Modern discussions about liberalism in Russia

Omelaenko Valentina Junior Scientific Associate, the sector of Philosophy of Russian History, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12 str. 1, kab. 509 valentina-o@list.ru Other publications by this author

This review analyzes the content of the book "Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism: Historical Drama and New Prospects" ^[1], published in English by Springer Publishing house in 2019. The book presents articles on various areas, topics and issues that make up the problematic area of liberalism research in Russia. Discussions in political and social philosophy demonstrate that the topic of liberalism is relevant and important in modern scientific research and journalism ^[5]. Socio-political transformations in Eastern Europe at the end of the XX century. They helped to increase interest both in the history of the development of liberalism and in the role of this ideology in modern society and in political processes in different countries. For Russian researchers, this topic has also become an important component of scientific debates ^{[2, 4]}. In recent years, a number of collective works have been published comprehensively and comprehensively discussing issues related to the history, development and current state of Russian liberalism ^{[3, 6, 7, 8]}. The reviewed book is interesting both as a new collective work on the topic of liberalism, and as a source of views on Russian liberal thought not only by domestic researchers, but also and foreign scientists.

Platforms for intercultural dialogue

At the present time of "global instability" and extremely tense interstate relations, it is so important to have platforms within which discussions of representatives of different countries and cultures could take place. The reader can learn about such forums and organizations from the preface to the book, which tells about the projects "Reset DOC" and "Russia Workshop" organized not so long ago, as part of the implementation of the latter, the idea of this book appeared, and materials for it were collected. Since 2005, the Reset DOC project has been promoting dialogue between representatives of different cultures and ideological exchange by holding seminars, international conferences and other events, publishing the online magazine Reset DOC. After the crisis caused by the events of 2014, under the scientific guidance of the famous Italian historian Andrea Graziosi, within the framework of the project "Reset.doc "The "Russian Workshop" was organized, aimed at creating a platform for free debate about modern Russia with the involvement of scientists and experts in the field of Russian politics. On July 17-18, 2016, the conference "State and Political Discourse of Modern Russia" was held, which became the third event in the "Russian Workshop". In addition, the conference began discussing the failure of liberalism and the pluralistic approach launched during perestroika in Russia. The discussion of the role of liberalism in different periods of Russian history was carried out at the international seminar "Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism", held at the University of Turin on October 26-28, 2017. This book includes part of the conference materials and shows the most important points of the discussion. 

Problem statement

The book continues with an introduction by Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, which outlines the main topics, provides the socio-political context of the development of liberalism in Russia, and also identifies the main trends in the re-evaluation of liberalism within the framework of the conservative discourse that has emerged recently.

The very definition of Russian liberalism, rather vague and problematic, has long been widely discussed in society. We do not have an unambiguous paradigm of liberalism. It shows different approaches to the state, society and justice, and even sometimes contradictory political orientations. The definition of a liberal in Russia is so broad that the concept of "liberal conservatives" is introduced, which include B.N. Chicherin, P.B. Struve, S.L. Frank, etc. Often, economic and political liberalism even seemed to be opposing each other. Whereas liberal projects in Russia were formed by circumstances and, mainly, as a response to crises. Given this, we can see in this book that the conversation is not about any strictly defined liberalism, but about a situationally understood fusion of various liberal ideas and concepts that can be attributed to three large groups: economic liberalism, political liberalism and social or moral liberalism. And speaking about liberalism in a specific historical period, we will focus on the group of ideas and ideas that are situationally prevailing at the moment.

To understand the historical significance of Russian liberalism, the authors of the book ask the following three key questions: "What are the historical contours of the evolution of Russian liberalism? How did the past course of Russian liberalism affect the state in which we find it today? What challenges and prospects await him?" [1 p. xxii]. It is also noted that it is necessary to have a serious discussion by historians, philosophers, sociologists, cultural scientists and political scientists, what was put into the concept of "liberalism" at different times. The desire to overestimate the evolution of Russian liberalism on an interdisciplinary basis at the moment seems to be quite an important task for Russian society.

Liberalism in Pre-Revolutionary Russia

Rethinking the history of the emergence and development of liberal thought in Russia is one of the most important topics of Russian social and political philosophy. And such aspects as the transformation of political culture, the discourse around the concept of the "rule of law", the institutionalization of ideological trends in political parties affect a wide range of issues of various humanitarian disciplines. The authors of the first part of the book turn to them. The subject of discussion is the time of the emergence of liberalism in Russia. For example, historians and political scientists date it either to specific authors of the XIX century, such as T.N. Granovsky, K.D. Kavelin, B.N. Chicherin, A.I. Herzen, or to various aspects of reforms in the history of the Russian autocracy: modernization of the times of Peter the Great, the enlightened role of Catherine II, the liberal views of Alexander I, the Decembrist uprising, the death of Nicholas I, the reforms of Alexander II.

In the first chapter, A.A. Kara-Murza and O.A. Zhukova present aspects of political philosophy, noting the reflection in the history of Russian liberalism, transformations in political culture that occurred from the XVIII to the beginning of the XX century [1 p. 3-14]. According to the authors, the emergence of liberalism in Russia was a consequence of understanding the causes and consequences of crises associated with the extreme instability of the authoritarian system. Their assessment of the legacy of thinkers developing a philosophical idea in Russia raises an urgent question for us: is a liberal project even possible in Russia? A.A. Kara-Murza and O.A. Zhukova analyze the main concepts of Russian liberalism by considering the features of liberal models in Europe, especially in Germany, Italy, England and France and their connection with national cultural traditions. It also suggests a different interpretation of the intellectual tradition of liberalism in Russia, different from the Soviet interpretation. 

Unlike British liberalism with its emphasis on individual freedom, Russian liberalism pinned its hopes on the positive role of the state as a guarantor of civil freedom and the gradual achievement of social justice through reforms. Thus, in the second chapter, Gianmaria Ajani writes about the development of legal science in the Russian Empire, restores the scientific debate about the concept of the rule of law, especially focusing on the criticism that arose before and after the introduction of the Constitution of 1906 [1 p. 15-26]. At the turn of the century, the faith of B.N. Chicherin and other liberals in the rule of law was replaced by the hope of creating a state that would be not only legal, but, first of all, fair. But over time, this concept has lost its relevance. In its place came new concepts such as the sociological analysis of law and Marxist scientific materialism. Thus J. Adjani argues that it is impossible to implement the idea of the rule of law in Russia due to the failure of the constitution of 1906, which led to the devaluation of liberal ideas. 

The third chapter examines the formation of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets) in the context of emerging mass politics, the 1905 revolution and political reforms [1 p. 27-42]. Examples of liberal thinking have always been found in Russian history, but they mostly existed in the underground intellectual sphere. Indeed, the organizations were underground or were in exile, and they were sometimes imbued with radicalism without any institutionalization until 1905, when Nicholas II stepped up with the promise of civil liberties and political parties. The liberal idea came to Russia through the creation of the Cadet Party. A.M. Semenov's work examines aspects of the Russian institutionalization of liberalism in the context of the organization of the Cadet Party, the 1905 revolution and political reforms. In contrast to the genealogical approach, the author shows the novelty of liberalism at the beginning of the XX century. and disagreements in the ranks of the cadets. He tries to study negotiation techniques and compromise ideas in a political environment that allowed the party and its platform to merge with each other. The pluralism of the context, both political and ideological, in which the Cadet party was formed, was a reflection of the diversity that existed in the space of the Russian Empire. The researcher considers the main paradox not the rebirth of the Cadet Party into the party of national liberalism, but its inability to follow the pan-European logic of development in its democratization and mass politics. The author of the article managed to show that imperial diversity not only hindered, but, as a result, helped liberal politics at the end of the existence of the Russian Empire.

Liberal thought in Soviet times

The second part of the book describes the times of the USSR, when liberal ideas were born inside the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The October Revolution, the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly and the defeat of the liberal forces in the era of the Red Terror, in essence, meant the end of the first stage of the development of Russian liberalism. The ideological hegemony that was established after that lasted until the end of the 80s of the XX century. In addition, three decades of totalitarianism under I.V. Stalin completely destroyed the remnants of liberal forces formed before 1917. Nevertheless, rare groups of dissidents and human rights activists, and a new generation of reformers who were at the helm of the Soviet Union in its last years, created new liberal discourses. 

V.M. Zubok, in his article beginning the second part of the book, focuses on the post-war and post-Stalin intelligentsia, the collective subject that embodied real and imaginary liberal qualities [1 p. 45-62]. These features, which the author explores, and the structures of Soviet life created the Soviet intelligentsia, who realized their mission was an attempt to surpass the Stalinist totalitarian state and society to create a "socialism with a human face" based on cultural and intellectual freedoms. He showed the development of Russian liberalism through the prism of scientific and technical intelligentsia organized into informal communities and groups of scientists and intellectuals in general. According to the author, they have become new types of the imaginary Soviet liberal community. Their human rights concept excluded the possibility of market reforms for the Soviet system. 1968 was a turning point for the liberal intelligentsia, whose aspirations stood in the way of authoritarian reform of the Soviet system. But at the same time, it was they who inspired Gorbachev's perestroika and its reforms two decades later, and also contributed to the rapid decline of the Soviet one-party system and the collapse of the Soviet state. The author also believes that for many educated Soviet emigrants who found themselves in Europe, America and Israel, the Sixties remained the main and most attractive social and cultural model. Some of them tried to recreate the liberal world of dissident circles and their own environment by opening literary magazines. Their great disappointment was that both worlds, the imaginary West and the environment of the intelligentsia, were disappearing before their eyes. Thus, the intelligentsia and Soviet liberalism, according to Soviet emigrants, perished under the rubble of the collapsed Soviet Union and completely disappeared from history.

It is clear that liberal discourse has survived under pressure in order to revive after decades of persecution and neglect. Thus, the fifth chapter of Benjamin Nathans is devoted to the elements of liberalism in the movements of dissidents and human rights defenders [1 p. 63-72]. And this group was quite diverse and included even nationalist and religious figures. Nevertheless, these were people who rejected the practice of violence and coups d'etat and whose main requirement was that the Soviet government comply with its own laws. The author writes that human rights defenders practiced liberal discourse, in addition to themselves, on behalf of various persecuted groups of the population and national minorities seeking greater autonomy. The theme of human rights in their language sounded especially vivid. But this version of liberalism can only be understood within the context of the late USSR. The researcher suggests that instead of importing liberal ideas from the West, human rights activists have developed a local version of liberalism, in which Soviet constitutional norms were used quite creatively. That is, being in isolation from traditional liberal values, such as market relations and private property, in the politicized circumstances of life in the Soviet Union, the most radical gesture of liberal dissidents was the demand to recognize their activities as non-political. 

The sixth chapter of S. Savranskaya is devoted to the events of the 80s of the twentieth century [1 p. 73-87]. At that time, the need to reform the floating system was already clear to the new generation of Soviet leaders who came to power after the death of Leonid Brezhnev. The reformist approach began to manifest itself even at the official level. At this time, serious changes took place within the various echelons of the CPSU in the 80s, when Gorbachev's politburo abandoned the Chinese model and tried to revive the USSR by breathing new air into the political system. The initial idea was to reform the almost non-developing economy and put an end to the arms race. Unfortunately, it was not possible to stop at economic transformations, and the reform broke and transformed the entire political system. Thanks to the "new thinking", as well as glasnost and democratization, the Cold War ended by the 90th year, free elections were held and, in fact, the rejection of communist ideology took place. Thus, a social-democratic state was built in the USSR. This time is deservedly considered the time of maximum support for liberalization in Russian society. And the Russian liberal discourse was closer than ever to its European counterparts. But when the new Russian government embarked on radical economic reforms in the 1990s, support for liberalism and liberal ideas almost disappeared. In fact, during this period, the fascination with classical liberal ideas ends and Russian liberalism begins to acquire its own specifics, oriented to the current situation.

A system that was based on the ideas of the absolutization of economic planning, the authoritarian role of the party and institutionalized violence could not be reformed. Consequently, the only possibility was a complete reboot and reconstruction of the system from scratch. Nevertheless, the basic legacy of Soviet times persisted in the next decade, influencing the course of transit. One of the main factors, according to the author of the article, which hindered and limited the possibility of transforming the country towards an open society, was the influence of remnants of Soviet ideology. In the seventh chapter, M. Kramer (Mark Kramer) writes about the autocratic nature of Bolshevism, which gave rise to the mass terror of Stalin's times [1 p. 89-106]. Although the direct influence of ideology decreased after the death of I.V. Stalin, it imposed serious restrictions that blocked the growth of liberal thought in the Soviet Union. After that, Gorbachev's plan of large-scale reforms shook the foundations of the Soviet system and many former supporters of Marxism began to have doubts about its legitimacy. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact seriously reinforced these doubts, forcing them to abandon the subject of their faith. But the process happened so quickly that it did not allow genuine liberal thinking to rise as an alternative to communist ideas. The problem was that after the collapse of Soviet ideology, an ideological vacuum remained, filled in part by the autocratic nature of ideology, which could not be compatible with liberal thinking. Democratic rhetoric has become fashionable for the ruling stratum. But without a solid foundation of elite thinking, democratic rhetoric not only failed to support the idea of liberal democracy, but also caused irreparable damage to it. According to the author, democratic thinking, which was firmly rooted in post-Soviet Russia, was very superficial and was not based on the liberal-democratic traditions of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Mill. Due to the fact that the new Russian officials used the term "democracy", the concept itself was discredited in the eyes of Russians, who unknowingly began to associate it with various difficulties and economic and political instability. As a result, V.V. Putin's authoritarianism was accepted with little public opposition and received broad support from the population. Since the autocratic nature of Soviet ideology prevented the deep rooting of liberal democratic ideas, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ideological void remained, filled by Putin with his personalized rule.

Liberalism, its place and role in Modern Russian Politics and Political Thought

The third part talks about the initial post-Soviet stage of the 1990s and attempts to assess the impact of liberalism at the stage of transition to modern Russia. In the 80s, Gorbachev's reforms destroyed the monopoly of the CPSU by introducing a multi-party system and free competitive elections. At that time, liberalism was a very real political alternative to reforming the country. After the collapse of the USSR, about a hundred new political forces emerged in Russia, fully reflecting the entire political spectrum from the left to the right. Most declared democratic and market values and claimed that their orientation had completely departed from the recent Soviet past. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, supporters of liberal reforms of the transitional system succeeded in the electoral plan. But the popularity of liberal economic ideas quickly waned. In 1991, about half of Russians approved the plan of upcoming reforms, while only 17 percent opposed the reforms. But already in 1992, the radical plan of price reforms and privatization was criticized from all sides as contrary to social interests. About 60 percent of Russians said that these economic measures were only a seizure of power and money. At the beginning of 1992, in the process of carrying out the program of radical reforms of E.T. Gaidar, Boris Yeltsin's popularity fell to 30 percent. At the end of the year, E.T. Gaidar was replaced by V.S. Chernomyrdin, and the country plunged into political instability, the peak of which was the shelling of the Russian parliament in October 1993. Thus, a deep constitutional crisis has arisen. In the mid-1990s, trying to enlist the support of the liberal-minded public and supporters of the West, Yeltsin formed a government of young reformers led by A. Chubais and B. Nemtsov. At the same time, a new class of "oligarchs" appeared. The crisis of 1998 led Russia to default on debt obligations and devaluation of the national currency. Any hopes for quick and painless changes have completely disappeared. This was the reason that liberalism never managed to become a widely attractive doctrine in society. Liberal economic reforms of the 90s made him guilty for a whole decade. But nevertheless, they could not truly realize the rights and freedoms of the individual. Liberalism was reduced to its economic dimension, which led to privatization, which resulted in the birth of a class of state-linked oligarchs. Russians remember this time with the final moments of the constitutional crisis, military companies inside the country, rampant crime and corruption, terrorism and instability in the administration. The weakness of the newly created Russian party system, its fragmentation was obvious due to the fact that the presidential administration completely dominated the political scene. The delegitimization of liberal politicians occurred together with the approval of the policy of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Thus, the third part of the book is devoted to the 1990s, as the moment of crucial reforms under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. At that time, shock therapy, a set of liberal democratic reforms that affected the majority of the country's population, and liberalism became synonymous in Russia. 

The eighth chapter of V.L. Sheinis is devoted to the analysis of the paradoxes of the transition era and the reasons for the sudden appearance of liberal reformist forces [1 p. 109-122]. The liberal reforms of the early nineties were chosen by Russia as a path to a free political system, a competitive market economy and a state of acceptance into a democratic society. But these goals were never achieved, and the transition period ended as quickly as it began. According to V.L. Sheinis in the XX century. Russia has had two attempts at social modernization. In both cases, at the beginning and end of the century, the movement was interrupted. In both the first and second cases, the country's development took the form of a parabolic curve instead of an ascending straight line: in the second case, from the initial Soviet authoritarian regime to an open liberal government, and then back to a new authoritarian system, although more responsive to the challenges of globalization. In addition, the author focuses on the international isolation of Russia, the nature of Russian society and the nature of the stability of the political system. The concept of V.L. Sheinis is based on the idea of antagonism between liberals and bureaucrats. Studying the timeline of what happened, an attempt is made to analyze the reasons for the sudden appearance of these antagonistic forces, which initiated a powerful reform movement at the first stage, when the bureaucratic system experienced serious difficulties adapting to the Russian post-Soviet transition, and gave way in the second half of the analyzed period to an authoritarian-bureaucratic reaction. 

The ninth chapter of A.V. Obolonsky is devoted to ethics and sociology of the transition period [1 p. 123-138]. This chapter assesses the beginning of the 1990s, the period when Russia reached the zenith of liberal ethical values, hopes and expectations, as well as society's demands for justice and real accountability of the electoral authorities. The author writes that underestimation of moral factors has led to an ethical crisis, general disillusionment with liberalism and other long-term negative consequences. Intellectual and political freedoms appeared simultaneously with the severe economic crisis and the introduction of urgent necessary measures, which hit the Russian population hard. Despite the fact that these actions may have saved the country from economic collapse, their political costs were extremely high, since in the mass consciousness they were firmly linked to the liberal concept of reforms. It explores the contradictory attitude to classical liberalism that existed both in the circles of Soviet intellectuals and in the circles of the bureaucracy, which shows how the inability to purify the administration of Soviet cadres caused an identity crisis and deep alienation between the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy, which led to institutional and moral anomie. For the first time, an attempt is being made to find the roots of the problem not in the economic or political plane of Russian liberalism, but in underestimating the moral component of the approach. Indeed, the mentality of officialdom cannot be compared with the ethical values of liberalism. Bureaucrats are most prone to a paternalistic vision of their status in society, to the so-called dirigisme. According to the concept of the article, officials turned out to be morally unprepared to work in transition conditions at the time of the beginning of the spread of systemic corruption. The lack of public trust in the State and government officials has undermined trust in democratic institutions and liberalism in general. But, nevertheless, the author finds some ground for optimism in the modern period, which indicates the revival of the demands of civil society for social justice.

In the tenth chapter Guillaume Sauv? tries to explore the historical period by the method of retrospective analysis [1 p. 139-151]. The object of the study is the views on the failure of perestroika of the main Russian politicians of that time, and a large number of disagreements contained in them. He tries to highlight trends in the development of the liberal democratic field in the period 1995-2005, when it experienced a real crisis. The main illustration of the conflict between the liberal currents competing with each other at that time was, first of all, differences in the assessment of perestroika. Liberals radically broke with the economic ideas of socialism, economic liberalism essentially defined the core of the liberal ideological field. The chapter argues that liberalism in Russia should be evaluated during this period at all three levels: political, economic and moral. In the pursuit of political stability, Russian liberals have come to situational conservatism, to the primacy of evolution over revolution, and from the rapid transformation of the regime to prudent reformism. And although liberals in Russia supported the idea that a liberal order requires essential moral prerequisites, they rejected moral restoration as a central goal and remained alien to the idea of state neutrality, which currently dominates Western theories of liberalism. In fact, Russian liberalism, generally professing theories close to Western ones, in practice faced the need to partially sacrifice moral aspects in order not to be squeezed out of the electoral field, and, as a result, to adjust, including the political level.

The fourth part is devoted to the confrontation between the power of V.V. Putin and the liberal alternative in the 2000s in the person of technocrats and systemic liberals. As a result, the above leads to the question whether there is a possibility of a reset of liberalism in Russia. In the final part of the book, aspects and features of liberalism in Russia from 2000 to the present are described., thus, researchers are trying to find answers to the questions why the liberal alternative has not been developed in Russian politics, to what extent liberal values, including the rule of law, have remained in the mentality of the Russian elite and bureaucracy, and how the Russian liberalism faced illiberal problems of the world order. To do this, it is proposed to evaluate the key points of the political space of modern Russia. 

Currently, the Russian party system consists of numerous registered parties. Nevertheless, the political arena is dominated by United Russia, a post-ideological popular party trying to reflect the problems of the population and get the support of the bureaucratic apparatus. This party forms the core of the coalition around the charismatic president, uniting economists, politicians, influential public figures close to the regime. And here, as far as the Russian party system is concerned, we need to define the word liberal as carefully as possible, which has recently been often used to describe any force opposed to Putin, since not all modern liberals oppose the regime. Also, a number of forces claiming to be liberal are not oppositional. In principle, the liberal opposition exists, but it is highly fragmented, and consists of several small parties defending anti-authoritarianism and free market ideas. As a result of their fragmentation, these parties were unable to organize a united political movement in order to engage in a real struggle with the presidential regime, counting on the support of the population and a serious electoral majority. Indeed, due to the powerful pressure of the pro-government media, the ruling regime was able to curb the protests that challenged the regime and its legitimacy, as well as divide opponents by resorting to nationalist and revanchist rhetoric. 2014 renewed confidence in the Government and its international policy. It is not surprising that the popularity of the Russian president has increased while at the elections to the State Duma in 2016, not one of the candidates representing liberal forces did not receive a sufficient number of votes. 

In the eleventh chapter, V.D. Solovey explores the phenomenon of "systemic liberalism" in Russia [1 p. 155-164]. Despite the fact that the positions of the regime look stable, the opposition is fragmented, and the electorate is apathetic, the liberal ideology remains, seemingly not in demand, but nevertheless existing in modern Russia. The work focuses on an inconspicuous, but nevertheless influential group of "systemic liberals". According to the author, they ensure the security of the Russian economy and, according to rumors, are developing a full-scale plan for liberal reforms. Liberal technocrats act as if behind the scenes in the Russian government and in various political structures. According to the author of the article, this is the only group in the Russian elite that has consistent thinking, managerial potential, motivated goals and a credit of trust from Western countries. Systemic liberals are technically competent and much more ready to integrate into the global economy. Despite this, they are cogs in the Russian state machine, and will not contribute to regime change and rapid democratization, thereby leaving Russian liberalism in limbo. The author's opinion is controversial, but it has the right to exist. Subject to the author's correctness, it can be concluded that parallel control and management structures of a liberal nature exist in Russia, not advertised, but forced to function due to "industrial necessity". In this case, we can talk about a new type of liberalism, peculiar exclusively to the current stage of the Russian state.

In the twelfth chapter, A.G. Barabashev and V.N. Prokofiev also discuss systemic liberals in the aspect of administrative management [1 p. 165-188]. The authors directly link the debate about Russian liberalism with institutional reforms and public administration. They note that since 1992, two cycles of administrative reforms have taken place in Russia. Both of them began with public statements of intent in response to calls for professionalization and efficiency of public service. Subsequently, there was a limited stage of reforms associated with ineffective conditional changes in policies and procedures. The reform turned into a bureaucratic tool to strengthen the power of the administrative and political elite. The authors demonstrate that the relative failure and repetition of these cycles are quite natural and, apparently, are a function of the technocratic elite and a consequence of the weakness of the Russian expert community. Other reasons include insufficient support for reforms and poor coordination between experts. Therefore, the reform of the Russian bureaucracy is the basis of any transformation of the Russian political system as a whole. That is, without the reform of the civil service on a liberal basis, it is impossible to create a truly open system focused on professionalism and transparent public administration. Thus, the dependence of liberal trends on management systems and relationships is built, and liberalism is tightly tied to the situational level of public administration development. The author's final conclusion is that in the absence of such a reform, neither political nor economic liberalism will have a chance of success.

In the thirteenth chapter, I.U. Zulkarnai gives an assessment of Russian liberalism in the plane of relations between the center and the periphery [1 p. 189-203]. In modern Russia at the moment we can observe the growth of centralizing tendencies of the state and the dependence of peripheral municipalities on the center. This suggests that the very problem of federalism, as a pillar of liberal democracy, is trying to describe the contradictions of the post-Soviet period in Russia between liberal economic reforms and a conservative approach to state-building. The tendency towards centralization was inevitable when Boris Yeltsin built state capitalism in Russia, when private business was closely connected with the power of officials. In such a model, federalism and democratic institutions were sacrificed, which allowed the liberal reformers of the 1990s to carry out their plans for the privatization of state property. Thus, the author shows how the centralized attitude of the entire spectrum of Russian political parties appeared in the 1990s as a counterweight to the decentralization of political power, especially against the acquisition of broader rights by ethnic republics than in other regions. The imperial dimension has always played an important role in Russian liberalism. Therefore, in the centralized approach to the construction of the state, there is only a part of the elements acceptable to the liberal concept. And, depending on the assessment of the role and significance of centralized hierarchical management (the vertical of power), we can talk about various, and often competitive, types of Russian liberalism.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, three important schools of liberal thinking emerged. The first were Western modernizers, such as E.T. Gaidar and a team of like-minded young reformers who emphasized liberal economic reforms. The second school consisted of institutionalists, like Mikhail Gorbachev and his followers, who affirm Russia's desire to integrate into international institutions. Naturally, representatives of this school paid the greatest attention to the political component of liberalism. The third school, the National Democrats, focused on the cultural peculiarities of Russian civilization. 

In the final, fourteenth chapter of the book, A.Y. Melville writes about the modern problems of Russian liberalism [1 p. 205-221]. These problems manifest themselves at the global and national levels, and also seriously affect the prospects of liberalism, especially in Russia, where the crisis of liberal ideology is an example of the synthesis of illiberal global and national trends, although it has specific features. Thus, the case of Russia seems to the author very peculiar, due to the historically established dominance of illiberal traditions and today's and non-conservative ideological consensus. The author tries to explore the possibilities of restarting liberal ideas in Russia and adapting them to the challenges of modernity. According to the author, for Russian liberalism there is an important problem of restoring relations with the state, society and the Russian nation as a whole, a reassessment of its place in the global scenario of world development.

Seeing the conceptual difference between the normative and institutional aspects of the global liberal world order, the researcher tries to analyze the ideological context, which, at least in some part, explains the current situation of Russian liberals. The article also provides a preliminary plan of how liberalism can survive in modern illiberal Russia. According to the author's vision, this is possible only with the formation of a real political alternative to the current situation. This alternative, first of all, should inspire confidence and, among other things, overcome personal ambitions and splits in the liberal camp, uniting the elite, people and mobilizing electoral support in developing a specific reform platform.

Conclusion

The reviewed book will certainly take a significant place among the works on liberal thought in Russia. The diverse and multifaceted studies presented in the book force us to take a fresh look at both the issues of the history of liberalism and modern challenges and political processes.