Analysis of evolution of the attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the Russian Federation within the framework of the establishment of German national identity after the German reunification

Veselov Yurii Aleksandrovich ORCID: 0000-0003-2043-2778 Master at the Department of International Security of the Global Politics Faculty of Moscow State University 119192, Russia, g. Moscow, mikroraion Leninskie Gory, 1, stroenie 51 veseloff30@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Identity, past and present of Germany

Russian-German relations have a special specificity within the framework of Russia's dialogue with the West in general and with the European Union in particular. Germany, being the traditional "heart" of Europe, the central European power both geographically and politically and economically, largely determines and determines the logic of European development, ^{[9, p. 15]} and the future of the EU also largely depends on the well-being of Germany. ^{[4, p. 34]} After Brexit, it became possible to believe that the future of the EU would be determined depending on the results of the old confrontation for leadership in Europe between France and Germany. So, the Germans already consider themselves practically the second leading force of the liberal and democratic West. ^[77] Without taking into account the German identity, it is impossible to analyze the relations between Germany and the Russian Federation, and it is also impossible to imagine the prospects for further dialogue between Russia and Europe. (in case of success of Germany in the struggle for leadership)

The modern system of international relations was built as a result of the victory over Germany, which is still within certain limits of the limitations of sovereignty, lost for the second time in a century as a result of defeat in World War II and partially regained during and after the Cold War. It is impossible to imagine that Germany will become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, since the seats there are occupied exclusively by the victorious powers. It is also impossible to imagine Germany as the owner of nuclear weapons.

Formally, the occupation status in West Germany (FRG) ceased to operate in 1954. In 1990, the victorious powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, concluded a "2+4" agreement with the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, according to which the united Germany received full sovereignty, which was evidence of the completion of the German question that figured throughout the Cold War. ^{[32, p. 172]} Nevertheless, many experts, including the German historian, professor of the University of Freiburg J. They doubt that Germany managed to restore full sovereignty after Reunification. ^{[32, p. 174]} This position is also "heated up" by the semi-legendary document "The Chancellor Act", which, presumably, is part of the secret treaty of May 21, 1949, and some experts believe that with its help the United States, among other things, they secured dominance over Germany, at least until 2099.

However, at the moment it seems appropriate to consider Germany more or less an independent actor in relations with Russia, and to analyze and characterize such relations, it is necessary first of all to understand the complex phenomenon of German identity.

In this work, national (civil) identity is understood as a cultural norm that reflects the identification of individuals with their nation, national political system. ^[79] It is based on a set of ideas associated with the national-state community, with obligations and rights in relation to other members of this community and to the state, allowing the individual to relate himself to them. ^{[30, p. 3]} For example, PhD, Professor of the Department of Theory and Philosophy of Politics of the Faculty of Political Science of St. Petersburg State University K. F. Konchalinsky believes that identity manifests itself as a cognitive-evaluative structure of the representations of social agents about themselves associated with their positions in diverse social spaces. The elements of group identity thus become personal properties as a result of socialization and assimilation of cultural experience. ^{[6, p. 89]} In other words, national identity manifests itself in the inclusion of oneself in a certain group (citizens) and the adoption of certain characteristics peculiar to the group that characterize the average self-perception of a typical representative of the group. Such an approach to the study of national identity exists within the framework of the science of the modern era, and not postmodern, whose representatives question the real existence of any group in principle. ^[2] National identity manifests itself in feelings of belonging or rejection. For example, two characteristics of national identity can be distinguished — community and distinctiveness. Community shows the level of homogeneity and unity of the nation, which is expressed in ideas about history, territory, institutions, language and religion. Community reflects the internal dimension of national identity. Distinctiveness, in turn, expresses the degree of difference or similarity of a nation with other nations — communities of citizens of other states. ^{[12, p. 16]} In addition, identity is determined by relevant information, as well as institutional features that identify members of this group or separate people who do not meet the requirements of this identity. ^[52]

The question of the formation, existence and influence of identity on the foreign policy vectors of state policy can be understood within the framework of the concept of symbolic politics (developed by such high-ranking experts as M. Edelman, ^[54] S. P. Potseluyev, O. Y. Malinova, U. Sarcinelli, T. Meyer, etc.), which, for the most part, focuses the above aspects on "social constructiveness"identity, its creation based on the "suggestion of stable meanings" ^[27], the "interpretation of reality" ^[16], for the most part, by the ruling elites ^[67] and its use by them as a "tool of political management" ^[74].  Moreover, this scheme fits particularly conveniently precisely in the study of German identity, since the victorious powers have made every effort to instill in Germans a sense of guilt for their own history through the newly formed institutions of state power and to modify, at least, the Prussian traditions of militarism. Nevertheless, it is also worth mentioning that, even in the case of Germany, identity was not built exclusively "from above", if only because the defeat in the war became a nationwide trauma and without any imposition, and this, in turn, shows that the "new" German identity cannot be called only a construct.

As noted by German political scientists V. Weidenfeld (Head of the Department of Political Systems and European Integration at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) and Professor of the University of Duisburg-Essen K. R. Korte ^{[81, p. 179]}, national identity consists of the following interrelated components: 1) Attitude to the past, namely the accumulation of events worthy of remembrance in the collective memory ("history justifies identity"). 2) The actual social and political disposition ("modernity asserts identity"). 3) A project (goals and intentions) aimed at implementation in the future ("the future forms identity"). ^{[81, p. 85]} Another German researcher, V. Bergem, interprets identity as a dynamic continuum based on the historical memory of societies. The central importance of collective memory for national identity was also noted by researcher V. Brukner, sociologist M. Halbwaks ^{[81, p. 86],[9, p. 12]} and domestic researcher E.L. Kauganov. ^{[14, p. 60]} Philosopher E. Renan emphasized at the end of the XIX century that history plays a decisive role in determining the characteristics of the nation. In addition to a common geographical landscape, a common language, religion and the obligation to live together, it is "the presence of a common rich heritage of memories" and "a long time of effort, sacrifice and dedication" ^{[76, p. 21]} that constitutes the essence of the national character. Consequently, collective memory and the reception of one's own historical past associated with it is a fundamental factor of national identity. ^{[42, p. 138],[9, p. 13]} Constant reminders of common historical events (usually positive) connect the past with the present, become the core of national identity. It can probably be argued that it is the negative perception of one's history that is the core of German identity. German writer G.M. Enzensberger remarked: "anyone who wants to understand himself and wants to be confident in himself must identify himself." ^{[14, p. 60],[76, p. 22]} But how can you be confident in yourself if you constantly flagellate and blame yourself for the mistakes of your ancestors? After all, it is the significance of the memory of Nazism that is the basic narrative in German national identity and in German political culture. ^{[41, p. 63]} While most countries are characterized by "triumphalist" constructions of national identity, the basis of German identity is a model based on sorrow and repentance. ^{[42, p. 95],[60, p. 87],[60, p. 88]}

At the moment, according to the statements of researcher D. Diener and sociologist M. Schwab-Trapp, the theme of Germany's "past" is the core of political symbolism ^{[47, p. 64]} and the central point of German political culture. ^{[55, p. 171]} As almost all German researchers note, over time, the acuteness of perception of Nazism is not it decreases, but, on the contrary, it worsens, does not pale, paradoxically "becomes more concrete". ^{[55, p. 75],[9, p. 62],[39, p. 28]}

Consequently, the complex of historical memory about the crimes of Germany in 1933-1945 still defines the modern German identity and is of key importance by which the modern political culture of Germany is measured. [39 p. 28],^{[9, p. 63]} For example, the German researcher H. Dubil draws a direct relationship between the culture of memory of the crimes of Nazism and the consolidation of democracy in Germany, seeing in the former the pledge of the latter. [39 p. 97] German writer, Nobel Prize winner in Literature G. Grass stated in one of his speeches in 2000. "Anyone who thinks about Germany today and is looking for answers to the German question should also think about Auschwitz." ^{[58, p. 285]} According to Professor, specialist in German culture, V. Bialas, ^{[9, p. 63]} in 1999, the majority of the political establishment had a consensus that national identity cannot and should not be torn away from the memory of the Holocaust. ^[43]

Attention should also be paid to the degree of unity of the Germans, which is due to the peculiarity of the historical path of Germany - its prolonged stay in a fragmented state. ^{[14, p. 59]} Post-war Germans faced a split of the German national identity, a terrible defeat repeated in half a century, which could not but hit the young national identity and which is still manifested. ^{[46, p. 121]} No European nation has known in the new and modern times such a sharp dismantling of the enthusiastically built national identity, like Germany. Also, the post-war split of the country, which lasted for more than 40 years, could not but have a strong impact on the further formation of German identity, given that the political, moral, and social values of the GDR and the FRG were based on confrontation. ^{[14, p. 61]} This is partly what causes the fact that Germany began to avoid violent state practices and not pursue military goals in striking contrast to its national history between 1880 and 1945. ^{[12, p. 19]} Moreover, it can be argued that Germany still shows quite a strong apathy in foreign policy, ^[82] excluding some economic vectors.

The reunification of Germany has undoubtedly acquired an epochal character, and, as Weidenfeld and Korte note, a clear division into national history "before 1989" and "after 1989" has firmly entrenched in the collective memory of Germans. ^{[81, p. 179]} The creation of an integral cultural and economic space has become possible again from the previously artificially divided country. ^{[81, p. 151]} It is also worth recalling that in Germany there is still a cultural, confessional and dialectical division into Saxons, Bavarians, Westphalians, Swabians, etc., which, in turn, does not contribute to unity. ^{[7, c. 33]}

Consequently, there is not only a general German identity within Germany, but also a supranational identity of Germany in the context of European integration and globalization processes, the national identity of Germans who migrated from Russia and other countries to Germany, new citizens of Germany – the consequences of waves of migration. ^{[7, c. 33]}

The fundamental features of German national identity after Reunification

The Wiedervereinigung (reunification) of Germany was at least the fifth attempt since 1871 to create a new national German identity. Nevertheless, despite the fact that on October 3, 1990, a full correspondence was established between the nation and the state, this exceptionally significant event was not perceived by the Germans unequivocally positively. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, one of the largest representatives of post—war German literature, M. Walser, noticed that most of the West German intelligentsia regarded the Reunification of a divided Germany either with distrust or discontent, at best with indifference. ^{[44, p. 911]} The legendary German Chancellor V. Brandt (1969-1974), always in favor of the reunification of the state, he later characterized the reunification with the word "schizophrenia". ^{[44, p. 918],[14, p. 61]} G. Grass, a supporter of unification and a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, left the party in protest in 1992 and criticized the current social situation. Grass pointed out that the politicians and public figures of Germany unleashed the persecution of cultural and public figures of the GDR. ^{[14, p. 61]} Also, in general, the period after reunification can be characterized by a crisis of German national identity, which was most likely caused by the problems of consolidation of the ethnic nation (West and East Germans, ethnic Germans-immigrants), the integration of immigrants into German society and the formation of a common civic identity. It was also necessary to correlate different levels of German identity (regional, national and European). It is worth noting that, at least in 2017, half of the citizens of Germany believed in the existing national unity (52% of citizens in the western part and traditionally less than 43% of citizens in the eastern part). ^[51]

However, Reunification helped the Germans to overcome the most difficult threshold for ideological restoration and find new features for German identity, allowed the Germans to feel like a full—fledged nation in favorable conditions for the first time in a long time - as a result of the "peaceful revolution" of 1989 ^{[8, p. 37]} Before that, M. Walser, who criticized the idea of reunification a few days after The "peaceful revolution" declared that "a happy time has come, since the Germans, now considering themselves an unlucky nation, have achieved success for the first time." ^{[44, p. 918]} Moreover, the reunification of Germany successfully coincided with the unification of Europe. And this, in turn, meant that the fragile and not fully formed German identity could be replaced by a pan-European one more easily than in other EU member states. Indeed, most modern Germans can be considered Euro-optimists, one of the most important forces of European integration, and "European identity is almost the second most important for Germans." ^{[28, p. 101]} It should also be noted that at least as of 2014, the number of Germans with a pure national identity It was only 30%, ^[56] which indicated a decrease in the sense of national identity among the modern population of Germany. As polls show in 2019, this trend did not slow down and did not go backwards, showing 21%. ^[80] In this case, it is worth noting that German citizens had a more pure European identity among other citizens of EU member states - 6%. ^[80] The German political elite conducts a rather cautious policy therefore, the European identity finds a great response among the Germans. ^[25]

A particular difficulty on the way to overcoming obstacles to achieving the idea of national unity was the question of the need to overcome the totalitarian past of the East Germans. West Germans saw the solution to the problem of overcoming the divided past in Europeanism and the formation of a post-national identity model. The East Germans adhered to the traditional position – through the consolidation of the nation on an ethno-cultural basis. ^{[5, p. 63],[25, p. 266]} At the moment, it can be argued about the dominance of the first approach, however, first of all, German citizens still identify themselves with Germans and only second, with Europeans. ^{[25, p. 264]} On the one hand, it can be argued that there is still a certain vacuum in the ideological sphere and the sphere of identity in Germany, which was noted by the German existentialist philosopher K. Jaspers back in the 1960s and 1970s. Then he wrote that this vacuum cannot be filled with national consciousness, since the latter is either absent or artificial and does not play any practical role, does not cause creative and political activity. ^[36] Nevertheless, the identity of the GDR was built on a national socialist basis, in turn, the identity of modern Germany was built not on the basis of ethnic cultural and historical community, but on the universal Euro-Atlantic principles of liberalism, humanism and democracy (i.e. the concept of "constitutional patriotism" ^[18]) ^{[14, p. 61]}, an ideology whose new agenda has now become the struggle against any constructivist oppression. The components that make up the German national identity today usually include a common language and culture, national history (the German attitude to it is especially accurately reflected in the video clip of the music group Rammstain "Deutschland"), federalism, democracy, tolerance, individual freedoms, ^{[81, p. 140]} military restraint, ^[77] the rule of law, work ethics, the European idea and a certain mission in the integration of the European Union. ^[17]

It is worth returning to the cornerstone of modern German identity – the problem of understanding the Nazi past, expressed, among other things, in the "question of guilt" (Schuldfrage), a sense of collective guilt before the victims of Nazi politics. ^{[14, p. 60]} It was this specific feature of German identity that contributed to the restructuring of the nation from militant to trading, shame for the past and the "four D's" imposed from the outside (denazification, demilitarization, democratization, decentralization) contributed to the formation of new socio-cultural forms and their new manifestation. ^{[10, p. 134]} That is why they were found in supranational principles based on the ethics of universalism. The requirement to be cosmopolitan has become an integral part of the cultural image of the new German citizen. ^{[10, p. 134]} The key motto is "Nie wieder!" (never again!) It emerged as a collective imperative and through the programs of political parties, the educational system or the intellectual strata of society naturally fit into the basis of national identity. Thus, the former Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany J. Fischer in an interview with the newspaper "Zeit" said: "All democracies have a basis, a foundation. For France, this is 1789 (the Great French Revolution, approx. the author), for the United States – the Declaration of Independence, for Spain – the Civil War. For Germany, this foundation is Auschwitz. And it can only be Auschwitz. Memory of Auschwitz, "never again Auschwitz" ("Nie mehr Auschwitz") maybe, from my point of view, the only foundation of the Berlin Republic." ^{[39, p. 412]} There is a stable position that the Germans must constantly be "beaten with the moral mace of the Holocaust," otherwise the "beast of Nazism" will wake up again. ^[21]

According to German historiography, the central importance in the public discourse of the united Germany were:

1. The controversy about the exhibition "War of Annihilation" organized by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research and exhibited from 1995 to 1999 in 33 German and Austrian cities. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941-1944" ("Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944"), for the first time positioning the Wehrmacht not just as an armed force, but an organization involved in mass crimes. ^{[55, p. 186]}

2. The controversy over Daniel Goldhagen's 1996 book "Hitler's Voluntary Performers" ("Hitlers willige Vollstrecker"). [39 p. 143]

3. Fierce debates that began as a result of a speech by one of the largest representatives of post-war German literature, M. Walser, voiced by him during the awarding of the Peace Prize (Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels) in 1998 ^{[9, p. 53]}

4. Discussions on the Bundestag-initiated construction of the central memorial to the fallen Jews of Europe in Berlin as a symbolic manifestation of national identity based on the memory of the Holocaust. ^{[42, p. 90]}

5. Dispute over compensation to former prisoners of Nazi concentration camps. ^{[42, p. 90]}

6. The debate on the Bundeswehr's entry into the Kosovo War in 1999, which took place with reference to the Nazi past. ^{[42, p. 91]}

7. The publication of T. Vermesh's book "He is Here Again" ("Er ist wieder da") in 2012. Thus, the newspaper "Zeit" claimed that. the film based on the book shows Germany, which is still waiting for Hitler ^[68]

8. The European migration crisis since 2015. ^[1] Germans have long been concerned about the impact on national identity of the flows of non-confessional non-cultural visitors, ^[75] who do not identify themselves with Germans in Germany, and in the minds of autochthonous Germans are not. ^{[7, p. 34]} On the other hand, Germany has already officially recognized that "the multimillion-dollar labor army of migrant workers and their offspring have made Germany an immigration country, and society multiethnic and multicultural." ^[31] Such statements are evidence of the success of the Euro-Atlantic ideology introduced into Germany.

Perhaps the best thing about the current state of German identity and foreign policy priorities of Germany was noted by K. Jaspers: "After the war, we only wanted security and tranquility for a life of work and security. Today we still do not have a political ideal, consciousness, goals, there is almost nothing but the desire for well-being and security." ^{[36, p. 39]} Some experts believe that modern Germans "are used to the fact that crises are solved. Recent generations have seen neither blood nor wars... One can even assume that "they grew up in such incredible prosperity that their instinct for danger was turned off. They are not looking for innovative approaches in geopolitics, consider themselves smarter than others and think that they will be able to maintain their comfort forever." ^[21]

In general, the process of forming the national identity of Germans has a pronounced historical conditionality, is incomplete and contradictory. ^{[4, p. 33]} Special difficulties still arise due to the still existing "border" between "Western" and "eastern" Germans.

The influence of German national identity on relations between Germany and the Russian Federation

It is worth noting that the relationship between the two continental powers – Russia and Germany, has always set a certain tone in the European space. Thus, Germany played a key role in stabilizing the situation in Europe in the 1990s. ^[15] It is also worth noting that 75 years after the end of World War II, German-Russian relations are largely unencumbered by the past, at least for the political elites of both countries. There are no unexplained territorial issues between Germany and Russia (including around Konigsberg/Kaliningrad), nor ethnic and religious tensions. ^[40]

It should not be excluded that it was thanks to the actions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev that reunification became possible, since he first agreed to the Chancellor of Germany G. Kohl, ^[20] contributed to the development of a unification mechanism, the organization of negotiations within the framework of 2 + 4, ^[24] and also wrote off Germany and the GDR debts to the Soviet Union. ^[3]

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, German-Russian relations developed quite positively. Germany played the role of an advocate and mediator for the Russian Federation on integration into the Western community and an attempt to create a "great Europe" from ocean to ocean (from Lisbon to Vladivostok). Germany has become a significant trade and economic partner of Russia. More than 6,000 German companies have worked in the Russian market and strengthened their positions there. ^[63] Cultural and humanitarian relations between Germany and Russia were the closest. Many Russian Germans returned to Germany and formed a diaspora of more than one million Russian-speaking people in the center of Europe. In the eyes of the German population, Russia no longer posed a threat. Russian citizens, in turn, looked at Germany as one of the closest and most loyal friends of their country. ^[77] On November 9, 1990, an agreement on good neighborliness, partnership and cooperation was concluded. In a speech to the Bundestag in September 2001, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had elected Europe. ^[83] In addition to a number of economic ties, some interstate agreements were concluded: the agreement on cultural cooperation of December 16, 1992, the agreement on the study of the Russian language in Germany and the German language in Russia of October 9, 2003, the agreement in the field of youth cooperation of December 21, 2004.

However, such good-neighborliness could not have existed for a long time, at least because Germany is a NATO outpost in central Europe and, at least, because the new nationwide German identity strives for universalism, pro-American values and democratic ideals of the European Union. Many factors played a role in the collapse of Ostpolitik, some of which are V. Putin's Munich speech of 2007; the Russian-Georgian war of 2008; V. Putin's election as president in 2012; ^[77] generational change in German foreign policy, which led to a loss of interest in Russia; ^[50] loss of ties and much more other. ^[15]

It also played a role that the German leadership actively supported the idea of expanding the European Union at the expense of the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, ^{[34, p. 129]} although in dialogue with the Russian Federation it claimed the opposite. ^{[34, p. 129],[66]}

In Germany, it is believed that the turning point leading to the cooling of German-Russian relations occurred after the re-election of President Vladimir Putin, a supporter of preserving Russia's sovereignty. This meant that foreign influence on the socio-political processes in the country should be prevented or at least mitigated. Consequently, the activities of Russian non-governmental organizations that received funds from abroad (including German funds) were limited. ^[71] The image of Russia in the German media, as well as in the public consciousness of Germans, turned in a negative direction: Russia was now considered an authoritarian, kleptomaniacal state, unable to conduct modern economic policy and therefore living only on its raw materials; a regime that persecutes dissidents and threatens the democratic development of its neighboring countries (Ukraine, Estonia, Georgia). Moderate German politicians and public figures who advocated "understanding Russian motives" and not disrupting the dialogue with Moscow were sharply criticized. ^[77]

The beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 meant the final outcome for close, friendly cooperation between Germany and Russia. The cooling of relations soon developed into alienation and rejection on the German side. Moreover, back in 2012 and 2013, Berlin expressed dissatisfaction with Russian efforts to keep Ukraine in its zone of influence. ^[77]

The events following the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych: the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the outbreak of civil war in the eastern part of Ukraine, plunged Germany, as well as other Western countries, into shock. ^{[77],[70],[69],[64]} Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Germany is part of the collective pressure of the West on Russia, but is also the leader and coordinator of sanctions policy in the EU. Since the beginning of the crisis, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has managed to convince a number of German companies operating in Russia to agree to sanctions and set them up for the need for a tough approach to Moscow in order to attempt to change course in Russia's foreign policy. ^[37] Moreover, Germany has implemented and is implementing a sanctions policy towards the Russian Federation not only because of the close relations between the German and American elites in the political sphere, the media and the economy. The actions of the German government can be explained not only by solidarity with Washington, but also by a categorical rejection of any military action in Europe.^[77] The exception, of course, can only be the noble actions of the United States and the NATO member states as a whole, since the EU-NATO coupling is the basis for the prosperity and security of Germany.^[15] Consequently, even conflicts and disagreements with the United States (which especially intensified during the presidency of D. Trump ^[33]) can hardly lead to a change in attitude towards the Russian Federation, but they will certainly increase the importance of the EU's position in the formation of German foreign and economic policy, as well as security policy. ^[15] currently, Germany continues to see Russia as a threat to European security and tries to participate in the collective efforts of NATO to strengthen its Eastern flank. However, German society perceives the threat from Russia as relatively moderate, especially compared to the Cold War period. ^[59]

In addition to this Eurocentricity, there is another approach to determining the origins of existing problems in German-Russian relations. This approach is based on a more sovereign character, according to which the rivalry between Moscow and Washington continues even after the end of the unique phenomenon of international relations - the Cold War. The modern confrontation between two "sworn partners" in Germany (and not only) is called a "hybrid war". ^[77],[78] According to this logic, peaceful, calm, striving only for prosperity, prosperity and security, Germany finds itself drawn into this confrontation. It is also believed that in the "hybrid war" Germany plays a unique role of a trusted American ally, which, despite the sanctions imposed by Washington, maintains certain contacts with Russia. Although Moscow's actions and inaction are absolutely unbearable for the United States, Russia continues to be an important partner for Germany to deal with. ^[77] First of all, the scandalous and still unfinished Nord Stream-2 project can be attributed to such "cases". Russia's main exports are both oil and natural gas. Germany exports mainly mechanical engineering products, vehicles and vehicle parts. ^[48] However, the volume of trade turnover with Russia is small and goes beyond dozens of trading partner countries (as of 2019). The economic importance of the Russian market for Germany has decreased as a result of the crisis, sanctions and stagnation of the Russian economy, especially as a result of the integration of Eastern European states into the EU. ^[57]. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that recently Germany has been increasingly trying to resist the United States.^[62],[61]

In addition, Germany and the Russian Federation have common interests not only in Europe, but also in other regions. So, in 2003, both states, together with France, criticized the beginning of military operations by the United States and Great Britain in Iraq. Germany and Russia also adhere to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed in 2015 to regulate the problem related to Iran's nuclear energy. Germany and the Russian Federation also advocate steps to ease the crisis situation on the Korean peninsula. Despite all the existing political differences, the stabilization of the situation in Syria and its recovery after the war represent another area of possible partnership. However, such cooperation is permissible only if both sides have previously agreed on fundamental issues, for example, regarding the future of the Syrian regime. ^[77] Dialogue with Russia remains important. The rules of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe are still relevant and necessary. In the Normandy format, Germany stands with France for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The two states also exchange views on current security policy issues within the framework of the Russian-German Working Group on Security Policy (HAGS). An important unique bilateral platform is the St. Petersburg Dialogue with ten working groups on various public spheres. Joint Russian-German thematic years ("Russian seasons", "year of Germany") especially emphasize the scope of bilateral cooperation. An illustrative example of the attitude of Germany to the Russian Federation at the moment is the visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the Kremlin in January 2020. Then the Chancellor came to Moscow in memory of the end of World War II, but declined Vladimir Putin's invitation to a military parade. Instead, A. Merkel simply laid a wreath on the grave of the Unknown Soldier and held a somewhat "cold" press conference with the Russian president, at which she once again condemned Russian policy towards Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. ^[49] However, recently the German elite has been increasingly cautious about US foreign policy actions and, according to German media, A. Merkel's visit was conditioned by the fact that Russia is ready to provide support and is always ready for dialogue with Germany. Germany, like the Russian Federation, seeks to prevent further escalation of relations between Iran and the United States. It is also claimed that the aforementioned Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project, hated by European neighbors and Americans, also brings Germany and the Russian Federation closer. ^[49] The visit of Angela Merkel to Vladimir Putin, the unexpected emphasis on general features, the words of praise for the actions of V. V. Putin and T. Erdogan in Syria and Libya, show how much the United States is weakening its superpower grip and leaving behind a vacuum that other players are trying to fill – Turkey, Russia, Iran and Germany cannot miss the chances to conclude favorable transactions and do not join the "pie section". ^[49] However, one should not rush to perceive such a visit unambiguously positively. In may 2020 during his speech in the Bundestag, Merkel accused Russia of hacking attack, which allegedly was done in 2015 ^[45] it was also the Chancellor said he always sought to improve relations with Russia, once again hinting at a one-sided effort, coming from Germany. ^[45] Consequently, despite certain dynamics in international relations, Germany is not yet going to reconsider its approach towards Russia.

 Transatlantic relations and European integration are an absolute priority for Germany. ^[77] Germans feel themselves in the Europe that their ancestors revived from the ashes after the end of World War II. As noted by the famous German international journalist A. Rahr: "Their system won, and Russia lost in the Cold War, they are not interested in it. Germans live in a sense of the triumph of liberal values and Western democracies, which must not only be defended, but also exported by any, even aggressive methods, by infiltrating other continents and alien cultures."^[77] Accordingly, Berlin is ready for dialogue only if Russia follows the will of the democratic community and its principles and So that this dialogue does not contradict the solidarity of Germany with other EU and NATO countries ^[77] At the same time, Berlin expects Moscow to take the initiative. ^[77],[50] In the meantime, the German media and government officials cannot but criticize Moscow's actions and inaction in both foreign and domestic politics: the murder in the center of Berlin, ^[73] the poisoning of ex-agent S. Skripal, ^[73] cyber attacks and "interference in the internal affairs of other countries", ^[53],[78] the wars in Syria and Ukraine, anti–government protests in Russia ^[38],[65] - all these are the next reasons for the accusation of the Russian Federation, proving that they prefer to write about Russia in Germany "either badly or in no way." ^[21]

It is worth paying attention to some statistical material: according to official data, over 26 million Soviet citizens were killed during the Second World War. ^{[29],[23],[19]} According to numerous sources, the Great Patriotic War was waged by the Nazis with obvious disregard for the rules of conducting a just war – it was aggressive and with a certain bias towards the destruction of the civilian population living on the territory of the USSR in order to create a Lebensraum, a living space for the Germans and to provide a resource base. ^{[11],[13],[22]} In addition, the Nazis sought to purposefully destroy the Communists, who were declared ideological enemies, ^[22] and the ethnic groups inhabiting the USSR were identified as representatives of an inferior race. ^[22] At the same time, during the period of the Nazi dictatorship in Europe, more than 6 million Jews were systematically killed.^[26] However, in addition to the "mace of the Holocaust", it is not profitable for Western society to recall the 26 million dead – the largest loss in the Western theater of operations. Germans do not feel their guilt towards Russians ^[21] or do not feel it to the same extent. They believe that since the "Russians" won, received trophies, took part of the territory from the Germans, conquered the main part of old Prussia, occupied Berlin, then the Germans paid in full for their crimes against the Soviet Union. ^[21] Modern Germans are brought up on the Euro-Atlantic (pro-American) vision of history, according to which "the Americans saved Europe from the Red Army, as aggressive as Hitler's, which would have reached the Atlantic Ocean if not for the brave American soldiers."^[21]

Based on the information provided, it follows that Germany will be a supporter of confrontation with the Russian Federation for a long time. This situation is likely to last until, at least, the benefits of cooperation cannot be sufficiently high. At the moment, Germany is beginning to realize that the Ukrainian crisis and other international scandals are not the only issues that need to be discussed with the Russian Federation.^[15] Germany comes to understand that Russia withstands sanctions, withstands a certain isolation in Europe, and that it is more profitable for Germany to slightly increase the degree of cooperation, regardless of whether they like whether Germany is the actions of the Russian elite or not. ^[15] In many ways, this no longer includes this elite, but interaction with a number of "proven" companies and relying on extensive public relations, bypassing direct intergovernmental ties. ^[15]

Conclusion

The future of German-Russian relations, as well as Russian-European relations, will be determined by the future place of Germany in Europe (if we exclude non-European forces). In case of the success of the FRG, the successful exit, perhaps, of the remaining unfinished national passion for domination in Europe, and the corresponding fusion of the German national identity with the pan-European one, it will be likely to improve not only Russian-German, but also Russian-European relations. In this case, it will also be possible to talk about the revival of the beautiful project "Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok".

So far, at the moment, representatives of the German elite, living by the ideals of a united democratic Europe, are trying to resist Russia. As people who perceive "the international arena in the context of the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism, it is more convenient for them to negotiate with Emmanuel Macron and Mark Rutte than with Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan." ^[50] The main problem in German-Russian relations is that this is no longer a German-Russian dialogue, but a Russia-Germany+EU polylogue, within which German policy towards Russia will increasingly coincide with European policy towards Russia and is becoming more and more rigid and uncompromising day by day. ^[50]  In addition, the EU's course towards the Russian Federation is strongly influenced by Poland and the Baltic countries, whose public opinion has long been strongly anti-Russian. The UK's exit from the EU, which took place at the beginning of 2020, did not lead to Europe becoming more friendly to Russia. Many other EU countries, from Sweden to Spain, view Moscow's policy with caution. Despite the importance of individual EU states, especially when it comes to large member states such as Germany, the influence of EU institutions should also not be underestimated.^[77] Thus, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy F. Mogherini has developed five basic principles of EU policy towards Russia, which in March 2016 were approved by all foreign ministers of the member states of the European Union: 1) full implementation of the terms of the Minsk-2 agreement; 2) strengthening relations with Russia's neighbors; 3) strengthening the "internal resistance of the European Union to interference"; 4) restoring cooperation with Moscow "in some selected areas", for example, in the fight against terrorism; 5)"maintaining contacts between people and exchanges". ^[72] These five principles have not lost their relevance today. ^[35]

It is believed that the modern world order is slowly becoming multipolar, and the United States is gradually losing leadership, ceasing to be an example to follow. So far, Russia and Germany have fundamentally different visions of the present and future world orders. While the Russian elite seeks to decide the fate of the world together with other great powers on the model of how the world has always developed and are building their strong sovereign nation-state, the German elite seeks to strengthen multilateral institutions ^[15] (since they understand the modern world order not as a system of geopolitical domination of the West under the leadership of the United States, but as practically perfect a set of principles, values and rules ^[77]) and fear the Russian threat. ^[21]