Worldview models of modern Russians (based on the results of a questionnaire survey in 2023)

Konstantinov Mikhail Sergeevich ORCID: 0000-0003-2781-789X PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Department of Theoretical and Applied Political Science; Institute of Philosophy and Socio-Political Sciences; Southern Federal University 105/42 Bolshaya Sadovaya str., Rostov-On-Don, Rostov region, 344006, Russia konstantinov@sfedu.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The worldview of modern societies is an extremely curious phenomenon, which, on the one hand, manifests itself quite clearly in certain invariant constants that make it difficult to carry out certain changes in society if the policy is dissonant with these constants, but on the other hand demonstrates impressive lability, sufficient to combine in the most bizarre way with various ideological concepts such as traditionalist revolutionism, which gave rise to the phenomenon of the conservative revolution in Germany in the 20-30s of the XX century [see, for example: 1, 2]. Accordingly, extremely intricate twists and turns of interdependence of the ideological base and ideological derivatives have repeatedly become objects of research by various scientists [see, for example: 3-13, etc.] However, this work The theory of self-categorization is used as a theoretical and methodological basis for the study of ideological models of modern Russian society. The principle of "metacontrast" in the theory of self-categorization ^{[14, 15, etc.]} In accordance with this principle, the categorization of oneself and one's group ("ingroup", in terms of J. Turner) occurs on the basis of comparison with significant other individuals and "outgroups", and on the basis of the revealed contrasts, there is a reflection of oneself and one's social group. Accordingly, the identification of individuals' ideas about themselves and the most important social groups for them is based on the principle of "metacontrast" – the identification of an individual's ideas about himself, his "ingroup" and "outgroups" in order to determine the characteristics that an individual gives himself and his group. On this conceptual basis, a sociological study was prepared, the main results of which are set out below. The object of the study was the four main generations of modern Russia, and the ideological models of these generations were used as the subject.

Materials and methods

A sociological survey of the worldview of Russians was conducted in November-December 2023 by employees of the Department of Theoretical and Applied Political Science of the Institute of Philosophy and Socio-Political Sciences of the Southern Federal University with the participation of colleagues from the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, from the Ryazan Regional Universal Scientific Library named after Gorky, as well as from the Lugansk State University named after V. Dahl.

Since, in accordance with the objectives of the project, the entire Russian society was accepted as a general population [according to Rosstat data on 01.01.2023, the entire population of Russia amounted to 146,447,424 people. See: https://rosstat.gov.ru/compendium/document/13282 ], a representative sample consisted of 1,600 respondents, which, with a confidence probability of 95%, is an error of 2.45%. In accordance with the objectives of the study, the sample was designed to be probabilistic and stratified. The stratification of the sample was assumed according to two criteria: age and regional (by place of residence). According to these criteria, four age cohorts of 400 respondents each were surveyed, distributed proportionally across eight Russian regions (200 respondents each).

The following age cohorts were identified for the study, corresponding to the four key generations of modern Russia:

- 18-24 years old ("generation Z", "zoomers", "igeners" [see, for example: 16, etc.] – born in the "zero" years of the XXI century.);

- 25-39 years old ("generation Y", "post-perestroika" [see, for example: 17, etc.], "millennials" [see, for example: 18, 19, etc.] – born from 1984 to the end of the 90s of the XX century.);

- 40-59 years old ("generation X", "perestroika" [see, for example: 17, etc.] – born from the second half of the 60s to the mid-80s of the XX century.);

- 60 years and older ("the generation of "baby boomers"", "stagnation" [see, for example: 16, etc.] - born from the mid–40s to the mid-60s of the XX century.

The geography of the survey consisted of the following regions:

- Vladivostok and Primorsky Krai;

- Yekaterinburg and Sverdlovsk region;

- Kazan and the Republic of Tatarstan;

- Lugansk and Luhansk region (LNR);

- Moscow and the Moscow region;

- Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk region;

- Rostov-on-Don and Rostov region;

- Ryazan and the Ryazan region.

In half of the regions (Moscow Region, Rostov Region, Luhansk region (LNR), Ryazan region), the survey was conducted by interviewers in the field, but with partial use of the questionnaire designer of the online survey service "Anketologist" [see: https://anketolog.ru /] (the remaining part was made up of printed questionnaires); in half (Novosibirsk region, Primorsky Krai, Sverdlovsk region, Republic of Tatarstan) the panel of respondents of the "Questionnaire" service was used.

The obtained results were processed in the SPSS program.

Results

The analysis of conjugations makes it possible to identify a fairly clear structure of connections between the worldview models of Russians. In accordance with the principle of metacontrast, a matrix of 34 response positions was included in the survey questionnaire, which formed the basis for three questions: - characteristics of one's own generation; - characteristics of a younger generation and - characteristics of an older generation. Respondents were asked to choose 5 key characteristics of the generation they identify with from 34 suggested ones. The obtained results already make it possible to make an appropriate typologization of worldview models, since the necessary differences were found in the views of the respondents (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1. The structure of self-categorization of generations in comparison (values are given as a percentage)

Figure 1 shows a comparison of the specifics of self-categorization of generations ("ingroups" ^[12]) in the studied age cohorts. When analyzing the structure of the worldview of generations, the morphological analysis of ideologies proposed by M. Frieden served as a model [see, for example: 20], according to which ideologies distinguish a core surrounded by an adjacent belt of concepts, which in turn is surrounded by peripheral concepts. At the same time, the most important thing in this scheme is the mutual decontestation of concepts – the "adjustment" of their semantic meanings to each other in order to achieve logical coherence. The main elements of this scheme (core and adjacent belt; peripheral concepts had to be omitted to save space) are implemented in the diagram in Fig. 1. But unlike M. Frieden, who believed that the core of ideology is one or two of the most significant concepts around which the entire ideological structure is built, this approach reflects the respondents' choice of five the most significant characteristics of their own generation, the younger and older generation. Accordingly, the adjacent belt also consisted of five concepts that are less significant in the structure of generational categorization.

So, we see that the core of the ideas of young people aged 18 to 24 about their own generation consisted of 5 key characteristics: they put activity in the first place (42.4%), then the desire for freedom (40.6%), efficiency (38.8%), openness to new experiences (34.8%), as well as the need in self-development (33.6%). In the adjacent belt, self-characteristics also turned out to be quite high: orientation towards personal success (29.8%), optimism (27.6%), self-confidence (25.8%), responsibility (25.3%) and individualism (25.3%). However, as they grow up, a very interesting thing happens: relatively young people aged 25-39 still retain the structure of the ideological core in the main points, although with some shifts in the value significance of the selected characteristics (efficiency is put forward in the first place (48.5%); activity shifts from the first place to the second with a value of 38.8%; the desire for freedom with the second place goes to the fourth (31.5%); the third place is occupied by responsibility, which with a value of 33.8% from the adjacent belt goes to the core, replacing the need for self-development characteristic of the 18-24 age cohort; finally, openness to new experiences with a value of 32.5% goes to the fifth place from the fourth. There are no other significant shifts in the worldview structure between the generations 18-24 and 25-39 yet, except for the noted exchange of responsibility and the need for self-development between the core and the adjacent belt: In all other worldview concepts, the adjacent belt of generation 25-39 repeats the structure of the worldview of generation 18-24.

But this shift, the exchange of value significance between the craving for experimentation, openness to new experiences, etc. in favor of responsibility is a very significant beginning, which produces a value shift in the entire structure of the worldview as they grow up: together with responsibility, which in the ideological core of generation 40-59 already occupies second place with a value of 61.3% immediately after efficiency (63.8%), patience will come (third place with a value of 38.0%) and a sense of duty, which, with a value of 37.0%, is still in fourth place (but the generation of 60 years and older will come in third place). Optimism comes in fifth place (28.3%), which is certainly the downside of patience and a sense of duty. Significant changes are also taking place in the adjacent worldview belt of generation 40-59: the focus on personal success, characteristic of younger generations, is replaced by thrift (27.0%); optimism, which has passed into the core, is activity (26.0%); the need for self–development, the corrosion of which began already in generation 25-39, is replaced by the ability to appreciate the present (22.0%), and individualism – collectivism (17.5%).

The noted value shifts are amplified in generation 60+: optimism disappears from its ideological core, and collectivism (36.3%) replaces it, which penetrated into the adjacent worldview belt in generation 40-59, although collectivism occupies only the fourth place (before patience – 34.5%), giving way to the first two places to the same concepts that and the 40-59 generation took the first places (efficiency – 73.0% and responsibility – 72.0%), as well as a sense of duty (66.3%), which came in third place in the core, displacing patience. There is also only one replacement in the adjacent belt: optimism moves from the core of the worldview of 40-59-year-olds to the adjacent belt, collectivism takes its place in the core of 60+-year-olds, and now the structure of the adjacent belt includes the following concepts: thrift (34.3%), optimism (32.3%), activity (25.0%), self-confidence (21.0%) and the ability to appreciate the present (19.5%).

That is, we are witnessing a gradual decrease in the importance of the values of freedom, self-development, openness to experiments and new experiences, which are beginning to be replaced by categories of responsibility and the associated sense of duty, patience, thrift and the ability to appreciate the present. This process begins at a fairly young age and gains strength with increasing integration into society, overgrowth of social ties, creation of a family, obtaining a permanent job, etc. These are age-related characteristics rather than generational (although in this case one does not exclude the other, but the final answer to this question can be given only after analyzing the relevant ideological values). But what attracts attention right now is the rather high importance of individualism and orientation towards personal success among the young (18-24 and 25-39), which are combined with optimism, activity and self-confidence and which are completely replaced by the opposite ideological values of collectivism and thrift, which find themselves in the same conceptual environment, but on the opposite ideological pole in relation to the values of the community. Such a shift can no longer be explained by age, it is rather cultural features (but then these values were more or less characteristic of all generations), or, more likely, generational, rather than age-related or cultural.

If we try to see some constants behind the described age–related worldview dynamics, then we immediately find two of them: at the core is the concept of efficiency, highly appreciated by all generations (apparently, this should be attributed to the cultural characteristics of the Russian population, since as generations grow older, the initial high importance of this concept only increases with age - from the "starting" values of 38.8% to 73.0% for generation 60+ and 56.0% on average in the sample), and in the adjacent belt – self–confidence, the importance of which varies among all generations in the region of 20-25% (on average in the sample - 22.6%). Apparently, these two concepts represent cultural dominants that structure the self-representations of the entire Russian society.

In addition, it can be seen that the main intergenerational split lies between two younger (18-24 and 25-39) and two older (40-59 and 60+) generations: in terms of values and worldview, the younger generations are much closer to each other than to any of the older ones; the same can be said about the older generations. This can be explained by the fact that the socialization of the younger generations occurred during a period of change in our country, while the older generations were socialized in the USSR, whose education system conveyed different values compared to the education system of the new Russia.

Figure 2. The structure of categorization of the younger generation in comparison (values are given as a percentage)

In relation to the younger generation (the answer to the question "How would you characterize the younger (relative to your) generation in modern Russia?) We also observe a very curious refraction of values (see Figure 2) and age-related value dynamics. First of all, the attitude of young people (cohorts 18-24 and 25-39) towards younger people is quite snobbish in the generational aspect. Thus, the core of ideas about the younger generation in the 18-24 age cohort includes irresponsibility (39.1%) and impulsivity (33.6%). Such "senile grumbling" cannot but surprise, because it is quite difficult to imagine that an 18-year-old really and seriously condemns the irresponsibility and impulsivity of 16-year-olds (or even younger ones). It is unlikely that young people at this age live with ideas about the need to be responsible and patient, while simultaneously condemning the lack of such qualities in the younger generation. On the contrary, it can be assumed here (in accordance with J. Turner's theory of self–categorization ^[14]) that the mental space of ideas about one's own generation ("ingroup", in J. Turner's terminology) is formed, inter alia, by comparing oneself with the alter ego - with older ones (as a representative structure of due) and younger ones (as a projection of ideas about the "mistakes of the past", about "unreasonable youth", about how it might have once been with someone from friends, but it should not be). If this hypothesis is correct, then at the next step of our analysis – in the study of the structure of ideas about older generations – we will see the projection of due onto older ones (by the way, this fact itself, if confirmed, may indicate the preservation in Russian society of traditionalist rudiments linking images of due with older generations; in societies that have lost the traditionalist the foundation, the older generations no longer act as models for the formation of ideas about what is due, on the contrary, in such societies (USA, Canada, some European countries) there is a kind of ageism that gives special value to youth; older generations in such societies also tend to look younger, respectively, the poles of formation of what is due are changing: young and successful people begin to dictate their ideas about life as role models – a young grandfather in such societies is more typical than an 18-year-old grumbling in an old man's way about "unbridled and irresponsible youth").

In this context, the attitude towards younger people mirrors their own ideas about their "mistakes of youth", about what they managed to get rid of (by the way, this attitude is typical for younger people [see, for example: 21]; with age, criticality in this regard is smoothed out). And here it is extremely significant that the anti–value of irresponsibility is included in the core of ideas about younger generations in all age cohorts - they all consider the younger ones to be irresponsible. Thus, the anti-value of irresponsibility culturally "mirrors" the cultural values of efficiency and (to a large extent) responsibility. Which most likely also speaks not about generational differences, but rather about general cultural constants.

The anti-value of impulsivity is included in the core of the ideas of two younger cohorts (18-24 and 25-39), being replaced in older ones (40-59 and 60+) by a focus on personal success. And this is also a very symptomatic point: as we saw above, for young people from 18 to 39 years old, the orientation towards personal success is not an anti-value, on the contrary, they characterize their own generation with this value (although in an adjacent belt, and not in the core). And here we clearly see a generational, not just a cultural split.

No less interesting is the presence of the desire for freedom in the core of ideas about the younger generation of all age cohorts. Here, apparently, while preserving the value itself, its pole changes as they grow older: as it was established above, this value is included in the core of self–categorization of two age cohorts - 18-24 and 25-39; older generations did not include this value even in the adjacent self-categorization belt. On this basis, it can be assumed that the projection of the desire for freedom on the part of young people (from 18 to 39 years old) to the younger generation acts as a unifying value, in contrast to the anti-values of irresponsibility and impulsivity, on the basis of which young people oppose themselves to younger generations. For older generations, the value of striving for freedom loses its positive connotation as they grow older, decontaminating in an environment of individualism and orientation towards personal success. The situation is similar with individualism, which for generations Z and Y, apparently, has quite positive connotations, while for older generations it begins to be evaluated more and more negatively, shifting from the adjacent belt of generation X to the core of the "baby boomer" generation. Finally, this hypothesis can be confirmed or refuted below, based on the results of an analysis of attitudes towards older generations, as well as the presence or absence of correlations with other ideological values. Here, for now, we note one more point: the core of the ideas of the 18-24 age cohort about the younger generation simultaneously includes both activity (30.1%) and passivity (25.8%), while in the older group of youth – 25-39 – passivity leaves the core into the adjacent belt, being replaced by idleness. Here you can see the beginning of the trend that was given above as a hypothesis: the formation of a conceptual framework that deconstructs the desire for freedom in the context of the ideological concepts of idleness, individualism and orientation towards personal success.

Now let's compare this critical projection with the representation of ideas about what is due in connection with the older generation (the answer to the question in the questionnaire: "How would you characterize the older (relative to your) generation in modern Russia?").

Figure 3. The categorization structure of the older generation in comparison (values are given as a percentage)

Here (see Figure 3), attention is drawn to the fact of the amazing uniformity of ideas about the older generation: four of the five characteristics in the core (efficiency, responsibility, patience and thrift) are reproduced in all age cohorts; the discrepancies relate only to the fifth characteristic: what young people (from 18 to 39 years old) perceive as conservatism, the older ones associate with a sense of duty. No less interesting are the similarities in the adjacent belt: all four age cohorts see collectivism in the older generation, three of the four generations (X, Y and Z) – the ability to appreciate the present and interest in politics; young people (18-24 and 25-39) note the desire to plan everything, and seniors (40-59 and 60+) – optimism.

The very fact of reproduction of a certain set of characteristics relative to younger and older generations, which is reproduced despite age differences, is surprising, which cannot but suggest that this set of characteristics is not objectively inherent in these generations, but some projection of their own culturally conditioned idea of what is due. How can the generation of, say, the current 40-59-year-olds be at the same time irresponsible, individualistic, focused on personal success, idle, impulsive, etc. (as it is characterized by representatives of the age cohort of 60+), and at the same time efficient, thrifty, responsible, patient, conservative, etc. (how is it characterized by representatives of the age cohort of 25-39 years old)? Of course not. This is exactly what the theory of self-categorization through significant others says: ideas about other groups are a projection of their own ideas about what is due, as a result of which ideas about their own generation ("ingroup", in terms of J. Turner) are formed (constructed).

Conclusion

As it was established in the course of the study, some cultural constants are found in the minds of Russians that unite all generations both in their self-categorization and in opposition to other generations, as well as in cognitive value preferences. Thus, performance and self-confidence as characteristics of one's own generation were identified by representatives of all the studied age cohorts, which allows us to talk about cultural invariants, rather than generational differences. These same constants manifest themselves in a negative sense – in contrast to their generation to a younger one, to whom the qualities of irresponsibility and impulsivity are attributed by all age cohorts, including even the youngest (18-24). At the same time, the desire for freedom as characteristic of younger generations was also noted by representatives of all age cohorts, but the meaning that is put into this concept is clearly different among different cohorts: younger ones clearly put a positive meaning, while older ones combine the concept of striving for freedom with individualism, impulsivity, etc. anti-values.

Older generations, on the contrary, clearly act as a projection of their own ideas about what is due: all age cohorts endow older generations with qualities such as efficiency, responsibility, thrift, patience, a sense of duty and conservatism. Such uniformity in the description of older generations also makes it possible to speak more about cultural constants projected on the image of the older generation than about real generational differences. Nevertheless, such differences (and even splits in some issues) also exist, manifesting existing generational differences.