Formation of the system of training and staffing of industrial enterprises of Stalingrad with engineering and technical workers during the period of industrialization (1929-1941)

Lozin Dmitrii Ivanovich Senior Lecturer; Department of National History and Local History Education; Volgograd State Socio-Pedagogical University 400050, Russia, Volgograd region, Volgograd, Prospekt Lenina, 27, office 3 - 04 dil199734587@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

The industrial policy of the Soviet Union, pursued in 1929-1941, became a time of fundamental modernization of the entire economy of the USSR, the creation of new sectors of the economy, the construction of new enterprises, and the overcoming of technical and economic backwardness from advanced Western countries. Such achievements were impossible without an engineering and technical link responsible for the organization, operation, as well as technical and scientific support of production. However, the problem of shortage of qualified engineering and technical personnel during the period of industrialization and especially during the first five—year plan was quite acute. At the time of 1930, there were about 100,000 technical specialists in the USSR. Of these, there were 24.1 thousand with higher education, 27.5 thousand with secondary education, and 48.4 thousand practitioners. As A. I. Beilin noted, one of the most important problems was the shortage of qualified engineering and technical workers in the main production activities and in the field of reconstruction and modernization of production ^{[1, pp.121-132]}.

The understanding of the need for a sufficient number of qualified engineers and technicians was reflected by the Soviet leadership in the first five-year plan. In particular, the document noted that only during the period of implementation of the first five-year plan, the shortage of engineers amounted to 15,000 people ^{[2, pp.76-77]}. To eliminate this breakthrough, it was planned to double the proportion of engineering and technical personnel in relation to workers.

For Stalingrad, the provision of enterprises with engineering and technical workers was of particular relevance. Being at the intersection of water and rail transport links, as well as having a fairly developed industrial base during the Russian Empire, Stalingrad became one of the cities where active economic development was initiated ^[3].

It was planned to create and launch production only for the first five-year plan: The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the district power plant, the Shipbuilding Plant (Shipyard), the Stalingrad Chemical Plant, as well as the major modernization of the enterprises "Barricades" and "Red October". During the third five-year plan, the construction of large cracking equipment plants for the oil industry and a hydrolysis plant was carried out. In total, there were 227 enterprises of various profiles in Stalingrad ^{[4, pp. 250-264]}.

During the period of the first five-year plan, Stalingrad began to produce 55% of the industrial output of the Lower Volga region, which made it one of the economic centers of the entire south of the USSR.

Such a large number of enterprises, which were also built using the latest technologies of the time, required a huge number of qualified workers and engineering and technical personnel. At the same time, given the diversity of enterprises by type of products, the technical staff had to be not just highly specialized, but highly specialized, able to take into account the specifics of the goods produced.

However, as the researchers note, engineering and technical workers, especially those with specialized education, were sorely lacking at Stalingrad enterprises. T. V. Yudina notes that in the early 1930s, there were practically no free engineers in Stalingrad ^[3].

Considering that Stalingrad, unlike Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other industrial centers of that period, lacked a long industrial tradition and a sufficient resource base of qualified personnel workers, the problem became even more acute. Solving the problem of personnel shortage required the involvement of all forces and resources, the use of non-standard solutions from the authorities and the internal factory management. This is what justifies the choice of the territorial framework of the study.

Historiography of the issue

The development of a system for training engineering and technical personnel and their recruitment to industrial enterprises in Stalingrad is an urgent problem today. Its study by Russian researchers was carried out both within the framework of a separate aspect of Soviet industrialization as a whole, and within the framework of highlighting this topic as a separate problem. Thus, N.A. Bolotov in his monograph considers the development of the social policy of the Soviet government in the Lower Volga region in the 1920s and 1930s as a multi–vector activity for the distribution of material benefits and the implementation of social programs for the creation of a new socialist state. The author devotes special attention to the problem of the formation of the working class during the period of industrialization, revealing the sources of its recruitment and training problems. In the same place, the author also points out some features of providing the factories of the Lower Volga region with technical specialists, noting first of all the use of a system for nominating ordinary workers to IT positions, the use of foreign specialists and politically convicted engineers in the framework of the Shakhty case ^[5].

The work of A.Y. Bazhenov is of great value for the disclosure of the problem posed in the study. Studying the development of armored production in Stalingrad, the scientist touches on the specifics of attracting a large number of foreign specialists at the initial stage to create production facilities, as well as attracting specialists who are banned for political reasons from working in the central regions of the USSR. It is particularly worth highlighting the author's thesis about the impossibility of recruiting industrial enterprises only by graduates of technical universities, since the system of technical education in Stalingrad was just going through its formative years, which is why the in–house training of technical specialists within the framework of various technical courses played a huge role ^[6].

V.A. Cholakhyan, T.V. Yudina, and O.O. Rezanenko separately address the problem of providing industrial enterprises in Stalingrad in their research. V.A. Cholakhyan examines the main forms of attracting the peasantry to enterprises in the Lower Volga region and the problems of their training within the framework of factory apprenticeship, technical minimum circles, and other various technical sections, circles, and exhibitions. The author separately touches upon the participation of foreign workers and specialists in the industrialization of Stalingrad, revealing the main countries from which the process of attracting foreign specialists took place, the specifics of their tasks and working conditions at industrial enterprises in Stalingrad ^[7]. T.V. Yudina and O.O. Rezanenko, developing the problem of the participation of foreign specialists in Stalingrad factories, specify the number of such workers during the beginning of the Noting the decrease in the number of foreigners in Stalingrad's industry by 1939, the authors also detailed the forms of attracting foreign specialists to the USSR, highlighting official and non-official methods of recruiting them, and the conditions of their residence in Stalingrad ^{[8, 9]}. Separately, T.V. Yudina considered the problem of shortage of workers and ways to solve it ^[3].

However, the studies described above mainly address the problem of a shortage of workers. The authors did not focus on the training and recruitment of engineering and technical workers to the industrial enterprises of Stalingrad, who were a key link in the development of the industrial potential of the region.

The novelty of the work, therefore, is the disclosure of the problem of the formation of a system for training and recruiting industrial enterprises in Stalingrad with engineering and technical workers during the period of industrialization as an integrated system. Based on archival sources and periodical press materials, the study characterizes external and internal sources of training and recruitment of engineering and technical personnel, examines the problems that arose during the implementation of this activity, and evaluates the results of providing industrial personnel in Stalingrad by the end of the industrialization period.

Research methodology.

The study is based on a systematic approach that allows us to consider the solution of the problem of recruiting engineers and technicians to Stalingrad factories and training new technical personnel as a system. Thus, in the course of the study, external sources of recruitment of enterprises with engineering and technical workers, as well as the internal capabilities and resources of the city for the training of qualified technical specialists, were considered.

The research also used a functional and structural approach, which allowed us to consider the activities of factories, educational institutions and the state as a whole aimed at recruiting qualified technical personnel to enterprises.

Provision of Stalingrad enterprises with technical specialists in the early 1930s.

As noted above, during the period of the beginning of industrialization in Stalingrad, due to the beginning of active industrial construction, there was an acute shortage of qualified engineering and technical workers.

This situation was complicated by the fact that both new plants and old ones were equipped with new, advanced technology at that time, which even existing engineers and technicians could not master quickly. In particular, in the 1930s, the Krasny Oktyabr Steel Plant switched to producing high–quality steel to service the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. The model for such a reconstruction was the German metallurgical industry, which, according to P. N. Sporyshkov's memoirs, enjoyed world fame. The same can be seen by the nature of the equipment ordered from the German companies Siemens, Man, Krupp and others ^{[10, pp. 35-39]}.

However, the number of engineering and technical staff for the development of new technologies was extremely insufficient. So, in October 1929, there were 35 engineers and 65 technicians at the plant ^{[5, p. 159]}. The qualification of these personnel was also a big problem. For example, in the newspaper Krasny Oktyabr in 1930, in the article "Give a technically competent force," it was noted that there were no technically competent managers in the bridge workshop, which caused this workshop to experience constant difficulties in its work. In particular, the example of two "illiterate craftsmen" (Krembi and Tatarkin) was cited, who "can not cope with the work, but there is no one to replace them" ^[11].

Moreover, the trend of shortage of engineering and technical staff due to the constant increase in the projected capacities remained in the future. For example, according to the "Minutes of meetings of the factory Personnel Commission" in 1931, an additional 82 engineering and technical workers were required ^{[12, l.10]}.

In 1933, 3/4 of the entire engineering and technical staff of the plant had a lower non—technical education. At the same time, as noted in the newspaper, most of them were only "elementary literate." Individual workshops were particularly revealing this problem, namely: open-hearth; varietal; large-grade blum; new medium-grade; sheet. In these departments, 202 out of 265 ITP had a lower education, 5 people had a general secondary education and 50 people had a special technical education ^[13].

The Stalingrad Shipyard, which was under construction by 1930, was in a "breakthrough" situation, when the backlog from the construction schedule of some workshops was more than 20%. For example, the shipbuilding workshop lagged by 29%, the mechanical workshop by 30%, and the finished goods warehouse by 26%. One of the reasons for this lag was, according to the personnel verification protocol, the lack of qualified labor and engineering staff ^{[14, L.14]}. As researcher A. Y. Bazhenov notes, by 1931, the shortage of engineering and technical staff at the Stalingrad Shipyard was 300 people ^{[6, p.39]}.

The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, as the first tractor-building plant in the country, was in a privileged position in terms of staffing workshops with technical personnel. As noted in the book "People of Stalingrad Tractor Plant", 70% of the technical staff were young people who had only recently graduated from Soviet universities. However, it was also pointed out there that they themselves were still learning to master in—line production ^{[15, p.15]}. In general, at the time of 1930, the plant required 10,408 workers and 473 engineering and technical workers to function ^{[4, p.254]}. However, by 1930, as N.A. Pichuzhkin's research shows, 131 engineering and technical workers worked at the STZ. At the same time, 38 of them had higher education, 55 had secondary education, and 33 engineers were practitioners ^[16].

At smaller enterprises, the shortage of engineering staff was also a significant issue. So, in December 1930, 25 employees of the administrative and technical staff worked at the Stalingrad Cannery. Of these, 3 people had higher education, 4 had higher education, 5 had secondary education, 4 had secondary education, and 9 had lower education. The plant lacked such a number of specialists, and, as noted in the "Minutes of the meetings of the commission for personnel verification of the Stalingrad Cannery," more technicians, mechanics, engineers and mechanics were needed, 18 canners or 72% of the total available staff.

The military enterprise, namely Barricades, had the most satisfactory indicators of saturation with technical personnel. In total, 132 engineers were registered at the plant at the time of 1930. There were 66 people with higher education, 63 with secondary education, and 3 specialists with primary education. In general, as noted in the protocol, the Barrikady enterprise had the best recruitment of highly qualified specialists (engineers) and was equal to 25% of the total ^{[17, pp. 5-12]}.

At the same time, the absolute majority of specialists, namely 2/3 of the staff, worked at this plant quite a bit (up to 1 year) and only 6% worked at the enterprise for more than 3 years. Because of this, as specified in the protocol, the technical and administrative guidance was not sufficient ^{[17, l.2]}.

The situation with the shortage of qualified engineering staff was complicated by the constant enlargement of enterprises, setting new tasks for them to improve their products, their quality and quantity. So, according to the original design of 1926 The Stalingrad Tractor Plant was supposed to produce 10,000 tractors per year, but already in 1929. The Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council approved a project assignment of 40,000 tractors "International" ^{[4, p.252]}. In addition, during the construction process, the organization of armored production of the T—26 light tank was designed, for which a special design bureau was specially created, which had the task of establishing in-line production of this armored vehicle ^{[6, p.34]}. By 1940, mass production of the T—34 medium tank was underway at the STZ, which was accompanied by numerous problems, including due to the fact that the plant did not have production personnel qualified in the production of this military equipment ^{[18, p.6]}.

The Krasny Oktyabr plant, which was specially upgraded to produce high-quality steel, including for the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, was also undergoing constant modernization. By 1931, the company planned to equip a new thermal workshop, a medium—grade drawing and drawing shop. Three new 70—ton furnaces were installed in the open-hearth workshop. They required even more administrative and technical staff to work for them, which was not enough even with the existing capacities ^[19].

The above data show that the problem of staffing Stalingrad enterprises with technical personnel was quite acute at the time of the beginning of industrialization. To solve this problem, various methods were used, aimed both at the external involvement of already trained technical personnel, and their training within the framework of the in-house and external (special educational institutions) training systems.

External sources of recruitment and training of technical specialists.

The external form of attracting specialists was one of the most relevant during the first five-year plan of 1929-1932. This is explained by the fact that the formation of specialized technical secondary and higher educational institutions had just begun by the time of 1929, and could not ensure the mass graduation of specialists. The in-house training system was also undergoing a process of formation by this period, and also did not have a full-fledged resource and personnel base for the training of highly qualified specialists.

Considering that the process of creating and modernizing Soviet enterprises was based on foreign equipment and production experience, foreign engineers and technicians were an important source of replenishment of plants with qualified technical personnel.

The organization of work of foreign specialists at enterprises of the Soviet Union and in Stalingrad in particular has been studied in detail in modern research. For example, researcher V. A. Cholakhyan reveals that the Soviet government actively attracted foreign specialists to master new imported equipment and transfer production experience. This was facilitated by the high unemployment rate that began in the West due to the severe economic crisis — the "great depression" of 1929-1933. In the course of this crisis, the Soviet state had the opportunity to hire foreign specialists actively looking for work through the conclusion of contracts for technical assistance or technical assistance. During the period 1923-1933 alone, 170 contracts were concluded with foreign companies totaling 93 million rubles ^[7].

Foreign specialists began to actively arrive in Stalingrad in the late 1920s and 1930s. After the construction of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant in the city and the radical reconstruction of the Krasny Oktyabr enterprises as a base of metallurgy and the Barricade military enterprise.

There were two main forms of recruitment for foreign technical specialists: legal and non-legal recruitment. In the first case, it was envisaged to conclude contracts individually or with a foreign company as a whole. Secondly, foreign specialists entered the USSR as tourists, who then got jobs in Soviet enterprises ^[3].

It also provided for the planned and unplanned recruitment of Stalingrad enterprises by foreign specialists. For example, by May 1931, the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical enterprise had 26 foreign specialists invited outside the plan, and a plan was being drawn up to invite 4 specialists to permanent work and 6 technical workers from the Krupp company to consult on the organization of production of the main workshops ^{[20, l. 44]}.

The role of foreign specialists in the industrialization of Stalingrad's industry cannot be overestimated. They were responsible for the design of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the radical modernization of old enterprises, the installation of imported machinery and the establishment of a conveyor production method ^[21]. However, the question of the number of engineering and technical workers who came from other countries is still a problematic issue, as is the question of the number of foreign specialists in general. Thus, V. A. Cholakhyan notes that during the first five-year plan, Stalingrad was one of the largest colonies of foreigners and had about 364 foreign specialists, 69 of whom were engineers and technicians ^[7].

At the same time, if we count foreign specialists who participated not only in setting up equipment and did not live in the USSR for a long time, we get a much larger figure. For example, researcher A. Y. Bazhenov reveals that 500 American and 50 German engineers were sent to the Soviet Union to build the STZ ^{[6, p.29]}.

By 1933, the number of foreign technical specialists at Stalingrad enterprises was beginning to decrease. Thus, researcher N. A. Bolotov reveals that by 1938, no more than 59 foreign specialists worked in Stalingrad ^{[5, p. 212]}.

The reason for this was the quantitative growth of Soviet technical specialists who completed internships abroad, studied in specialized educational institutions in the USSR itself and, not least, the expensive maintenance of specialists from abroad ^[7].

In addition to sending foreign technical specialists to the industrial enterprises of Stalingrad, Soviet engineers and technicians from other industrial centers of the Soviet Union were also attracted ^{[19, p.207]}. At the same time, graduates of various technical institutions, as well as experienced specialists, were sent. Thus, in 1930, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), 290 technical specialists were sent from Moscow and Leningrad to the STZ ^{[4, p.255]}.

Technical specialists were also sent for other enterprises, for example, for a shipyard. At the same time, as A. Y. Bazhenov notes, the secondment of experienced engineering and technical workers to Stalingrad enterprises was facilitated by the Shakhty affair, when a number of repressed technical specialists were forbidden to live and work in central cities, which facilitated their referral to industrial enterprises in Stalingrad ^{[6, pp.39-40]}. For example, in 1930, the Secretary of the RK VKP (b) ordered the Secret part of the Shipyard's management to establish careful control over the engineers Pirogov and Sokolsky serving their sentences, as well as other technical specialists sent by the RCT authorities from other institutions and enterprises ^{[14, l.3]}.

In 1931, an old and experienced metallurgist A. A. Snitsyn worked at the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical enterprise, which was under the control of GPU authorities ^{[10, p.83]}.

The above practice of sending IT equipment to enterprises in Stalingrad continued in subsequent years. For example, as noted in the "Report on the state of personnel at Plant No. 91 for 1940" (Khimprom), the staffing of senior economic and political personnel took place through the regional organizations of the People's Commissariat of Chemical Industry at the expense of seconded specialists who graduated from universities and technical schools.

Judging by the placement of personnel in higher administrative and technical specialties, this practice has been quite successful. Thus, the positions of plant director, chief engineer, head of the production and technical department, chief mechanic, power engineer, that is, all central plant management bodies were staffed by specialists with higher technical education in the relevant field (chemical engineer, electrical engineer, etc.) in the second half of 1940, 38 specialists arrived at the Chemical Industry, which made it possible to replace 33 practitioners working in IT positions ^{[22, l. 1-30]}.

A similar practice can be observed at the Shipyard, where in 1941, the plant's management, in connection with the introduction of a new work facility, made a request to replenish the IT staff in the number of 20 people ^{[22, l.30]}.

In addition, in the period 1939-1941, an important way to replenish technical personnel was the redistribution of technical specialists between factories. An example of staffing plant No. 221 is illustrative. By 1939, this plant was undergoing reconstruction, in particular, a separate design and technology bureau of the People's Commissariat of Armaments was being created. To implement these plans, the factory administration, together with the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), planned to send 100 engineers from other enterprises of the city.

However, obtaining specialists was accompanied by great difficulties, as neither the enterprises from which the employees were sent, nor the People's Commissariats in charge of them wanted to part with qualified personnel. So, by March 1939, only 8 engineers had been sent, as the directors of Krasny Oktyabr, the Shipyard and the Shipbuilding College refused to release the selected workers, arguing that they had instructions from their People's Commissariats, which forbade the release of specialists ^{[23, pp.115-116]}.

In parallel with the referral and redistribution of technical specialists, an active process of developing the training of engineers and technicians took place. During the first five-year plan of 1929-1933, sending specialists on business trips to foreign countries, primarily to the USA and Germany, was actively used to train specialists and gain practical experience working on new foreign equipment. In order to send Soviet specialists for training, the USSR government concluded agreements with foreign firms, which made it possible to work at their enterprises. So, during the first five-year plan, the USSR could keep up to 30 people as interns at the German Krupp plants. After returning, engineers and technicians who gained practical experience passed it on to other specialists, and also compiled technological instructions ^{[10, p.115]}.

Specialists from the Stalingrad Tractor Plant were sent to practice in the USA. In particular, I. V. Ivanov, director of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, was one of the first to visit the United States in order to gain experience in production. In his memoirs, he describes his trips to different cities in the United States, where he supervised the process of creating equipment for STZ and at the same time studied the production experience. According to the author's memoirs, engineers and craftsmen of about the same age, no older than 30, practiced at different factories in North America ^{[15, p.58]}.

As a rule, specialists with completed education or extensive production experience were sent on business trips abroad. For example, when discussing a new collective agreement at the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical enterprise, it was noted that in order to improve the skills of workers with 3 One-year and higher work experience is represented by 5 overseas business trips and 20 within the USSR, while those workers who completed advanced training courses were sent on business trips ^[24].

It can be seen from the contract that an equally important practice of improving the skills of workers and IT specialists was to send them to other factories in the USSR with extensive production experience. Thus, during the first five-year plan, the Krasny Oktyabr plant sent specialists to Leningrad to the Izhorsky, Krasny Putilovets and others plants, where they got acquainted with the smelting of alloy steels ^{[10, pp. 62-68]}.

Internal sources for the training of engineering and technical personnel.

However, business trips, especially abroad, were expensive, so the most widespread type of education in Stalingrad during the period of industrialization was the in-house training system. She meant different formats of study, depending on the specialist's existing qualifications.

Thus, the training of specialists with certain qualifications and experience took place within the framework of various educational centers, where the plant's employees taught with experienced and specialized technical education.

For example, on the basis of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant in May 1930, the bureau of the Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) organized a "Workers' University" within the framework of which mastery of technology took place. This center was divided into departments according to the workshops of the plant and included: foundry, mechanical, blacksmithing, planning and other departments. The departments, in turn, were divided into three levels of training, where representatives of low-skilled workers were trained at the first level, masters, technicians and engineers of a narrow specialty were trained at the second, and at the third level. Each concern was completed, and after appropriate practical tests, the worker was given a certificate giving him the right to change his qualifications ^{[25, l.11]}.

By 1933, 24 engineers and 4 technicians taught at the Workers' University and 180 technical workers were trained, mainly foremen of senior flights. The number of graduates at the time of 1933 was 287 technicians ^[26]. As noted in the certificate, the entire third year was built so that the worker who graduated from it could be accepted as a student of the Stalingrad Tractor Institute ^{[25, l.11]}.

A FOUNDATION (Faculty of General Education and Technical Sciences) was organized at the Krasny Oktyabr Metallurgical Plant to improve the skills of engineering and technical workers ^{[10, p. 161]}. The FSTK (factory technical courses) also functioned. By the time of 1930, 18 engineers were studying at the FSTK. 210 people were trained as technicians in the preparatory groups. Despite a fairly large number of trainees (compared to the total number of full—time specialists), the learning process itself was not organized efficiently enough due to the lack of professional teachers. Just like at the STZ, the factory was taught by full-time engineers and technicians who were unable to teach special advanced disciplines ^[19].

The Chemical Industry of Stalingrad operated a system of in-house training of technical personnel, designed for three-year courses. Operating since 1938, it has produced 14 engineering and technical workers. In total, 112 people were studying at them at the time of January 1, 1940 ^{[27, L.22]}.

The system of in-house training was constantly evolving and was under the close supervision of the party authorities.

So, in 1939, the regional committee of the VKB (b) prepared a certificate on "Labor turnover at industrial enterprises of the city of Stalingrad for 1939." It noted the success of the city's factories in deploying technical training. In particular, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant initiated socialist technical education in the tractor industry, launching a socialist competition both within the plant's maintenance department and between other tractor plants in Kharkov and Chelyabinsk.

As a result, as noted in the report, the plan for mass technical education was exceeded and 844 people passed through advanced training courses, instead of 354 according to the plan. The activities of technical training at the Krasny Oktyabr plant at the timber factory were also positively assessed. Kuibyshev and other enterprises ^{[27, l.10, l.11]}.

Separately, in the field of the in—house education system, it is worth highlighting the training of craftsmen, since the problem of the middle technical level at Stalingrad enterprises was constantly acute, either due to a shortage of technical personnel or their low qualifications.

So, even in 1940, 518 people out of 614 craftsmen at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant had no technical education. The situation was complicated by the fact that in 1940 the STZ was transferred to a group of heavy machinery plants, which increased the qualification requirements for engineering staff.

To improve the skills of the craftsmen at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, a plan was developed for 35 hours. This plan provided for training in the format of lectures, where the masters were given information on the organization of production, economics and finance.

By 1940, the Stalingrad Shipyard had 137 craftsmen on staff. Of these, 10 were engineers, 12 technicians, 46 graduated from master's courses, and 69 were practitioners with lower education.

However, in general, the number of masters undergoing training or upgrading their qualifications was extremely small. In particular, out of 485 masters with no technical education, only 97 studied at the master's courses and 7 people at the technical school. Out of 69 technically illiterate craftsmen, only 19 studied at the Stalingrad Shipbuilding Plant ^{[27, l.98]}.

The process of staffing the city's enterprises with medium-technical staff and the further placement of workers who completed the master courses in new positions complicated. In particular, an example is given for the Krasny Oktyabr plant, where only 8 people out of 20 who completed the courses were appointed to engineering and technical positions. The same situation with the promotion of graduates of the courses of masters of socialist labor was in other factories ^{[27, l.10, l.11]}.

In addition to the in-house education system, a system of secondary and higher technical education was being established in Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Industrial College (SIT) and the Stalingrad Mechanical Institute (SMI) served as the basis for the training of future engineers and technicians in Stalingrad.

The Stalingrad Industrial College was opened in 1927. Until 1930, it graduated 15-20 technical specialists annually. However, by 1930, the admission of students to the college was increasing, which made it possible to increase the graduation of qualified specialists to 100-150 people. By 1935, the college began to graduate 280 technical specialists annually in such specialties as: technicians, cold metal cutting technologists, general mechanics and tractor builders. ^{[28, l. 11]}. During the period 1925-1942, the college graduated about 2,000 specialists ^{[29, p.33]}.

The Stalingrad Mechanical Institute, opened in 1930, was supposed to train highly qualified engineers for machine-building enterprises of the USSR and, above all, STZ. In the period 1933-1937– the Institute taught at the faculties: 1) automotive engineering in the specialties of automotive engines and automotive engineering; mechanical engineering with the specialties of mechanical engineering technology, metal cutting ^{[28, p.19]}. During the pre-war decade, the institute increased the number of places for study. So, if in 1930 the mass media recruited 236 students, then in 1935 the number of students was already 836 full-time and 292 evening students ^{[30, p.11, 8, 31, l.2.]}.

In 1935, a postgraduate course was opened at the institute, which trained both teachers for the institute and technical specialists conducting research for the qualitative development of production. By 1940, 22 graduate students were studying in the media.

The process of formation of the institute was accompanied by numerous problems in educational and research work. Among the shortcomings of the educational work, it was noted: insufficient coordination of classroom and laboratory work with lectures, lack of well-established accounting of academic performance and systematic work to improve the skills of teachers.

These problems were explained by the presence of a large number of part-timers who consider university work as an additional income, as well as the insufficient qualifications of a significant part of the main scientific leaders. Thus, out of 120 teachers, only 46 were full-time employees, the rest worked part-time and most were engineers at Stalingrad enterprises with little teaching experience.

The full-time teachers also did not have the necessary teaching experience. The main staff of the Institute's teachers had no more than five years of work experience. There were only 3 approved professors in 18 departments. Of the 19 associate professors, 5 people were confirmed in the title, and only one teacher had an academic degree.

Research activities in the media were random and haphazard, which was explained by the lack of attention of the institute's management to this issue, as well as the lack of qualified scientific staff. In addition, an important disadvantage was the lack of constant communication with the industry of the region and the scientific research institutions of the country ^{[31, l.3, l.4]}.

The situation with the shortage of teaching staff improved somewhat by 1940. The number of full-time teachers increased to 64 people: 3 professors, 9 associate professors of whom 4 were candidates of sciences, 30 senior teachers, 8 teachers and 14 assistants.

In general, for the period 1930 – 1940. The Stalingrad Mechanical Institute was able to train 1,300 engineers of various types in the field of automotive, machine-building and defense industries ^{[32, p.11]}.

However, it should be borne in mind that not all of the graduates were sent to industrial enterprises in Stalingrad.

It should be especially noted that distance learning has been organized by educational institutions in Stalingrad and other cities since 1930 due to an acute shortage of technical personnel. The reason for studying at other higher educational institutions was the lack of the necessary specialized training areas. In particular, Plant No. 91 (Khimprom) had to send its engineers to study at institutes located in other cities of the USSR, since there were no higher educational institutions in Stalingrad that trained chemical engineers ^{[22, l. 23]}.

Factories such as STZ, Barricades, and Krasny Oktyabr were much more fortunate because their engineers and technicians not only had the appropriate specialties, but also provided places for enrollment. Thus, at the Krasny Oktyabr enterprise, 320 people of different qualifications were recruited for correspondence education through the factory committee ^[19].

In 1931, the evening department was opened at the Stalingrad Mechanical Institute, where both evening groups and students of factory courses studied. Education at the correspondence department of the institute was available only to workers and engineers of the STZ and Barricade factories and was fully paid for directly by these enterprises. In 1932-1933, there were 337 students enrolled in evening classes and 138 people enrolled in courses. However, during the period of the pre-war five-year plans of the media, 256 engineers were graduated from the evening department ^{[30, p.27]}.

Correspondence education at the Stalingrad Industrial College was organized only in 1939 for employees of the STZ, Barricade and Krasny Oktyabr enterprises. By 1939, 250 people were studying there.

Such a small number may be explained by the poor organization of incentives for distance learning on the part of the plant management. So, in 1933, in the newspaper "You Give a tractor", it was noted that only 30 IT specialists took part in correspondence training at the STZ. The article emphasized that the number of part-time IT specialists "not only can, but should be increased" ^[26].

The need to step up the involvement of practical engineers in correspondence training was also pointed out at the Krasny Oktyabr plant, which was motivated by the low level of education of IT specialists. The reasons why distance education is an advantage for IT practitioners were also pointed out, namely: 1) it was possible to study at home in their free time; 2) there was a base at the factory where practitioners were consulted by teachers; 3) for practitioners of craftsmen and workers who did not have knowledge for seven years and who could not study to become a technician, additional training in general education subjects was organized, after which they could study in a technical specialty directly.

In general, as it was emphasized in the article, professional development for the vast majority of technicians outside of correspondence training was impossible, since evening factory technical courses might not have the necessary specialty ^[15].

Provision of Stalingrad enterprises with technical specialists in the 1940s and 1941s.

The above data on the number of students in both full–time and evening departments of technical educational institutions in Stalingrad show that there were insufficient internal resources to replenish, upgrade and replenish industrial enterprises with engineering and technical personnel. Given the ever-increasing scale of production, the opening of new production halls, new product ranges, and even entire enterprises, maintaining stable plant operations could only be achieved with the involvement of all forms of replenishment and training of technical specialists.

However, as the sources show, they were not enough. By the time 1940 – 1941. at the industrial enterprises of Stalingrad, with a general increase in engineering staff, there was still a shortage, especially of qualified personnel.

So, in 1940, at plant No. 91, out of the total number of ITP at the plant, 79 people were supposed to be in the plant management office, 75 actually worked. 256 technical staff worked at the plant, which was in line with the plan. However, there were 79 qualified engineers, 102 technicians, and 150 engineers, technicians, and practitioners, i.e. more than 50%.

On January 1, 1941, 450 technical specialists were required at the Stalingrad Shipyard, but 402 people actually worked, 79 of whom were engineers, 109 technicians and 204 practitioners.

On January 1, 1941, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant had about 3025 engineering and technical personnel. There were 441 certified engineers, 552 technicians, 131 with incomplete higher and secondary education, and 1,901 IT practitioners ^{[22, l. 1-30]}.

Nevertheless, from the above data it can be seen that the number of engineering and technical specialists has increased many times since the beginning of 1930, which allowed enterprises, although with difficulty, to ensure not only the increase in output, but also to expand its range. In 10 years of its existence, Khimprom has been able to develop and launch production facilities for phosgene, mustard gas, chlorine, etc. In 1940, for the first time in the Soviet Union, the production of carbon tetrachloride was mastered on an industrial scale, which made it possible to completely free themselves from the import of this product. In many ways, as noted in the report, this became possible thanks to a well-designed technological process. In general, by 1940, the plant fully met the needs of military departments and civilian enterprises ^{[33, l.110, l.111]}.

By June 1940, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant had produced 232,700 tractors. During the production of the wheeled tractor at STZ, a tracked tractor was developed and introduced, and a domestic diesel engine was created ^{[4, pp.259-261]}. At the same time, in the second half of the 1930s, industrial enterprises in Stalingrad established a production complex for the production of T–26 tanks, and other types of light tanks were being developed. Also, by 1939, the production process for the in-line creation of T-34 medium tanks began to be established at the STZ.

The Stalingrad shipyard was engaged in the production of various types of vessels and at the same time, from the second half of the 1930s, began to master the creation of armored hulls for tanks ^{[6, pp.42-45]}.

Conclusion

Based on the above, the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, during the period of industrialization of Soviet industry, a huge number of qualified engineers and technicians were required who were able to carry out not only the maintenance of the production process, but also its qualitative development based on foreign equipment and experience. For Stalingrad, as the industrial center of the Lower Volga region, this was of particular relevance. The construction of new enterprises such as the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Shipyard, the Stalingrad Chemical Plant (Khimprom), and the radical modernization of the old ones, the launch and commissioning of production of these and other plants revealed the need for a huge number of engineering and technical workers. However, their number and qualifications were insufficient at the time of the start of the first five-year plan. This situation was complicated by the fact that in the process of industrialization, enterprises were constantly developing and expanding, they were tasked with producing new types of products and increasing the number of old ones, creating experimental design bureaus for research and development.

Secondly, in order to solve the problem of the shortage of qualified specialists in Stalingrad, a system of recruitment and training of technical specialists was created. External sources of recruitment for industrial enterprises were divided into attracting foreign specialists and sending domestic engineers and technicians from other regions of the USSR to the factories of Stalingrad. Foreign specialists arrived in Stalingrad through the conclusion of an agreement with foreign firms that sent their specialists, as well as through an individual agreement with a separate specialist. The main countries from which foreign specialists came to Stalingrad were the USA and Germany. There was an illegal form of hiring specialists, when foreign engineers and technicians came disguised as tourists and then got jobs at Soviet enterprises. The exact number of foreign engineers and technicians who worked at the Stalingrad factories is debatable and varies from 69 to more than 500 technical engineers in the period 1929-1933. However, during the next five years, the number of foreign specialists decreased due to the high cost of their maintenance, as well as the training of their own technical staff. Despite the small number of foreign engineers and technicians compared to the Soviet ones, they have made a great contribution to the development of foreign equipment and the establishment of in-line production. In addition to foreign specialists, Soviet engineers and technicians from other industrial regions of the USSR, primarily from Moscow and St. Petersburg, were sent to Stalingrad throughout the period of industrialization. In the second half of the 1930s, with more technical personnel, it became possible to redistribute engineers and technicians directly between Stalingrad enterprises. However, this kind of practice was complicated by the unwillingness of enterprises and the People's Commissariats in charge of them to part with qualified personnel.

At the same time, the process of developing the training of engineers and technicians took place in Stalingrad. An important part of it was the sending of technical specialists on business trips abroad through the conclusion of contracts with foreign industrial firms. It was there that Soviet technical personnel gained experience working on foreign production equipment, as well as studying the production process itself. In addition, Stalingrad specialists were sent to Soviet industrial centers with similar, but more established and developed production. Also in Stalingrad itself, an educational system was being formed aimed at training qualified engineers and technicians, which was divided into an in-house training system and training specialists in special institutions (technical schools and institutes). The in-house training system was aimed at training practical engineers in various kinds of educational centers located at the plant and where highly qualified employees of the enterprise taught in their field. The disadvantage of such training was that such specialists lacked the necessary pedagogical skills. At the same time, since 1929, special educational institutions were established in Stalingrad, primarily the Stalingrad Industrial College and the Stalingrad Mechanical Institute. These educational institutions trained qualified engineering and technical personnel in such fields as cold metalworking technology, general mechanics, mechanical engineering technology, and others. In the process, both educational institutions experienced a shortage of teaching staff. The Stalingrad Mechanical Institute also had such problems as insufficient coordination of classroom and laboratory work with lectures, lack of constant communication with the industry of the region and research institutions of the country, and others. Both institutions trained specialists for enterprises such as the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, Barricades and Krasny Oktyabr. During the period of industrialization, the media and SIT have trained a total of more than 2,300 full-time and part-time specialists. However, considering that by 1941 the STZ alone had more than 3,000 engineers and technicians, the number of graduates was insufficient and could not provide all enterprises with technical personnel without other forms of recruitment and training.

Thirdly, despite the active use of all forms of recruitment and training by 1940 – 1941, it was not possible to provide the industrial enterprises of Stalingrad with qualified engineers and technicians. More than 50% of the technical specialists working at the key industrial enterprises of Stalingrad (STZ, Khimprom, and the Shipyard) were practitioners with no specialized education. However, at the same time, the number of IT equipment at the city's enterprises increased many times, which allowed not only to ensure and increase the production process, but also to expand the range of products. Thus, enterprises such as the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Chemical Industry and the Shipyard not only increased the production of products originally intended for them, but also constantly qualitatively developed their technological process, developed and adjusted new types of products, including increased production of military products.