Abstract: The subject of this research is the establishment and development of the policy of the Council of Ministers P. A. Stolypin in the area of state defense. The armed forces reform that took place in the Russian Empire after the severe defeat in the Far East played a substantial role during the World War I. The basic strategies that defined the army and navy development originated during the period of activities of P. A. Stolypin. The foreign and Russian historiography viewed the indicated problem in a peculiar way, mostly using the public utterings of P. A. Stolypin, while disregarding the published documentation. Thus, the position of P. A. Stolypin is extensively covered within the historiography that was offered for the Czar, news media, and society, although his true contribution into the army and navy reforms has not been studied until presently. The goal of this work consists in determination of Stolypin’s involvement in the reforms of the defense establishments, considering that his representations of the reforms and political influence varied under the influence of certain factors. The chronological method allowed examining the course of events of the indicated transformations. Guided by the principle of scientific objectivity, leaning on the works of the forerunners, the author rejected the dogmas of the “reputable” historians, and based his conclusions exceptionally on the sources, structuring the research in a way that the conclusion will be based on the facts will be adjusted to the previously made conclusion. The author underlines that the military reforms conducted in Russia in the early XX century were not a part of Stolypin’s reforms, and the heads of the military and navy establishments were exerting the non-reliance, deviating from the line set by the government. The scientific novelty is defined by the fact that this conclusion completely refutes the viewpoint in the Russian historiography.