Abstract: The implementation of the constitutional principle of judicial independence directly correlates with the criteria by which their activity is being assessed. Russian courts use judicial statistics for assessing the performance of judges. This article analyzes the applicability of statistical indicators as direct indicators of the performance of judges. The hypothesis advanced that with sufficient pressure and absence of artificial manipulations, the statistical probability of maximum indicators of “quality” and “terms” tends to zero. Statistical values are determined by a range of factors, including those that do not depend on the judges. Their objective and direct imputation to judges misinforms and distorts the reality. The assessment of mental work of the judges in exact figures is pointless. The conclusion is made that the achievement of the maximum statistical indicators cannot be a value orientation of the judicial system. The simplicity of their use is deceptive. In reality, the assessment of judges by “quality”, “quantity” and “terms” is imbalanced, inconsistent, and non-functional. Statistical indicators can be used for assessing the performance of judges only as indirect indicators. In this case, it is feasible to use the “red flags” method, which means that only significant departure from the norm should be taken in account in assessing judicial activity.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the impact of assessment of judicial performance in accordance with the indicators of judicial statistics upon the organization of culture of the Russian court, which incorporates the shared by majority of judges informal rules of conduct, traditions, and values. The article describes such criteria for assessment of judicial performance as “quality”, “quantity”, and “terms”. In studying the historical origin of judicial performance assessment based on judicial statistics, it is demonstrated that the tradition of such assessment was founded in the 1930s, when political leadership who carried out repressive policy instigated “socialistic competition” between the courts and the judges. The article analyzes the impact of the “struggle for statistics” upon conduct of judges. Such circumstance that in consideration of cases the judges take into account judicial statistics violate the requirement of procedural fairness. There is a contradiction between the Russian legislation, which for the most part complies with the universally recognized international principles, and conservative organizational culture of the Russian courts. Mechanism of reproduction of the latter is the inertia of the “struggle for statistics”. In order to bring into compliance the representations of Russian judges on the acceptable conduct with the values of democratic justice, the system of assessment of judicial performance requires revision.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the impact of assessment of judicial performance in accordance with the indicators of judicial statistics upon the organization of culture of the Russian court, which incorporates the shared by majority of judges informal rules of conduct, traditions, and values. The article describes such criteria for assessment of judicial performance as “quality”, “quantity”, and “terms”. In studying the historical origin of judicial performance assessment based on judicial statistics, it is demonstrated that the tradition of such assessment was founded in the 1930s, when political leadership who carried out repressive policy instigated “socialistic competition” between the courts and the judges. The article analyzes the impact of the “struggle for statistics” upon conduct of judges. Such circumstance that in consideration of cases the judges take into account judicial statistics violate the requirement of procedural fairness. There is a contradiction between the Russian legislation, which for the most part complies with the universally recognized international principles, and conservative organizational culture of the Russian courts. Mechanism of reproduction of the latter is the inertia of the “struggle for statistics”. In order to bring into compliance the representations of Russian judges on the acceptable conduct with the values of democratic justice, the system of assessment of judicial performance requires revision.