Turkey and Central Asia during the coronavirus pandemic

Avatkov Vladimir Alekseevich Doctor of Politics Head of the Department of the Near and Post-Soviet East INION RAS 117997, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Profsoyuznaya, 23 avatkov.v@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Prilepsky Pavel Aleksandrovich ORCID: 0000-0003-2220-9094 Advisor to the Department for Monitoring the State of Interethnic and Interfaith Relations, Prevention of Extremism and Interaction with Religious Associations, Federal Agency for Nationalities. 123112, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Presnenskaya Naberezhnaya, 10s2 pavelprilepsky@gmail.com

Introduction

30 years after the collapse of the USSR, the active formation of the Central Asian subsystem of international relations and state-building continues. At the moment, these processes are characterized by instability, lack of a common direction of development, a high role of external actors who see the development of the subsystem in contradictory concepts ^[1].

At the beginning of 2020, the so-called "black swan" appeared - the coronavirus pandemic, which seriously affected the development of the Central Asian subsystem, actualizing some and postponing other problems of the region's development. External actors, including the Republic of Turkey, were also forced to adapt to the new rules of the game.

After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey got a unique chance to spread its influence in Central Asia ^[2]. The formation of new independent states proceeded with great economic, political, social and other problems. Turkey sought to orient the newly formed Central Asian countries towards itself ^[20], however, it did not represent a strong political and economic center capable of closing the Central Asian subsystem on itself. Proceeding from this, gradually trying to transform into an independent center of power, she began to develop other instruments of her influence. The Turks used the ideological vacuum formed in the post-Soviet space to create loyal elites and groups of citizens of Central Asian states through the promotion of their values, culture and history. A number of organizations were created, such as TURKSOY, TIKA, the Turkic Council, cultural centers named after Y. Emre, exchange programs "Mevlana", etc. were promoted ^[3], along the political line – the Cooperation Council of Turkic states, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking Countries ^[19].

Since 2002, after the arrival of the "Justice and Development Party" (AKP), gradually Turkey's foreign policy towards Central Asia began to operate more and more with a common Turkic identity. A peculiar outcome of this process was the events of 2021, when Turkey began to promote the idea of victory in the so-called second Karabakh conflict as a common victory of the "Turkic world" and on this symbolic capital to give a new impetus to the Turkic integration. It is also necessary to cancel the increasing role of Islam as a foreign policy tool of Turkey and the promotion of its Turkish version in the countries of Central Asia ^{[18, p. 47]}.

With the development of mobile technologies and the Internet, which allows reaching almost every citizen of Central Asian countries, with the help of mass media and social networks, Turks are actively promoting their vision in the region. They are also trying to discredit the presence and projects of other countries in Central Asia. Turkish popular culture, especially films and TV series on historical themes, have become another tool for shaping Ankara's leading role in the region.

In the new historical conditions of independence, the Central Asian countries are pursuing a multi-vector policy ^[4], which implies balancing between regional and world powers. They also continue to defend their independence and strive to be a subject rather than an object of international relations. Because of this, Turkey's advance meets with the resistance of local elites and reaches a certain limit within which individual waves of changes in Turkey's influence are noted. Ankara can overcome this limit only through the development of conflict potential and the chaoticization of Central Asia to discredit the economic and political influence of other external players and the idea of a secular state, as well as the promotion of the archaization of political societies.

In this regard, the pandemic period, on the one hand, was an exception. The Turkish authorities were unable to cope with the coronavirus and present a successful model for overcoming the pandemic. The economic problems of Turkey itself have also affected, which also prevents it from being a key driver of economic growth and promoting its interests in Central Asia. On the other hand, despite the identified problems, Turkey demonstrates a steady growth of its influence in the world ^[21], and the interpretation of the victory in the Karabakh conflict has become a significant tool in spreading Turkish influence.

Turkey–Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is one of the two leaders of the Central Asian subsystem, which explains Turkey's special interest. For Kazakhstan, based on the Concept of Kazakhstan's Foreign policy for 2020-2030, Turkey is not a diplomatic priority, yielding to a number of countries and international organizations. However, given the internal political transformation of Kazakhstan ^{[12, p. 59]}, the growth of everyday Kazakh and pro-Turkic nationalism, the role of Turkey will grow in the domestic and foreign policy of Kazakhstan. It is also worth pointing out that Kazakhstan was the first country from the post-Soviet space to conclude an agreement with Turkey on strategic partnership ^{[18, p. 48]}.

During the pandemic, Turkey, both at the official and civil society level, provided humanitarian assistance to Kazakhstan. In the economic sphere, the turnover of goods exceeded 3 billion US dollars, showing an increase compared to 2020, when it amounted to 2.977 billion US dollars. It should be noted that in 2019 this figure was 3,119 billion US dollars ^[5].  In March 2021, the parties expressed their readiness to increase the trade turnover to 10 billion US dollars. 

In promoting its interests in Kazakhstan, Turkey actively uses its role in Azerbaijan's victory in the Karabakh conflict. In particular, at the March 31 summit of the Turkic Council, it was this victory that became the foundation of the summit. It was also used to try to include Kazakhstan in the "Army of Turan", a kind of military and defensive alliance under the leadership of Turkey. In social networks, this summit and the idea of the "Turan Army" received strong pan-Turkist support from the Turkish and Azerbaijani media. A special role was played by news and materials distributed by ordinary users (some of whom were pro-Turkish bots), where the context of the victory of the "Turkic world" over the Armenians stood out. Touching upon the development of military ties between the two countries in March 2021, the parliaments of the two countries ratified the agreement on military-technical cooperation concluded in 2018.

It is also worth noting that Turkey, through its media and social networks, supports anti-Chinese sentiments in Kazakhstan ^[6] on the alleged infringement of Uighurs and Kazakhs on the territory of the XUAR. Russian-language anti-Chinese content about the "great Turan" is being promoted on social networks, in which the XUAR plays a big role ^[7]. Thus, problems are being created for Chinese policy in Central Asia, which Turkey is trying to cover with its positive agenda and get dividends from this.

Such a sharp increase in pro-Turkish (pro-Turkic) sentiments causes concern in the circles of Kazakh politicians ^[8]. At the same time, it is a signal that Turkey has reached the limit in relations with Kazakhstan. The growth of bilateral relations became possible due to the active promotion of the victory factor in the Karabakh conflict, internal political transformation (transition to the Latin alphabet, the growth of everyday nationalism), manifestations of anti-Russian sentiments in Kazakh society. However, the two countries currently do not have strong economic prospects under the current conditions. Kazakhstan's multi-vector policy also involves balancing the interests of the centers of power. Based on this, Turkey will continue to look for forms of interaction with Kazakhstan, through the proposals of new forms of ideological cooperation.

Turkey–Uzbekistan

After the departure of I. Karimov from the post of president of Uzbekistan, the country's foreign and domestic policy changed in favor of openness to the outside world. This also affected Turkish-Uzbek relations. Uzbekistan, as a regional leader and a state with the highest demographic potential in the region, is of important interest to Turkey. Given the multi-vector nature and pragmatism in foreign policy under Sh. Mirzeyev, we can expect further growth of relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan ^{[12, p. 82]}.

The concept of foreign policy activity of the Republic of Uzbekistan from 2012 has not been published in the public domain, however, it is possible to judge Uzbekistan's priorities from sources close to making foreign policy decisions and facts of Uzbekistan's cooperation with other countries. So, at the end of 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan A. Kamilov, telling ^[9] about the results of work in 2019, did not mention either Turkey or the Turkic Council. A. Kadyrov, head of the department of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, indicated Turkey as the third in the list of Uzbekistan's foreign policy priorities (after Russia and the USA), the Turkic Council was also in third place, being below the UN and the CIS, but above the SCO ^[10].

Just before the outbreak of the pandemic in Central Asia on February 19, 2020, the first meeting of the Turkish-Uzbek Strategic Cooperation Council of the highest level, which is a new format of cooperation between the two countries at the highest level, was held in Ankara. The second meeting was held on March 9, 2021, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. In a similar format, issues in the fields of politics, security, economy, culture, humanitarian cooperation and others will be condemned.

At the initial stage of the pandemic, Turkey provided humanitarian assistance to Uzbekistan. According to official data, Uzbekistan passed the pandemic more easily, and already in 2021 the Uzbek authorities sent humanitarian cargo to Turkey.

Currently, investment projects worth over $500 million are being implemented jointly with Turkey. Three years ago, this figure was not even 20 million dollars. Last year alone, the number of joint ventures increased by almost 500 and now their number is 1,600.

The volume of trade turnover between Turkey and Uzbekistan in 2020 amounted to 2.1 billion US dollars. Uzbekistan's exports to Turkey amounted to US$ 1 billion, while imports from Turkey exceeded US$ 1.1 billion. In 2019, the volume of trade amounted to 2.5 billion US dollars. The parties set a task to achieve the goal of 5 billion US dollars. Since 2016, Turkey has been increasing investments and the number of projects being implemented in Uzbekistan. In the period 2018-2020, 750 Turkish enterprises were created, the amount of investments from Turkey reached 500 million US dollars. Following the meeting between the Vice-President of the Republic of Turkey F. Oktay and Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Investments and Foreign Trade of the Republic of Uzbekistan S. Umurzakov signed 25 agreements worth 679 million US dollars on June 28, 2021.

Uzbekistan participated in the summit of the Turkic Council held on March 31, 2021. Within the framework of this organization, the task has been set to integrate as closely as possible into the cotton and textile industry in general, which is especially true for Uzbekistan, since cotton remains the third largest export item.

Cooperation is also developing in humanitarian terms. In 2020, Turkey opened a branch of the University of Economics and Technology in Tashkent ^[11], and also declare their readiness to open branches of Turkish institutes in Uzbekistan. All this indicates a softer attitude of Sh. Mirziyoyev to the issue of Turkish educational institutions in Uzbekistan. The Consulate General of Turkey has also opened in Samarkand.

On the other hand, in February 2021, after a meeting with President Sh. Mirziyoyev, the authorities decided to remove foreign TV series from showing in Uzbekistan and replace them with national ones. Some Uzbek religious figures also oppose these series. It is interesting to note that on March 3, 2020, by order of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the filming of the series "Jaloliddin Manguberdi" with a Turkish cast started in Turkey.

Continuing on the formation of his own, sovereign line of national identity, on May 3, 2020, Sh. Mirziyoyev signed a decree "On additional measures to improve the effectiveness of spiritual and educational work", which is aimed at "increasing the effectiveness of spiritual and educational work, the effectiveness of combating internal and external threats, risks in the field of spirituality, strengthening ideological immunity in society". In theory, this document can be used to limit the growth of Turkish influence.

For Turkey, at this stage, the formation of the national identity of Uzbekistan is beneficial, as this reduces the influence of Russia and forces official Tashkent to use a strong Turkic element in the construction of a national myth. In a crisis period, it is the appeal to the Turkic past that can become the driver of the growth of Turkey's influence in this country.

Turkey– Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is the only country in Central Asia where the coronavirus pandemic and its consequences led to a coup d'etat, a change of the country's president and a balance between regional groups. The new leader, S. Zhaparov, has inherited a rather difficult political legacy, the problems of which will have to be solved, including through the involvement of external partners.

The "Foreign Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic" lacks a hierarchy of priorities for cooperation between countries. After the change of power in the autumn of 2020, official Bishkek intensified its foreign policy, one of the directions of which was the Republic of Turkey. The visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic R. Kazakbayev in November 2020, and the return trip of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic M. Cavusoglu, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, allowed to "reset" relations in many areas ^[12]. On June 9, 2021, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic paid a visit to Turkey, during which S. Zhaparov stated the need to develop trade and economic cooperation, stimulate Turkish investments in Kyrgyzstan and bring trade turnover to 1 billion US dollars. Following the visit, the parties agreed on a number of projects, including plans to build a Kyrgyz-Turkish industrial zone in the Chui region and turn Manas Airport into a transport hub. Agreements have been reached on holding days of culture and art between the two countries in 2022. It is also planned to hold film and theater festivals, various exhibitions and training of cultural workers. In addition, cultural centers will be opened in Kyrgyzstan. Emre.

During the pandemic, Kyrgyzstan experienced serious problems with the health care system and the government of the country set the task of the Foreign Ministry to actively attract assistance from abroad ^[13]. Turkey has also provided repeated assistance to Kyrgyzstan with humanitarian supplies ^[14], but its volume has not always corresponded to the expected requests of the Kyrgyz side.

In the economy in 2020, the parties brought the trade turnover to 212 million US dollars, Turkey exported by 144 million US dollars, Kyrgyzstan by 68 million US dollars. In 2019, the trade turnover amounted to 312.7 million US dollars. It should be noted that by the end of 2019, the total trade turnover of Kyrgyzstan with other countries fell by 19 percent (with Turkey it decreased by 32 percent).

As with other Turkic countries, Turkey promotes in Kyrgyzstan the symbolic capital of Azerbaijan's victory in the Karabakh conflict (and its role in it). Thus, in July 2021, the exhibition "Victory in Karabakh" was opened at the Turkish-Kyrgyz University "Manas", organized by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. The event was attended by the Turkish Ambassador, who delivered a congratulatory speech to the entire Turkic world.

In the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Turkey was ready to assist in the settlement. Rumors were actively spread ^[15] that Turkey was also ready to provide assistance, thus demonstrating Turkic unity. Ankara is also ready to help with the restoration of infrastructure in the areas of Kyrgyzstan affected by the fighting.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Kyrgyzstan has signed an agreement with the Turkish foundation "Maarif" to open private educational institutions in the country in November 2020. In 2021, it is planned to open the first school in Kyrgyzstan under the auspices of this foundation. It positions itself as independent, but only this foundation has the right to open educational institutions abroad on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. According to unofficial data, "Maarif" has received the management of educational institutions that previously belonged to the Gulen foundation "FETO".

In this context, it is worth noting that earlier Kyrgyzstan was the only state that did not transfer Gulen educational institutions to the Maarif Foundation after 2016, and in 2017 they were re–registered under the new name "Zapat" (formerly "Sebat"), where the Ministry of Education of the Kyrgyz Republic became one of the founders. The head of "Zapat" was born in Turkey, but in 2012 received Kyrgyz citizenship, a follower of F. Gulen O. Inanda. On May 31, 2021, he disappeared in Bishkek. Social networks claim that he was abducted and is in the Turkish embassy, but the Turkish side denied this. A number of protests were held in Kyrgyzstan demanding the release of Fr . Inanda, including such actions took place near the Turkish embassy. During S. Zhaparov 's visit to Turkey , he asked R. To Erdogan about the finding of O. Inanda, to which the Turkish president replied in the negative. On July 5, R. Erdogan announced that Fr. Inanda was taken to Turkey. Turkish Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic A. Dogan stressed that Fr. Inanda is recognized exclusively as a citizen of the Republic of Turkey.

In the context of the situation, it should be noted that in 2018 in Mongolia, the Turks tried to take V. Aksai out of the country, who led the network of pro-Gulen schools "Sebat", but the Mongolian authorities took measures and did not allow this to be done.

The situation that has occurred leaves questions about the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state. If the Zapat network of institutions falls under the influence of Turkey in one form or another, this will indicate a further erosion of the sovereignty of the EAEU member Kyrgyzstan.  

Kyrgyzstan's desire for a more active dialogue is connected with the negative situation in the Kyrgyz economy and S. Zhaparov's big election promises. Turkey will use this chance and try to increase its influence through culture, development of business contacts and education. The open provocation against a citizen of Kyrgyzstan O. Inanda indicates the growing influence of Turkey in Kyrgyzstan, including among the Kyrgyz political elite. Turkey will try to use the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to further promote its influence.

Turkey – Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan's neutral status allows for an active multi-vector policy, avoiding large commitments and following in the wake of any center of influence. The republic's interaction with various international structures in a special status operating in the region and beyond is characterized by specifics. Turkey's task at this stage is to include Turkmenistan as much as possible in the work of its network-centric structures.

 The pandemic period, despite the fact that the authorities did not recognize the spread of the coronavirus, was marked by a deterioration in the domestic political situation, there is a deterioration in socio-economic indicators in the country. For this reason, receiving humanitarian aid, including from Turkey, has become an important element of the state's foreign policy.

In bilateral cooperation during this period, Turkey actively supports the joint gas projects of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea at the Dostluk (Friendship) field, the implementation of which can resolve the contradictions between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and contribute to the growth of Turkey's influence. Despite the neutral status of the country, President A. Berdimuhamedov took part in the online meeting of the Turkic Council on March 31, 2021

In 2020, the economy is experiencing an increase in trade turnover to almost 2 billion US dollars. It should be noted that by the end of 2019, the trade turnover between Turkmenistan and Turkey amounted to 944.5 million US dollars, which indicates, among other things, the political decision of the Turkmen authorities to promote bilateral cooperation.  

At the same time, Turkey supports the forces opposing the current President G. Berdimuhamedov. Turkey is actively promoting criticism for the alleged pressure of the Turkmen authorities on Islam. For example, such articles are published by the Turkish-based portal "HolosIslama" ^[16]. In addition, the Turkish authorities are actively working among Turkmens living in Turkey (including about one million Turkmen migrants), among whom anti-Berdimuhamedov sentiments are widespread. This forces the Turkmen authorities to take measures. Citizens arriving from Turkey are being interrogated. In 2021, a number of kindergartens were closed, in which, as it turned out, Turkish was the main language in education and everyday life.

Despite the fact that Turkmenistan is given a significant status in the pan-Turkist project, the closeness of the Turkmen political regime does not allow Turkey to effectively implement its intentions. However, even with such a characterization of the regime, Turkey manages to implement the tools of its influence. The growth of instability in domestic politics or the liberalization of Turkmenistan's political regime will be used by Ankara to involve Ashgabat in its orbit of influence.

Turkey– Tajikistan

Despite the fact that Tajikistan is not a Turkic country (although Tajikistan is home to more than 1 million Turkic-speaking citizens, mostly Uzbeks, that is, more than 10 percent of the total population), Ankara is also making efforts to develop relations with Dushanbe. The priority of Tajikistan's foreign policy is security and economic development, and Turkey occupies a low position in the hierarchy of interests.  

During the pandemic, Turkey provided assistance to Tajikistan, where the situation with the coronavirus was quite difficult.

In economic terms, in 2020, the trade turnover of the countries reached 300 million US dollars with the overall growth of Tajikistan's foreign trade with other countries. In 2018, the trade turnover between the states amounted to 400 million US dollars. It should be noted that Turkey ranks second in the structure of Tajikistan's exports with 14.4 percent of total exports. In April 2021, Turkish Foreign Minister M. Cavusoglu, after a visit to Dushanbe, noted the contribution of Turkish businessmen to the strengthening and development of relations with Tajikistan.

In the humanitarian sphere, cooperation between the countries is much more modest compared to other Central Asian States. Thus, only 40 to 60 quotas are allocated annually to students from Tajikistan to study at higher educational institutions in Turkey. Turkish TV series were banned from showing back in 2012, which does not negate their popularity. Practically all Turkish educational institutions have been closed since 2015, the rest are prohibited from teaching Turkish. It is worth noting that in 2019 several hundred names were banned in Tajikistan, one of the reasons for this was the discord and inconsistency with the culture of Tajikistan, and Turkish TV series were called among the sources of such names. From the positive experience of cooperation between the two states, it is worth noting the opening at the end of February 2021 of a school with special conditions for children with diabetes by the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TICA).

Despite the absence of a Turkic component in bilateral relations, Turkey is also trying to use the symbolic capital of victory in the Karabakh conflict, but in the case of Tajikistan – as Turkey's ability to provide effective weapons for local conflicts. So, the head of the Turkish Defense Ministry H. Akar said that the Turkish side is ready to assist in strengthening the defense capability of Dushanbe and the fight against terrorism.

Conclusion

During the pandemic, Turkey was able to strengthen its influence in the region. The first factor in this process was the internal crisis of the Central Asian countries due to the coronavirus pandemic, the accumulation of psychological fatigue of the citizens of these countries. The second is the victory of Azerbaijan in the conflict in Nagorno–Karabakh, which is promoted in the region as a common victory of the Turkic world. Its symbolic resource will continue to be exploited by Turkey, but the scale of this victory does not allow it to be used for a long time. The main risk is that Turkey will begin to form "enemies of the Turkic world" and through a negative identity will begin to promote its interests in Central Asia.

On the other hand, Turkey's economy has been shrinking in the last few years, which does not make Turkey an attractive economic partner of the Central Asian countries. During the pandemic, Ankara was unable to demonstrate an effective economic and social model for overcoming the crisis, and was unable to create its own vaccine. The humanitarian assistance that has been provided in the region is obviously insufficient. All this does not allow Turkey to fully claim leadership status in Central Asia.

Therefore, Turkey promotes its influence in other ways. First of all, she is interested in the development of the Turkic identity, and secondly, in creating a conflict environment to promote the pan-Turkic idea. Ankara encourages the process of including the Turkic factor in the formation of local national ideas. For the Central Asian countries, the Turkic idea is a fairly solid foundation, but it threatens to partially lose sovereignty and fall under Turkish influence. The deterioration of the socio-economic situation due to the global recession of recent years only encourages the borrowing of Turkic elements. The Central Asian countries have too "short" history and too few national successes to distance themselves from pan-Turkism in favor of a "sovereign" history and identity.

The growth of borrowing by Turkic elements leads to "state regulation" of Turkish influence. Once again, in 2021, kindergartens with Turkish language teaching were closed in Turkmenistan. The process of allowing and banning Turkish schools, TV series, Turkish language courses and the like is cyclical and depends on the conjuncture of the development of the region. If the apparatus of power weakens, then Turkish influence is spreading more actively, as it happened in Kyrgyzstan in the period after the change of the country's president.

That is why Turkey is interested in instability in Central Asian countries and the weakening of state power. For this reason, anti-Chinese propaganda is supported in Central Asia, especially against the allegedly oppressed population of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Ideas about the negative role of Russia in the history of Central Asian countries are actively spreading in the media, social networks, education and science. The withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan and, as a result, the chaotic internal processes inside the country, gives Turkey the opportunity to use this situation in the interests of promoting its influence in Central Asia.