

A.V. Manoylo

## Armed rebellion in Ukraine could be the last wake-up call to Russia

**Abstract.** Today the attention of the world is focused on the events in Ukraine. Cruelty and uncompromising in struggle having overgrown in a time so short from separate clashes of hooligans and police in organized armed rebellion can not be ignored – street fighting in the capital of the neighboring state, where representatives of the Slavic people inextricably linked historically with the Russian people take their part, can not but disturb the public, government and the leadership of the Russian Federation. Ukrainian nationalists balancing on the edge of ramming attack put on the acting government call the events “revolution”, though in fact it can be considered only as a coup, armed rebellion to seize power, well known in the present-day world under the common title “a color revolution”. And it’s not just a random conclusion: in the Ukraine events we can discern signs all of us had met with in color revolutions in the CIS, Georgia, Central Asia, in the orange madness that spread over the Ukraine at the beginning of the two thousands, as well as during the recent revolutions of the Arab Spring.

**Keywords:** the international relations, the international safety, political conflicts, conflicts management technologies, conflicts management models, psychological operations, information war, politica, interests, UN.

Today the attention of the world is focused on the events in Ukraine. Cruelty and uncompromising in struggle having overgrown in a time so short from separate clashes of hooligans and police in organized armed rebellion can not be ignored – street fighting in the capital of the neighboring state, where representatives of the Slavic people inextricably linked historically with the Russian people take their part, can not but disturb the public, government and the leadership of the Russian Federation. Ukrainian nationalists balancing on the edge of ramming attack put on the acting government call the events “revolution”, though in fact it can be considered only as a coup, armed rebellion to seize power, well known in the present-day world under the common title “a color revolution”. And it’s not just a random conclusion: in the Ukraine events we can discern signs all of us had met with in color revolutions in the CIS, Georgia, Central Asia, in the orange madness that spread over the Ukraine at the beginning of the two thousands, as well as during the recent revolutions of the Arab Spring<sup>1</sup>.

When comparing the Ukrainian (color) revolution 2.0 with recent events in the Middle East and North Africa, it should be noted that the scenario of the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 repeats in full the revolution in Egypt<sup>2</sup> during which the Mubarak regime had been destroyed, and the Egyptian President himself was removed from his post and imprisoned. There are too many coincidences such as:

- nature of public unrest escalated into riots that were passed off as spontaneous, but in fact the events were quite different;
- well-organized protest movement backed by paramilitary units of fighters – Ukrainian nationalists which had been transferred to Kiev from western regions of Ukraine, where they had been training their combat skills for years in special camps and studied the tactics to resist to MVD and Security Service of Ukraine special units, as well as the tactics of the war in urban conditions;
- excellent equipment of fighters opposing the Berkut – ballistic helmets, shields, body armor and suits of

<sup>1</sup> Filiiu J. – P. The Arab Revolution. Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising. / London: Hurst & Co. 2011. 195 p.

<sup>2</sup> Manoylo A.V. Specific features of “Arab Spring” color revolutions // Proceedings of Uralsk Federal University. Series 3. Social Sciences. 2013. № 3. pp. 30–36.

armor, knee and elbow pads adopted in the USA Army units serving in Afghanistan;

- weapons including firearms to seize which the nationalists had taken several army depots;
- blockade of public authorities and capture (according to the Leninist principle) of strategic and vital infrastructural objects of the capital;
- use of conflict mobilizing of people to involve them on the side of “rebellious people representatives”, rousing hatred against the regime, wide brainwashing of those who came under the influence of nationalists- revolutionaries;
- large-scale information war<sup>3</sup>;
- well-organized supply of the rebels with everything they need to continue the fight, including special equipment, clothing, food, money to pay for services of hired guns and provocateurs.

But Egyptian and Ukrainian revolutions are not similar only by these coincidences: in either event well-organized and armed groups of fighters are joined in the armed struggle under a mask of rebellious people: in Egypt – Islamists, in Ukraine – western nationalists (in Crimea – the Crimean Tatars). At that the struggle with all signs of the civil war is still being presented to the public as a national liberation movement organized by the rebellious people against the criminal regime. And this is the very essence of any color revolution as a technology of organizing a coup under artificially created political instability when the pressure on the government takes the form of a political blackmail and specially organized youth protest movement acts as the main driving force of ramming attack on the authorities.

In either event the “rebellious people” are opposed by a weak, wavering and corrupt government which hesitates to take decisive actions, keeps hanging in midair, is torn between the former allies which tend to distance themselves from it under new conditions, makes contradictory statements, showing helplessness and thereby discrediting itself almost more effectively than by its opponents. That was how Mubarak went on: until the last moment he believed that the USA would come to help him and save him from the performance they played out as a color revolution, hoping that that was just an educational measure. However, he was disappointed in his hopes as well as Yanukovich in his expectations that practically the European Ukraine which presented the world civilization and (at the same time) the “moscals” with the Kievan Rus are not a wild Egypt, and the Ukrainians are not illiterate Arabs, and that everything will be resolved.

Few years later Yanukovich made nothing but duplicated Mubarak’s behavior: despite the obvious threat from the expanding riot that began with a futile (in its essence) unrest in so-called maidan, he did nothing to stop this coup. Instead of tough but fair measures to restore order – that Lukashenko had used to suppress the “cornflowerblue revolution” – Yanukovich started an incomprehensible political game, flirting first with the West (European Union and the USA), then with Russia and hoping on the back of “the great role he has been intended for to control the chaos in Ukraine” to receive regular financial tranches from both sides. That weakness of Yanukovich became the reason why at first he had lost the support of his electorate, and then his supporters had turned away from him and began to scatter in every direction or just to change sides. Under these critical conditions Yanukovich had ordered to crush the maidan by force (which was so fatally late that could change nothing but lead only to numerous human losses on both sides. and used law-and-order advocate – security forces, the Berkut as fall guys), but he did not have enough willpower to fight to the finish as from the moment the rebels had pulled illegal armed groups and nationalists to the maidan and began to form self-defense units (i.e. municipal police) using the majority of protesters, then it became possible to suppress the rebellion only at a high price in blood. But Yanukovich could not take that upon himself for fear not so much for the killed people, but for safety of his funds and accounts in foreign banks, which he could be deprived of immediately after having been recognized as an “international criminal offender.” His flirtation with the European Union had also played a fatal role: first the EU insisted on that Yanukovich had strongly suppressed the riots in the capital when restoring the rule of law, but when he finally started to do it and first victims appeared, the EU immediately started yelling about human rights and genocide of the Ukrainian people by Yanukovich regime, as well as about urgent need to make concessions to the rebels and enter into negotiations with them. When Yanukovich, following this recommendation, started negotiating with the rebels, they had recognized it as weakness of the government and intensified their efforts starting the phase of the violent armed struggle. As a result, Yanukovich and his henchmen instead of continuing fight or be responsible for their actions, just ran out of the capital: on February 23, 2014 it was reported that Yanukovich tried to escape abroad by unmarked plane, but was stopped by the Ukrainian border guards. Thus, he appeared to be not only a spineless leader who could only pump out the country resources into income of his own clan (i.e.

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<sup>3</sup> Goldstone J. *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley (CA), 1991.

to plunder the country in the same way as it was done by Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan), but became a traitor to all those citizens of Ukraine, especially its eastern and southern regions that supported him as a pro-Russian force capable of preserving the integrity of the state and protect its citizens from nationalism.

There were only minor differences between Egypt and Ukraine: in Egypt there were the Arabs who came to the squares of Cairo, in Kiev – the Ukrainian nationalists and ordinary citizens disgusted with dominance of Donetsk clan. In both cases the color revolution was activated by “tiredness related to the government” – both from the Mubarak regime and the regime of Yanukovich. And that is the nationalists try to appeal to, forgetting the obvious analogy which can be traced between the Ukrainian and Egyptian scenarios. In similar revolutions in Syria and Libya the Islamists confronted the governments in place with which the regimes had been relentlessly struggling for decades; and in Ukraine the nationalists are represented by Catholics, Greek-Catholics and followers of numerous Protestant sects, mostly totalitarian by nature and preaching extremism. In both cases the success of the coup could be possible only due to weakness and endless rises and falls of the ruling regime, initially extremely confident and then collapsed quickly and by that giving the signal to his supporters “save yourself if you can!”

Both in Egypt and Ukraine the color revolutions were carried out in several stages – we refer to 2.0 revolutions, where the Ukrainian events may be attributed to. But between Ukrainian revolutions (the Orange and the present ones) there have passed 10 years, and between the Egyptian revolutions – it was about a year. In Egypt it was moderate Islamists who came to power after the revolution, and in Ukraine the power was seized by extreme nationalists, which are roughly the same.

Following the logics of the global processes development, we can assume that Yanukovich will suffer the same fate as of other leaders displaced as a result of color revolutions – Gaddafi, for example. He will be made an international criminal, chasing after all over the world, be found somewhere in Africa or Latin America, and be extradited to “the oranges”. On the way to the Ukraine he may suffer “while trying to escape”, or an ardent westerner accidentally let off his shotgun at him unable to cope with the emotions rushed upon him in foreign parts. Because who knows what Western Europeans and Americans have promised to Yanukovich, pushing him first into the violent suppression of protests, and then to negotiations and a matter-of-fact surrender accompanied by backdown of all pro-Russian positions and gains.

The danger of the current situation in Ukraine primarily consists in that the armed rebellion raised by radical nationalists has every chance to develop into a civil war, as even now the rebels exhilarated with all-permissiveness catch out the supporters of the fallen regime around Kiev, brutally beat them and possibly even kill (it is quite likely in these conditions). They also catch the Berkut and Security Service employees. So it is rather close to the beginning of “revolutionary terror”.

Tymoshenko urgently comes from Germany and immediately arrives at the maidan to lead the revolution. Isn't it carrying you back? Lenin and Bolsheviks who also arrived from Germany in a sealed train. A hundred years later the scenario has been repeated in great detail. Only now the leader of the new revolutionaries chooses as its tribune not an armored car, but a wheelchair which Tymoshenko is most likely not in need with.

The color revolution of 2.0 in Kiev has put Ukraine on the brink of civil war and disintegration of the state according the lines of geopolitical tension, which in any case will not pass peacefully and painlessly: in this case Ukraine will be faced with the prospect of the Yugoslav scenario, the war of everybody against everybody, genocide, terrorism, foreign intervention (both of the Western states and of Turkey watching the activity of Crimea and Crimean Tatars), during which the number of victims will be hundreds of thousands. The Crimea where at present there are fights between Tatars supporting Klitschko and Slavic (not only Russian-speaking) population may even separate from the country and become either a Turkish protectorate or quasi-Islamic state following the example of Kosovo. All this will strongly hit the security of neighboring states, where the flame of color revolution may spread on. It's difficult even imagine the consequences of such a scenario for Russia. The Arab Spring revolutions swept across the CIS territory and hitting Russia may become the beginning of “a Christian winter”<sup>4</sup>.

During the time when tsunami of the Arab Spring color revolutions swept across North Africa and the Middle East, and the world's attention was focused on the tragedy of Libya and Syria, Russia did not stop arguing where this wave of color revolutions will turn to, when the last bastion – the Bashar al-Assad regime – is swept away. It was more or less obvious that new technology of colored revolutions implementation based on the controlled chaos having been run in the Arab East will not be limited only to the East. The only ques-

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<sup>4</sup> Syria's Mutating Conflict / International Crisis Group (ICG) Middle East report no. 128. – Damascus; Brussels: ICG, 1 Aug. 2012.

tion was: what country this meat grinder has been prepared for? For Iran, where so-called Green Revolution almost reached its goal in 2009?

The states of Central Asia were called to become the next objectives, where the previous model of color revolutions had failed to ensure stability of the puppet regimes that came to power in the forefront of the color revolutions; there were talks about Belarus, which with its partisans style has long been a strong irritant for the whole of the West, putting one in mind of the Gaddafi regime; some people mentioned China. However, the wave of color revolutions did not continue to format the Muslim East, but had unexpectedly emerged in Ukraine – close to Russia's borders. So the obvious conclusion is: the purpose of new wave of color revolutions is not Ukraine and Yanukovich regime, but Russia, its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Because color revolutions were invented by Anglo-Saxons and North Americans, and only they know how to apply these techniques in practice. We can say that color revolutions are their trademark style. But there was no reason for the USA to replace Yanukovich by Klitschko, Tymoshenko: as during all these years Yanukovich pretending to be wholeheartedly with Russia, carried out in fact the entirely pro-Western and pro-American policy, and was an obedient executor of Washington and Brussels will, laying Russia open to attack whenever it suited the interests of his clan or his Western "partners" and "mentors". That is, he was completely loyal from an American point of view. There was absolutely no reason for the USA to change him, the same as there was no need to shift Mubarak, one of the most faithful and loyal to the USA allies in the Arab world. That is why, at the early stages of the color revolution the Americans preferred just to manage the events while being in deep shadows and did not bother at all – as whoever wins, he will still be in stable of the USA foreign policy. If Yanukovich had won – the color revolution would become a warning and a lesson for him, as in its time Okruashvili opposing Saakashvili in Georgia. If Klitschko or Tymoshenko come to power – they will be the first to rush to the United States for foreign support and recognition, since only the influence and authority of the United States can turn ordinary rebels and bandits into European politicians with whom the civilized Europe will start a dialogue.

The rebels who have destroyed Yanukovich regime will face a cardinal problem after their seizure of power: they will get a poor country with the devastated and plundered economy in permanent crisis, with budget without funds, huge debts and corrupted authorities. To overcome such a crisis, the new government

will need money and a lot of money. In addition, they will need to pay to supporters and other "loyal fighters" who in case of their winning expect to get their share of former state property and the possibility to plunder the treasury. And even the leaders have a desire to improve their financial situation due to "trophies" of the city sacked and virtually stormed as well as the country. But where can they take the money?

And then you refer to a \$ 15 billion loan allocated to Ukraine by Russia to overcome the crisis in the Ukrainian economy. And you understand that the loan was given to the country, but not to the regime, and the change of regimes does not discharge Russia from its voluntary commitments. One cannot but wonder. It seems that the financial costs of organizing and conducting the "Ukrainian Spring" revolution will be paid by the Russian loan, that is, at the expense of the Russian budget. In this respect, we can only applaud the Americans: at last they have found a way to make some countries pay for pro-American revolutions in other countries, even if those others are related in culture, language and blood. And feel sorry for the Slavic peoples of the former USSR, for which the Soviet Union ("prison of nations", "communist empire") was the only guarantor of safety and peaceful co-existence.

For Russia, keeping in mind the Ukrainian experience, it is necessary to be prepared that it will be the next target in the list of Anglo-Saxon color revolutions, time-tested both under conditions of traditional eastern type societies and over-centralized states built on the principle of "vertical power structure" and having no safety cushion in the form of civil society able to withstand disruptive operations of color revolutions' organizers. In this regard, the efforts taken by the Russian leadership to bind passionate activity of young people who are the driving force of any color revolution and involved in various formal pro-government movements (such as "Ours", "Young Guard", etc.) and suppress the activity of foreign funds-agents on the territory of the Russian Federation to which accounts the funds to organize color revolutions are transferred, are important, but in general not so efficient. This is more a prevention of color revolutions than fighting with them. Under modern conditions repeatedly emphasized by armed rebellion in Ukraine in 2014, it is necessary for Russia to have a state concept to counteract the color revolutions both in Russia and within the whole of CIS territory backed by road map for its implementation. It is naive to hope that this time the wave of color revolutions will pass by Russia – there are no miracles and no exceptions in politics. Americans have just been looking for approaches

to Russia, based on the experience of the trial color revolution – the so-called “white ribbon revolution” – and finally have found the approach. Ukraine – it is

nothing but the last dress rehearsal of such a revolution, its running in a country with a similar mentality, culture and civilization identity.

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