Abstract: The subject of the study is the foreign policy expertise of the United States of America in the interwar period on the problem of the development of national liberation movements on the outskirts of European empires and methods of fighting them. This perspective allows us to take a new look at the problems of ensuring the internal security of global empires, their position in the Versailles-Washington system of international relations, the prospects for the development of colonial possessions and mandated territories, as well as the specifics of relations of empires with each other and with the United States (for the first time actively intervened in the conflict on European territory and in the construction of a new configuration of international relations). And also to determine the place and role of foreign policy expertise, its main characteristics and features in the analysis of colonial conflicts and methods of their resolution. The article uses such methods of historical research as problem-analytical, synchronic, comparative-historical and methods of system analysis. The main conclusions of the conducted research are that there was no unanimity among experts and in relation to the future of colonial systems. The obviousness of the collapse of the “old order” in metropolis-colony relations forced experts to look for possible options to minimize this process. Here the concepts of “civilizational mission” of empires were expressed, which were characterized by undoubted racism towards colonial peoples, the purpose of which was “Europeanization” of local elites with the subsequent transfer of powers to manage the former colonies. In addition, US think tanks and expert organizations of the interwar period played a leading role in the formation of the so-called “special relations” between the United States and Great Britain.

Abstract: The author analyzes the features of the expert activity of the RAND Corporation at the end of the twentieth century, aimed at studying the colonial experience of counterinsurgency activities of the British Empire during the interwar period. The position of the American analytical center on the possibility of using such experience in modern conditions is considered. A comparison is made of the conclusions of RAND Corporation experts on a similar issue in an earlier historical period - the Cold War era. The reasons for the change in the views of the experts of the analytical center on the question of the potential possibility of applying the colonial experience of the counterinsurgency of the British Empire are revealed. Thus, the characteristic features of the academic examination of US foreign policy decisions at the end of the twentieth century are analyzed. The analysis showed that the RAND Corporation considered this experience useful to the United States, since this analytical center believed that the United States after the end of the Cold War found itself in the same position as the United Kingdom after the First World War. At the same time, the United States repeats the same mistakes that the British Empire authorities made – reducing spending on the army, shifting the emphasis from using infantry in anti-insurgency operations to modern weapons, spreading pacifist ideas and reducing the level of military training. Also, the RAND Corporation for the first time evaluated the colonial experience of the British Empire in a negative way, thereby advocating a return transfer. The United States of the late twentieth century, according to the analytical center, should make decisions not similar to those taken by the British authorities in the interwar period, but opposite to them. This approach is explained by the fact that the RAND Corporation had to provide information support for increasing spending on the US armed forces and maintaining large contingents of troops.