Abstract: The subject of this research is the real pragmatics, i.e. targeted activity of the members of society (individuals, human associations). Real pragmatics, in general, in unity and interaction of the natural and humanitarian worlds is the subject of pragmatic theories. In practical aspect, the actual tasks of the analysis and large system management alongside their systemic analysis in unity of the natural scientific and socio-humanitarian components – is a pressing need. The article reveals the requirements to information background and architectonics of the pragmatic theory essential for establishing a reliable scientific theory of the real pragmatics. A comparative analysis with the construct of “theoretical knowledge” proposed by V. S. Stepin is carried out. The author formulates the general laws and requirements to the architectonics of components of the reliable and substantive pragmatic theories. The detailed comparative analysis demonstrates that the scheme of structuring the fundamental and argumentative pragmatic theory is fully compatible with the construct of (post-nonclassical) “theoretical knowledge” of V. S. Stepin. It is underlined that the scheme of theoretical knowledge proposed by V. S. Stepin leans not only on the meticulously examined by the scholar physical theories, but the mathematical theories as well.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the real pragmatics; in other words, the purposeful activity of social subjects (individuals, human associations). Real pragmatics as overall, in unity and interaction of the natural and human realms is the subject of pragmatic theories. From the practical perspective, the actual tasks of the analysis and large systems management, as well as their systemic analysis in cohesion with the natural scientific and socio-humanitarian components – is the actual necessity. The article determines the requirements to information base and architectonics of pragmatic theory essential for structuring the trustworthy scientific theory of real pragmatics. The author conducts a comparative analysis with the construct of “theoretical knowledge” proposed by V. S. Stepin; applies the interdisciplinary systemic approach: methods of theory of information, mathematical logic, systemic analysis, concept interpretation of conclusions and adequacy analysis. The author formulates the general laws and requirements to the architectonics of the components of accurate and substantial pragmatic theories. As a result, the article is first to demonstrate that the pattern of structuring the fundamental and argumentative pragmatic theory is fully compatible with the construct of (post-nonclassical) "theoretical knowledge” of V. S. Stepin. The necessary clarifications and inclusion are provided. It is illustrated that the pattern of theoretical knowledge proposed by V. S. Stepin leans not only on the physical theories that were meticulously examined by the scholar, but also the mathematical theories.

Abstract: This article analyzes the forms of logical analysis in the pragmatic theory and the requirements necessary for structuring the authoritative pragmatic theory. The author compares the various logical schemes and their use pragmatic theories. The article examines the origins and peculiarities of institutional mathematical logics and discusses the specificities of logical calculus structured by L. I. Rosonoer (1983); PCont equivoluminar paraconsistent calculus PI s built by A. Arruda; and LPCont and LP1Cont in which the classical logic plays a role of formal metalanguage for the paraconsistent calculus PCont. The author analyses the three distinctions of para-tautology from institutional tautology; discusses refusal from the principle ECQ (ex contradictione quodlibet) and execution of the “principle of unprovability from the extraneous thoughts” in the (non-trivializing) paraconsistent logic; as well as applicability of logical pluralism for various pragmatic theories. The article carries out a comparative analysis of the various logical systems and their potential application in pragmatic theories, in creating an artificial intelligence and regulation of discussions. The author analyzes the theoretical-plural motivation of para-compatibility suggested by K. Mortensen. In accordance with Mortensen’s position, is proposed an approach for verification of fundamental ideas and conceptual logical schemes, which is called the principle of mathematical tolerance. The work also analyzes the cases of use of the paraconsistent logic in pragmatic theories and crucial causes for the inconsistent pragmatic positions and the alternative theories of real pragmatics.

Abstract: The subject of this research is the real pragmatics, i.e. the goal-oriented activity of social subjects (individuals, human associations). The real pragmatics overall, in unity and interaction of the natural and humanitarian worlds, is an object of pragmatic theories. In the practical aspect, the actual goals of the analysis and management of complex systems and their systemic analysis in the combined natural science and socio-humanitarian component are in high demand. The article determines the requirements for the information base and architectonics of the pragmatic theory necessary for structuring a trustworthy scientific theory of real pragmatics. A comparative analysis with construction of “theoretic knowledge” offered by V. S. Stepin is conducted. The author formulates the general laws and requirements for the architectonics of the components of authentic and informative pragmatic theories. As a result of a careful comparative analysis, the author is first to demonstrate that the scheme of structuring substantial and provable pragmatic theories is fully compatible with the construct of the (post-nonclassical) “theoretical knowledge” of V. S. Stepin. The author also underlines that the proposed by V. S. Steping scheme of theoretical knowledge derives from not only the meticulously examined physical theories, but also the mathematical theories.   

Abstract: This article discusses the various views of philosophy and information theory upon the definition and structure of information, means of its acquisition and verification, different approaches towards the quantitative description of information, as well as L. Floridi’s approach to definition of information. The work highlights the basic types of formalizing the term “information”, types of information and information interaction, as well as the specificity of information in natural and humanitarian sciences, its completeness and validity. The author analyzes the appropriateness of the notion of “false fact”. The article defines, classifies, and examines different types of information and information interaction. The author conducts a comparative analysis of approaches of information theory and philosophy towards definition of information, provides definitions to the pragmatic information and pragmatic knowledge, and separates the information from knowledge. The article also analyzed the approach towards the information theory to establishment and structuring of information and its adequacy.

Abstract: The article is devoted to the problems raised by Kat in his ‘mathematical antinomies’. Analysis is carried out in original formulation of Kant’s own terms and as a part of his own philosophical argumentation. The same problems are also viewed disregarding Kant’s philosophy. Validity and evidence which make it possible to structure analysis in a form of rigorous theory as it is seen by modern mathematics, allow to categorically state that Kant’s classification lacks grounds and his reasoning regarding ‘mathematical antinomies’ can’t be considered to be a proof. On the contrary both his theses and antitheses are irrefutable. The essence of problems is not in unavoidable contradictions of mind or process of cognition of transcendental world in the course of Kantian debates of mind with itself but in non-uniqueness of conceptual representations. As for the limits prescribed to the perceptive mind, they involve, first of all, the laws that determine the architectonics of veritable theories.