It all started in 1989. 35 years of the crisis of national and religious identity in France

Osipov Evgeny Aleksandrovich PhD in History Senior Scientific Associate, Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences 119334, Russia, Moscow, ul. Leninsky Prospekt 32a, 26 eaossipov@gmail.com Other publications by this author

It all started in 1989. Many French scientists, among them, for example, the famous Arabist Gilles Kepel ^{[1, 2]} or the equally famous philosopher Alain Finkelkraut ^[3], when describing the growing crisis of religious and national identity, manifested in the gradual spread of Islam in the country and the radicalization of youth, the origins of this crisis, not only in France, but also in Europe as a whole, they see it in the events of 1989. The year was rich in global events. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the fall of the Berlin Wall – 1989 became one of the most important in the post-war history of the world. At that time, France also celebrated the bicentennial anniversary of the French Revolution. What are the reasons to believe that it was 35 years ago that the crisis began in France, which is constantly being talked about both inside and outside the Fifth Republic?

There are many objective prerequisites that turned the issue of migrant workers in France into a problem of the spread of Islam, often in its radical forms, which became noticeable to the French in the late 1980s. Firstly, the international context was gradually changing. In 1973, as a result of the new Arab-Israeli war, the first so-called "oil shock" occurred ^[4]. Oil prices have increased by about four times. In total for the 1970s. they have grown about 10 times. For European countries dependent on the supply of "black gold", these events had dramatic consequences for the economy. High inflation, devaluation of national currencies, rising unemployment and a decrease in the purchasing power of the population – all this has long become the main component of European life, and the period of rapid recovery after World War II was replaced by a series of crises. As for the oil-supplying countries, for them the new situation, on the contrary, meant an expansion of opportunities. Some Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, thus gained the opportunity to finance the development of Islam in Europe, which in the medium term radically changed the lives of Muslim communities in European countries.

In 1977, the World Islamic League began its work in Paris, which in the future will control a significant part of the places of Islamic worship in France. In 1980, the Regional European Council of the Supreme Council of Mosques was opened in Brussels, and in 1982 the Islamic Institute for the Training of Preachers and Imams in Europe was established there.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978-1979 also significantly influenced the Muslim diaspora in France. Despite the fact that, unlike Shiite Iran, the majority of Muslims living in Europe were Sunnis, the events in Iran gave impetus to the development of Islam around the world, demonstrating that the fight against the Western world can be successful.

The events in Iran have also influenced the perception of Islam in France. Before the Iranian Revolution, immigrants from the Maghreb and Black Africa were considered in the Fifth Republic, and in Europe as a whole, as labor migrants, even though many of them had already moved their families to France by that time, and women in traditional Muslim clothes began to appear on the streets of French cities. Archival documents show that the opening of the World Islamic League office in Paris in 1977 with the active participation of Saudi Arabia was considered by Paris as part of bilateral relations with Riyadh, while the issue of the influence of religious Muslim organizations funded by Saudi Arabia on the Muslim diaspora in France was not taken into account ^{[5, 6]}.

The Islamic Revolution has changed the situation. In September 1978, the Department of North Africa and the Levant of the French Foreign Ministry sent a circular to French embassies in various countries with the task of preparing analytical notes on the role of Islam in them ^[7]. Thus, a religious aspect gradually began to emerge in the migration issue.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the "oil shock" had consequences, of course, not only for Arab countries, where incomes increased, but also for European countries, where the cost of living increased significantly. In France, this was one of the reasons for the transformation of the migration issue, first, into a migration problem, followed by a discussion about the crisis of religious identity.

The period of post-war accelerated economic growth entered French history as the "glorious thirty years" and lasted, respectively, until about the mid-1970s. At that time, natural population growth (the post-war "baby boom") was successfully combined with the attraction of a large number of migrants to the country. The growth of the economy required "free hands". In 1945-1962, the population of France grew by 6 million people. Since 1957, a program was launched to create "priority urbanization zones" - new neighborhoods in the suburbs of large cities, mostly multi-storey panel houses. Both young indigenous French and migrant workers moved to these areas. A total of 197 such zones have been created.

During the period of rapid economic growth, priority urbanization zones successfully coped with their task. However, the increase in economic problems after the end of the "glorious thirty years", especially aggravated after the jump in oil prices and a noticeable increase in unemployment, led to the fact that the crisis hit the residents of these new quarters the most. The government has reduced social programs. The outflow of middle–class representatives from the suburbs began, where, accordingly, the percentage of migrants increased markedly and the unemployment rate increased sharply - up to 30% among young people ^{[8, p.24]}. As a result, the suburbs of large cities began to turn into migrant "ghettos" with a standard of living that was very different from that of the indigenous part of the population. A natural increase in social tension has begun. The first clashes with the police in these areas took place already in 1971. And in 1979, mass pogroms took place in the suburbs of Lyon, in the 1980s. they were already perceived as part of everyday reality in many French cities. "Priority urbanization zones" eventually became "sensitive urbanization zones," and new neighborhoods turned into "difficult suburbs."

It is important that the deterioration of the economic situation in France did not lead, as many French people thought, to an outflow of migrants to their native lands, since the countries of the Maghreb and Black Africa, freed from colonial dependence, by that time had not managed to reach a trajectory of sustainable economic growth. France, with its economic crisis and rising unemployment, still looked like the best options for people who came to the Fifth Republic to work. Migrant workers gradually became French citizens and transported their families. There is an opinion that the so-called "decree on family reunification" issued in 1976 ^[9] became just the point of reference for a sharp increase in the number of migrants in the country. In fact, this decree prescribed almost the same procedure for obtaining permission to transport a family to France, which existed before 1974 ^[1]. In general, in the 1970s, a gradual process began for migrants from Muslim countries to move to France for permanent residence, together with their wives and children. And the laws and decrees issued by the government basically fixed the already established practice. The lack of a clear state policy on the ethno-confessional issue has become another reason for the growing crisis.

For a long time, the government has been withdrawing from interfering in the ongoing processes. A striking example was the March for Equality and against Racism in 1983, when a group of young Arabs walked from Marseille to Paris. At the beginning of the journey, there were only 17 people, and about 100 thousand people passed through the Champs-Elysees in the French capital a month and a half later. The march was the response of Arab youth to the increase in crimes against migrants, which was then recorded in different parts of the country. In fact, the march was held under the slogan of equality in the rights of indigenous French and representatives of the second generation of migrants. There was no religious component to it.

The very idea of the march arose in connection with the 20th anniversary of Martin Luther King's famous "march on Washington for jobs and freedom" in 1963, where he delivered his speech "I have a dream ...". For Arab youth, this march to Paris became a real act of self-identification, it was then that they first declared themselves at the national level. For indigenous France, these widely publicized events also became a turning point: the French realized for the first time that they were not talking about migrant workers who came to France to work, but about a large number of their compatriots, that is, citizens of the Fifth Republic, who were not going anywhere and linked their future with France.

Despite the fact that the organizers of the march were received at the presidential palace by Francois Mitterrand, there were no concrete steps on the part of the authorities to simplify the integration of the growing second generation. With the direct participation of the Socialist Party that ruled France at that time, the SOS Racism organization, which still exists today, was created. It was assumed that it would be through her that public policy in the suburbs would be built. However, over time it became clear that the scale of her activities was insignificant. As a result, a vacuum formed between migrant organizations and the authorities in the "difficult areas", which was actively filled by radical religious groups operating mainly at the expense of foreign funding. Over time, the term "re-Islamization" of the second generation appeared, which meant that the children of migrants who came to France were, firstly, less integrated into French society than their parents (although unlike their parents, many of them were born in France, graduated from French schools and most of them had French as their native language) And secondly, they turned out to be more religious than their parents. The problem of the growing radicalization of Arab and African youth in France has arisen.

All of the above factors have shaped the French crisis of national and religious identity. However, it really began in 1989, and two events served as a starting point for it, one of them was of an international nature, the other was important for France.

In February 1989, the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa in which he actually called for the murder of writer Salman Rushdie, the author of the novel "Satanic Verses", who lived in Great Britain, which was perceived by many as blasphemy. The importance of the fatwa, among other things, is evidenced by the fact that the assassination attempt on Salman Rushdie eventually took place in the United States in 2022. The perpetrator turned out to be a 24-year-old native of Lebanon, that is, he was not even born at the moment when the Ayatollah's fatwa appeared. Its significance, first of all, is that until that moment it was believed that fatwas issued in different parts of the Islamic world apply only to the territory to which the spiritual authority of its author extends. In this case, it was about the territory of Iran. However, Ayatollah Khomeini made his fatwa universal. As Gilles Kepel correctly notes, "by condemning a British citizen to death on the territory of Great Britain, the fatwa included Great Britain in the territory where the Muslim religious law operates" ^{[11, p.15]}. Thus, Europe was named a territory where Islam is spreading, and Muslims in it ceased to be migrants and, accordingly, according to the Ayatollah's logic, received the full right to demand the extension of Sharia law to European territory. Gilles Kepel, continuing his thought, notes that Khomeini's fatwa referred to the time of the Prophet. After leaving Mecca, Muhammad and his companions at first felt their weakness in Medina, but over time they began to control it ^{[11, p.14]}.

In France, which already had the largest Muslim community in Europe at that time, after the fatwa of the Ayatollah, the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia) gave it a Sunni significance: the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, which was close to them, was renamed the Union of Islamic Organizations of France. All this should have indicated that several waves of migration and demographic indicators among French Muslims have already reached the point where we can talk not about Muslims in France, but about French Muslims and, accordingly, French Islam.

The second event, directly related to the first, occurred in September 1989. Three college students in the city of Creil, a suburb of Paris, were expelled from the educational institution after they refused to remove the Muslim headscarf (hijab) during classes, which became known to the general public after the publication of an article on October 4, 1989 in the newspaper Liberacion. The director of the college said on this occasion: "We will not allow ourselves to be infected with religious issues" ^{[3, p.25]}. Very quickly, this issue became the most discussed in France. For the first time, the Islamic theme was at the center of a socio-political discussion and immediately split French society.

Representatives of officially existing cults in France were the first to speak out, supporting the excluded students. The Archbishop of Paris stated: "It is not necessary to wage war with teenage Bers (bers in France are called Arab youth - E.O.). Stop the fire!" ^{[3, p.25]}. The leader of the French Protestants said: "Our dormant France is waking up to start a war with religion again. An old story that should remind people of something" ^{[3, p.25]}. The Rabbi of France noted that the attempt to force students to renounce their religious beliefs constitutes an encroachment on religious freedom ^{[3, p.25]}. It is worth noting that in 1989, as today, there were officially only three religious cults in France – Catholic, Protestant and Jewish. This is due to the fact that in 1905, at the time of the separation of Church and state, only three religions were mainly spread in France. Islam, which was represented mainly in the colonies at that time, was not included in this number. Since then, religious legislation has not changed. As a result, today in France, despite the fact that Islam is the second largest number of believers and the most practiced religion (in terms of the number of believers who regularly visit places of worship), Islam is still not represented at the official level, which makes it very difficult to build relations between the state authorities and numerous Muslim organizations.

The scandal continued to flare up and quickly reached the political level. On October 23, 1989, the wife of the President of the Republic, Danielle Mitterrand, spoke out: "If today, two hundred years after the Revolution, secularism in France is not able to accommodate all religions, all ways of expression, then this is a regression ... The headscarf is a form of expression of religion, we must accept traditions as they are" ^{[12, p.21]}. Then it was the turn of the Minister of National Education Lionel Jospin: "First of all, heads of educational institutions should start a dialogue with parents and students to try to convince them to abandon the manifestation (of religious symbols – E.O.) and explain to them the principles of secularism ... If, after these discussions, families still do not abandon religious symbols A child whose education is a priority should be accepted at school, that is, in classrooms and hallways during recess. The French school was created to teach and integrate, not to exclude" ^{[12, p.22]}.

Jospin's controversial statement further complicated the situation. French intellectuals Alain Finkelkraut, Elisabeth Badinter, Regis Debre, Elisabeth de Fontenay and Catherine Kinzler published a collective article entitled "Teachers: We will not capitulate" in the famous Nouvelle Observer on November 2, 1989 ^[13]. It was a direct answer to Jospin: "You say, Mr. Minister, that it is forbidden to exclude. Although we are touched by your kindness, we tell you that it is allowed to forbid…To negotiate, as you do, announcing in advance that you will eventually give in, means to capitulate... It is necessary that students forget the community where they come from and think about other things… The right to be different, which is so dear to you, is freedom only if it is accompanied by the right to differ from your difference. Otherwise, it is a trap, even slavery" ^{[13, p.4]}.

In the same Nouvelle Observer, Muslim intellectuals already spoke from the opposite side and called for moderation in their assessments and statements, warning of the danger of radicalization of public consciousness ^{[12, p.25-26]}. Even then, in 1989, they wrote about what would be extremely relevant for today's France. The attempt by the state to regulate religious issues, especially at the legislative level, is perceived by the Muslim community as actions directed against them, and this, in turn, leads to the fact that moderate Muslims, who are the majority, are increasingly influenced by radical Islamist movements. This will be the case not only with the issue of religious clothing in schools, but also, for example, with the problem of caricatures of the Prophet.

The Ministry of National Education eventually sought clarification from the French Council of State, which, on the one hand, refused to consider that religious symbols contradict secularism, and on the other hand, opposed proselytism and propaganda of religious views that interfere with the educational process. Further, State Councilor David Kessler will add such terms as "demonstrative" and "provocative" to proselytism and propaganda ^{[3, p.29]}. This will begin France's long road to a legislative ban on religious clothing in public schools. In 15 years, in 2004, a law will be adopted, which states: "In public schools, colleges and lyceums, it is prohibited to wear symbols or clothing that deliberately indicate religious affiliation. Disciplinary measures can be applied only after a dialogue with the student" ^[14]. The weakness of both the 2004 law and the decisions of state bodies and commissions in 1989, first of all, was that terms such as "ostentation", "demonstrativeness" or "provocation" are evaluative in nature, therefore, responsibility for decision-making in specific cases was shifted to the administrations and staff of educational institutions who became the main victim of the crisis of national and religious identity in France.

In general, the case of the Muslim headscarf at the College of Krei had many origins. The complicated socio-economic situation in France has hit the most vulnerable segments of the population, primarily former migrants. Growing unemployment and a decline in living standards caused tension in relations between the government and the migrant community. The reluctance of the French authorities to deal with this issue, even after the widely publicized migrant march on Paris in 1983, only worsened the situation. Radical Islamist groups funded from foreign countries took advantage of the "vacuum" that had formed in the suburbs of large cities and strengthened their influence on the Muslim community in France. The so-called "re-Islamization" of the second generation took place.

There were also purely objective reasons. By 1989, a large number of those second-generation migrants, that is, the children of those migrants who came to France to work in the 1960s and 1970s, began to study in the senior classes of French schools (colleges, lyceums). The children who became adults and their parents, who were "rooted" in the Fifth Republic, tried to bring traditional norms and customs to educational institutions.

Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie, who lived in the UK, gave this movement a global character, including European Muslims in the general Islamic processes. The scandal with the wearing of religious clothing at the college of the city of Creil in September-October 1989 thus became the starting point for the formation of a full-fledged crisis of national and religious identity in modern France.