International legal aspects of the Black Sea Grain Initiative

Gordeev Artem Postgraduate student; Faculty of Highly Qualified Personnel Training; Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Business partner for working with commercial functions; Legal Service Center; Rusagro Group of Companies LLC Borovskoe shosse, 46, block 109, 119634, Russia, Moscow gordeev_avia@mail.ru

Introduction

Achieving food security in the context of unilateral restrictive measures (hereinafter referred to as OOM) and armed conflicts seems to be one of the priorities of interstate cooperation in the humanitarian agricultural sphere. One of the vectors of such cooperation was the so-called Black Sea Grain Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the Black Sea Grain Initiative), which consisted of several international agreements, which, despite its failure, has retrospective significance for international law, since it is an example of the fact that states are able to cooperate even in conditions of geopolitical confrontation.

At the same time, a special role in the development and implementation of such cooperation, as the experience of the JI shows, may belong to the United Nations (hereinafter the UN), represented by its bodies, which, performing their statutory functions to ensure international peace and security, including food security, are able to act as a mediator and mediator between states in solving urgent problems of a humanitarian nature.

Currently, there is a complete lack of research in the domestic doctrine of international law on the international legal aspects of the JI, in particular the legal status of agreements concluded within its framework and their significance for international law. Among the foreign researchers who analyzed the international legal aspects of JI, G. Novak, H. Aust, M. Kakabadze can be distinguished. In the course of the research, the author also turned to the works of scientists in related fields of international law, for example A. Aust, R.A. Wessel, J. Wouters, V.V. Voynikov, D.S. Vecherin, M.A. Eliseev, K.V. Kritsky, I.I. Lukashuk, F.Yu. Panov, D.J. Paulina, A.N. Talalaeva, G.I. Tunkin, economics (I.V. Derigina), international relations (L.N. Klepatsky)

Thus, the need for a retrospective analysis of the international legal aspects of the JI, the identification of its significance for international law, as well as the lack of domestic international legal research on this issue determined the author's choice of the research topic

General prerequisites for concluding agreements within the framework of the JI

Back in 1975, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) proposed that food security be understood as "the uninterrupted availability of sufficient global stocks of vital food products to maintain a steady increase in food consumption and offset fluctuations in production volumes and prices" (URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/701143/files/E_CONF.65_20-RU.pdf (Date of request: 12/15/2024)). At the same time, it seems that achieving food security on a global scale is impossible without strengthening interstate cooperation in the field of agriculture, including ensuring stable and uninterrupted supplies of agricultural products to world markets, especially to developing and least developed countries.

The importance of ensuring global food security is also emphasized in the framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), namely SDG No. 2 "Eliminating hunger, ensuring food security, improving nutrition, promoting sustainable agricultural development". To achieve this goal, a number of tasks were set, among which it is necessary to highlight such as the need to eliminate and suppress the introduction of restrictions on trade in agricultural products, as well as taking measures to ensure the stable functioning of food markets.

At the same time, it should be recognized that humanity has been moving away from achieving the goal of eradicating hunger and ensuring food security over the past few years against the background of increasing geopolitical instability in the world, problems with interstate cooperation in the agricultural sector, and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was also confirmed in the joint FAO report for 2022, prepared jointly with others international organizations (URL: https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0639ru (Date of application: 12/15/2024)). According to this report, in 2022, from 691 to 783 million people faced the problem of hunger, which is 122 million more than in 2019. The UN Progress Report on the implementation of the SDGs for 2022 provides data that in 2021-2022, almost 2.3 billion people are faced with the lack of regular access to high-quality food (URL:https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2022_Russian.pdf (Accessed: 12/15/2024)). The resolution of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) No. 76/124 of October 10, 2021 also confirmed the negative impact on global food security of such factors as armed conflicts, natural disasters, trade restrictions, the COVID-19 pandemic, etc.

The threat of a food crisis reached its peak in the spring of 2022. According to FAO data, in March 2022, the average world food price index amounted to 159.3 points, which exceeded the value of the February indicator by 12.6%, reaching a record level since 1990 (URL: https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-food-price-index-posts-significant-leap-in-march/ru (Date of application: 12/15/2024)). In April 2022, this indicator decreased, but remained at a level that is 30% higher than the April values of the previous year. The reason for the increase in food and grain prices was the interruption of grain supplies from Russia and Ukraine, as they accounted for almost a third of world wheat exports, about 20% of world corn exports, and 80% of world sunflower exports as of February 2022. Moreover, the Russian Federation is one of the largest exporters of fertilizers to the world market. Supplies from Russia, in turn, were suspended due to the introduction by the United States and its satellites of the OOM in relation to its banking, transport, and financial sectors in connection with the beginning of Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2024, and from Ukraine – against the background of military risks during the transportation of exported grain through the Black Sea. Thus, the unpredictable and significant reduction in exports of grain, sunflower, fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine has put third countries importing the above-mentioned products in a difficult position, and which are faced with a sharp increase in food prices and disruptions in supply chains.

It should also be noted that restrictions on the import of fertilizers from the Russian Federation by the United States and the EU are not new for this industry. The introduction of trade restrictions on fertilizers as a result has always caused an increase in price escalation in the global fertilizer market, especially this trend, as noted in his 2023 report by Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, National Coordinator of the Russian Federation for food systems A.V. Yakovenko, manifested itself in 2021, when the annual growth rates of prices for various crops exceeded 20% (URL: https://www.dipacademy.ru/documents/7705/doklad-2023.pdf (Date of application: 12/15/2024)). The results of such restrictions, as the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations rightly noted at the high-level debate of the UN Security Council in 2023 on the problem of hunger and conflict-provoked global food insecurity, are the destabilization of world trade in agricultural products and fertilizers, reduction of acreage and a decrease in the volume of agricultural products against the background of constantly growing demand (URL https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1899754 / (date addresses: 12/15/2024)).

In order to prevent further increases in grain prices and, as a result, reduce the threat to global food security, the UN Secretariat, headed by Secretary General A. Gutterisch, took the initiative to conclude agreements between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of Turkey and the UN Secretariat. The general purpose of the agreements was to resume the supply of grain and fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine. The result of the efforts of the UN Secretariat was the simultaneous signing of two different documents on July 22, 2022:

– The Initiative for the Safe Transportation of grain and food from Ukrainian ports (hereinafter referred to as the Initiative) (https://www.un.org/sites/un 2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf (Date of application: 12/15/2024));

– Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat on promoting the promotion of Russian food and Fertilizers on world markets (hereinafter the Memorandum) (URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1829558 / (Date of access: 12/15/2024)).

OOM through the prism of international law

Restrictive measures in interstate relations seem to be one of the main reasons hindering sustainable cooperation between States in agriculture and ensuring global food security. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation has faced enormous economic pressure in recent years and is the terminator of an unprecedented number of OMS from the United States, the EU and other states – a total of 22,000 OMS have been imposed on the Russian Federation itself, as well as Russian individuals and legal entities from 2014 to the present. Although formally the agricultural sector of the Russian Federation is not a direct target of OOM, the consequences of restrictions in finance, logistics and insurance are extremely noticeable in the agricultural sector, making it difficult to export agricultural products to world markets, including to countries in need, and since the Russian Federation is one of the leading suppliers of certain types of agricultural products, there is a crisis in the global food market. The main difficulties of the Russian agricultural sector can also be identified as overcompensation by "Western" counterparties seeking to "faithfully" comply with the regulations of their states; informal restrictions (boycotts) of Russian companies in the field of cargo insurance, the refusal of foreign charterers and shipowners to work with Russian vessels in principle, the termination of the issuance of export credits by foreign banks to pay for Russian food supplies. from the Black Sea ports.

In fact, restrictive measures are government measures or measures of international intergovernmental organizations aimed at limiting or prohibiting certain actions or relations between States. Restrictive measures, depending on the subject and the order of their introduction, can be unilateral or collective. Within the framework of this article, we are interested in unilateral restrictive measures (OOM), which must be distinguished from "sanctions", which should be considered restrictive measures by the UN Security Council (UNSC) within its competence granted to it by the UN Charter against a state violating international law and order, within the framework of the procedure provided for by the UN Charter in order to maintain international peace. and Security (Articles 24, 39, 41 of the UN Charter).

However, it should be noted that international law does not explicitly prohibit the introduction of OOM. There is even a category of retaliatory countermeasures (retorsions, reprisals, self-defense). UNGA Resolution No. 56/83 of December 12, 2001 confirms the right of States to take countermeasures if the State that is the originator of these measures has committed an internationally wrongful act against it. Countermeasures are the only legitimate form of unilateral coercion in international law and are imposed by States in order to restore a pre-existing situation or influence other States that have violated their obligations towards them.

At the same time, the Russian Federation has not violated its international legal obligations towards the states that initiated the OOM, for example, the United States. Consequently, such MOS should be considered not as countermeasures, but as acts of economic aggression, which contradicts the fundamental principles of international law, including the principle of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force, peaceful resolution of international disputes, respect for human rights (the right to food), cooperation between States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations assumed. international legal obligations. The UN also recognized the contradiction of the OOM to the basic principles of international law, in particular, this was confirmed in the 2011 report of the UN Secretary General entitled: "Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries" (URL: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/publications/general_assembly/a_66_138.pdf (Date of reference: 12/15/2024)) and in the UNGA Resolution of October 27, 2015 A/RES/70/5, "The need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba."

The national doctrine of international law as a whole has a common understanding that the adoption by some States of unjustified, politically motivated acts against other States contradict international law. For example, K.V. Kritsky in his dissertation research stated the thesis that OOM are a mechanism for implementing foreign policy, contradict the basic principles and negatively affect the system of international law ^{[1, P. 12]}. F.Y. Panov considers OOM as a political mechanism of pressure, the legal basis of which are acts of national (supranational) law ^{[2, P. 138]}. Professor V.V. Voynikov notes that despite the possibility of states in international law and WTO law to introduce restrictive measures for security reasons, the EU sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation cannot be recognized as complying with international law ^{[3, p. 14]}.

International legal characteristics of agreements within the framework of the CHI

The initiative is the first agreement under the JI. The answer to the question of whether the Initiative is an international treaty within the meaning of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is not clear, since the parties did not explicitly provide for this in the text of the agreement. In the doctrine of international law, In such conditions, the position of I.I. Lukashuk seems to be fair, who believes that the main criterion for distinguishing an international treaty from an agreement of a non-legal nature is the intention of states to conclude a legally binding agreement ^{[4, p. 545]}. A. Aust notes that the UN International Law Commission has developed the main criterion for distinguishing international treaties and agreements. political (non–legal) agreements - the latter are not regulated by international law ^{[5, pp. 28-54]}.

It should also be noted that the Initiative was not registered as an international treaty, as required by Article 102 of the UN Charter, which deprived the parties of the right to refer to it in the UN bodies. However, as M.A. Eliseev rightly notes, the absence of registration of the treaty in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter does not in itself deprive the treaty of legal force ^{[6, p. 21]}.

The legal definition of an international treaty, given in Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, establishes the following features of an international treaty: it is an agreement between States; it is concluded in writing; it is governed by international law. At the same time, within the meaning of the Convention, the number of interrelated documents forming the contract does not matter, as well as the name of the contract itself. Article 2 of Federal Law No. 101–FZ of July 15, 1995 "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation" contains similar features of an international treaty, with the expansion of its subject matter to states, international organizations and other entities endowed with international legal personality.

It is also necessary to refer to the doctrinal definitions of an international treaty. Thus, A.N. Talalaev suggests the following characteristics of an international treaty: a) an explicit agreement between the wills of states and other subjects of international law; b) concluded on issues of mutual interest and designed to regulate the relationship between the parties; c) establishes the mutual rights and obligations of the parties; d) complies with the basic principles of international law ^[7]. G.I. Tunkin emphasizes that through an international treaty Subjects of international law agree to the recognition of specific rules as norms of international law ^{[8, pp. 75-76]}.

Thus, researchers agree that an international treaty should reflect the agreed expression of the will and initiative of States to establish precisely international legal obligations. Regarding Russia's intention and will to establish international legal obligations by signing the Initiative, one should cite the position of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in his article "Russia and Africa: Joining Forces for Peace, Progress and a Successful Future" in 2023, noted that "The Grain Deal was originally aimed at ensuring global food security, reducing the threat of hunger and helping the poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America – in fact, that is why Russia has committed itself to contribute to its implementation" (URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71719 (Date of access: 12/15/2024)). The use of the term "Grain Transaction" will be mentioned later. The key thing is that the President mentioned the word "commitment." Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking on July 22, 2022, with a statement upon the signing of the Initiative and the Memorandum, also stressed that "Russia will be committed to its obligations in this area" (URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1823484 / (Date of access: 12/15/2024)).

The initiative was concluded in writing in English, while there is no indication in the text that an authentic copy was signed in Russian or any other language. Analyzing the text of the Initiative in English, it can be concluded that it is ambiguous and contains contradictory formulations. For example, some provisions of the Initiative use the verb "shall", which is characteristic of legal English when formulating obligations, while other provisions use the verb "will", which implies an intention rather than an obligation.

The Initiative lacks the classical structure inherent in international treaties. Structurally, the Initiative consists of 5 paragraphs, with the fifth paragraph consisting of 9 sub-paragraphs (A-I). The designation of the agreement in question as an "Initiative" is irrelevant for its recognition as an international treaty, which follows from the above-mentioned features of an international treaty in the 1969 Vienna Convention.

According to the Vienna Convention of 1969, in order for an international agreement to become legally binding on the parties, they must express their consent to be bound by the treaty for them. Since the text of the Initiative does not contain provisions on how the parties express their consent to be bound by it, it appears that such consent was expressed by signing it by the parties (Articles 11, 12 of the 1969 Vienna Convention).

The initiative is a trilateral agreement, with Russia, Turkey and Ukraine acting as its subjects. At the same time, it should be noted that for military and political reasons, Russia and Ukraine did not sign a single document of the agreement. Instead, two separate but textually identical documents were signed between Russia and Turkey and between Turkey and Ukraine.

Such a mechanism seems to be determined only by political factors and is fully consistent with the rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention, since according to the above-mentioned definition of an international treaty in Article 2 of the Convention, from a legal point of view, it can be contained in either one or several documents. The main aspect here is that the Initiative was concluded between the subjects of international law – the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.

The United Nations, as an international organization, is not a Party to the Initiative, which follows from the content of paragraph 1 of the Initiative, however, in both cases, UN Secretary-General A. Guterres also signed these documents, but under the wording "Witnessed for the UN". It seems that this need could be caused by several factors. Firstly, since Russia and Ukraine signed the Initiative with Turkey separately, additional verification of the authenticity of the UN documents signed by them was required as an intermediary for concluding and executing the Initiative. Secondly, the UN mediation is declared in paragraph 4 of the Initiative as a manifestation of the "UN humanitarian Mission" in accordance with its powers (Article 1 of the UN Charter). In addition, paragraph 4 of the Initiative notes the special personal role of the UN Secretary-General in "organizing the discussion" of this Initiative, and the parties "request the Secretary-General to provide further assistance in its implementation."

Nevertheless, the UN, while not formally a participant in the Initiative, was nevertheless involved in its implementation. Thus, the text of the Initiative stipulated that the parties would establish a Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in Istanbul "under the auspices of the United Nations" (paragraph 5a of the Initiative), which also included representatives of the United Nations. UN staff members were also part of the inspection teams of the JCC, which will be mentioned later.

The purpose of the Initiative, as follows from the content of paragraph 3 of the Initiative, the parties considered the need to ensure safety in commercial shipping when exporting grain, food and fertilizers from Ukraine through the seaports of Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny. In addition, it is worth noting that the Initiative has a humanitarian purpose, since the parties initially concluded the Initiative on the condition of ensuring food security and stabilizing world grain prices through the resumption of grain exports from Russia and Ukraine.

The specific mechanism of cooperation between Russia, Turkey and Ukraine through the mediation of the United Nations is presented in paragraphs A-G of paragraph 5 as follows:

– The parties agreed to establish a JCC in Istanbul under the auspices of the United Nations. The SCC consisted of one official representative each from the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Nations, as well as the required number of staff. The SCC was responsible for the overall management and coordination of the Initiative, as well as ensuring the safety of navigation.;

– The SCC was supposed to develop and coordinate a safe MMC, a timetable and inspections of merchant vessels involved in the Initiative from three Ukrainian ports through the territorial waters of Ukraine and the international waters of the Black Sea to the Turkish Straits and in the opposite direction. All vessels involved in the Initiative were subject to registration with the JCC, and each voyage was coordinated with the JCC, including the ports of loading.;

– The SCC inspection teams, also consisting of representatives of the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Nations, were authorized, in accordance with the approved inspection schedule, to conduct an ongoing inspection of merchant vessels involved in the Initiative in harbors designated by Turkey at their exit/entry from the Turkish Strait for the presence of cargo and personnel not provided for by the Initiative.;

– The movement of vessels in the newly created MMC will be controlled by the parties remotely, and the warships and aircraft of the parties could not approach the humanitarian corridor closer than the distance agreed with the CCC.;

– The parties have guaranteed that they will not attack commercial and other civilian vessels, ports involved in the Initiative. If there was a violation of the terms of the Initiative, the occurrence of emergency situations, the parties and the JCC were entitled to provide assistance to the crews of ships and conduct additional inspections, while observing the norms of international maritime law. The implementation of the Initiative in Ukrainian territorial waters was under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, and in international waters was carried out jointly by the parties.

In paragraph 5h, the parties agreed on the initial period of the Initiative – 120 days with the right of automatic prolongation. At the same time, the right of the parties to express objections to the extension of the Initiative was provided, which, coupled with the relatively short duration of the Initiative, allowed the parties, objecting to the automatic prolongation of the Initiative on the previous terms, to propose new terms on which the party was ready to continue its participation in the Initiative.

In our opinion, the key aspect indicating that the Initiative is an international treaty is that it is governed by the norms of international maritime law (paragraph 2, paragraph 5f of the Initiative), including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, together with the Additional Protocol of 1988 (SOLAS-74) and the adopted based on it, the International Code for the Protection of Ships and Port Facilities 2002 (ISPS Code). All parties to the Initiative we are considering are parties to both SOLAS-74 and the ISPS Code. Researchers have a similar opinion.

In general terms, these international treaties regulate the safety of international navigation. According to paragraph 2 of the Initiative, it is based on Rule 11 of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS-74 (hereinafter, paragraph XI-2/11) and paragraph 26 of Chapter 4 of Part B of the ISPS Code (hereinafter, paragraph B-4.26). In accordance with paragraph XI-2/11 of SOLAS-74 and paragraph B-4.26 of the ISPS Code detailing it The parties have the right to conclude bilateral or multilateral written agreements on the use of alternative security systems in the context of the application of special measures to enhance maritime security. Such agreements apply exclusively to short-term scheduled international flights between ports located on the territory of the parties, on the other hand, the implementation of such agreements should not adversely affect the security of other ports and vessels. Thus, the author believes that the parties to the Initiative implied that they consider it as the above-mentioned international agreement.

In addition to SOLAS-74 and the ISPS Code, the Initiative is governed a priori by the norms of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (ILC-82), since the implementation of the Initiative by the parties involves their activities in international waters, the legal regime of which is established in the 1982 Convention.

Thus, it seems that the Initiative, despite the contradictory formulations in its text and the lack of a classical structure of an international treaty, is, within the meaning of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a tripartite urgent international treaty governed by international law, since it was concluded by the parties on the basis of and in compliance with other international treaties to which they are parties – ILC-82, SOLAS-74 and the ISPS Code.

European researchers G. Novak and H. Aust come to a similar opinion, who also believe that the Initiative: It is regulated by international law; the subjects of the Initiative are designated as "Parties", legally binding constructions are used regarding a number of aspects ("shall be set up", "agrees as follows", etc.), the name "Initiative" and the lack of a classical structure of an international treaty are of no fundamental importance, taking into account the objective circumstances of its conclusion ^[9] M. Kakabadze believes that since the Initiative and the Memorandum were developed and signed simultaneously, if the parties wanted to consider the Initiative as an illegal agreement, this would be explicitly stated in the text, as it is done in the Memorandum ^[10].

The fact that the format of the Initiative does not fully correspond to the "classical" structure of international treaties does not detract from its essence as an international treaty. Here it is appropriate to cite as an example the position that traditional international lawmaking has recently been in the process of quantitative and qualitative stagnation and is being replaced by more informal international lawmaking, characterized by freer and more flexible mechanisms ^{[11, p. 762]}. The author partially agrees with the researchers in the sense that in some cases requiring a prompt response to an international problem, States may use more flexible mechanisms of international law-making.

2. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat on promoting the Promotion of Russian Food and Fertilizers to World Markets dated July 22, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum) is the second agreement under the JI with a validity period of three years. Structurally, the Memorandum consists of a preamble and 7 paragraphs. It should be noted the high level of legal technology used in the preparation of the Memorandum.

From the point of view of international law, the Memorandum of Understanding is not an international treaty, which is explicitly stated in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum. It does not establish obligations under international law and has no legal force as a treaty. This is a document that enshrines the political commitments, agreements and intentions of the parties — the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat — on the issues of facilitating the export of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets in the context of the OOM. However

In the preamble of the Memorandum, the parties state the existing significant problems with ensuring global food security and achieving SDG No. 2, confirm the special role of Russia in maintaining food security in developing and least developed countries and the special role of the United Nations in coordinating measures to combat the global food crisis under restrictive measures, declare the need to consolidate the efforts of the UN Secretariat and the Russian Federation in eliminating the obstacles created by the OOM of individual states in the relations of the Russian financial and transport sector and the overcompensation of business structures that make it difficult for transparent and unhindered supplies of Russian agricultural products and fertilizers to world markets in order to stabilize world prices for food and fertilizers.

The specific mechanism of interaction between Russia and the UN Secretariat is presented as follows:

- Russia, for its part, guarantees to continue commercial supplies of food and fertilizers to countries in need of them, and will inform the Secretariat through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations of any specific obstacles encountered in the export of these products of food and fertilizers, such as logistical problems, OOM or other barriers. In addition, the Russian Federation agreed to facilitate the export of food, sunflower oil and fertilizers from the Black Sea Ukrainian ports. It is in this phrase that the connection between the Initiative and the Memorandum appears to be manifested.

- The UN Secretariat, for its part, agreed to continue efforts to eliminate restrictive barriers in the field of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets and, to this end, confirmed its commitment to work with the authorities and the private sector to achieve relevant exemptions from restrictions in order to facilitate unhindered and transparent supplies to the markets of developing and least developed countries agricultural products. The UN Secretariat has also agreed to provide advice to domestic companies on doing business with the UN and helps in registering Russian manufacturers as UN suppliers.

The Memorandum entered into force immediately from the moment of its signing, which follows from the content of paragraph 6 of the Memorandum. The Parties agreed on the validity period of the Memorandum in three years. At the same time, the termination of the Memorandum is possible by sending a written notification to the other party of the intention to terminate the execution of the Memorandum. Despite the fact that the Initiative has already ceased to be valid due to its non-prolongation, the Memorandum remains in force from a formal legal point of view, since there is no official confirmation that any of the parties sent such a notification to the other party.

Execution and results of the agreements within the framework of the JI

By concluding the Initiative and the Memorandum, the parties implied their interrelated, "package" nature, despite their different legal nature. Sergey Lavrov noted that from the very beginning, the agreements within the framework of the JI were proposed by the UN Secretary General as a single initiative, and Russia agreed to exactly such conditions (URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1823484 / (Date of request: 12/15/2024)). In the above-mentioned article, Russian President Vladimir Putin focused his attention on the fact that the Initiative and the Memorandum together constitute a "Grain deal" and imply reciprocal "obligations" towards Russia to withdraw Russian grain and fertilizers from the action of the OOM of Western states, which were never fulfilled, and therefore Russia refused extending the Initiative.

It should be noted that the term "grain transaction" was often used on the sidelines of political discussions and the media, however, it should be understood that this was rather a "political characteristic" of the phenomena under consideration and should not be identified with the civil category of the transaction. Moreover, the Initiative and the Memorandum cannot be considered as a single international agreement for the reasons described above. There are no specific references to each other in the text of the Initiative and the Memorandum. The only formal confirmation of the connection between the Initiative and the Memorandum is the provision of paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Intent of Russia to facilitate the transportation of food and fertilizers from the ports of Ukraine through the Black Sea. The text of the Initiative did not contain similar provisions.

As part of the implementation of the Initiative, by the end of July 2022, the SCC was organized in Istanbul; the boundaries of the MMC were agreed – almost 140 nautical miles long and 3 nautical miles wide; the SCC developed and adopted rules and procedures for the organization of commercial shipping on the MMC (URL: https://www.un.org/sites/un 2.un.org/files/jcc_shipping_procedures_26_aug_2022.pdf (Date of request: 12/15/2024)). During the entire period of the Initiative, more than a thousand flights were made, through which almost 33 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products (cucumbers, wheat, sunflower, etc.) were transported.

The implementation of the Initiative lasted for almost 1 year from July 22, 2022 to July 17, 2023. During the initial period of the Initiative, Russia suspended its participation in it from October 29 to November 2, as Ukraine violated its obligations by firing at the Russian Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. At the same time, it seems that Russia suspended its participation in the Initiative lawfully, in accordance with the Vienna Convention of 1969, since, within the meaning of Part 2 of Article 60 of the Convention, a party to the treaty who suffered from a violation of contractual obligations by another party has the right to suspend the operation of the treaty in relations with the guilty party.

On November 17, the Initiative was automatically extended for 120 days, due to the absence of objections from the parties (paragraph 5h of the Initiative). On March 14, 2023, the Initiative was extended for 60 days, as Russia exercised its right to change the terms of the Initiative by notifying the parties. At the same time, the reason for the shortening of the Initiative by the Russian side was the "non-fulfillment of the conditions" of the Memorandum regarding food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation. Russia also extended the Initiative by 60 days on May 17, 2023 in a similar way. On July 17, 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated the termination of the Initiative, announcing that Russia objects to its extension on the basis of paragraph 5h (URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897157 / (Date of access: 12/15/2024)). Consequently, the Initiative as an international treaty was lawfully terminated on the internal basis of its termination – the expiration of the validity period and the refusal of the Russian Federation from its prolongation. As mentioned earlier, the Memorandum remains in force de jure, although its de facto implementation is difficult.

The implementation of the Memorandum formally began immediately after its signing. For example, a special task Force was organized within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD SCG), whose competence included cooperation with the authorities of the initiator states of the OOM in relation to the Russian Federation in order to exclude Russian food and fertilizers from the action of the OOM, reduce world prices for food and fertilizers, stabilize agricultural markets, and as a result, ensuring global food security.

At the initial stage, there has been some progress in this direction. The main activity was observed in November 2022, against the background of the upcoming extension of the Initiative. On November 4, the Ministry of Finance of the United Kingdom accepted a General License for financial transactions related to the export of Russian agricultural products and fertilizers, including insurance services (URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1115732/Publication_Notice_INT.2022.2349952.pdf. (Date of application: 12/15/2024)). On November 11, the office of the UN Secretary-General announced preparations for the shipment to Malawi of the first batch of Russian fertilizers, which had been blocked in European ports for a long time, which was the result of negotiations between the UN Secretary-General and the P&I club of Lloyd's Insurers. On November 14, on the eve of the G20 summit, the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy J. Borrell, U.S. Secretary of State E. Blinken and British Foreign Minister J. The Cleverleys signed a joint statement on global food security and "sanctions" against Russia. The document emphasized that "the three countries have made certain exceptions to their sanctions regimes, allowing banks, insurance companies, carriers and other participants to continue supplying Russian food and fertilizers to world markets" (URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-us-uk-joint-statement-global-foodsecurity-and-russia-sanctions-high-representative_en (Date of request: 12/15/2024)).

However, the effectiveness and practical implementation of the Memorandum leave many questions, and these changes made up only a small part of those OMS that would solve the bulk of the problems of the Russian Federation in the field of agricultural exports. D.S. Vecherin, for example, considers "the measures taken by the UN Secretariat to ensure unhindered supplies of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets during the implementation of the Memorandum to be clearly insufficient" ^{[12, p. 163]}.

In current economic and political domestic scientific research, scientific research notes the fact that JI as a whole had both positive and negative aspects. In particular, I.V. Deryugina, arguing, believes that "the JI positively influenced the image of Russia, especially in relations with Africa" ^{[13, P. 14]}. L.N. Klepatsky and D.S. Matyukhin name two main factors of the failure of the JI: the unwillingness of the states of the collective West to comply with the terms of the Memorandum between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat and the use of The Ukrainian MMC in the Black Sea in order to carry out anti-Russian sabotage ^{[14, p. 83]}.

It is worth noting that in non-legal studies, as well as in the media, one can encounter loose and illegible characteristics of the Memorandum, for example, in relation to the "obligations" of the UN Secretariat and even more so the obligations of third states, for example, the "Collective West" within the framework of the Memorandum. The Memorandum does not contain any international legal obligations. The UN Secretariat does not have the right to "oblige" states to behave in a certain way, it only has the right to make recommendations regarding the relaxation of the OOM in relation to the Russian Federation. The UN Secretariat does not have the right to influence the actions of States in this matter, since the opposite was considered interference in the internal affairs of states (Part 7 of Article 2 of the UN Charter). Also, in the law of international treaties, there is a general rule res inter alios acta, according to which an agreement cannot establish obligations for third parties, in this case States, without their written consent.

From our point of view, the obvious problem that led to the fact that the Memorandum turned out to be ineffective, which eventually also led to the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Initiative, is the legal status of the Memorandum and the vagueness of its wording. The UN Secretariat actually acted as an intermediary between the Russian Federation and the initiator states of the OOM. De facto, the UN Secretariat had to "persuade" the authorities of the initiator states of the OOM to faithfully fulfill their international legal obligations, since OOMs affecting the supply of agricultural products inherently contradict the general principles of international law and the special principle of excluding supplies necessary to ensure global food security, from under the action of the OOM. The Secretariat, as a statutory body of the United Nations, tried only to carry out mediation functions within the framework of the common humanitarian goal of the United Nations. It would be more productive for Russia to conclude counter-agreements, legally binding agreements directly with the initiator states of the OOM in relation to the Russian Federation.

It seems that the experience of implementing agreements within the framework of the JI, the initiator states of the OOM in relation to the Russian Federation are not interested in ensuring food security, since they pursue their own economic and geopolitical goals. This fact was also highlighted in the official position of the Russian Federation at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (URL: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/publications/general_assembly/a_66_138.pdf (Date of application: 12/15/2024)).

In addition, Vladimir Putin in his article rightly stressed that the main "humanitarian" purpose of the agreements under the JI was violated, since most of the agricultural products exported from Ukraine during the implementation of the Initiative were supplied to high-income countries, while no more than 3% were exported to countries in need. The Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that the humanitarian goal of the JI was only declared and immediately after the signing of the agreements, purely commercial interests began to be pursued, since the main beneficiaries of Ukrainian agricultural products are large Western agricultural holdings (URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897157 / (Date of access: 12/15/2024)).

Formally, the JI was of a humanitarian nature and was aimed at maintaining food supplies to global chains, which was important to prevent further destabilization of global food markets. JI demonstrates that cooperation between states is possible even in conditions of political contradictions and conflicts, if it is aimed at ensuring food security, which corresponds to the basic provisions of international law and the UN SDGs. Despite the obvious failure of the JI, this experience opens up new prospects for the further implementation of the mediation function of the United Nations (or the UN Secretary-General) in the field of cooperation between states in the field of agriculture in the context of restrictive measures to ensure global food security.

In accordance with the UN Charter, one of the main goals of its creation is to promote international peace and security, including food security. According to Article 1 of the UN Charter, one of the UN's tasks is "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature." This includes food security, which is an integral part of global sustainable development. Article 55 of the UN Charter confirms that "the Organization must contribute to: ... the development of the common well-being of peoples and their economic and social progress." This provision underlines the need for the UN to actively participate in issues related to agriculture and food security. According to Article 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General may "at his discretion address the Security Council on any issue that, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." This provision allows the Secretary-General to act as a mediator in a situation where conflicting interests of States in the field of agriculture are at stake. It seems that the "conditions" of the Memorandum could have been implemented more effectively, and the Initiative would have continued to operate if this issue had been submitted to the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly.

Conclusions

Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1) In recent years, food security has been under threat due to a number of reasons, including the consequences of COVID-19, armed conflicts, natural disasters, and restrictive measures by States. The general prerequisites for the emergence of a crisis in the global food market in the spring of 2022 and, as a result of the conclusion of the JI, were restrictions on the supply of food and fertilizers from the two largest grain and fertilizer suppliers at that time: Russia, due to the introduction of restrictive measures by a number of states against the Russian Federation, the action of which affected the Russian agricultural sector and Ukraine, against the background of armed conflict. The restrictive measures imposed on the Russian Federation by the United States and its allied states contradict the basic principles of international law, to the extent that they affect the trade in agricultural products, thereby destabilizing global food security.

2) From an international legal point of view, the JI was represented by two formally unrelated and legally different agreements: the Initiative concluded between the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine and the Memorandum between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat. The initiative should be considered as a trilateral urgent international agreement establishing an alternative system for the protection of merchant shipping in the Black Sea, in order to ensure the safe export of agricultural products from Ukraine for humanitarian purposes. The memorandum is a political agreement, an agreement of intent, according to which the UN Secretariat undertook to assist in the removal of restrictive measures that impede the promotion of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets on the basis of the principle of excluding agricultural supplies from restrictive measures.

3) JI's failure appears to be due to two factors. First, initially, the very design of the JI: an international agreement - an agreement of intent in modern conditions was obviously unprofitable for the Russian Federation, since Russia, having assumed international legal obligations, in response received only "political promises" to eliminate restrictions on the export of Russian food to states in need, which, through the prism of the basic principles of international law and It should have been done that way. In fact, the UN "promised" the Russian Federation to "ask" the states that initiated the OOM to comply with their international legal obligations. Secondly, the practice of implementing the Initiative has shown that the humanitarian goal of the Initiative was only a cover to ensure the commercial interests of the United States and its satellites. The practice of implementing the Initiative also proves Russia's commitment to conscientious compliance with its international legal obligations.

4) JI is an example of the fact that international legal cooperation between States in the field of agriculture and food security is possible even in the context of global geopolitical confrontation, armed conflicts and restrictive measures. JI is also important for the development of international law in the sense that it reflects the importance of the United Nations as an intermediary in relations between States in situations of armed conflict and restrictive measures to ensure international peace and security, including global food security. It is necessary to further expand the mediation of the United Nations in relations between States in solving problems with food security. Perhaps the implementation of the JI would have been more successful if the issue of lifting the OOM affecting the export of Russian food and fertilizers had been raised more seriously and submitted for consideration by other bodies of the UN system, for example, the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council.