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Reference:
Ivkina N.V., Moraru N.
Features of Germany's new migration policy in the context of multilevel governance theory
// International relations.
2024. № 4.
P. 90-104.
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.4.72492 EDN: SCMUDM URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=72492
Features of Germany's new migration policy in the context of multilevel governance theory
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0641.2024.4.72492EDN: SCMUDMReceived: 26-11-2024Published: 03-12-2024Abstract: This study focuses on the new migration policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The research aims to identify the migration strategy introduced by Olaf Scholz and the ruling "traffic light" coalition for the pan-European asylum system. The theoretical framework of the study is based on the multilevel governance theory, which employs three levels of analysis: national, supranational, and subregional. The authors conducted a comparative analysis of Germany's national migration policy, followed by its application at the EU's integration level and within the subregional context. The African region was selected as a subregional case study due to the high percentage of migrants arriving from this area. The novelty of the research lies in its analysis of changes in Germany's migration policy, which came into effect in 2023–2024, using an unconventional integration theory to substantiate shifts in the country's foreign policy course. The research findings are presented at each individual level. At the national level, the authors identified key changes in Germany's migration policy and, more importantly, examined the attitudes within the country's political establishment toward these changes. At the supranational level, conclusions were drawn regarding the influence of Germany's new approach on the pan-European asylum policy. Finally, at the subregional level, the study assessed the impact of these processes on the African region, which significantly contributes to the growing number of migrants in the EU. The results have both theoretical and practical applications. The research demonstrated the efficacy of the methodological toolkit provided by multilevel governance theory and established a connection between changes in Germany's migration policy and the pan-European strategy. Keywords: migration policy, Federal Republic of Germany, FRG, German ruling coalition, European Union, EU, CEAS, multi-level governance theory, African migration, disintegration processesThis article is automatically translated.
Introduction
The migration issue is extremely relevant for most European countries. Since 2015, the events of the Arab Spring and, in particular, the Syrian conflict have influenced the European Union (EU), represented by official representatives of the European Council and the European Commission, to recognize the presence of a migration crisis in the region. This situation has provoked many additional problems for both the EU member states and the integration association. The greatest danger is caused by the terrorist threat, which forced European countries to take some kind of disintegration measures - to change the approach to collective security, "strengthen European border control and control between states, pursue a strict migration policy, develop their own European strategy, redistribute the responsibility of all European state institutions in the fight to prevent the risks of terrorist attacks" [1]. In 2015, it became apparent that the EU's Common Asylum System needed urgent review, as too many people fleeing war in North Africa and the Middle East began to apply for asylum. And, given that the priority of refugees was either geographically "advanced" countries such as Greece and Italy, as well as the most economically strong countries such as Germany, France and Austria, it became clear that the concerns of Federal agencies were not in vain and the EU's Common Asylum System requires revision [2]. In this regard, the process of regulating the regulatory framework of the EU and individual European countries has begun to balance migration policy. Thus, a comprehensive approach to European security issues and, in particular, the migration crisis was developed in 2016, when the EU's Global Security Strategy was adopted. It outlines a range of priority issues that pose the greatest threat: terrorism, conflicts (in Syria and Ukraine), the migration crisis [3]. The Federal Republic of Germany, which is one of the largest donors to pan-European projects, has shown the greatest interest in the issue of migration regulation. During the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel, this became especially noticeable. Already in 2015, when the migration crisis was actively discussed on the international fields, A. Merkel changed the nature and tone of her speeches on migration. If earlier in her speeches there was a call for European countries to accept all those in need of help, now we are talking about careful selection of those who arrive in Europe and fencing off those who try to enter there illegally. Such statements sound careful enough, on the one hand, to ease tensions in Europe, and on the other, to preserve the image of the EU as a guarantor of democratic values. Another reason why the rhetoric has changed is the large amount of funds that the EU spends on the maintenance of refugees. According to Steffen Angenendt, one of the main experts of the Foundation for Science and Policy on the migration problem, "Germany's migration policy is hitting the German federal budget" [4]. However, the change in rhetoric did not bring significant results, the situation with migrants steadily worsened, which forced the new Chancellor Olaf Scholz to reconsider the country's strategy regarding migration issues. The purpose of the study is to analyze Germany's new migration policy in the context of the migration crisis. Theoretical and methodological basis of the study As a theoretical basis for the study, a test of the theory of multilevel management is proposed. This concept involves considering the problem at several levels at once – national, supranational and regional. Such a multicomponent approach helps not only to consider the process of solving the problem, but also to assess the effectiveness of the chosen strategy to overcome it. The theory itself was developed in the 1990s in the context of the intensification of integration processes and the creation of the European Union (EU). The works of theorists Lizabeth Huget and Geri Marx emphasize that integration processes will entail jurisdictional gaps between different levels of decision-making: national structures of European countries, supranational governing bodies and subnational entities [5, 6, pp. 417-419]. The EU is experiencing similar problems, especially in the context of new challenges and threats, which include the migration crisis. It is important to note that the advantages of this theory include multilevel policy systems, which are characterized by the fact that responsibilities are distributed among levels with interdependent tasks, and decisions must be coordinated between levels [7]. In addition, in the context of the theoretical framework, crisis management is understood not only and not so much as the efforts of the state to solve a particular problem, but rather the definition of the capabilities of an actor (state or non-state) to control the deepening of processes leading to an aggravation of the threat [8]. In the context of these theoretical assumptions, O. Scholz's new migration policy is represented by Germany's efforts to level the threat at several levels: national – directly for the interests of the state, supranational – for the interests of the EU integration association, sub–regional - for regions that are inextricably linked to the EU migration agenda. As a test of the sub-regional component of the new German migration strategy, it is proposed to consider the African case. The sub-regional choice is primarily due to the ever-growing migration flow from the continent to the EU countries (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Dynamics of the African population in Germany in 2016-2023.
Source: compiled by the authors based on data from Foreign population, 2016 to 2023 by selected citizenships // Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis). 2024. URL: https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Society-Environment/Population/Migration-Integration/Tables/foreigner-citizenship-time-serie.html
As can be seen from the above graph, the progressive increase in the African population in Germany has a continuing upward trend, which indicates the extreme relevance of the research topic. Due to the fact that the object of the study is the new migration strategy of Germany, the subject of the study can be defined as a multi–level study of the factors that became the basis for the formation of a new migration policy. The historiography of the study is represented by the works of Russian and foreign authors, including materials published on the portals of German analytical centers, which, in turn, play a significant role in the formation of the state's foreign policy strategy. In the course of the study, some gaps were identified that need to be filled in further studies. Firstly, due to the fact that Germany's new migration policy towards migrants has changed relatively recently, which makes the research topic relevant. Secondly, in most studies, one of the levels is studied – national or integration. There is a need for an integrated approach to the problems under study. Multilevel management of the migration problem. Level one: national. Taking into account the fact that at this level of analysis it is necessary to consider Germany's national efforts to combat the migration crisis, the changes in the regulatory framework that were adopted under Chancellor O. Scholz come to the fore. It should be noted that the development of the strategy was particularly influenced by the difficulties of forming a new government and the inclusion of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AFD) party in it. She was the main opponent of Merkel's liberal migration policy. Representatives of this party have repeatedly accused the most influential party figures of the CDU/CSU and the SPD of indecisive actions regarding the migration issue and the right to asylum. Largely due to migration issues, the stability of the new coalition [9], formed in 2021 after A. Merkel left office, was in question. In order to somehow balance the efforts of the new ruling coalition under the conditional name "traffic light", the new Chancellor O. Scholz had to reconsider some approaches to the migration issue. So, in 2023 The German government has officially announced a new strategy for migrants based on the synthesis of "humanity and order" [10]. According to the new strategy, Germany is tightening legislation on the reception of migrants on its territory, while coordinating its decisions with the reforms of the European asylum and migration system [11]. Now the country will be more focused than ever on reducing illegal migration, and is happy only with highly qualified personnel who can benefit the economic well-being of the country. At the same time, it cannot be said that O. Scholz himself does not agree with the government's decision. He believes that humanity should dominate the decisions taken by Germany on the migration issue, especially in relation to those people who are fleeing military conflicts [12]. However, this topic is progressively becoming speculative in the Chancellor's rhetoric in the context of Germany's assistance in fueling the conflict in Ukraine. Scholz links the reduction of migration flows with the resolution of this conflict and thus incites the Government to allocate new financial tranches and supply weapons to the territory of Ukraine. But Chancellor O. Scholz's personal preferences on the issue of updating migration regulation remain in most cases within the framework of parliamentary discussions. Practical actions initiated by the collective efforts of the Svetofor coalition began already in early 2024. The Federal Ministry of Internal Policy began to conclude agreements with the countries from which the largest number of migrants were observed. The purpose of such agreements is "... the effective return of people who do not have the right to stay in Germany, which is very important for reducing illegal migration" [13]. For example, shortly after the conclusion of the migration agreement between Germany and Kenya, Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Feather signed a comprehensive partnership agreement on migration and mobility with the Republic of Uzbekistan in Samarkand. The Federal Government is conducting confidential negotiations with several other countries. Among them are Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Colombia, Morocco, Ghana and the Philippines, as well as other countries [13]. Another measure adopted at the national level was an increase in deportations and a decrease in cash payments to asylum seekers and migrants. This is enshrined in the "Law on the Improvement of Repatriation", which includes a package of measures for early announcement of deportation, extension of detention to 28 days, expanded powers for the police to search for those ordered to leave the country, as well as access to personal data of the wanted [14]. This measure has borne fruit: according to Government data, 7861 people were deported in the first half of 2023 alone [15]. This has caused serious discontent among migrants and diasporas of various countries. The most effective measure adopted as part of the new strategy was the closure and introduction of temporary controls at the German national border. German Interior Minister Nancy Feather said at a press conference in Berlin about the measures that apply to the temporary closure of borders with Poland and the Czech Republic. The same measures will be extended to the borders with France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. They are designed to ensure a massive increase in the number of refusals to refugees and migrants [16]. Summing up the intermediate result of the analysis of the first (national) level, we can talk about significant discrepancies between the Chancellor's ideas about the modernization of migration policy and decisions taken at the Government level. The reason was the obvious failure of the strategy, which was conventionally called the "balance between humanity and order." The Traffic Light coalition has managed to lobby for the adoption of a new German migration strategy in order to tip the scales in the direction of "order". According to the most optimistic assumptions, this should lead to a relief, first of all, of the financial burden of German taxpayers. Level two: supranational. German migration initiatives in the EU. The migration crisis has become one of the most difficult threats to European security, and, as a result, a test for most European integration systems. The EU had to take drastic measures aimed not so much at protecting European values as at physically protecting borders. In 2015, it became clear that the migration crisis was beginning in the EU due to the fact that almost 1.4 million applications for international protection were submitted to the structures of individual EU member states, many of them from people from places like Syria, where there could be no doubt about the motives of their flight [17]. The European Commission has concluded that it is necessary to review the Pan–European Asylum System (CEAS), an agreed set of procedures for the reception of asylum seekers and the consideration of their applications [18]. In 2017, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a broad political agreement on the creation of a full-fledged European Asylum Agency, the reform of Eurodac [19] (information system for the collection, transfer and comparison of fingerprints), the revision of the Directive on the conditions of admission of Migrants, the Regulation on Qualifications and the resettlement system in the EU. However, the Council could not come to a common opinion on the reform of the Dublin system and the Asylum Regulations [20]. One of the supporters lobbying for the continuation of negotiations on the reform of the Dublin system and the Asylum Regulations within the EU was Germany. In 2024, at a meeting of the prime ministers of 16 federal states of Germany, it was decided to apply to the European Commission with proposals for the reform of the Dublin system and its implementation in a new form. It is proposed to tighten border controls, allow checks at intra-European borders, return migrants to the territory of those countries where they first entered European soil, limit family reunification if necessary [21]. Such proposals can be considered as disintegration measures in the EU, so for now the German government is actively ignoring such calls. The only thing that Germany is actively promoting is the idea of deportation to the territory of the first entry of a migrant. This is easily explained from the point of view that migrants enter its territory through land borders with other countries. It does not have such a problem as the southern countries, therefore many illegal migrants can be easily sent to other European states. There is another idea where migrants can be sent, which Germany is actively promoting in the EU. According to the statements of German representatives in the European Council, it is necessary to negotiate with Turkey [15], which has long been used as a natural barrier to increase the migration flow to the EU. This proposal is based on the fact that Turkey has repeatedly made deals with both the EU and individual European countries. For example, in 2016, the European Union concluded a landmark agreement with Turkey, through which hundreds of thousands of migrants transited to the territory of the EU. Illegal migrants trying to enter Greece have been returned to Turkey, and Ankara has taken the necessary steps to prevent the opening of new migration routes. In return, the European Union agreed to resettle Syrian refugees from Turkey individually, ease visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, pay 6 billion euros in aid to Turkey for Syrian migrant communities, update the Customs Union and resume suspended negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union [22]. Thus, the EU has effectively shifted responsibility for regulating migration to Turkey, promising to intensify the process of negotiations on the latter's membership in the organization. But given that these promises have not been implemented, Germany's recommendation to resume negotiations with Turkey on this issue looks promising. In addition to the "Turkish case", Germany is actively promoting the idea of individual negotiations with individual EU member states. Despite the fact that Chancellor O. Scholz does not agree with the chosen government strategy, as part of the implementation of the policy of the ruling coalition, Svetofor has intensified negotiations with the governments of neighboring countries with Germany on changing the pan-European approach to migration. The first country the German Chancellor started with was Poland. Danald Tusk was not informed in advance about the desire of the German representative to discuss measures to tighten migration controls in a telephone conversation. Poland expressed dissatisfaction with Germany's actions to close national borders from migrants [23]. This step was regarded by Polish representatives as unfriendly on the part of Germany. Moreover, Interior Minister Nancy Feizer is conducting similar negotiations with Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Austria and Slovenia. This is similar to Germany's attempts to form a coalition in the European Council on its proposal to tighten pan-European migration measures. So far, Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece and partly France have expressed some support for the German initiative. These countries face the greatest pressure from migrants.
Level three: sub-regional. The African case of Germany's new migration policy.
One of the most vulnerable regions, from which there is a large migration flow to Germany and individual EU countries, is Africa. Moreover, we are talking not only about the North Africa region, but also about Sub-Saharan Africa. This is one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world. For example, experts and analysts believe that the Sahel region deserves special attention, which represents a litmus test for the European Union's new approach to Africa in connection with the migration crisis. This region is a belt between the Mediterranean Basin and sub-Saharan Africa [24, pp. 2-3]. For Germany, the African migration agenda is extremely relevant. Africans migrate mainly to cities that provide economic opportunities and access to basic services, including health and education, as well as cities where African communities have long been established. These key cities include Berlin (49,974 migrants of African descent as of 2024 [25]), Hamburg (29,477 migrants of African descent as of 2022 [26]), Munich (24,801 migrants of African descent as of 2023 [27]), Frankfurt-on-Main (19,125 migrants of African descent as of 2021 [28]), and Cologne (11,500 migrants of African descent as of 2020 [29]) (see Fig. 2). Figure 2. German cities with the largest number of African migrants
The migration of Africans to Germany can be classified according to several main goals: 1. Political and social goals – Africans can flee conflict, persecution or human rights violations, hoping for protection and the opportunity to build a secure future in Germany; 2. Family goals – migration of Africans may be associated with family reunification, when migrants seek to reunite with loved ones already living in Germany; 3. Economic goals – Many African migrants seek better living and working conditions in Germany, seeking to increase their income levels and ensure the well-being of their family; 4. Educational goals – Some migrate to Germany for higher education or vocational training, as Germany offers high-quality education and research opportunities. The integration of African migrants in Germany is a multifaceted process influenced by various factors, including the legal framework, socio-economic conditions and public attitudes. Germany's legal framework and integration policy have undergone changes, especially after the European migration crisis of 2015. The German Government has taken measures to promote the integration of migrants, including language courses and vocational training programs. For example, the Integration Act of 2016 [30] is aimed at improving access to education and the labor market. It is to African countries that Germany already applies the principle of the return of migrants who, for whatever reason, have been denied asylum or a migration visa. Effective management of migration flows has been developed for most African countries, the main aspects of which include mainly attracting highly qualified personnel through support only for skilled migration, the development of special agreements with resource-producing countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria to obtain new sources of energy resources to diversify energy supplies after the outbreak of the crisis with Russia, investments in the development of African countries through various programs, such as the Marshall Plan for Africa, to prevent new migration crises by improving living conditions in the homeland of migrants. Conclusion. Germany's new migration policy, developed in response to the deteriorating situation both in the country and in the EU, is still a contradictory system of checks and balances. The cases considered in the context of the theory of multilevel management, which served as the basis for the analysis of the new German migration policy in Germany, allowed us to draw several conclusions. Firstly, in Germany itself there is no unified approach to the idea of tightening migration policy. Many representatives of German parties see this as a way out of the current situation of public distrust of political decisions made by government circles. Chancellor O. Scholz sees more negative sides in this. This is due to the fact that Germany's national efforts to close the border, expel migrants to the country where they first set foot in the EU and other measures are causing concern among Germany's closest partners. Moreover, in order to implement this strategy, it is necessary to resort to concluding bilateral agreements with those countries from which the largest flows of uncontrolled migration originate. Each of these countries, in return for pandering to German migration initiatives to return migrants home, wants to receive some privileges in return, which can be no less expensive than accepting migrants. Secondly, the analysis of the second level, supranational, suggests that it is closely linked to the results of the study of the first. Despite O. Scholz's disagreement with the ruling coalition's decision, he is promoting Germany's new migration strategy to the EU, actively preparing the ground for the formation of a coalition. Moreover, if earlier, in 2015-2020, Germany's initiatives to close the border and expel migrants would have been regarded as disintegration efforts and would have been openly condemned by many countries, now some of the EU countries most affected by migration flows have an understanding of the need to act in a similar way. But the reaction of some actors, including individual EU structures such as the European Commission, suggests that it is too early to consider the German strategy promising for adoption at the pan-European level. For example, Poland understands that if Germany has enough resources to implement its strategy, then it has little chance of implementing such initiatives in conditions of having a common border with Ukraine and military operations on Ukrainian territory. Thirdly, the sub-regional level of the study showed that Germany is really trying to work with the migration problem in the most problematic regions, where the threat of uncontrolled migration comes from. Its strategic initiatives are aimed at solving internal migration problems. The main component of these initiatives is international relations with African government circles, which can limit the increase in border crossings by representatives of their countries. But this strategy has not yet brought the desired result due to the lack of control by the German government over the effectiveness of the allocation of resources allocated to improve people's lives. References
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