Submarine forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

Osipov Yurii Anatol'evich Postgraduate student, Department of Russian History, A.S. Pushkin Leningrad State University 196605, Russia, Saint Petersburg, Saint Petersburg, Peterburgskoe highway, 10 yuriiosipov@gmail.com

For a long time, the opinion prevailed in Russian historical science that of all the branches of the armed forces and formations of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, only the Navy, in particular the Red Banner Baltic, met the enemy in full combat readiness. Modern research shows a slightly different picture, in which some ships and formations were indeed alerted and were not taken by surprise, but some of the formations, especially those based on the most remote, Western naval bases, were not notified of the impending threat in a timely manner. In this case, the most important question is what measures were taken by the Soviet naval command to ensure high combat readiness in the face of frequent provocations and the obvious aggressive policy of Germany in the border zones. At the same time, it is important to take into account how effectively these measures were taken and implemented in practice by the personnel. A special place in this issue is occupied by the submarine forces of the KBF, as the most professional units, whose activities are associated with the greatest risk in combat conditions.

In modern conditions, the development of the issue of combat training of Baltic submariners on the eve of the Great Patriotic War is becoming increasingly important. The modern naval doctrine of Russia is largely based on the use of underwater forces to strike at surface formations and coastal infrastructure of a likely enemy. In this situation, historical experience, closely related to its practical application in combat conditions, can make an invaluable contribution to modern trends and methodologies for ensuring the combat readiness of submarine forces.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was the largest naval unit of the armed forces of the USSR, having 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 19 leaders of destroyers, 66 submarines, 48 torpedo boats, a gunboat, 7 patrol ships, 6 minelayers, 33 minesweepers and a significant number of other ships, boats and auxiliary vessels.

The Soviet command assumed active actions of the parties in the Baltic Theater in the event of the outbreak of war, on the basis of which the following tasks were assigned to the KBF:

-                   Provision of anti-amphibious defense of the coast of the Latvian and Estonian SSR (including the islands of Dago and Ezel);

-                   Suppression of attempts to break through the enemy into the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga;

-                   Defeat and withdrawal from combat operations of the Finnish Navy, in case of its action against the Soviet Union;

-                   Support of ground forces on the coast and islands controlled by units of the Red Army and Navy;

-                   Ensuring the transportation of troops in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga;

-                   Interruption of the enemy's sea communications in the Baltic Sea. ^{[1, pp. 41-42]}

 To solve the tasks set , the fleet had large submarine forces consisting of: 1st and 2nd Submarine Brigades (commanders - Captain 1st rank Egypko N.P. and Captain 2nd rank Orel A.E.), Submarine Training Brigade (commander – Rear Admiral Zaostrovtsev A.T.), which includes a separate division of newly built and repaired ships.

The deployment of the submarine forces looked as follows:

The 1st KBF UAV consisted of four divisions:

1. 1st division of the 1st KBF UAV, commander – captain of the 3rd rank Tripolsky A.V. The composition of the division: (boats IX and IX-bis series) "S-1", "S-3", "S-4", "S-5", "S-6", "S-7", "S-8", "S-9", Smolny PLB. The home port is Ust-Dvinsk.

2. 2nd division of the 1st KBF UAV, commander Captain of the 3rd rank Chervinsky A.V. The composition of the division: (IX-bis series) "S-10", "S-101", "S-102", Irtysh PLB. The Home Port Is Ust-Dvinsk.

3. The 3rd division of the KBF UAV, commander – captain of the 3rd rank Averochkin A.K. The composition of the division: (minzags and foreign-made submarines received from Estonia and Latvia) "L-3", "Kalev", "Lembit", "Ronis", "Speedola". The home port is Libava.

4. 4th division of the 1st KBF UAV, commander – Lieutenant Commander Matveev S.I. Composition of the division: (trays of type "M" VI-bis series) "M-71", "M-77", "M-78", "M-79", "M-80", "M-81", "M-83". The home port is Libava. ^{[2, pp. 17-18]}

The 2nd UAV had a three-division composition:

1. 6th DPL KBF, commander – captain of the 2nd rank Fedotov M.V. The composition of the division: (boats "Shch"-series) "Shch-309", "Shch-310", "Shch-311", PLB "Polar Star". The home port is Tallinn.

2. 7th DPL, commander – captain of the 3rd rank Egorov V.A. The composition of the division: "Shch-317", "Shch-318", "Shch-319", "Shch-320", "Shch-322", "Shch-323", "Shch-324", PLB "Amur", PLB "Oka". The home port is Tallinn.

3. 8th DPL, commander – captain of the 3rd rank Yunakov E.G. Division composition: (XII-M-series) "M-90", "M-94", "M-95", "M-96", "M-97", "M-98", "M-99", "M-102", "M-103". The home port is Hanko. ^{[3, p. 18]}

The UBPL also consisted of three divisions:

1. 9th DPL, commander – captain of the 3rd rank Mokhov N.K. The composition of the division: "M-72", "M-73", "M-74", "M-75", "M-76".

2. The 13th and 14th DPL, composition: "L-1", "L-2", "L-20", "L-21", "L-22".

Basing of the 9th, 13th and 14th DPL – Kronstadt and Leningrad. ^{[4, p. 18]}

Also, a separate training division at the scuba diving training unit included: "P-1", "P-2", "P-3", "Shch-301", "Shch-302", "Shch-305", "Shch-306", "Shch-307", "Shch-308", "B-2", "L-55". In addition, the training brigade and a separate training division included the repaired and newly built submarines "Shch-303", "Shch-405", "Shch-406", "Shch-407", "Shch-408", "Shch-411", "Shch-412", "Shch-413", "Shch-414", "R-1", "M-200", "M-201", "M-202", "M-203", "M-204", "M-205", "M-206", "M-400", "M-401", "K-3", "K-22", "K-51", "K-52", "K-53", "K-54", "K-55", "K-56", "D-2", "S-11", "S-12", "S-13", "S-19", "S-20", "S-21". ^{[5, pp. 18-19]}

In total, by the beginning of the war, the brigades included 4 cruising, 5 large torpedo, 29 medium torpedo, 23 small torpedo submarines, as well as 5 minelayers. ^{[6, p. 41-42]} In total, the fleet command had 66 combat–ready submarines (According to A.V. Platonov - 65 submarines) ^{[7, p. 13]}, most of which, 42 pcs., were based on the western naval bases closest to the enemy – Hanko, Tallinn, Ust-Dvinsk, Libava.

It is also important to understand the fact that most of the submarines of the fleet, unlike surface ships, were built in the 1930s and met the requirements of the time. The most modern boats were of the types "M" XII-bis series, "K" XIV series, "C" IX-bis series. PL types "K", "L", "M", "S", "Sch", as well as PL of foreign production "Kalev" and "Lembit" were built and put into operation in the period 1931-1937. The oldest boats on the KBF were the B-2 submarine (as of 06/22/1941 it was officially an experimental submarine), as well as foreign-made Ronis and Speedola submarines built in 1926 ^{[8, pp. 9-79]}

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the special operational and tactical specifics that had developed in the theater by the beginning of the war.

Firstly, the fleet was actively developing new naval bases obtained as a result of the war with Finland and the entry of the Baltic Republics into the USSR. The result was the acquisition of bases in Libava, Ust-Dvinsk, on the Hanko Peninsula and the transfer of the main fleet base to Tallinn. Despite the fact that these bases had a developed infrastructure inherited from the Russian Empire, the new bases required a significant upgrade of their material and technical condition: it was necessary to equip harbors, piers, berths, coastal artillery points, warehouses, fuel storage facilities, barracks, etc., taking into account modern requirements, it was also necessary to build new logistics lines, which required interaction with a considerable number of government agencies.

Secondly, the expansion of the zone of direct control required a revision of strategic plans and the reorganization of the interaction of the fleet with the Red Army. The new basing areas required the creation of sea defensive areas, minefields, etc. At the same time, the organization of the defense of bases from land was entrusted to the ground forces, which led to the actual absence of defensive structures and the absence of a land defense front already in the conditions of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War.

Thirdly, the fleet was undergoing a significant personnel upgrade. In the second half of the 1930s, part of the command staff was subjected to repression: according to P.V. Petrov, in the period from January 1, 1937 to December 31, 1939, 444 commanders and political workers were convicted ^{[9, p. 336]} (according to F.K. Saberov, this figure is slightly higher – over 600 people, and also, over 300 persons of the command and commanding staff, dismissed due to "political distrust" ^{[10, p. 363]}. At the same time, a significant part of the convicted commanders and political workers were accused of political crimes, namely, conducting anti-Soviet agitation, espionage, participation in counter-revolutionary terrorist organizations, etc. These events led to a significant renewal of commanding personnel: 62% of the commanders of formations, 77% of the chiefs of staff of formations, 31% of staff specialists, 32% of the commanders of surface and 55% of the commanders of submarines were replaced. At the same time, in 1940, repressions were sharply reduced: for the fourth quarter of 1940. The Military Tribunal of the KBF convicted 439 Red Navy men and commanders, only 9 of them for counter-revolutionary agitation (1.8%). In the first quarter of 1941, the number of convicts practically does not change: 449 people in the fleet, while the vast majority of sentences were handed down in connection with gross violations of military discipline – unauthorized absences, drunkenness, etc. ^{[11, p. 339]} It is important to understand that the repression, affecting mainly the command staff, dramatically affected the quality of combat training of personnel and a decrease in military discipline on ships and in parts of the fleet, which resulted in a slight decrease in the level of combat capability.

Thus, before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet faced significant difficulties that provoked phenomena that negatively affected the combat training and the moral and psychological state of personnel, including the submarine forces of the fleet.

Speaking of such phenomena, first of all, it is necessary to note the deterioration of the sanitary condition in the Crews of submarines, primarily based on the bases of Hanko, Libava, Ust-Dvinsk.

In the annual report on the state of antiepidemiological work in 1940, the 1st UAV KBF identified the main problems as interruptions with fresh food and the transition to canned and dry products for a long time. An example of this is the stay of the Smolny PLB on Hanko, during which the personnel did not receive fresh food for three months, which led to an insignificant number of cases of beriberi. ^{[12, L. 16]}

Analysis of the sanitary condition of the food unit of the 1st UAV demonstrated its satisfactory condition, however, a number of shortcomings were identified. Among them there were violations of the rules of cooking, insufficient taste qualities of cooked dishes, lack of a glacier, insufficient galley capacity, lack of overalls for the galley staff. These problems, however, did not play a decisive role in providing the personnel with food according to the established norms. The exception was the issue of providing medical nutrition, which, as of December 1940, 20 people needed: in the conditions of relocation and development of new bases, it was not organized. ^{[13, L. 9]}

A difficult situation has developed with the water quality in the Ust-Dvinsk base. The acting flag doctor of the 1st UAV KBF Pegeev, in a report dated June 14, 1941, reports on the unsuitability of seawater in the basing area for drinking, cooking, washing dishes and washing, as well as bathing. This situation required the transition to the use of water exclusively from the fresh water tanks of the base, however, the analysis of fresh water from the RP-1 water-filling tug that provided the brigade revealed the same problems: the water was unsuitable for use by personnel both for personal use and for cooking and hygiene procedures.^{[14, L. 37]}

Another problem was called the spread of rodents and insects on the PLB. So, on the Smolny PLB, after staying on Hanko, rats were bred. The crew of the ship at the same time could not provide proper deratization. Bugs and cockroaches were found on the Smolny PLB, as well as on the SS Commune, which, however, were actively combated through the use of fire, steam, chemicals, etc. ^{[15, l. 16]}

The organization of garbage collection was also a big problem, which was also noted in the report: "Garbage pits are cleaned irregularly. Garbage accumulates in large quantities. On the wall near the Smolny PLB in the spring of 1940, so much garbage accumulated that the box was not visible. The brigade does not have its own transport, the commandant of the Libava Naval Air Station does not have enough transport, great efforts are required to get transport. By the end of 1940, garbage was being taken out regularly. Garbage pits and boxes are sprinkled with bleach. The sewage system is working fine." ^{[16, l. 16]}

The organization of personal hygiene of the Red Navy and commanders also required great efforts. So, for example, the Libava Navy had a small bathhouse for 15 people, with the number of personnel of only the 1st KBF UAV on February 1, 1941 - 1166 people, ^{[17, L. 8]} and on March 25 – already 1220 people ^{[18, L. 31]} At the same time there was a bathhouse for two showers and four gangs on the Smolny PLB, SS Commune also had its own complex. Together, these capacities, with strict observance of throughput, could provide washing of personnel 1 time a week. On the other hand, a serious problem in ensuring personal hygiene was the organization of a laundry complex. So, the brigade did not have its own laundry at all. The commissioning of a new bath and laundry complex in Libava was planned in 1941, the fleet promised to provide two washing machines, but as of January 1941, the submariners were forced to build a temporary laundry complex from existing materials on their own, and drying clothes remained impossible at all, which significantly aggravated the situation. The situation was aggravated by the fact of an acute shortage of working uniforms: "Despite the presence of a special order of the People's Commissar, there are not enough working dresses, shoes are not enough, shoe repairs are not adjusted, the personnel wear a black dress and chrome shoes." ^{[19, l. 37]}

Given the complexity of the situation in the issue of ensuring sanitary and epidemiological work, ensuring timely medical prevention was of particular importance. Despite the objective organizational shortcomings in the conditions of relocation, medical examinations and vaccination of personnel were of a regular nature, the incidence was kept as responsibly as possible. So , in accordance with the instructions of the MSO KBF in March 1940 , everything personal and beginning . the composition was vaccinated prophylactically against typhoid fever, paratrophs "A" and "B", against tetanus, against dysentery disease by "OCCASIONALLY". However, a number of areas of medical support for personnel remained at an insufficient level. So, for example, in 1940, medical examination of personnel was carried out twice, but the flag doctor of the 1st UAV KBF Krupovich notes that the results of medical examination are carried out poorly. They also focus on the low rates of transfer of those unfit for military service on submarines to shore and surface ships. ^{[20, L. 18]} The level of dental care remained unsatisfactory: some of the personnel needed dental prosthetics, while there was no special laboratory for these purposes. At the same time, there is also a shortage of material assets of the infirmaries. Thus, the coastal base of the 1st UAV provided the deployment of a 12-bed infirmary without staff, for which there was no proper amount of furniture, beds, infirmary linen, etc. ^{[21, L. 15]} At the same time, the absence of an inviolable reserve of medical equipment on the S-7, S-8 PL was revealed, "C-9", "C-10", "C-101", "C-102" and "L-3". ^{[22, l. 30]} There were even casual situations. So, for example, the malariki identified on the Brigade were "lost" during the relocation of the brigade units, as a result of which they had to be quickly searched for by ships and units. ^{[23, L. 37]} On January 1, 1941, 5 of the 12 observed Red Navy men were identified.

In total, in 1940, only on the 1st UAV, 1,749 cases of various diseases were recorded among the Red Navy and commanders, of which inpatient treatment was applied in 345 cases. The most common diseases were:

1) Diseases mainly related to body cooling (flu, pneumonia, rheumatism, bronchitis, sore throat, etc.) – 685 cases;

2) Diseases and lesions of the fangs (mycoses, scabies, boils, carbuncles, pyoderma, phlegmons, etc.) – 222 cases;

3)                 Injuries (wounds with firearms and cold weapons, mechanical damage of various origins, burns, etc.) – 237 cases;

4) Diseases of the organs of vision and hearing (conjunctivitis, inflammation, etc.) – 108 cases;

5) Diseases of the digestive system (ulcers, gastritis, colitis, appendicitis, etc.) – 82 cases;

6) Respiratory diseases (mainly bronchitis) – 75 cases. ^{[24, l. 9]}

In January 1941, 153 cases of diseases were recorded, which generally corresponds to the average monthly number according to 1940 data ^{[25, l. 19]}

Analysis of the list of the most common diseases of personnel allows for a better understanding of the production and living conditions of service by submariners in the conditions of 1940. From the wide spread of diseases associated with body cooling and respiratory diseases, it can be concluded that a large number of jobs associated with being on the street and, given the specifics of naval service, with constant contact with with water. Injuries are also part of the specifics of the naval service, requiring large amounts of physical labor during loading, unloading, working with mechanisms, etc. The difficulties described above in the organization of sanitary provision have contributed to an increase in the number of diseases in paragraphs 2 and 5.

The next area requiring special attention is the issue of military discipline in units and on ships of the KBF submarine forces.

 According to the political reports of the political departments of the PL brigades, the level of military discipline was assessed as unsatisfactory, there were numerous cases of its violation.

So, for example, in the IV quarter of 1940, only 28 offenses were committed on the Shch-309 PL, 12 offenses were committed on the Shch-310 PL, and 19 offenses were committed on the Shch–317 PL. The main offenses were tardiness from the shore (6 cases, 4 of them on the "Shch–309"), drunkenness (10 cases, 8 of them on the "Shch-317"), negligent attitude to service and poor maintenance of weapons (5 cases). ^{[26, L. 8]}

In the memo of the Political Propaganda Department of the 2nd UAV, the reasons for this situation are also called. So, for example, on the Shch-309 submarine, the indiscipline of the assistant commander of the boat, senior lieutenant Trishenko, who received two penalties only in December 1940 for not appearing on the boat while turning the mechanisms, is noted. On the same PL, the spread of fraternal relations between the junior staff and subordinates is noted.

On the Shch-310 submarine on December 27, the ascent lasted 20 minutes, despite the fact that in November 1940, 26 crew members were awarded commendations for their successes in combat and political training. On the same PL, during an official meeting of the junior command staff, the commander of the boat Morozov, addressing his subordinate Lodygin, said: "If you do not keep order on watch, I will impose a penalty on you." Ladygin, sitting down, threw a remark in response: "Don't be rude, comrade commander." Morozov did not call Ladygin to order.

On the Shch-317 submarine, the command did not take the necessary preventive measures to prevent relapses of violations of military discipline, which led to the fact that the Red Navy man Harkunov, who actively violated military discipline, received 6 penalties in 1940, which resulted in a cumulative 40 days of deprivation of the opportunity to retire ashore, 5 days of the guardhouse, a strict reprimand, as well as exclusion from the ranks of the Komsomol. At the same PL, the work of the political instructor Kalashnikov on explaining the political decisions of the party and the government was not organized at the proper level. So, when the Red Navy man Sadovnikov asked about the reasons for the liquidation of the institute of military commissars, Kalashnikov answered as follows: "The commissars were liquidated because generals and admirals were introduced." These statements of the commander of the political unit could provoke the spread of distrust towards the higher command staff and, accordingly, its decisions. It is important to note the fact that the commissars had a serious authority among the personnel, due, on the one hand, to their direct work with the personnel, as well as the glorification of the image of the commissar during the Civil War and the first years of the existence of Soviet power.

One-time inspections of military discipline were also carried out. So, the check of May 18, 1941 on the 2nd UAV revealed 6 facts of delays from the shore, 12 facts of drunkenness, 2 cases of drunken fights, 1 case of drunkenness in the office. As a result, the personnel of the most guilty ships – PLB "Irtysh" and PL "S-102" - were forbidden to be dismissed ashore until further notice, and the Red Navy and the commanders of the remaining ships and the Coastal Base were denied another dismissal. ^{[27, l. 25-26]}

The state of military discipline in the fleet formations was regularly monitored. So, for example, in the 2nd UAV KBF in January 1941, 123 committed offenses were recorded with the number of personnel in 834 people. Thus, the percentage of the total population is 14.7%. The most common offenses were drunkenness – 15 cases, violation of the rules of internal and curfew service – 18, bickering, insults and rudeness to superiors – 11. Most of the offenses committed were minor, insignificant in nature – 56 cases. ^{[28, L. 5]}

The report for February 1941 shows some improvement in the situation: 101 offenses were committed with the number of brigade personnel in 820 people, which amounted to 12.3% of the total number of Red Navy men and commanders. There is also a positive trend for specific groups: there was a decrease in cases of drunkenness – 13, violations of the rules of internal and curfew service – 17, bickering, insults and rudeness to superiors – 6. In turn, the number of offenses related to negligent attitude to the storage and saving of weapons and ammunition has sharply increased from 5 cases in January up to 15 in February 1941 ^{[29, l. 5]}

More detailed statistics on the state of military discipline are available for the 1st UAV. For the fourth quarter of 1940, it shows 269 disciplinary offenses with the number of personnel in 1114 people, which was 24% of the total number. The most common offenses were violations of the rules of internal and curfew service – 37, drunkenness – 36, bickering, insults and rudeness to superiors – 32. For each case of violation of military discipline, one or another penalty was imposed, the most common were outfits – 107, disembarkation – 56, reprimands – 48, arrests in the guardhouse – 32. Three cases of conviction by a Military Tribunal were also noted. At the same time, 796 Red Navy men and commanders were produced during the same period, which is more than 2.8 times the number of offenses. ^{[30, L. 6]}

In the second quarter of 1941, the situation with military discipline in the units and on the ships of the 1st UAV deteriorated significantly: during this period, 473 offenses were recorded with the number of personnel in 1180 people, which amounted to 40% of the total number of Red Navy and brigade commanders. It is indicative of the fact that the increase in the number of offenses of the rank and file was 77%, while the senior staff committed 96% more offenses compared to the IV quarter of 1940. The number of cases of drunkenness has increased significantly – 74, violations of the rules of the watch duty service – 70. In proportion to the increase in the number of violations of military discipline, the number of penalties applied also increased: reprimands and severe reprimands – 136, non–shore visits – 125, outfits – 102, simple and strict arrests - 81 (53 and 28, respectively). There are also 2 cases of demotion and 3 cases of reduction in military rank. At the same time, there was no significant increase in incentives for personnel – 806 cases, which, with a proportional comparison of the dynamics of penalties and incentives imposed, indicates a decrease in the level of military discipline. ^{[31, l. 33]}

The nature of violations of military discipline can also be assessed by statistics on those convicted by a Military Tribunal. In total, in 1940-1941, 7 Red Navy men were convicted by a Military Tribunal on the 1st UAV and transferred to the disciplinary battalion of the KBF for a period of 6 months to 2 years, two Red Navy men were sentenced to serve their sentences in a correctional labor camp for a period of 2 and 4 years, respectively.

It is important to note that the level of military discipline is one of the determining factors of combat readiness of personnel. In the conditions of regularly committed offenses, combat training deteriorates significantly, the reasons for which are an increase in disciplinary work to the detriment of combat training, a general decrease in vigilance and concentration on solving combat tasks, an atmosphere of lack of responsibility for the shortcomings of combat work, etc. Confirmation of this thesis is the results of the combat training check, as well as the accident rate and damage to combat mechanisms when performing assigned tasks.

On December 17, 1940, the Kingston of the ballast tank No. 3 on the starboard side of the nearby submarine "S-8" was damaged by the submarine "S-4" departing from the Smolny PL. To eliminate the damage, the S-8 submarine had to be docked for 14 days for repair by the plant. A commission was appointed to investigate the accident, which established a gross violation of the rules of control of the submarine when the commander of the "S-4", Lieutenant Commander Abrosimov, departed from the PLB, as a result of which the latter was severely reprimanded. ^{[32, L. 4]}

On December 27, 1940, a combat alert was played on the 6th DPL of the 2nd KBF UAV. The personnel took their places at combat posts within 1.5-2 minutes, but most did not have gas masks with them. When raising the "Gases" signal, it was noted that it took 2 minutes for the personnel to put on gas masks, which in a combat situation would inevitably lead to the defeat of toxic substances. ^{[33, l. 10]}

On January 21-23, 1941, the introductory task was received on the S-7 and S-5 submarines, during which a number of significant shortcomings of combat training were noted:

The boats recorded an unsatisfactory state of documentation on the warhead-I, the material condition of the main drainage pump and periscopes, a low level of training of helmsmen, poor knowledge of the ship's armament, unsatisfactory knowledge of the specialty by radio operators, etc. As a result, a repeated deadline was set for the S-5 and S-7 submarines to complete the introductory task, and the commander of the BCH-III S-7 submarines, Senior Lieutenant Freyberg, was deprived of a three-month superannuation allowance (the penalty was canceled by the Order of the commander of the 1st KBF UAV No. 07 dated 12.02.1941^{[34, l. 12]}). ^{[35, l. 7-8]}

On April 29, 1941, during the final preparation of torpedoes for firing, the absence of two capsule tubes was discovered on the S-9 submarine. The missing tubes were found only on May 28, when unloading ammunition before putting the submarine into dock. During this unloading, the firing compartment was damaged, the reason for which was an attempt by the chief petty officer of the torpedoists of the submarine "S-9" Prokopenko, who during the lunch break tried to personally prepare another torpedo for unloading. ^{[36, L. 34]}

Also, cases of violations of the rules of the mine service were observed during the inspection on the S-7, S-101 and Smolny PLB. ^{[37, l. 35]}

The report of the Political Propaganda Department of the 2nd UAV No. 061 dated June 6, 1941 "On the results of tactical exercises No. 3 and No. 5" notes the fulfillment of tasks by submarines of the "Shch" type, despite the fact that the commanding staff of these boats controls the ships for the first year. However, the fact of the discovery of two submarines in a surface position was also noted. ^{[38, L. 34]} As part of the same exercises, a gross misconduct was recorded by the watch commander of the staff observation post, Senior Lieutenant Sova, who left his post at 7:50 a.m. on June 4 without the permission of the command, and also left no one in his place. During the absence of the watch commander, a raid by enemy aircraft was announced, but the absence of an Owl led to a delay in declaring a combat alert. By order of the commander of the 1st UAV, Senior Lieutenant Sova was severely reprimanded. ^{[39, l. 30]}

On June 19, at 5 o'clock on the 1st UAV, a combat alert was announced on ships and a coastal base in order to test the warning system (according to the order of the brigade commander). According to the results of the exercise, a number of serious shortcomings were revealed: the notifiers, due to ignorance of the routes, could not find a number of commanders at the addresses, some of them did not turn out at all at the address indicated in the notification package. The transport for the commanders was not equipped with the necessary benches. During the alarm, some commanders slept in their cabins, not responding to the signals of the warning system. As a result, the Irtysh PLB was ready for battle in 6 minutes, with anti-aircraft artillery ready in 3 minutes, while the submarine was reported ready to go to sea in 20-25 minutes. ^{[40, L. 37]}

These facts characterize, firstly, a fairly intensive combat training and testing of various operations in units and on ships of the fleet's submarine forces. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Red Navy and commanders made a considerable number of mistakes when solving tasks, which led to accidents, damage to combat mechanisms, tactical miscalculations during the exercises. There are several reasons for this state of affairs: these are, first of all, a number of the factors described above – the redeployment of formations, the resulting problems with the supply and organization of household life, the development of new operational zones, a low level of military discipline.

It is also important to understand the fact that in the armed forces of the USSR there was a system in which the duties of personnel management were distributed between the commander of the unit (compound) and his deputy for the political part. Specifically in the Navy, this state of affairs was fixed by the Combat Charter of the Naval Forces of 1937 (Articles 132-136), ^{[42, pp. 98-102]}, according to which political workers had, in addition to ensuring the political and moral condition of personnel, to ensure the implementation of combat training, control over the execution of combat missions, preparation and conduct of ship repair campaigns, to provide supplies and etc . On the one hand, this was designed to ensure a clear distribution of responsibilities and optimize the work of the commander, on the other hand, it led to the fact that the deputy commander of the political unit assumed command functions, which went against the principle of unity of command and could lead to a decrease in the combat authority of the commander, who bore the greatest responsibility for life and combat work personnel. All this also did not ensure an increase in the level of discipline and combat training of the Red Navy and junior commanders.

It is impossible not to point out that the international situation and, in particular, the processes taking place directly in the Baltic Sea, such as the intensification of German traffic through Finland, violations of airspace by German aircraft, exercises of large surface formations directly in areas bordering Soviet territorial waters, the detection of unknown submarines and surface ships directly in the operational areas of the Baltic fleet – all this increased the general tension of the personnel.

The few memories of eyewitnesses of those events directly indicate an understanding of the inevitability of war between the Soviet Union and Germany. The commander of the submarine "L-3" P.D. Grishchenko in his memoirs describes the last peaceful days as follows: "... The exercise began on June 18. The tense atmosphere was already clearly felt on the air. The warlike speeches of the German fascist bosses were transmitted by all German radio stations and were replaced by no less militant marches. The arrow of the political barometer clearly predicted a storm." ^{[42, p. 18]} The commander of the M-102 warhead II submarine, Yu.S. Rusin, gives the following assessment of the atmosphere of June 1941: "We were all aware of the proximity of war. It was the difficult, alarming situation that dictated the relocation of submarines, including the "babies", as well as some organizational measures taken by the People's Commissariat of the Navy." ^{[43, p. 9]} Commander of the warhead-I PL "S-9" Pravdyuk V.V. also indicates a feeling of approaching war and characterizes the situation as follows: "And the threat of war was growing. Local residents listened to radio broadcasts from Germany — speeches by fascist leaders containing undisguised threats, boastful reports from the Western front, terry anti-Semitism… At a meeting of the brigade's command staff, for the first time, komflota openly called fascist Germany a likely enemy (however, he did not recommend repeating it out loud), called for vigilance, but to treat possible provocations with restraint." ^{[44, p. 21]}

Thus, the question of the possibility of an imminent war with Germany looks ambiguous through the eyes of the Red Navy and commanders themselves: on the one hand, there were a number of indirect facts of the impending war described above, on the other hand, the high command urged to prepare for provocations from the likely enemy. This could contribute to the increase in general tension and nervousness of the personnel, which also negatively affected the moral and psychological state and combat work.

In general, analyzing the above facts, we can draw a number of conclusions.

Firstly, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the submarine forces of the fleet had sufficient forces to ensure the fulfillment of a complex of defensive tasks, such as the defense of operational areas, setting mine positions, carrying out combat patrols, reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy. This corresponded to the military doctrine of the USSR, according to which the leading role in offensive operations fell on the ground forces, while the fleet had to perform auxiliary functions. As for the possibility of organizing combat activities directly on enemy communications, the available submarines were able to perform these tasks with the proper level of intelligence organization, interaction with the surface forces of the fleet and aviation.

Secondly, the expansion of the fleet's operational area has negatively affected its combat capabilities. The new bases required significant reorganization, provision of material and technical parts, building logistics links, which at the time of June 22, 1941 was not fully implemented, which led to supply disruptions, a decrease in the level of medical and sanitary and household support for personnel. At the same time, more time was needed to study the features of the theater of military operations itself, primarily navigation.

Thirdly, despite the great attention of the fleet command and individual formations, the state of military discipline on ships and in units remained a big problem, which also negatively affected the combat capabilities of the submarine forces. As the disciplinary practice of 1940-1941 showed, violations of military discipline repeatedly led to the disruption of combat missions and the undermining of the combat capability of boats.

Fourth, the identified problems did not play a decisive role in the overall level of combat capability of the fleet as a whole and its submarine forces in particular. By the summer of 1941, the morale of the personnel was rated highly, the material part met the requirements of modern warfare, the exactingness of the military and political leadership of the fleet allowed ensuring the necessary level of concentration on solving combat tasks.

Together, all of the above provided the nature of the combat situation in the conditions of the outbreak of war, when the Baltic submariners successfully began to carry out their combat tasks, however, the problems identified in the pre-war period will subsequently lead to the difficulties that the Baltic submarine will face.

List of abbreviations and symbolsUAV – Submarine brigade;

Warhead – warhead;

VMB – naval base;

Navy – naval forces.

DPL – Submarine Division;

KBF – Red Banner Baltic Fleet;

PL – submarine;

PLB – floating base;

UBPL – Submarine Training Brigade;