Abstract: The article is devoted to the US foreign policy during one of the most acute crises of the Cold War period. The issue of the Eisenhower administration's choice of a strategy of deterrence and non-interference in the military action of NATO allies is debatable and relevant as a historical experience in the development of geostrategic guidelines in the US foreign policy strategy. The purpose of the article is to identify the main risks and opening prospects for the United States in the choice of foreign policy strategy in the Middle East in the context of the development of the Suez crisis. The methodological basis of the study is the historical-genetic, historical-comparative, historical-typological methods. It has been established that the reasons that prompted the United States to form an appropriate strategy included geopolitical and economic motives: the desire to take a leading position in the Middle East, demonstrating an alternative to Great Britain and France; the desire to win the trust of Egypt, which has the potential of a leader in the region and military-strategic contacts with the USSR; readiness to join economic sanctions against Egypt with the potential to receive economic and political dividends and competitive advantages; preference to keep the possibility of balancing between the sides in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The author comes to the conclusion that during the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States acted rationally, but in the conditions of the current moment.

Abstract: The authors consider the problem of the significance of Egypt's policy in the context of the transformation of the US geostrategic approaches in the Middle East in 1953–1956. It is shown that the approaches of the United States that have undergone transformation, which sought to create a controlled military-political bloc of the states of the Middle East region, were not implemented largely due to the policy of Egypt. Continuing the implementation of the military-political project - the Baghdad Pact, Washington not only did not achieve the favor of Cairo, but also caused its extremely negative reaction, which became a derivative of the understanding that American initiatives were an attempt to strengthen Egypt's traditional rival in the struggle for leadership in the Arab world – Iraq. A special contribution of the authors to the study of the topic is the designation of the role of Egypt as a regional power capable of creating alternative military projects to American initiatives. The circumstances preventing the inclusion of Cairo in the military-political bloc of states in the Middle East initiated by the United States, which directed a number of Arab countries against such initiatives, sympathizing with the anti-colonial sentiments of the Egyptian leadership, are indicated. It was revealed that the persistence of the initiatives of the Western states and the methods of their implementation prompted Cairo to seek protection in the face of an alternative center of power. Therefore, in the conditions of aggravation of Egyptian-Israeli relations on the eve of the Suez crisis, Egypt is drawing closer to the USSR. However, Washington retained the possibility of rapprochement with Cairo, not formally becoming a member of the Baghdad Pact, and also «staying aside» in the military anti-Egyptian action of Great Britain, France and Israel.

Abstract: The author considers the main causes and peculiarities of the process of transformation of the foreign policy of Egypt in the early 1950s. The chronology of the study is determined by the beginning of the new stage of the conflict between Egypt and Israel, prompted by political events in Egypt in 1952 and the subsequent rise to power of G. Nasser. Egypt aspires to leadership in the Arab world; it takes the central place in the conflict between the world powers in the Middle East. The topicality of the research is determined by the process of Egypt’s choosing the guarantor of its foreign policy among the world powers. The research methodology is based on the system method. The author applies the historical-genetic and historical-comparative methods. The author focuses on the process of Egypt’s foreign policy shift towards the USSR. This reorientation was the result of Egypt’s understanding of the hopelessness of the negotiation process with the western countries in the sphere of trade, economic and military cooperation. The author proves that the world power’s intentions to serve their own national interests promoted tensions between the parties to the conflict.