Analysis of the organization of the provision of material resources to the Soviet troops during the repulse of fascist aggression (June 1941 – November 1942)

Kil'yan Igor' Asent'evich Adjunct of the Military Academy of Logistics named after General of the Army A.V. Khrulev" (St. Petersburg) 199034, Russia, g. Saint Petersburg, nab. Makarova, 8 ikilyan@mil.ru Degtyarev Aleksei Nikolaevich PhD in Military Science Head of the Department of organization of scientific work and training of scientific and pedagogical personnel of the Military Academy of Logistics named after Army General A.V. Khrulev" (St. Petersburg) 199034, Russia, g. Saint Petersburg, nab. Makarova, 8 alex01102000@yandex.ru Abramov Aleksei Kirilovich PhD in Economics Senior Researcher of the Research Institute (VST MTO of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) "Military Academy of Logistics named after General of the Army A.V. Khrulev" (St. Petersburg) 199034, Russia, g. Saint Petersburg, nab. Makarova, 8 abramov_14.09@mail.ru

Trifonov Grigorii Igorevich Junior researcher of the Military Training and Research Center of the Air Force "Air Force Academy named after Professor N.E. Zhukovsky and Yu.A. Gagarin" (Voronezh) 394064, Russia, Voronezhskaya oblast', g. Voronezh, ul. Starykh Bol'shevikov, 54, of. A grishakip@yandex.ru

Introduction. The fundamental qualitative changes caused by scientific and technological progress cover all aspects of military activity, put forward many important problems of great theoretical and practical importance for the further improvement of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their logistical support. One of such important problems is the study of the development of the principles of military art in general, and in particular, the principles of material and technical support of units, formations, associations in peacetime and wartime.

The development of the art of war is closely related to the level of economic development, that is, what is the material basis of war, such are the methods of its conduct ^[1].

It should be noted that in recent years of the construction and development of the Armed Forces, there have been very significant changes in the basic concepts and principles of logistics. In particular, there was a transformation of the concept of "logistics support" into a component of "logistics support" caused by a change in the functions of the relevant structures and management bodies in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the beginning of the XXI century.

In accordance with these ideas, the principles of logistics support can be determined by the most general, fundamental provisions, recommendations and ideas adopted for guidance in the practical activities of the rear and its individual units (management bodies). Principles are a connection, an association, a conglomerate of theory and practice, reflecting the output of theory into practice and vice versa, guidelines for practical activity and theoretical research ^[2].

The methodological basis for the formation of the principles of logistics support were and remain the general principles of military art. The most important of these principles are considered ^[3]: high combat readiness of troops (forces) to perform tasks in any conditions of warfare; resolute concentration of the main efforts in the most important areas to solve the main tasks; suddenness, determination, activity of hostilities, constant striving to capture and retain the initiative; full and comprehensive use of various means and methods of struggle to achieve victory; coordinated use and close interaction of associations (formations) of all types and branches of the armed forces; simultaneous defeat of the enemy to the full depth of its construction; timely build-up of efforts, bold maneuver by forces and means to develop combat operations at high rates and defeat the enemy in a short time; accounting and full use of moral- psychological factor; firm and continuous management, determination in the performance of assigned tasks; comprehensive support of combat missions; timely restoration of reserves and combat capability of troops.

Based on the objective requirements of the armed struggle, the principles to a greater or lesser extent are always the result of creative, analytical activity, generalizing the experience of practical activity ^[4].

All previous experience has been transformed into the principles of logistics, which are also valid for logistics ^[5]: maintaining combat and mobilization readiness of formations, military units and logistics organizations; compliance with the level of combat and mobilization readiness, technical equipment, mobility (mobility), maneuverability, autonomy of logistics management bodies, personnel, structures and capabilities of formations, units and logistics organizations corresponding to the indicators of the troops (forces) provided in all types of activities; continuity of advance preparation of the territory operationally, taking into account economic opportunities; priority implementation of logistical support measures that most affect the combat readiness and combat capability of troops (forces); coordinated use of forces and means of logistics and close cooperation; concentration of main efforts to ensure the groups of troops (forces) operating on in the main direction; responsibility of higher authorities for the completeness and timeliness of providing troops (forces) with weapons and military equipment, missiles, ammunition, fuel, military-technical property and other material means; achieving maximum autonomy of groups of troops (forces) in the rear; scientific justification of the directions of development of all elements of the logistics support system, methods of logistics support in the unity of theory and practice, in peacetime and wartime on the basis of economic achievements and scientific and technological progress; reliable awareness of the military logistics management bodies, stability, continuity, efficiency and secrecy of logistics management.

In the conditional classification of logistics principles, general and particular principles are distinguished ^[6]. General principles regulate the functioning of the logistics support system of all its links, in all types of Armed Forces, all types of logistics. Particular principles are characteristic of a particular type of Armed Forces or type of logistics support. These principles are a complement, a development of general principles. They are close to the rules, the established requirements.

In the system of principles, rules of provision, methods of material and technical support are distinguished. Methods are understood as methods of actions chosen to solve certain tasks, based on the requirements of the situation and in accordance with the developed principles of logistics. The use of one or another method depends on a number of conditions – the availability of forces and means, the specific situation, the characteristics of the theater of military operations, and others.

Mastering a variety of ways to solve problems, the ability to distinguish from all their diversity the most appropriate to certain conditions of the current situation is the basis for the successful implementation of logistics tasks ^[7].

As the Grand Marshal of the USSR G.K. Zhukov said, "The rear is half of Victory, even more...". ^{[8, 9, 10]}. The Great Patriotic War is the largest event in world history. On the one hand, it is a model of fascism and inhumanity, on the other hand, it is the great heroism and self-sacrifice of peoples. G.K. Zhukov in his writings examines in great detail the largest operations in the planning and implementation of which he took part. In addition, the analysis of the actions of the Soviet command, political leaders (including I. V. Stalin) was carried out. In addition, the rear and its role in the conduct of military operations are considered.

In the article we will look at how the principles, rules and methods of logistics support of the Soviet Armed Forces were formed during the Great Patriotic War.

The main part. The war began in conditions unfavorable for the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. The German fascist army, prepared in advance for an attack, managed to use the element of surprise and, seizing the strategic initiative, forced the Soviet Armed Forces to switch to strategic defense.

The sudden attack of Germany did not allow, at least partially, to deploy operational and military rear in the active army before the start of hostilities. The frontline and army rear was created already during the beginning of the war, as planned, on the basis of district stationary rear units and peacetime institutions, as well as at the expense of rear units and institutions formed by internal military districts. The planned deadlines for the creation of the rear were not fulfilled.

The concentration of the main mobilization stocks of material resources in the border military districts led to the fact that a significant part of them was destroyed or captured by the enemy. As a result, the system of systematic material support of the troops of the active army and the deployment of strategic reserves was disrupted.

The temporary occupation by the Fascist invaders of the western regions of the USSR with significant production capacities, the evacuation of industry to the east and its restructuring for the needs of the war led to a sharp reduction in the production of military products and disruption of transport, especially in October-November 1941, when the battle for Moscow was in full swing ^[11]. This created extreme difficulties in the material support of the existing fronts and new formations. After the defeat of the enemy near Moscow, the economic situation of the country began to improve. Since March 1942, an increase in industrial production began, and the output of military products increased significantly. By the beginning of the Stalingrad defensive operation, the restructuring of the country's economy in a military manner was completed ^[12].

Material support. The difficult situation prevailing at the front at the beginning of the war, the violation of the planned formation of management bodies, as well as the deployment of rear units and institutions by wartime states did not allow the army to switch to supplying troops in relation to the peacetime scheme developed: center-front-army-corps-division-regiment-battalion-company-soldier.

Basically, the supply of troops was carried out from stationary district warehouses, transferred along with supplies to the fronts and armies. There was no proper order and planning in the organization of providing troops. Combined-arms headquarters, being loaded with operational issues, did not provide real planning for the supply of troops, and the services, often without the necessary data on the combat and rear situation, could not purposefully carry out supplies. The provision of troops went without any restrictions on applications, mainly by performing urgent tasks, although the pre-war provisions provided for the establishment of a limit. The lack of proper order in the organization of material support at the beginning of the war led to the fact that the troops, armies and fronts did not have the necessary stocks of basic material assets at a time when they were available in large quantities in the district warehouses. A number of prominent statesmen and major specialists from various sectors of the national economy of the country were involved to directly address the fundamental issues of supplying the army, due to which it was possible to organize the collection and evacuation of the material and property necessary for the active army, as well as to improve the order of supply planning.

In the current conditions, an important role was given to increasing the economy regime, saving public funds. By order of the NGO, firm limits were introduced on the consumption of food, ammunition (September, October 1941), and then fuel (August 1942). In March 1942, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee "On the Protection of military property of the Red Army for wartime", an important innovation was introduced for the conservation and preservation of material values – an "open list" was introduced." ^[13]. For each loaded wagon, plane, car, wagon, an open sheet was written out, which indicated which cargo and to whom it was sent. Which made it possible to end the lack of control, and establish responsibility for the delivery of goods in one piece.

The difficult economic situation in the autumn of 1941, the need to increase the mobility of the operational rear in accordance with the highly maneuverable nature of the fighting, required a revision of the standards for the maintenance of stocks in frontline and army warehouses. In October 1941, the stocks in these warehouses were reduced: ammunition – by 5-6.5 times (depending on the purpose), fuel – by 4.3 times, food – by 2.6–2.8 times (Table 1) ^{[14, 15]}.

With the transition of the Soviet troops on the offensive and a significant increase in their material needs, especially in ammunition and fuel, the question of improving the planning of material support became acute. The central maintenance departments have completed the transition to monthly planning of material support for the fronts. The planning of the material support of the troops has become more closely linked with the plans of operations, with the tasks solved by the fronts, armies and formations in operations. Changing the order and methods of planning increased the reliability of the organization of material support for troops.

Insufficient income from the industry of basic material resources caused the need for even greater rigidity in limiting their release and expenditure, as well as the constant maintenance of mobile reserves of the rear, including material means and transport. So, to carry out the maneuver during operations, a reserve of material resources of the Supreme High Command (VGK) was constantly maintained on vehicles based on the provision of one rifle division: ammunition – 1 ammunition, fuel – 1 refueling, food - 1 daily cottage ^[16].

Table 1 – Stocks of material assets in the active army according to pre-war views and established in October 1941

*– for the Leningrad front – 20 s/ d, for the Karelian – 30 s/ d.

Local resources were used as much as possible in the interests of logistical support of the troops. On a large scale, the local material base was used in the Battle of Moscow, in the defense of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa. Significant assistance in providing the army was provided by the population in the form of a gratuitous transfer to the National Defense Fund of food, fodder, personal belongings and the collection of personal funds for the creation of military equipment and weapons.

Provision of ammunition. By the end of June 1941, the ammunition reserves of the active fronts had decreased to 1.5–2, ammunition. It was not possible to replenish ammunition stocks at the fronts and in central warehouses due to supplies from industry. To solve these tasks, a reserve of ammunition of the VGK Headquarters is being created: their dispatch for internal military districts was stopped, and since July 1941, the withdrawal of part of the ammunition stocks from the Far Eastern Front, the Trans-Baikal and Central Asian districts began. Taking this into account, in August 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered to organize the collection of spent cartridges and capping at firing positions and send them to the rear by passing transport. The shells were released only in exchange for the returned shells of at least 75% of the shells received. This has produced tangible results. If in 1941 only 10% were returned to the rear, then in 1942 – more than 50% ^[17].

Thus, during the defense of Moscow, increased ammunition stocks (up to 4 ammunition sets) were installed for the fronts operating in the most important operational areas.

On the Western Front, these stocks by the beginning of the Battle of Moscow were up to 40% in the troops and 30% in army and front-line warehouses. Instead of the principle of uniform provision of troops with ammunition, there has been a tendency to provide troops based on the importance of the tasks they perform in the operation. Strict limits on the release and consumption of ammunition were introduced, which later became a solid basis for planning the supply of ammunition.

During the defensive operations, the necessary ammunition stocks were accumulated for the counteroffensive. On the Western Front near Moscow, these stocks ranged from 1.7 to 4.0 ammunition. At Stalingrad, the troops of the fronts were also provided with ammunition by the beginning of the counteroffensive (on average from 1.5 to 3.2 ammunition). Some armies created stocks of up to 2.6 ammunition for the main types of ammunition ^[18].

Thus, when preparing a counteroffensive of the troops of the Western Front for the armies of the shock group on the right wing of the front (30th, 1st shock, 20th and 16th armies), the expenditure was provided for an average of about 42% of the total number of shots planned for the entire front; for troops operating on the left wing front (10th army and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps), - up to 35% and for the armies of the central direction – up to 23% ^[19].

Thus, the measures carried out made it possible, mainly, to provide the troops with ammunition, especially in the crucial areas of operations of this period of the war.

Provision of fuel. On July 1, 1941, the fronts were sufficiently provided with fuel according to average daily consumption rates ^[20] (high–octane gasoline – for 35 days, low-octane gasoline - for 45 days, automobile gasoline – for 15 days). However, difficulties with transportation within the fronts themselves disrupted the uninterrupted supply of fuel to the troops. The previous procedure for planning the provision of troops with fuel on the basis of quarterly applications in defensive operations, the provision of troops with fuel was extremely uneven. So by the beginning of the operation near Moscow, six armies of the Western Front contained: diesel fuel in army warehouses from 0.7 to 2.6 refueling, in military warehouses from 1.5 to 2.6 refueling; gasoline in army warehouses from 0.3 to 4.2 refueling. Unevenness in the creation of reserves in the troops was also observed on the Stalingrad Front. Some armies had large reserves (for example, the 3rd army: gasoline – 10 refueling stations, diesel fuel – 18 refueling stations), while others were low and supplied "from the wheels".

The uneven provision of fuel was explained by poor planning and imperfect accounting. All this required optimization measures. So, in particular, fuel reserves in the fronts were redistributed by reducing them in frontline and army depots and increasing them in the troops, since November 1941, a transition was made to a decade-long planning of providing troops with fuel according to average daily consumption rates. Mobile fuel reserves were created at the disposal of the VGK Headquarters, work was carried out to mobilize troops to fight for fuel economy. An important role in saving fuel was played by limiting its consumption, as a result of which the average monthly consumption in 1942 decreased by 8 refueling stations compared to 1941 ^[21].

Of particular note is the organization of providing fuel to the troops directly defending Stalingrad. Fuel was transported from the branch of the army depot, past divisional and regimental warehouses, to refueling stations, where 3-5 daily stocks of it were maintained. So, to create reserves in the Astrakhan region, tanks and even railway tanks from Makhachkala were delivered afloat across the Caspian Sea. Prior to this, the practice did not know such methods of transporting containers by sea.

With the transition of troops to the counteroffensive, fuel consumption increased by 40-50% compared to the defensive period and exceeded the established norms. There were still shortcomings in accounting, as well as expenditure and replenishment planning (photo 1).

In addition, during the offensive, the troops widely used captured trophy containers, refueling and pumping facilities.

Thus, during the ongoing operations of this period of the war, the fuel service gained some experience in providing troops with fuel. The main provisions for planning the provision of fuel to troops, limiting and saving its consumption were worked out, experience in maneuvering reserves was accumulated and the beginning was laid for the creation and use of fuel reserves of the VGK Rate.

Provision of food. The organization of food supply of the Armed Forces and the country as a whole in the first period of the war consisted in consistent and unwavering observance of the principle of conformity of the organization of food supply to the real conditions of the military economy. The procurement of food from local resources has been one of the important activities of the Armed Forces since the beginning of the war. In connection with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, it became necessary to evacuate the food supplies available there, as well as livestock and products of collective farms and state farms from the threatened areas. In these circumstances, it was important that the troops make maximum use of local food resources. Therefore, by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of July 1, 1941, it was allowed to harvest food and fodder by the forces of the troops in the military, army and front-line rear areas to meet current needs at state procurement prices at the expense of mandatory supplies to the state ^[22]. However, such an order of procurement from local resources, in which there was no state control, could not last long.

Photo 1 – Fuel supply to the troops through the army supply station

In October 1941, the organizational forms of blanks were ordered. They began to be conducted through local procurement agencies. Due to the constant procurement of food from local resources in large volumes, it became necessary to create special procurement bodies in the active army. On the basis of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR in July 1942, regular procurement groups were formed in the fronts and armies. In August of the same year, by order of the SNK, the apparatus of authorized People's Commissariat of Procurement of the USSR was created to coordinate the issues of procurement from local resources between the home front management bodies and civilian procurement organizations. The commissioners were appointed to help the departments of the rear of the front and the army. As a result of the restructuring of the entire organization of procurement and the creation of procurement bodies in the fronts and armies, work on procurement since the beginning of the new harvest in 1942 has acquired a strict planned character.

To streamline the rationing of the provision of the Red Army troops with food, the GKO approved new differentiated norms of supply for wartime on 09/20/1941 (Order of the NCO of the USSR No. 312, 1941). 14 food norms were established. In terms of quality and value, rations for the troops of the active aria were significantly higher than for other troops. A table was introduced to replace some products with others. Similar changes in the norms of allowances were carried out in the Navy.

The size of the food reserves to be maintained in the armies was determined by the military councils of the fronts. Subsequently, depending on the situation and the availability of resources in some fronts, the size and separation of reserves were repeatedly revised. However, the total size of reserves in the fronts in most cases were close to the established ones.

In September 1941, the GKO adopted a resolution on a new procedure for assigning funds and distributing food to the fronts. The release of food and fodder began to be made on the list (actual) number, but not more than the number of rations (monthly limit) established by the State Budget for the front. For armies, formations and units, the monthly limit of rations was assigned by the corresponding higher command.

Of the other activities carried out by the food service, it is necessary to include the provision of troops with technical means. Due to the large losses of the technical means of the food supply service and due to their absence in the reserve of the Food Supply Department of the Red Army, it has become much more difficult to provide new military formations with them. This caused the need for a number of urgent measures: the production of hearth kitchens at local enterprises was organized and the conversion of camp boilers for kitchens (photo 2); camp kitchens were transferred to the troops from rear units and institutions, and they were also recommended the construction of floor stoves; the transfer of camp kitchens and car factories from the Far East, etc. was carried out.

The organization of cattle transportation to the active army over a long distance also deserves attention.

Photo 2 – Conversion of boilers for field kitchens

Provision of personal property. In the pre-war period, issues related to the unification of clothing, simplification of accounting and reporting for wartime were also not resolved.

Along with other branches, the light industry, which produced goods for the clothing service, experienced enormous difficulties. In the initial period of the war, about 400 enterprises of the textile industry alone were put out of operation.

Taking into account the current situation, the government, already in the first national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, provides for an increase in the production of military products compared to the pre-war plan by 26%.

The prevailing circumstances and conditions of wartime created the need to reformulate the established procedure for supplying and providing troops with clothing, maintaining and accounting in warehouses and ensuring the procurement of clothing.

In August 1941, Circulars of the Chief Quartermaster No. 10 and No. 13 put into effect "Regulations on clothing supplies in wartime" and "Instructions on accounting and reporting of quartermaster property in units and institutions of the Red Army" ^{[6, 9]}. These documents provided for the wartime release of property according to supply plans for the list (actual), and not for the regular number according to the scheme: center-front (district)-army (corps)-division (brigade)- regiment-company. This principle of providing troops in those specific conditions has fully justified itself.

To the fronts, military districts, units and institutions, consisting of supplies, the clothing property was released in a centralized manner, through central, front and district clothing warehouses, and bases. The warehouses of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NCO) were used to complete this property and prepare for shipment in accordance with the supply plan.

In order to obtain information about the resources of personal property in the warehouses of NGOs, starting in July 1941, a report card of urgent reports to the center was established:

to inform the chief daily by telegraph about the receipt of personal belongings in warehouses for the reporting day;

every five days, inform him by telegraph about the availability of personal property as of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 dates of the month;

as of the first day of each month, submit by mail information on the availability of personal belongings across the entire nomenclature, divided by quality.

From the regiment (separate military unit) and above, monthly reports were established on the need and availability of personal belongings, as well as its replenishment. The established regulations on the service life and operation of personal belongings were abolished. Things were replaced as they were actually worn out and completely unusable for further use.

The personal uniforms of the personnel, which according to the terms of service should be replaced, had to be returned to the warehouses. The military units, neglecting the above instructions, were not issued with category 1 personal belongings.

The servicemen of the active army were provided, as a rule, with new clothing and footwear, and the personnel of the internal districts were provided with used clothing.

In the winter of 1941-1942, a special place in the work of the clothing supply service was occupied by providing troops with warm clothes. Taking into account the current economic situation of the clothing supply of troops, it was decided to centralize winter uniforms and shoes in district warehouses, while simultaneously enrolling in the Clothing Supply Department of NGOs. In addition, it was allowed to partially withdraw warm clothes from the reserves of the Far Eastern Front. Their production at industrial enterprises was expanded and the collection of warm clothes among the population was organized. Before being sent to the front, warm clothes were completed at the central and district warehouses. The measures taken made it possible to fully and timely provide the troops with warm clothes. The supply of units, especially those who arrived at the fronts defending the capital, was carried out from central warehouses and industrial enterprises in Moscow, in echelons en route to the front, on the march or even before their entry into battle ^[23].

The seasonal change of property in 1942 was organized taking into account the experience of the previous winter. Sending warm clothes to the fronts was organized in advance (since August). All this greatly contributed to the organized transition of troops to winter uniforms in 1942 (photo 3).

An important task of the service was the seasonal change of the wagon train in the winter of 1941-1942 . By the beginning of the war, the Soviet Army had only 13 thousand sleds. The emergency measures taken to manufacture sledges in the national economy and preparations by the troops themselves from local resources allowed the active army to switch from a wheeled wagon train to a sleigh in December 1941.

The practice of supplying troops in the battle of Moscow has shown that in order to ensure the uninterrupted supply of the active army with clothing, it is necessary to create irreducible stocks of it in the fronts. Therefore, the decree of the State Defense Committee of 03/25/1942 provided for the maintenance of stocks and exchange funds: rolling stocks in the amount of 10% of the list number of the front, stocks of uniforms, linen and bedding in medical units and military sanitary trains, exchange funds for bath and laundry facilities, army quartermaster warehouses and evacuation points.

Photo 3 – Seasonal transition to winter clothing

The main work of the repair bodies was focused on the deployment of an additional network of stationary workshops in the rear, economical use of supplies of uniforms and materials (photo 4). The creation of regular divisional, army and front-line workshops in 1942 had a positive significance in strengthening the previously existing repair base in the active army (Order of the NCO of the USSR No. 154 of 05/22/1942).

Conclusions. Thus, certain provisions on material support and the work of supply services developed before the war turned out to be unacceptable in a military situation.

The creation of a new structure of the rear management bodies, the increasing military and economic capabilities of the country, as well as the expansion of the capabilities of the rear Center and the transfer of parts of the functions of the operational rear to the Central link of the rear contributed to solving the tasks of supplying troops with material means. The introduction of new material means into the practice of providing troops with material means (changing the norms of the maintenance of stocks, creating reserves, maneuvering stocks, introducing strict limits on the release and expenditure of material resources, planning for tasks performed by troops, improving accounting and reporting on rear services, and others) improved the organization of supply of troops, changed the planning system and allowed to establish a planned material the provision of fronts obliged the troops to use material resources economically and rationally.

Photo 4 – Organization of repair of personal belongings in the regimental link

The lessons of the first period of the war showed that the shortcomings in the organization of the logistics of the Armed Forces at the beginning of the war were explained primarily by the fact that in the pre-war period the principle of compliance of the composition, organizational structure, technical equipment and combat readiness of the rear with the corresponding indicators of the troops was not fully observed.