment, calling for a revision of environmental policy towards ensuring the functioning of the economy and the security of energy supply at lower costs ^[8].

Nixon's words embody the concept of energy independence, and the degree of its influence on the formation of US foreign policy was vividly demonstrated by the 40-year ban on the export of domestic crude oil. The Energy Policy and Energy Conservation Act of 1975, passed by Congress in response to the 1973 oil crisis, gave the President the authority to restrict exports of petroleum products, natural gas, as well as a wide range of energy products and energy materials. The law was based on an isolationist understanding of the role of the United States in international energy relations. Subsequently, exports were allowed, with the exception of natural gas exports, which are still agreed on an individual basis. Crude oil exports were fully authorized at the end of 2015.

The concept of energy independence was originally associated with the 1973 energy crisis and a sense of vulnerability to energy shortages. However, today - in an era of relative abundance of energy resources in the United States - the threat of shortage is no longer relevant. Opponents of natural gas and crude oil exports, who perceive the "shale revolution" as an opportunity to achieve US energy independence, now justify their position in a different way. Without setting aside the security of energy supply, they emphasize the economic impact of hydrocarbon exports. They consider the shale revolution a chance to achieve a "revival of production." This line of argument is supported by the American Economic Association, which includes some of the leading manufacturers of goods and gas distribution companies. They believe that the export of LNG (or rather its uncontrolled export) leads to the rejection of the prospect of reviving domestic production, since gas prices will rise to a "harmful level". It is believed that the export of natural gas will reduce the cost of energy for foreign enterprises and consumers at the expense of domestic industry and consumers ^[9].

Scientific schools advocating energy independence and interdependence equally support the idea of energy security, but their approaches to the relationship between energy and US foreign policy are completely different. In contrast to the isolationist position close to the supporters of independence, the supporters of interdependence emphasize the interconnectedness of energy markets and international affairs, advocating for the active participation of the United States in international energy relations. What also distinguishes these two scientific schools is that the former is very homogeneous and stands on a simple and clear position, while the latter is heterogeneous with significant variations. It can be argued that the different shades of the second approach are located on the axis, at the beginning of which are national interests, and at the end of which is the global public good.

At the beginning of this axis, the emphasis is on the protection and promotion of US national interests in an interdependent international environment. This point of view is most vividly illustrated by the so-called "Carter Doctrine", which equates any attempts to prevent US access to energy resources in the Middle East to "encroachment on the vital interests of the country" ^[10]. For the sake of fairness, it should be emphasized that President Carter differed from his predecessors in that he directly linked US energy security with reducing energy consumption. He eloquently expressed his position by wearing a cardigan in the White House in 1977 and reducing the temperature in the office at the same time. The Carter administration put an end to the practice of keeping energy prices in the United States below the global market level, which led to wasteful energy consumption, and introduced a program that combined increased energy production with its careful use. The "Carter Doctrine" continued to influence U.S. energy and foreign policy even after Reagan's victory in 1980, but the emphasis on reducing energy consumption faded ^[11].

The "Carter Doctrine" reflects the concern of a society facing a severe shortage of energy resources. Since the United States has already entered an era of relative abundance of energy, the idea of switching to a more active use of energy in international relations is gaining popularity. With this approach, the United States should use its energy advantage to protect and promote national interests. According to T. Donilon, who served as National Security Adviser from 2010 to 2013, "the new energy position of the United States gives Washington advantages in realizing its goals in the field of international security" ^[12]. Apparently, this point of view implies the rejection of energy isolationism. But at the same time, it implies that the energy factor should turn into a tool in the service of foreign policy. With this understanding, "the energy weapon that has been so effectively used against the United States in the last half century can easily change the owner and be used by the United States itself" ^[13].

The main idea here is that the United States can use energy exports to exert economic pressure on opponents relying on oil and gas revenues, such as Russia or Iran. In this context, the increase in oil production in the United States is perceived as an "economic justification" for the sanctions imposed by the US administration, since it minimizes the burden on the global oil market and mitigates concerns about economic consequences. Accordingly, American LNG exports to Europe are seen as a potential means of increasing competition for Russian natural gas and further reducing Russia's revenues ^[14]. This line of reasoning is reflected in the rationale of the bill, which will allow faster obtaining permits for the export of natural gas to US allies: "by providing a rich and reliable alternative source of natural gas to allies, the US will be able to weaken the influence of countries such as Russia, which use the energy market to impose their will and create instability" ^[15].

At the end of the mentioned axis, the emphasis is placed on the idea of the United States as a supplier of global public goods. At the heart of this concept of interdependence is the link between the global public goods in the energy sector and the national interests of the United States. Here, the United States is seen as a guarantor of the free flow of oil and gas and a liberal global energy market. The report of the US National Energy Policy Development Group (the Cheney Report) states: "Serious disruptions in global oil supplies can negatively affect our economy and ability to achieve key foreign and economic policy goals, regardless of the level of US dependence on oil imports" ^[16]. Fourteen years later, the founder of the State Department's Bureau of Energy Resources and former Special Envoy of the U.S. Department of State for Energy Pascual confirms this opinion, arguing that "politically and economically, the United States is interested in the stability of world oil and gas markets. Even if we are able to avoid supply disruptions, we cannot protect ourselves from price vulnerabilities that directly affect the American economy."^[17]

According to this line of reasoning, energy independence is rejected as a myth, and the argument of isolationism is rejected as outdated. The proactive role of the United States in global energy affairs is justified in the light of the key challenges facing the international community and related to energy security, energy markets and mitigation of climate change, which pose a serious challenge to U.S. national security ^[18].

Projecting the energy power of the United States is perceived as a means of ensuring American interests while providing a "set of public goods". Since interdependence makes US energy security inseparable from the security of global energy, Washington "acts as a stabilizer of global energy needs" ^[19]. In addition, at least under the Obama administration, the US has played a leading role on climate issues. As stated in President Obama's action plan to combat climate change: "The United States is intensively working on global responses to climate change, participating in a number of important international negotiations, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Three years later, the Obama administration's latest economic report emphasized that "America's leadership on climate issues helped pave the way for the Paris Agreement" ^[20].

Formation of the EU energy security concept

It is obvious that the discussion about independence, interdependence and their manifestations determines the perception of the energy issue in US foreign policy. In the USA, this discussion is actively developing, but it can be reasonably assumed that it is irrelevant in the EU, given the level of energy imports by the countries of the Union. However, this is not the case. At the supranational level, energy interdependence is considered a given, but everything is different when it comes to the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational power. Being a sphere of joint competence, energy is often perceived by national governments through the prism of independence, transforming the relationship between national sovereignty and supranational power into the relationship between independence and interdependence.

To outline the scope of the discussion, first of all, it should be noted that although energy has played an important role since the very beginning of European integration, it was recognized as a sector of the EU's joint competence only in 2009 with the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty. It is not surprising that the treaty states that the measures taken by the Union to achieve its energy goals "do not affect the right of its member countries to determine the conditions for the use of their energy resources, choose energy sources and determine the overall structure of energy supply" ^[21]. Thus, although the treaty lays the necessary foundation for a common EU energy policy "in the spirit of solidarity", it preserves national sovereignty on key issues such as energy supply strategy and energy balance, which complicates "the development of a consistent common energy policy at the EU level, not to mention the external energy strategy" ^[22].

Against this background, the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU is permeated with a constant dualism between independence and interdependence. At the supranational level, the European Commission emphasizes the internal energy interdependence within the EU and beyond at the regional and international levels. Over the past ten years, Brussels has been developing the structure of the relationship of energy to foreign policy on the basis of this perception of energy issues. Starting with the joint document of the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy in 2006 and the address of the same year on external energy relations, the emphasis is on the "collective external energy security of the Union", the need for coordination between member states and the Commission and a common understanding of the principles of future energy partnership with Russia ^[23].

However, less than 3 years later, the 2009 gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine and the fair criticism of the EU's response to a serious energy security crisis called into question the course adopted by the European Commission on interdependence. After the crisis of 2009, the Commission seriously tackled the problem of fragmentation of the internal energy market as a result of bilateral energy relations between EU countries and third supplier or transit countries, emphasizing the need to strengthen coordination of external strategies of EU countries. Moreover, she proposed concrete measures in this direction, including the introduction of a mechanism to increase transparency and exchange information on intergovernmental energy agreements of EU states with third countries, and the creation of a Strategic Group for International Energy Cooperation, consisting of representatives of EU countries and relevant EU services with regular reviews of EU countries' cooperation with third countries ^[24].

As a result, the Commission recognized that the exchange of information between EU countries on their activities in third countries remains incomplete, and the mechanism for the exchange of information on intergovernmental energy agreements did not allow to correct any agreements that do not comply with EU legislation, and did not affect the negotiations of EU states with third countries. In fact, since the adoption of the mechanism, the countries have never notified the Commission about their negotiations on intergovernmental energy agreements ^[25]. The new action plan on energy diplomacy, developed by the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, once again emphasized the need for a unified EU position on major energy issues in bilateral and multilateral relations. In July 2015 The Council on Foreign Affairs adopted an action plan defining the need for a "coordinated EU foreign and energy policy, taking into account geopolitical events." Nevertheless, in order to avoid misinterpretation, the same paragraph mentioned "the right of EU states to determine their energy balance" ^[26].

When determining the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the EU, there is no escaping the two balancing forces that affect it. While the European Commission is moving towards further integration and stronger interdependence between EU countries, a number of countries are trying to defend national prerogatives and strengthen their independence. While in the USA the dualism of energy independence/interdependence reflects the dispute about isolationism and intervention, in the EU it is a product of the traditional opposition of national and supranational. In the USA, the question is about a different understanding of the country's role in the international arena, and in the EU, we are talking about a different understanding of the scale or even the meaning of the entire foreign policy of the Union, and hence its foreign energy policy.

The most recent and eloquent manifestations of this state of affairs are the proposals of the 2016 Commission on, firstly, the creation of a proactive mechanism for the exchange of information on international energy agreements and other agreements of EU countries with third countries in the field of energy, and, secondly, the inclusion of a new principle of solidarity in the resolution on measures to ensure the security of gas supplies.

The Commission assessed the existing mechanism for the exchange of information on concluded energy agreements as ineffective. In order to remedy this situation and ensure compliance with EU legislation in the field of energy, the "winter package of energy proposals" contained proposals for mandatory prior notification of the European Commission on draft interstate agreements. In other words, the proposed update of the information exchange mechanism introduces a mandatory preliminary compliance check and obliges EU countries to receive the Commission's opinion before signing interstate agreements.

Unsurprisingly, this proposal was poorly received by several Governments. France has directly expressed its dissatisfaction. She also recalled that the Commission can assist in bilateral negotiations with third countries only at the request of an EU member State. Germany joined France, severely criticizing the proposal. She did not see the need to revise the Decision on the International Energy Agreements of 2012 and considered the Commission's intervention in the signing of such agreements unnecessary. But the very essence of the discussion was revealed by Germany's remark that the proposed measures would "seriously shake the sovereignty of EU states." Obviously, for Paris and Berlin, which are considered the driving force of European integration, national sovereignty in external energy security is a sensitive issue to which Brussels will not be allowed.

The security of energy supplies is still considered by the majority of EU states as a problem that needs to be solved from a national perspective. Despite the existence of the European Energy security Strategy, national governments are not inclined to deviate from their prerogatives in this area. The exceptions are the Baltic States and Poland, which support the proposed amendment on the mechanism of information exchange. For these countries, the European Energy Security Policy is a refuge from Russia's assertive energy policy. In this case, energy and foreign policy are closely linked. The reaction to the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the fierce criticism of German-Russian cooperation in the field of energy by former Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski is an excellent illustration of the relationship between energy, foreign policy and national identity.

Disagreements over the Nord Stream and Nord Stream-2, the problem of increasing energy dependence of some EU countries on Russia, as well as the risk of interruptions in energy supplies exacerbate the key issue of solidarity between EU countries in the energy sector. Emphasizing the "vital importance" of strengthening solidarity in the field of supply security, the Commission in 2016 proposed to include a new principle of solidarity in the revised regulation on the security of gas supplies.

The different points of view of national Governments participating in public consultations on the principle of solidarity reflect a wide range of views on energy independence and interdependence. The Austrian Government considers the existing provisions on solidarity sufficient, and from the Czech point of view, EU agreements on bilateral or multilateral anti-crisis measures can be useful, but should be concluded on a voluntary basis. Lithuania fully supported the new measures, while Hungary explicitly stated that it does not support new mandatory anti-crisis measures. The Italian Government considers agreements on anti-crisis measures useful, provided that countries have a free choice and that they do not entail harmful consequences for non-signatory countries. From Poland's point of view, crisis measures should be spelled out in regional contingency plans and in the relevant EU plans, including control methods, with the support of the European Commission ^[27].

The diversity of positions on the principle of solidarity, as well as discussions on the mechanism of preliminary information demonstrate the difference in understanding of the energy problem not only between the Commission and the EU countries, but also between the countries themselves. This polyphony inevitably affects the attempts of the European Commission to determine the relationship between energy and foreign policy at the EU level. Although in the mentioned action plan, the goals of energy policy are embedded in the EU's foreign policy, the perception of energy issues is largely determined at the national level, taking into account foreign policy considerations. Moreover, the European Commission strives for the EU to play the leading role of the EU in the management of global energy, promotes the ideas of liberalization and sustainability of energy on the basis of regional and/or international interdependence, and at the national level, energy problems are still perceived from the standpoint of energy independence.

Conclusion

Summing up our research, it should be emphasized that the energy sectors of the EU and the USA differ significantly from each other. At the same time, we were able to identify a common pattern in the perception of energy issues in the foreign policy of the EU and the United States, associated with the opposition of independence and interdependence. However, the context in which this opposition arose in the two regions? different.

So, in the USA, ideas about energy independence and interdependence are embedded in the isolation/intervention dilemma, and in the EU they largely reflect the tug of war between national sovereignty and supranational power, because here energy is a sphere of general competence. In the USA, this opposition gives two different orientations in disputes about the country's role in world energy affairs, while in the EU it raises essential questions about the EU's foreign energy policy, especially when it comes to energy security.

This picture is reflected in the perception of the connection between energy and foreign policy. Traditionally, it is believed that the United States tends to see energy in relation to defense and security, to perceive the energy problem through the prism of foreign policy goals. Refuting this stereotype, it would be fair to say that, at least in the period from 2008 to 2016, the relationship between energy and foreign policy in the United States was viewed from the standpoint of interdependence, and in global energy management, the United States played the role of a supplier of global public goods. With this approach, the United States has built into its foreign policy the goals of international energy policy: ensuring the free flow of energy resources, liberalizing the global energy market and combating global climate change.

Thus, comparing the approaches of the USA and the EU, one can see a tendency towards their convergence. Despite the significant difference in the energy landscape of the EU and the United States, Brussels and Washington agreed that they included a common vision of the global energy architecture in their foreign policy. The use of energy as a political tool, at least in rhetoric, was condemned by both sides.

Nevertheless, at the national level, energy issues in the EU are often determined by the foreign policy considerations of a particular country. It is also worth remembering that LNG exports from the United States to Europe are considered to a certain extent as a means of increasing competition for Russian natural gas, as a way to provide US allies with an alternative and help them reduce dependence on Russia, sometimes even as an energy weapon, but in any case as a very effective foreign policy tool.